Survey Developments in Maryland Law, 1985-86 by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 5
Survey Developments in Maryland Law, 1985-86
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Survey Developments in Maryland Law, 1985-86, 46 Md. L. Rev. 533 (1987)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/5
SURVEY
Developments in Maryland Law, 1985-86
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw ................................. 541
A. Scope of Agency Power .............................. 541
1. Authorization .............. ................. 541
a. Consumer Protection Division ............. 541
b. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 544
c. Baltimore County Board of Appeals ....... 545
d. Police Trial Board ........................ 546
e. Public Service Commission ................ 547
2. Preem ption .................................. 549
3. Scope of Judicial Power ...................... 552
a. Comptroller of the Treasury .............. 552
b. State Board of Education ................. 553
c. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 554
d. Insurance Commission .................... 555
B. Arbitration ........................................ 556
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements ............ 556
2. Health Claims Arbitration .................... 559
C. Due Process .............. ................... 560
1. Tax Refund Interception Program ............ 561
2. Employment Discrimination .................. 565
D. Workers' Compensation ............................. 566
1. Fees ......................................... 567
2. Award Levels ................................ 568
3. Eligibility .................................... 569
4. Exclusivity Under the Act/Limitation on Other
Rem edies .................................... 569
a. Deliberate Intention Exception ............ 569
b. Relation to PIP and UM .................. 570
c. Employment Status under the Exclusive
Remedy Doctrine ......................... 570
E. Attorney Grievance Commission ...................... 574
1. N eglect ...................................... 575
2. Fees ......................................... 575
3. Moral Turpitude ............................. 577
a. Misappropriating Client Funds ............ 577
b. Tax Fraud ................................ 580
533
534 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 46:533
4. M itigation .................................... 581
F. Other Developments ................................. 583
1. Freedom of Information ...................... 583
2. Legislation ................................... 585
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE .................................... 586
A. Jurisdiction ........................................ 586
1. In Personam ................................. 586
2. Subject M atter ............................... 590
B. Final Judgments ................................... 590
1. Lower Court's Erroneous Determination ...... 590
2. Partial Summary Judgment ................... 595
3. Effect of Motion to Alter or Amend .......... 596
4. Consent Decrees ............................. 596
5. Consolidated Cases .......................... 597
6. Revision of Judgments ....................... 599
C. Statutes of Limitations .............................. 601
1. Discovery Rule ............................... 601
2. Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act ......... 602
3. Defense Raised in Motion to Dismiss ......... 603
D. Attorney's Fees .................................... 605
1. Decision to Award ............................ 605
2. Local Court Rules ............................ 608
E. Choice of Law ..................................... 609
F. Other Developments ................................. 611
1. Postjudgment Attachment Procedures ........ 611
2. Inadequate Record Extract ................... 614
3. Forfeiture .................................... 615
4. Justiciability .................................. 615
5. Determination of Employment Relationship... 616
6. Abuse of Discretion .......................... 617
7. Res Judicata .................................. 619
III. COMMERCIAL LAW .................................... 620
A. Debtors and Creditors ........................... 620
1. Role of Mortgage Agents ..................... 620
2. Correction of Default Prior to Institution of
Foreclosure Proceedings ..................... 621
3. Garageman's Lien as to Purchaser Without
N otice ....................................... 622
4. Liability of Cosignor of Installment Sales
C ontract ..................................... 623
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5. Voidable Preferences ......................... 624
6. Priority of Antecedent Perfected Security
Interest ...................................... 626
7. Acceptance of Late Payments as Waiver ...... 628
8. Conversion on Repossession ................. 630
9. Fraudulent Conveyances in Administration of
E states ....................................... 63 1
10. Subordination of Vendee's Lien Through
Consent Clause .............................. 631
B. Corporations and Associations ........................ 632
1. Termination Clause in Management Contract. 632
2. Beer Franchise Fair Dealing Act .............. 633
C. Insurance ......................................... 635
1. Method of Computing Period of
Incontestability ............................... 635
2. Distribution of Dividend to Former Mutual
Policyholders ................................. 637
3. Intended Damages Clauses ................... 639
4. Named Excluded Driver Provisions ........... 640
5. Uninsured Motorist Coverage ................ 641
D. Uniform Commercial Code-Measure of Damages for
Breach of Warranty of Title ......................... 642
E. Contracts-Failure of Condition ...................... 642
F. Banking .......................................... 643
1. Conversion of Capital Stock Savings and Loan
to Commercial Bank ......................... 643
2. Acquisition of Maryland Bank by Out-of-State
Holding Company ............................ 644
G. Consumer Protection-Automotive Repair Facilities Law
and Commercial Customers .......................... 644
IV. CONSTrrTrIONAL LAw ................................. 647
A. Maryland Constitutional Law ....................... 647
1. Equal Rights Amendment .................... 647
2. Power of Counties to Enact Ordinances ...... 651
3. Conflict Between County Charter and Public
General Law ................................. 653
B. Commerce Clause ................................... 655
C. Freedom of Speech-Public Employees ................. 657
D. Due Process ....................................... 660
E. Equal Protection ................................... 663
F. Right to Jury Trial ................................. 669
1987] 535
536 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 46:533
G. Preemption ........................................ 673
V . CRIMINAL LAW ........................................ 675
A. Constitutional Issues ................................ 675
1. Probable Cause .............................. 675
2. Double Jeopardy ............................. 675
3. Right to Counsel ............................. 678
4. M iranda ...................................... 683
5. Self-Incrimination ............................ 684
6. Right to Jury Trial ........................... 685
7. Right to Confrontation ....................... 689
8. Identification Evidence ....................... 689
9. Search and Seizure ........................... 691
10. Death Penalty ................................ 694
a. Allocution ................................ 694
b. "Death Qualified" Juries .................. 695
c. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors ........ 697
11. Speedy Trial ................................. 700
B . Crim es ............................................ 70 1
1. Elem ents ..................................... 701
a. Criminal Attempt ......................... 701
b. A ssault ................................... 701
c. G am bling ................................. 702
d. H om icide ................................. 703
e. Sexual Act ................................ 705
f. T heft ..................................... 705
2. Defenses-Entrapment ....................... 706
C. Procedure ......................................... 706
1. Indictm ents .................................. 706
2. D iscovery .................................... 707
3. Injunctions ................................... 708
4. Pretrial M otions .............................. 710
5. R ecusal ...................................... 711
6. Judicial Conduct ............................. 711
7. Illegal Sentence .............................. 712
D . Sentencing ........................................ 713
1. Accessory After the Fact ...................... 713
2. Restitution ................................... 714
3. Enhanced Punishment Statute ................ 715
4. Probation .................................... 720
536
1987] TABLE OF CONTENTS 537
V I. EVIDENCE ............................................ 722
A. Relevance ......................................... 722
B. Character and Reputation-Prior Bad Acts ............ 723
C. Hearsay .............................. ..... 726
1. Prior Recorded Testimony ................... 726
2. Business Records Exception .................. 728
3. Present Sense Impression Exception .......... 729
4. Excited Utterance Exception .................. 730
5. "Catch-All' Exception ........................ 731
D. Failure to Preserve Evidence; Spoliation ............... 732
E. Qualification of Expert Witness ...................... 733
F. Sequestration ...................................... 734
G. Testimonial Competence ............................. 734
H . Arguing Law ...................................... 735
VII. FAMILY LAW .......................................... 738
A. Monetary Award Under the Marital Property Act ....... 738
1. Three-Step Process: General Provisions of the
Marital Property Act .......................... 738
2. Determination of Marital Property ............ 741
a. Definition of "Property" .................. 741
b. Time Limit: The Ninety-Day Rule ........ 745
c. Separation Agreements and Marital
Property .................................. 746
3. Valuation of Marital Property ................. 748
B. Alimony .......................................... 750
C. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg ............................. 751
1. Monetary Award ............................. 752
a. Inclusion of Loans and Cash Advances .... 752
b. Valuation of Pension Plans and Retirement
A ccounts ................................. 753
c. Trust Interest-Nonmarital Assets ......... 756
d. Determining the Monetary Award ......... 757
e. Computation of the Monetary Award ...... 761
2. The Cross-Appeal ............................ 761
3. Alim ony ...................................... 762
a. Indefinite Alimony ........................ 762
b. Amount of the Award ..................... 762
4. Fees and Costs ............................... 763
D. Child Support ..................................... 765
1. Scope of Parental Duty ....................... 765
2. Support Agreements ......................... 765
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
3. Enforcement of Support Obligations ..........
E. Custody and Visitation ..............................
1. C ustody ......................................
2. V isitation ....................................
F. A doption ..........................................
G. Enforceability of Private Agreements ..................
1. Agreement Not to Litigate ....................
2. Unconscionability ............................
H. Other Developments ................................
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ...................
2. Infants ...............................
3. R estitution ...................................
VIII. H EALTH CARE ........................................
A. Cost Containment-Certificates of Need ................
B. Medical Malpractice-Arbitration ....................
1. Procedure ....................................
2. Joint Tortfeasor Releases .....................
C. Legislative Developments ............................
1. Cost Containment ............................
2. Medical Malpractice-Arbitration .............
3. Health Insurance-Policies-Nonduplication
Provisions ....................................
4. Developmental Disabilities Administration ....
IX . PROPERTY ............................................
A. Zoning and Planning ...............................
1. Zoning Board of Appeals .....................
2. Procedure-De Novo Hearings of Zoning
A ppeals ......................................
3. M aster Plans .................................
B . Takings ..........................................
1. Standard .....................................
2. Landowner's Testimony ......................
C. Property Rights ....................................
1. Adverse Possession ...........................
2. A ccretion ....................................
3. Antenuptial Contracts ........................
D. Landlord- Tenant ..................................
1. Security Deposits-Treble Damages ..........
2. Sm oke Detectors .............................









































1987] TABLE OF CONTENTS 539
1. W ills ......................................... 8 13
2. Appeal by Personal Representative ........... 815
F. Security Interests .................................. 816
1. Foreclosure Sale Price ........................ 816
2. M echanics' Liens ............................. 817
G. Power of Attorney .................................. 818
H. The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission ....... 820
I. In Rem Actions .................................... 821
J. Legislation-Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas ............ 821
X . TAXATION ............................................ 824
A. Income Tax ....................................... 824
1. Domestic International Sales Corporations .... 824
2. Valuation of Mineral Leases .................. 825
B. Interest on Refunds ................................. 827
C. M aryland Tax Court ............................... 829
1. Statute of Limitations ........................ 829
2. Exhaustion of Remedies ...................... 831
D. Personal Property Tax .............................. 831
E. Real Estate Taxes .................................. 833
1. Property Tax Exemption ..................... 833
2. Transfer Tax ................................. 834
F. Use and Retail Sales Tax ........................... 836
X I. T ORTS ............................................... 838
A. Abuse of Process ................................... 838
B. Damages .......................................... 839
1. C ap .......................................... 839
2. Punitive Damages ............................ 841
C. Infliction of Emotional Distress ....................... 842
1. Intentional ................................... 842
2. N egligent .................................... 844
3. Dam ages ..................................... 845
D. Invasion of Privacy ................................ 845
E. M alpractice ....................................... 847
1. A ttorney ..................................... 847
2. M edical ...................................... 849
a. Statute of Limitations ..................... 849
b. Burden of Proof .......................... 853
F. Negligence ......................................... 854
1. D uty ......................................... 854
2. Contributory Negligence ..................... 858
539
540 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 46:533
G. Negligent Hiring ................................... 859
H. Negligent Misrepresentation ......................... 862
I. Privilege and Immunity ............................. 863
1. Im m unity .................................... 863
2. Privilege ..................................... 867
J. Products Liability .................................. 870
K Statutes of Limitations .............................. 877
1. G enerally .................................... 877
2. Latent Diseases .............................. 878
L. Workers' Compensation ............................. 881
1. Exclusive Remedy ............................ 881
2. W rongful Discharge .......................... 884
TABLE OF CASES ............................................. 901
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Scope of Agency Power
An administrative agency is "[a] governmental body charged
with administering and implementing particular legislation."' The
agency's power is derivative; a governmental body cannot authorize
an agency to perform any function that, constitutionally or by char-
ter, it could not perform itself.2 The enabling legislation sets forth,
in general terms, an agency's powers. The agency then promulgates
more specific rules and regulations. Furthermore, a state agency's
power may be expressly or impliedly preempted by federal action in
the same area.3 Thus, the scope of proper administrative power
may involve complex matters of constitutional, statutory, or regula-
tory interpretation.
1. Authorization.-a. Consumer Protection Division.-In Consumer
Protection Division Office of the Attorney General v. Consumer Publishing Co.4
the Court of Appeals addressed a broad array of issues involving the
scope of enforcement powers held by the Consumer Protection Di-
vision Office of the Maryland Attorney General (Division). The
Consumer Publishing Company, Inc.5 (company), which sold diet
pills through the mails, appealed from the Division's cease and de-
sist order directed at the company's allegedly false and deceptive
advertisements.6 The circuit court vacated the Division's order and
substituted a new order, allowing the Division to enforce terms of
an agreement between the company and the United States Postal
Service.7
In 1938, in Board of Zoning Appeals v. McKinney,8 the Court of
Appeals had held that certain administrative agencies acting in a
nonadversarial, quasi-judicial capacity cannot appeal the reversal of
their decisions by a circuit court, unless granted that power by statu-
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (5th ed. 1979).
2. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.6 (2d ed. 1984).
3. Id. at § 1.12.
4. 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48 (1985).
5. The Consumer Publishing Company, Inc. was incorporated in Ohio. Id. at 737,
501 A.2d at 51.
6. Id. at 737-38, 739-40, 501 A.2d at 52, 53. The company claimed that the diet
pills promoted permanent weight loss. Two physicians disputed this contention at the
administrative hearing. Id. at 738, 501 A.2d at 52.
7. Id. at 740-41, 501 A.2d at 53. The terms of this agreement were not detailed.
8. 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938).
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tory allowance.9 Despite this, the Court of Appeals preliminarily de-
termined that the Division had the authority to seek review of circuit
court decisions. Because the Division's participation in litigation is
essential to its role as protector of consumer and State interests,'
0
and because its regulations give the Division a civil prosecutorial
role in Division-initiated cases," the Court of Appeals held that the
McKinney doctrine did not preclude the Division's powers to seek
appellate review.'"
The Court of Appeals then held that the circuit court's substitu-
tion of the company/Postal Service agreement for the Division's fi-
nal order constituted an invalid usurpation of the Division's
determination." The court found that the replacement of the
agency's order with an entirely distinct order exceeded the circuit
court's modification powers.' 4
The Court of Appeals also articulated its views on a number of
other consumer protection enforcement issues, in response to the
company's plea to uphold the circuit court's reversal of the Divi-
sion's decision. First, the court found no violation of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause in the Division's failure to
proceed against any other company that similarly marketed the
same goods. The court held that even if there had been such market
activity, conscious selectivity is not a per se constitutional violation;
9. Id. at 562-64, 199 A. at 545-46.
10. The court reasoned that since the Attorney General is a constitutional officer
whose duties include prosecuting and defending cases on behalf of the State in order to
promote the State's policies and protect its rights, the Division, as a part of the Attorney
General's Office, is charged with the same mandate. 304 Md. at 744-45, 501 A.2d at 55.
11. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 01.02.14(B) (1986) provides that when the Division it-
self initiates an investigation, the Division is the party proponent. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2,
§ 01.02.14(C) (1986) further provides that the party proponent has the obligation of
demonstrating probable cause that a violation of the consumer protection laws has
occurred.
12. 304 Md. at 746, 501 A.2d at 56. The Court of Appeals quoted from the follow-
ing exception to the McKinney rule:
There are administrative boards and agencies, such as the State Tax Commis-
sion and the Public Service Commission, the functions of which are so identi-
fied with the execution of some definite public policy as the representative of
the State, that their participation in litigation affecting their decisions is re-
garded by the Legislature as essential to the adequate protection of the State's
interests.
McKinney, 174 Md. at 561, 199 A. at 545.
13. 304 Md. at 747, 501 A.2d at 56-57.
14. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-215(g)(3) (1984) gives circuit courts the power
to "modify" an agency's decision. The Court of Appeals stated, however, that "the au-
thority to 'modify' cannot be stretched to include replacing the agency's order with an
entirely distinct one based on an agreement between the company and the Federal Gov-
ernment." 304 Md. at 747, 501 A.2d at 56.
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rather, the company must prove that the Division deliberately based
its selective enforcement on an unjustifiable standard or arbitrary
classification.' 5 Second, the court found no merit in the company's
claim that since the allegedly deceptive advertising practices were
industry-wide practices, the Division made policy and should there-
fore have proceeded by rulemaking.' 6 Even if the company had
proved an industry-wide practice, the court found no change in ex-
isting law that required a rulemaking proceeding.' 7 Finally, citing
statutory authority and policy considerations, the court held that the
Division had the authority to hold cease and desist order hearings in
the absence of consumer complaints.'"
In response to the company's claim that collective procedural
irregularities imposed by the Division constituted a violation of due
process,' 9 the Court of Appeals further elucidated the guidelines
and limits of consumer protection proceedings. The court ap-
proved the Attorney General's issuance of a press release announc-
ing the charges against the company and the scheduling of hearings:
timely public notification was necessary to prevent further gain from
the unfair or deceptive practices. 20 The press release may have
demonstrated some prejudgment by the Attorney General, but only
if the case's decisionmaker issued the actual prejudicial press release
would there have been a possible due process violation. 2' In addi-
tion, the court held that the conciliation provision of the Consumer
Protection Act,22 requiring the Division to attempt to conciliate
cases if it believes a violation has occurred, did not apply to the in-
stant case, because the Division had itself initiated the complaint.23
15. 304 Md. at 751, 501 A.2d at 59; see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). In
re Laurence T., 285 Md. 621, 628, 403 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1979).
16. 304 Md. at 753, 756, 501 A.2d at 59-60, 61.
17. Id. at 756, 501 A.2d at 61.
18. Id. at 759, 501 A.2d at 63. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-403(c)(1) (1983)
states that the Division may file an action in court to preserve the status quo "at any time
after a complaint has been filed." The court found that the term "complaint" reason-
ably encompassed both a consumer complaint and a complaint filed by the Division it-
self. 304 Md. at 758, 501 A.2d at 62.
19. 304 Md. at 761, 501 A.2d at 64.
20. Id. at 764-65, 501 A.2d at 65-66.
21. Id. at 765-66, 501 A.2d at 66. In this case the court found no evidence that the
Attorney General's press release revealed a prejudgment of facts. The court also
pointed out that the Attorney General was not the actual decisionmaker in this case, and
that there was no evidence that the hearing officer or the Chief of the Division was in any
way pressured by the Attorney General or anyone else prosecuting the case. Id. at 766,
501 A.2d at 66.
22. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-402(a)(l)-(2) (1983).
23. 304 Md. at 768, 501 A.2d at 67.
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Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the Division's power to
enter a general order of restitution without direct proof of pur-
chaser reliance;2 4 however, it vacated the restitution provision in the
instant case because the Division's order did not provide a proce-
dure for processing individual consumer claims.25 In support of its
determination, the court pointed out that some of those purchasing
the company's products may not have relied on the false advertise-
ment claims, that some of these consumers may not want refunds,
and that other jurisdictions had adopted similar requirements for
individual determination of consumer restitution claims.2 6
b. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.-In American Recovery
Co. v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene2 7 the Court of Appeals
articulated the basis of civil penalties, for a violation of the State's
hazardous waste laws, under certain statutory provisions 28 subse-
quently amended 29 and codified as amended. 0 The Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) issued four civil penalty as-
sessments against American Recovery Company, Inc. (ARC) in
1982, alleging violations under former section 8-1416(d) of the Nat-
ural Resources Article."' In response to ARC's contention that the
statute required a showing of actual pollution before imposition of a
civil penalty, the court stated that the assessment is based upon the
violation itself, not upon the harm caused by the violation. 2 The
court relied on the statute's policy objective of pollution prevention
in holding that the Department need not wait until environmental
effects can be proven.
24. The court noted the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of reliance on decep-
tive or misleading advertisements. Id. at 778, 781, 501 A.2d at 72, 74. In the instant
case there was no direct evidence of consumer reliance, but the Division had determined
that the company advertised in Maryland at the time sales were made, the pills were only
available through mail order, and the company never contended that Maryland consum-
ers purchased pills in any other way than from the advertisements in evidence. Id. at
780, 501 A.2d at 73-74.
25. Id. at 775, 501 A.2d at 71.
26. Id. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74. The cases from other jurisdictions cited were State ex
rel. Guste v. General Motors Corp., 354 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App.), aff'd, 370 So. 2d 477
(La. 1978); State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116
(1980); and State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553
P.2d 423 (1976).
27. 306 Md. 12, 506 A.2d 1171 (1986).
28. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1416(d) (1974 & Supp. 1981).
29. 1983 Md. Laws 630.
30. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-266(b)(2)(ii)(5) (Supp. 1986).
31. 306 Md. at 15, 506 A.2d at 1172.
32. Id. at 18, 506 A.2d at 1174.
33. Id. at 18-19, 506 A.2d at 1174.
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Consistent with this policy objective, the state legislature in
1983 amended the controlling statute, providing for "potential for
harm" as a consideration in the DHMH's penalty assessment deter-
mination.3 4 The Court of Appeals held that this standard, although
not expressly stated in the former statute, has always been implicit
in the DHMH's power to assess fines for any statutory violations that
by their nature pose potential environmental harm.35 Citing a con-
sistent line of cases holding that a subsequent amendment of a stat-
ute is not controlling as to the meaning of the prior law,3 6 the court
rejected ARC's contention that the statutory amendment, adding
"potential harm" as a criterion, precluded DHMH's consideration
of such a provision in its interpretation of the pre-amendment civil
penalty statute. 7
ARC claimed that because DHMH's Assistant Secretary for En-
vironmental Programs, the hearing officer in the ARC case, ap-
peared as a witness before a congressional subcommittee 38 and
testified on the case prior to the final hearing before DHMH, ARC
was denied an impartial decisionmaker in the administrative pro-
ceedings.3 9 The Court of Appeals disagreed. The testimony did
not amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the case: the official
did nothing more than recite the facts that supported the institution
of a civil penalty proceeding.40
c. Baltimore County Board of Appeals.-In Baltimore County v.
Penn 4 1 the Court of Special Appeals held that the Baltimore County
Board of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning per-
sonnel and retirement matters.42 After the Board of Appeals au-
thorized accidental disability retirement for two Baltimore County
policemen, Baltimore County alleged that its own charter did not
define personnel and retirement matters as falling within the juris-
34. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 99, 1983 Md. Laws 630 (codified at MD. HEALTH-ENVTL.
CODE ANN. § 7-266(b)(2)(ii)(5) (Supp. 1986)).
35. 306 Md. at 18, 506 A.2d at 1174.
36. See Collier v. Connolley, 285 Md. 123, 125-26, 400 A.2d 1107, 1108 (1979); Di-
rector of Finance v. Myers, 232 Md. 213, 218, 192 A.2d 278, 280 (1963); A.G.
Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 369, 177 A.2d 252, 255 (1962).
37. 306 Md. at 18, 506 A.2d at 1174.
38. See id. at 24, 506 A.2d at 1117 (quoting Implementation of Federal Hazardous Waste
Legislation in Maryland: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982) (statement of
William Eichbaum, Ass't Secretary, DHMH)).
39. Id. at 20-21, 24-25, 506 A.2d at 1175, 1177.
40. Id. at 25, 506 A.2d at 1177.
41. 66 Md. App. 199, 503 A.2d 257, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986).
42. Id. at 206, 503 A.2d at 260.
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dictional powers of the Board of Appeals.4 3 The court held that the
Board of Appeals' power over "all other adjudicatory orders ' 44 fur-
nished proper jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the proceeding be-
low constituted a contested case involving the presence of counsel
for both sides, the review of evidence, and a determination on a
matter of statutory entitlement.45
d. Police Trial Board.-In Walker v. Lindsey46 an Anne Arundel
County police officer sought to enjoin further investigation by the
Anne Arundel County Police Department and the Police Trial
Board into charges of excessive force in his arrest of a minor.4 7 The
officer contended that because the complaint against him was signed
by the aggrieved minor, the Board lacked jurisdiction pursuant to
the applicable Maryland criminal statute.48
The statute limits the class of claimants eligible to file an action
against police officers for brutality to: (1) the aggrieved person, (2)
a member of the aggrieved person's immediate family, (3) any per-
son with firsthand knowledge obtained as a result of the presence at
and observation of the alleged incident, or (4) the parent or guard-
ian in the case of a minor child. 49 The police officer first argued that
the fourth category, when read in conjunction with the first, meant
that if the aggrieved person was a minor, the complaint must be
signed by a parent or guardian.
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed and held that minors
themselves are included in the class of those able to file complaints
of brutality. First, the court reasoned that the word "or" carries its
customary disjunctive meaning, as opposed to its conjunctive mean-
ing.5 0 Since the minor in this case was the "aggrieved person," he
43. Id. at 205, 503 A.2d at 260.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(u)(4) (1981) authorizes the county board of appeals
to hear and decide "the issuance... of any adjudicatory order .... " Section 602(d) of
the Baltimore County Charter provides: "The county board of appeals shall hear and
decide appeals from all other administrative and adjudicatory orders as may from time
to time be provided by Article 25A of the Annotated Code of Maryland . BALTI-
MORE COUNTv, MD., CHARTER § 602(d) (1978).
45. 66 Md. App. at 205-06, 503 A.2d at 260. The court viewed an adjudicatory order
as "one that decides what the Administrative Procedure Act defines as a 'contested
case'-an agency proceeding that involves 'a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privi-
lege of a person .... "' Id. at 205, 503 A.2d at 260 (citing and quoting MD. STATE GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 10-201(c)(1) (1984)).
46. 65 Md. App. 402, 500 A.2d 1061 (1985).
47. Id. at 403, 500 A.2d at 1062.
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(4) (1982).
49. Id.
50. 65 Md. App. at 407, 500 A.2d at 1064.
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could swear to a complaint of brutality.
The court rejected the argument that the use of "or" in its dis-
junctive sense would render the fourth category of eligible com-
plainants superfluous in light of the second category. 5' A person
may be a member of the aggrieved person's immediate family and
not a parent or guardian.52
Additionally, the court interpreted the legislative history of the
statute to indicate an intent not to exclude the possibility of minors
filing complaints, but to enable a parent or guardian to file a com-
plaint in cases in which the minor is unable to do so. 53 The legisla-
tive purpose behind subsequently expanding the class of eligible
claimants to include "a member of the aggrieved person's immedi-
ate family" was to "cover all possibilities-broadly, expansively, and
with anticipated overlapping."
5 4
e. Public Service Commission.-In Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v.
Public Service Commission55 the Court of Appeals upheld the adjudica-
tory powers of the Maryland Public Service Commission (Commis-
sion) by allowing the Commission in a utility rate determi-
nation case to apply a 1978 statutory interpretation that had evolved
over a four-year period by way of further development and refine-
ment in subsequent contested proceedings.56 In construing section
54F of the Public Service Commission Law,5 7 which governs the
Commission in fuel rate adjustment 58 proceedings, the Commission
51. Id. at 407-08, 500 A.2d at 1064. Walker, the police officer, cited Police Comm'r
of Baltimore City v. Downling, 281 Md. 412, 379 A.2d 1007 (1977), in which the court
remarked that: "Absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possi-
ble, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage,
superfluous, meaningless or nugatory .... " 281 Md. at 419, 379 A.2d at 1011.
52. 65 Md. App. at 408, 500 A.2d at 1064. Spouses, sons, daughters, siblings,
grandparents, and grandchildren, for instance, are all members of the immediate family,
yet are not parents or guardians.
53. Id. at 409, 500 A.2d at 1065. The General Assembly initially created the "parent
or guardian" category to provide "an avenue of complaint for an incapacitated minor,
an infant of tender years, or a minor of intermediate age who might be either somehow
incompetent or too intimidated to file a complaint directly." Id.
54. Id. To interpret the statute as Walker suggested would lead to absurd results,
the court noted. For instance, the 17-year-old mother who, along with her child, had
been brutalized by a police officer could file a complaint on her child's behalf, but not on
her own. The possibility of such a result and others like it were clearly not intended by
the General Assembly in enacting this statute. Id. at 409-10, 500 A.2d at 1065.
55. 305 Md. 145, 501 A.2d 1307 (1986).
56. Id. at 165, 501 A.2d at 1317.
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54F (1980 & Supp. 1986).
58. Formerly, changes in a utility company's expenses, including its fuel costs, were
reviewed by the Commission as part of a lengthy base rate proceeding. To alleviate the
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held in 1978 that its assessment of the validity of fuel rate adjust-
ments would include consideration of relevant industry statistics as
well as evidence concerning specific outages and other incidents of
reduced generation at a utility company's plants.5 9 In the original
Commission proceedings in which the statute was implemented, the
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) applied for a Com-
mission determination that the company had maintained the pro-
ductive capacity of all its generating plants at a reasonable level, in
compliance with section 54F(f)(4).6 ° The Commission based its ap-
proval of BG&E's application in part upon evidence that "the availa-
bility of the company's generating units is well above industry
averages." 6 1
The instant case arose when the Commission denied BG&E re-
covery of increased fuel costs incurred as a result of forced outages
at one of its nuclear generating units.6 The Commission assessed
the potential for avoiding increased costs by examining the individ-
ual performance of the plant experiencing the outage, as reasona-
bleness of performance could not be based solely on satisfactory
performance levels of the power production system as a whole, or
on the basis of statistical comparison with the industry. 6 The Com-
mission acknowledged that the performance of BG&E's nuclear fa-
cility far exceeded the industry average; 64 however, the Commission
denied full recovery of the purchased power costs because BG&E
had failed to implement cost-effective procedures that might have
prevented such an outage at its nuclear facility.65
The Court of Appeals found no merit in BG&E's contention
that the Commission's interpretation represented a significant de-
substantial regulatory lag between the time that changes in costs were incurred by the
utility and the time those costs were reflected in customer rates, the General Assembly
established a sliding scale for the automatic adjustment of changes. Fuel rate adjust-
ment plans adopted by BG&E and other major Maryland utilities permitted a company
to adjust its rates automatically, subject to later Commission approval, to reflect changes
in fuel costs. Id. at 150-51, 501 A.2d at 1309-10; MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54F (1980).
59. 305 Md. at 163, 501 A.2d at 1316.
60. Id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54F(O(4) (1980).
61. 305 Md. at 163, 501 A.2d at 1316.
62. Id. at 153, 501 A.2d at 1310-11. The forced outages occurred at the company's
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in 1980 and 1981. The total cost of purchased power
resulting from this forced outage was $6.327 million.
63. Id. at 164, 501 A.2d at 1316. This standard, applied by the Commission, fol-
lowed the standard applied in proceedings involving similar fuel rate adjustment dis-
putes before the instant case, but after the original 1978 statutory interpretation.
64. Id. at 163, 501 A.2d at 1316.
65. Id. at 172, 501 A.2d at 1321. The court upheld the Commission's finding that
BG&E was entitled to recover only 25% of its purchased fuel costs from its customers.
[VOL. 46:541
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
parture from the 1978 standard; rather, the Commission's initial in-
terpretation had developed and grown in a manner not inconsistent
with the language and purpose of the statute.66 Accordingly, the
court denied BG&E's contention that the standards imposed consti-
tuted an illegal promulgation of rules. It would be "patently unrea-
sonable," the court held, to conclude that the mere explanation of
the standards through which an agency applies a statute in a con-
tested proceeding gave rise to a promulgation of rules, subject to
the notice requirements of Title 7 of the State Government Arti-
cle.67 Furthermore, the court upheld the Commission's decision to
proceed in this case by way of adjudication, citing the well-settled
principle of administrative law that requires deference to the in-
formed discretion of the administrative agency in its choice between
proceeding by rulemaking or by adjudication.68
The court also considered, as a preliminary matter, the viability
of these final orders, which the Commission issued long after the
statutory time limit had run.69 Citing relevant parts of the Public
Service Commission Law that provide rehearing and modification
powers over original orders,7 ° the court upheld the final orders
handed down after the deadline.7 ' In so doing, the court relied on
the notion that the time limits contained within an integrated statu-
tory scheme must be understood in that context and harmonized to
the extent possible with the other provisions of the statutory
scheme.72
2. Preemption.-Section 220 of the Communications Act grants
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) power to regu-
66. Id. at 165, 501 A.2d at 1317.
67. Id. at 167, 501 A.2d at 1318; MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 7-201 to -222
(1984).
68. 305 Md. at 168, 501 A.2d at 1319.
69. Id. at 156, 501 A.2d at 1312. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54F(c) (1980) required
the Commission to issue its final order within 90 days of the filing of an application. The
statute also divested the Commission of jurisdiction after 90 days, thereby rendering
further Commission action ineffectual. While the Commission issued orders in each of
the disputed cases within 90 days, subsequent final orders on the three proceedings at
issue were issued 630 days, 266 days, and 294 days after BG&E's filing of application.
305 Md. at 154, 155, 501 A.2d at 1311, 1312. Effective July 1, 1983, the time limit was
extended to 120 days. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54F (Supp. 1986).
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 86(d) (1980) provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he Com-
mission shall have the authority, on its own motion, to rehear any final order .. " MD.
ANN. CODE art. 78, § 86(c) (1980) provides, in pertinent part: -[T]he Commission may
abrogate, change, or modify its original order."




late "depreciation rates.""3 The FCC Preemption Order enunciated
the FCC's position that section 220 preempts all state regulation of
depreciation rates.7 4 The case of Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
v. Public Service Commission75 presented the question whether section
220, coupled with the FCC Preemption Order, preempted Mary-
land's authority to establish depreciation rates for intrastate
service.
7 6
The District Court for the District of Maryland granted the
plaintiff, Chesapeake & Potomac (C&P), a preliminary injunction
compelling the defendant, the Public Service Commission (PSC), to
apply the FCC's prescribed depreciation rates in calculating intra-
state charges for telephone services.7 7 The court considered several
factors, including: (1) the likelihood of C&P's success on the merits
of its case; and (2) the public's interest in the injunction. 78
Citing the Fourth Circuit's approval of Chief Justice (then
Judge) Burger's statement that the Communications Act "must be
construed in light of the needs for comprehensive regulations and
the practical difficulties inhering in the state regulation of parts of
an organic whole," 79 the district court held that C&P's chances of
eventually forcing PSC to apply the FCC's depreciation rates were
good.8 0 The court also held that a uniform regulatory policy is in
the public's best interest.8 ' For this proposition, the court found
support in the congressional mandate contained in section 151 of
the Communications Act "to make available ... to all the people of
the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide...
communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable
73. 47 U.S.C. § 220 (1982).
74. Uniform System of Accounts, CC Docket No. 79-105, FCC 82-581 (1983).
75. 560 F. Supp. 844 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated, 106
S. Ct. 2239 (1986).
76. 560 F. Supp. at 845.
77. Id. at 849.
78. Id. at 847. In considering the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction, the
court used the standard established in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Selig Mfg. Co., 550
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). According to Blackwelder, courts should consider (1) the likeli-
hood of irreparable harm to the party seeking the injunction; (2) the likelihood that
other parties will be irreparably harmed if an injunction is issued; (3) the injunction
seeker's likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Both the district
court and the Fourth Circuit held that each of these factors militated in favor of an
injunction.
79. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 795-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1027 (1976) (quoting General Tel. Co. of California v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390,
398 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J.)).





Citing similar cases from other jurisdictions, 3 the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's finding that C&P was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits.8 4 The court also upheld the lower court's
holding that the public interest as embodied in section 151 of the
Communications Act demanded a centralized regulatory author-
ity. 5 Since the FCC's Preemption Order sought to achieve this
goal, the Order similarly served the public interest.
86
Upon review the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
proceedings consistent with its recent holding in Louisiana Public Ser-
vice Commission v. FCC.8 7 In Louisiana Public Service Commission the
Court directly confronted the issue of whether section 220 of the
Communications Act confers upon the FCC exclusive regulatory
power over depreciation rates, intrastate or otherwise.88 The Court
observed that Congress created the FCC to centralize regulatory
power over communications and to accomplish the broad ends man-
dated by section 151 of the Communications Act; however, the
Court held that section 152(b) of the same Act limits the FCC's
power, enabling it to regulate only interstate depreciation prac-
tices.89 Section 152(b) states: "[N]othing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with re-
spect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities or
regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication ser-
vice .... "90
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that since section
220 expressly grants the FCC the power to prescribe depreciation
rates, state depreciation regulations are automatically preempted.
The section's meaning is not "so unambiguous or straightforward as
to override the command of § 152(b) that 'nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction'
over intrastate service." 91
82. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
83. E.g., South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 570 F. Supp. 227
(M.D. La. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1984); Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Wash-
ington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 565 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
84. 748 F.2d 879, 883 (4th Cir. 1984).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1899 (1986).
88. Id. at 1893.
89. Id. at 1899.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
91. 106 S. Ct. at 1903. The Court also noted that the principle of statutory construc-
tion preferring specific terms over general did not apply in this case. Section 152(b)
19871
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Construing sections 151 and 152(b) so as to avoid conflict, the
Court also held that Congress intended a dual regulatory system to
achieve the national goal of a quick and economical phone system.92
Thus, state regulation is not inconsistent with a national policy.
Two of the Fourth Circuit's findings necessarily fall in the wake
of Louisiana Public Service Commission. On remand, the court will be
forced to conclude that C&P's likelihood of success on the merits is
nil, and that the public's interest lies in a system of dual regulatory
power, rather than a completely centralized regulatory authority. 93
3. Scope ofludicial Power.-Related to the issue of agency power
is the issue of a court's power to review or modify administrative
action. An administrative scheme should provide for some type of
judicial review.94 But a party generally must comply with all admin-
istrative procedures before getting into court.95 The following
cases concern a court's jurisdiction to hear an administrative
dispute.
a. Comptroller of the Treasury.-In Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Brand Iron, Inc. 96 the Maryland Tax Court had remanded to the
Comptroller a taxpayer's appeal. 97 The Court of Special Appeals
reversed and dismissed the appeal because the taxpayer had failed
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court by exhausting all reme-
addresses jurisdiction, and § 220 specifically deals with depreciation. While it is true
that § 220 is more "specific" than § 152(b), "the sections are not general or specific with
respect to each other." Id. at 1902 n.5. Also, § 152(b) dictates how the entire statute
should be read, including § 220, by stating that "nothing in the Act shall be construed to
extend FCC jurisdiction to intrastate service." 106 S. Ct. at 1902-03 n.5.
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1899.
93. The issue then becomes whether a preliminary injunction is proper if it is neither
supported by a likelihood of success on the merits nor in the public interest. In West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir.
1971), the court addressed the import of the "likelihood of success" factor:
While we express no opinion on the merits of the issues, we can say that their
resolution is not immediately apparent. That is enough to say that Conser-
vancy has not embarked on frivolous litigation, and thus interlocutory relief is
not improper if Conservancy can also show a need for protection which out-
weighs any probable injury to the defendant.
Thus, the court implied that there must be at least some question as to whether the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits. If the plaintiff will certainly lose on the merits, a
preliminary injunction should not be granted-especially if the injunction is not in the
public's interest.
94. Board of Educ. of Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786, 506 A.2d 625,
631 (1986).
95. See id. at 787, 506 A.2d at 631.
96. 65 Md. App. 207, 499 A.2d 1325 (1985).
97. Id. at 209, 499 A.2d at 1325.
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dies before the Comptroller.98 The appellate court held that the
taxpayer's failure to appear before the Comptroller in an informal
hearing, to explain this absence in writing as requested by the
Comptroller, and to appear before a subsequently scheduled formal
hearing rendered the Comptroller's conclusion final and correct. 99
The court's reasoning rested on the legislative policy that the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies before the Comptroller affords
expert and potentially final pre-judicial determination of tax issues
as well as a shield for the courts from the complexity and volume of
such cases.' 00 Fully exploring the administrative process is a condi-
tion precedent to Tax Court jurisdiction.' The Court of Special
Appeals therefore held that the Tax Court lacked any authority be-
yond dismissing the taxpayer's appeal, leaving the taxpayer with no
other recourse.10 2
b. State Board of Education.-The Court of Appeals in Board of
Education of Dorchester County v. Hubbard'0" held that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the issues of teachers' certifica-
tions and kindergarten class sizes were arbitrable, since such a deci-
sion involves an interpretation of the Education Article of the
Maryland Code.' 04 The General Assembly expressly limited such
interpretive power to the State Board of Education.' 05
The court wrote that:
98. Id. at 212, 499 A.2d at 1327. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 230 (1980) provides that
an appeal to the Maryland Tax Court will be permitted only if a taxpayer "has exhausted
his remedies before the appropriate assessing or taxing authority ......
The case stemmed from an assessment levied by the Comptroller for unpaid sales
or use taxes due against Brand Iron, Inc. Before the Court of Special Appeals, the
Comptroller of the Treasury, Retail Sales Division, challenged a circuit court order re-
manding this case to the Maryland Tax Court. The Comptroller asserted that this action
merely compounded the Tax Court's error in not dismissing Brand Iron's appeal to the
Tax Court. For, the Comptroller contended, Brand Iron failed to exhaust the pre-
scribed remedies for a taxpayer seeking revision of a retail sales or use tax assessment.
65 Md. App. at 209, 499 A.2d at 1325-26.
99. 65 Md. App. at 209-10, 499 A.2d at 1326.
100. Id. at 211, 212, 499 A.2d at 1327; see Boyd v. Supervisor of Assessments, 57 Md.
App. 603, 606, 607, 471 A.2d 749, 750, 751 (1984).
101. 65 Md. App at 211-12, 499 A.2d at 1327.
102. Id. at 212, 499 A.2d at 1327.
103. 305 Md. 774, 506 A.2d 625 (1986).
104. Id. at 792, 506 A.2d at 634. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 6-401 to 6-514 (1985)
authorizes collective bargaining between public schools and public school employees.
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 6-402(a), 6-408(b) (1985) limit the union's authority and the
school's authority to "all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working
conditions."
105. 305 Md. at 788, 789, 506 A.2d at 632. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(e) (1985)
delegates to the State Board of Education the power to interpret the Education Article.
1987] 553
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[w]hen the Legislature enacts a comprehensive remedial
scheme in which a claim is to be determined by an adminis-
trative agency ... it establishes, as public policy, that such a
procedure produces the most efficient and effective result.
In order to effectuate this public policy, trial courts gener-
ally should not act until there has been compliance with the
statutory comprehensive remedial scheme.' 0 6
In so holding, the court recognized the Board of Education's pri-
mary jurisdiction and therefore reversed and remanded the case.10 7
c. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.-In Browning-Ferris,
Inc. v. Baltimore County 108 the owner and operator of a sanitary land-
fill, Browning-Ferris, Inc. (BFI), applied for and was denied a re-
newal of its landfill permit by the Maryland Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene (DHMH).' °9 BFI challenged the denial in fed-
eral court, alleging that DHMH acted in accord with "improper
political or personal motives."" t0 The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland dismissed BFI's claim without prejudice
under the doctrine of Burford v. Sun Oil Co."
In Burford the United States Supreme Court held that federal
courts should not interfere with a "complex state regulatory scheme
concerning important matters of state policy for which impartial and
fair administrative determinations subject to expeditious and ade-
quate judicial review are afforded." ' 1 2 The underlying concerns of
the Burford doctrine are federalism and the preservation of a state's
independence in circumstances in which the state is particularly
well-suited to resolve complex problems of domestic policy, '3
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. 4-205(c) (1985) requires that appeals from decisions construing
the Education Article be taken to the State Board of Education.
106. 305 Md. at 787, 506 A.2d at 631 (citing Secretary, Dep't of Human Resources v.
Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d 713, 717 (1979)).
107. Id. at 792, 506 A.2d at 634.
108. 774 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 78.
110. Id. at 77. In an agreement between BFI, the State of Maryland, and Baltimore
County, BFI was granted a landfill operation permit. The State contended that the per-
mit's renewal was conditioned upon the execution of a contract of sale of BFI's landfill
property. Because BFI did not execute this contract, it lost its right to renewal of the
permit. BFI claimed, however, that the land title transfer was to occur either when the
landfill reached its capacity or four years from the date of the execution of the agree-
ment. Since neither had come to pass, BFI alleged that it had not breached the contract
and was therefore entitled to a renewal of its permit. Id. at 78.
111. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
112. Aluminum Co. v. Utilities Comm'n of N. Carolina, 713 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1052 (1984) quoted in Browning-Ferris, 774 F.2d at 79.
113. 319 U.S. at 318.
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Applying Burford, the district court abstained from the matter
because: (1) Maryland's statutes concerning the operation of land-
fills indicate a policy to closely oversee such operations; (2) the reg-
ulations governing permit approval involve complex scientific
questions; and (3) landfill issues have been of particular concern to
state and local governments, rather than the federal government." 4
The district court decision effectively upheld the permit denial.
d. Insurance Commission.-In Insurance Service Management, Inc. v.
Muhl "5 the Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court's
power to modify and then to affirm as modified an order of the In-
surance Commissioner. "6 The Court of Special Appeals construed
the controlling statutory provision, section 40(5) of the Insurance
Code," 7 as giving the circuit court the option to affirm, remand,
reverse, modify, or choose any combination thereof.1i The appel-
lant had claimed that the circuit court's modification of three out of
six of the Commissioner's findings compelled a remand of the case
to the Commissioner. 1'9 In response, the Court of Special Appeals
cited section 40(4) of the Insurance Code, which calls for a de novo
hearing before the circuit court. 120 This section, the court con-
tended, supplied a basis for a broadened scope of review. 12 ' Liken-
ing the section 40(4) proceeding to the expanded scope of judicial
114. 774 F.2d at 79. The court noted that even if this action could be characterized as
contractual in nature, the federal court would still have to address the complexities of
state land use control. Id. Thus, abstention was proper.
115. 65 Md. App. 217, 500 A.2d at 297 (1985).
116. Id. at 218, 500 A.2d at 298.
117. MD. ANN. CODE art 48A, § 40(5) (1986) provides that "[tihe court may affirm the
decision of the Commissioner or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may
reverse or modify the decision . "
118. 65 Md. App. at 224, 500 A.2d at 301.
119. Id. at 225, 500 A.2d at 301.
120. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 40(4) (1986) states in pertinent part:
Upon receipt of such transcripts and evidence the court shall hear the mat-
ter de novo as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. Upon the hearing of the
appeal, the court shall consider the evidence contained in the transcript, exhib-
its, and documents therein filed by the Commissioner, together with such addi-
tional evidence as may be offered by any party to the appeal.
121. The court noted that had the appellants' proceeding fallen under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -405 (1984), in which
judicial review is predominantly limited to deciding the issues raised in the appeal
strictly on the basis of the record made before the agency, see id. at § 10-215, their argu-
ment for a remand to the Commissioner would have been more persuasive. Cf. Insur-
ance Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 236 A.2d 282
(1967) (comparing and contrasting the two types ofjudicial review).
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review under workers' compensation proceedings,1 22 the Court of
Special Appeals granted the circuit court discretion to determine
whether the Commissioner's initial decision remained appropriate
in light of revised findings.' 12
B. Arbitration
Binding arbitration is an increasingly popular alternative to the
judicial system. Many arbitrable disputes end up in court, however,
when one party questions the arbitrator's decision or authority to
decide. Maryland appellate cases in the past year addressed the is-
sue of arbitration in the contexts of private agreements and public
institutions.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements.-In Amalgamated Transit
Union, Division 1300 v. Mass Transit Administration' 24 an arbitrator re-
instated a discharged Mass Transit Administration (MTA) employee
whose breath had smelled of alcohol while on duty.125 The Court of
Appeals upheld the reinstatement on the ground that Maryland's
public policy against drunk driving is not so strong as to warrant
undermining an arbitrator's solution. 26
On November 26, 1983, Andrew Smith, an MTA bus driver,
was involved in an accident while on duty. 127 MTA supervisors ar-
rived shortly after the accident and smelled alcohol on Smith's
breath. MTA police requested that Smith take a breathalyzer test,
but he refused. 12  After an interview with a supervisor, Smith was
suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of
the accident; because of those suspicions, he was thereafter
discharged. 129
Under MTA's collective bargaining agreement with the union
employees could be discharged only for just cause, and unsettled
grievances were to be finally resolved by an arbitrator's binding de-
122. Maryland Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 279, 265 A.2d 860 (1970); see
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 37, 415 A.2d 636 (1980).
123. 65 Md. App. at 227, 500 A.2d at 302.
124. 305 Md. 380, 504 A.2d 1132 (1986).
125. Id. at 385, 504 A.2d at 1134.
126. Id. at 390, 504 A.2d at 1137.
127. Id. at 382, 504 A.2d at 1133. While his bus was stopped, a truck smashed its left
rearview mirror.
128. Id. at 383, 504 A.2d at 1133. Smith refused the test on the advice of a union
steward at the scene.
129. Id. at 383-84, 504 A.2d at 1133-34. Smith's discharge followed a hearing before
a superintendent and further review by MTA's Manager-Divisions. Id.
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cision. 3 o Smith eventually resorted to arbitration.S'' The arbitra-
tor found that the "Sniffer's Test,"'' 3 2 which the supervisor had
administered, amounts only to suspicion, and that "suspicion is not
tantamount to proof."' 3 3 The arbitrator thus awarded reinstate-
ment, but denied backpay or benefits."3 4
Despite the ruling and the collective bargaining agreement,
MTA did not reinstate Smith; therefore, the union filed a complaint
for specific performance in circuit court.'3 5 Collective bargaining
agreements, however, are not enforceable if they are contrary to
public policy.' 36 MTA thus argued that the arbitrator's decision vio-
lated Maryland's strong public policy against drunk driving. 13 7 The
circuit court agreed with MTA, invalidating the decision and render-
ing the collective bargaining agreement unenforceable.' 3 8
The Court of Appeals reversed and consequently deemed the
arbitration agreement to be binding. 3 9 The court noted that it was
obliged to accept the facts as found by the arbitrator. 4 ° Of particu-
lar importance was the arbitrator's finding that Smith did not oper-
ate the bus while under the influence of alcohol, but rather only had
the smell of alcohol on his breath.' 4 ' Hence, the court declared that
Maryland's public policy did not justify discharging a bus driver on
such weak grounds. 4 2
The court relied on prior arbitration decisions involving MTA,
which indicate that for drivers to be discharged for alcohol use, they
must have either been driving while under the influence or con-
sumed alcohol while on duty. 143 While the Sniffer's Test may some-
130. Id. at 384, 504 A.2d at 1134.
131. Id.
132. The "Sniffer's Test" is used to determine the extent of an individual's intoxica-
tion in the absence of more objective means. More specifically, the test is administered
by pointing one's nose towards the individual in question, and inhaling. The adminis-
trator may then be able to detect the odor of alcohol emitted from the individual's
breath. See id. at 382-83, 504 A.2d at 1133.
133. Id. at 385, 504 A.2d at 1134.
134. Id. at 386 n.3, 504 A.2d at 1135 n.3.
135. Id. at 387, 504 A.2d at 1135.
136. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
137. 305 Md. at 387, 504 A.2d at 1135.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 390, 504 A.2d at 1137.
140. Id. at 389, 504 A.2d at 1136.
141. Id. at 390, 504 A.2d at 1137.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 392, 504 A.2d at 1138. The Court reviewed five MTA arbitration decisions
in which allegations of driving while impaired by alcohol were based on the Sniffer's
Test. In three of the five cases the arbitrator reinstated the driver. Note, however, that
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times be sufficient evidence to support a finding that an individual
has driven while under the influence of alcohol, it is not always so.
Therefore, no public policy mandates the discharge of a public bus
driver if his or her breath smells of alcohol.
14 4
The court also looked to legislative enactments. The General
Assembly has made no policy pronouncements that would indicate
that the mere odor of alcohol on one's breath rebuts the presump-
tion of innocence.' 45 It is true that pursuant to the Transportation
Article, a police officer may administer a chemical test for alcohol if
there are reasonable grounds for believing that an individual was
driving while intoxicated or while under the influence of alcohol.'
46
It is also true that the Sniffer's Test may furnish reasonable grounds
to administer a chemical test.' 47 The Sniffer's Test, however, is in
no case determinative evidence of intoxication or alcoholic influ-
ence. The subjective test serves only to furnish reasonable suspicion
so that the dispositive objective test may be administered. It is en-
tirely possible to have "failed" the Sniffer's Test and yet be
innocent. 148
Since the General Assembly has little confidence in the ability
of police officers' noses to definitively indicate levels of alcohol use,
it is unlikely that the General Assembly granted mass transit authori-
ties such power and discretion. 41 In sum, Maryland's public policy
stands firmly against driving while intoxicated or under the influ-
ence of alcohol, but not so firmly against driving with alcohol on
one's breath. Consequently, the arbitrator's decision was held to be
enforceable, and Mr. Smith was reinstated.' 5 0
The Amalgamated decision is important for a number of reasons.
First, it illustrates judicial deference to a collective bargaining agree-
ment concerning binding arbitration; arbitration is a viable alterna-
tive method of dispute resolution only to the extent that courts will
an employee in one case was discharged for driving while intoxicated based on "external
appearances"-the driver's uncontrolled state. Id. at 391, 504 A.2d at 1137.
144. Id. at 392, 504 A.2d at 1138. The court stated that the history of prior decisions
"is inconsistent with the existence of a public policy which mandates the discharge and
nothing less, of any public bus driver who bears the odor of alcohol while on duty."
Thus, one may assume, there is no such policy.
145. Id. at 394, 504 A.2d at 1139.
146. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1986).
147. 395 Md. at 393, 504 A.2d at 1138.
148. Id. at 394, 504 A.2d at 1139.
149. Id. Mass Transit authorities are even less capable of administering an accurate
Sniffer's Test, as police officers deal with cases of public drunkenness on a daily basis,




enforce such agreements.' 5 1 Second, the case analyzes the legal sig-
nificance of the "Sniffer's Test." There is an interesting tension at
work here: the desire to avoid attaching too much weight to a sub-
jective test versus the recognition that alcohol is like Justice Stew-
art's description of pornography-you know it when you smell it.
The court seeks to balance these concerns by acknowledging that
the subjective Sniffer's Test may form the basis for administering a
more objective test, but will not of itself provide proof of
drunkenness.
2. Health Claims Arbitration.-In McClurkin v. Maldonado 152 the
Court of Appeals held that a single panel chairman lacked the au-
thority to dismiss an action brought under the Health Claims Arbi-
tration Act. 153 The plaintiff, Josepha McClurkin, filed a medical
malpractice claim under the Act 154 with the director of the Health
Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO).' 55 Before a full arbitration
panel was appointed to hear Ms. McClurkin's claim, as required by
statute, 156 a panel chairman, Mr. Carey, granted a motion to dismiss
because of the plaintiff's failure to complete discovery. 157
The court observed that the General Assembly purposely fash-
ioned the Health Claims Arbitration Act to provide a " 'balanced
decision-making tribunal,' " consisting of three arbitrators: an at-
torney, a health care provider, and a member of the general public
who is neither an attorney nor a health care provider. 58 The lan-
guage of the statute reflects this purpose by exclusively vesting the
power to make binding decisions of law and fact in the panel, and
not in any specific individual.' 59
Since the proper decisionmaking procedures were not fol-
151. Id. at 388, 504 A.2d at 1135-36.
152. 304 Md. 225, 498 A.2d 626 (1985).
153. Id. at 234, 498 A.2d at 631.
154. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-06 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
155. 304 Md. at 227, 498 A.2d at 627.
156. "All issues of fact and law raised by the claim shall be referred by the director to
the arbitration panel." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(a) (1984) (emphasis
added); "The arbitration panel shallfirst determine the issues of liability with respect to a
claim referred to it." Id. at § 3-2A-05(d) (emphasis added).
157. 304 Md. at 227, 498 A.2d at 627. Initially, the plaintiff failed to respond to the
doctor's discovery requests. Thereafter, the panel chairman, Mr. Carey, granted the
doctor's motion to compel discovery as well as the plaintiff's request for an extension of
time to comply. Approximately three months later, discovery still was not completed.
Id.
158. Id. at 231-32, 498 A.2d at 629-30 (quoting and citing Stifler v. Weiner, 62 Md.
App. 19, 24, 488 A.2d 192, 194, cert. denied, 304 Md. 96, 497 A.2d 819 (1985)).
159. MD. CTS. &Juc. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(n) (1984).
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lowed, the court vacated the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and
remanded the case for consideration by a full arbitration panel. 60
In Mitcherling v. Rosselli'"6 the Court of Appeals, in a four to
three decision, upheld the adequacy of a rejection notice'62 filed fol-
lowing an award entered by a health claims arbitration panel. 63
While section 3-2A-06 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Arti-
cle requires a filing "with the Director [of the Health Claims Arbitra-
tion Office] and the arbitration panel,"'" the court found adequate
a filing with the Director alone. 165 The court construed a 1979
amendment 166 to section 3-2A-06 as an attempt to centralize the fil-
ing of important documents with the Director; that the present stat-
utory language mistakenly fails to reflect this intent is an apparent
oversight.1 6 7 The court further relied upon the codification of
award rejection regulations, in which a filing with the Director alone
is held adequate 168 and the intent of procedural simplification is
expressed. 169
C. Due Process
A common issue in administrative law is whether certain admin-
istrative procedures comply with the due process clause of the fifth
or fourteenth amendment. 170 Any due process claim must be ana-
160. 304 Md. at 236, 498 A.2d at 632. The court vacated the chairman's decision
even though subsequent legislation empowered a chairman to act alone in dismissing a
case for failure to comply with a discovery order. See Act of April 9, 1985, ch. 104, 1984
Md. Laws 1245 (codified at MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(a) (Supp.
1986)). The amendment will apply on remand, but the case is not moot. For after the
panel chairman dismissed the claim, the plaintiff tendered some discovery materials.
304 Md. at 228, 498 A.2d at 628.
161. 304 Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985).
162. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a) (1984) provides that, to pursue a
claim in circuit court, "notice of rejection must be filed with the Director and the arbitra-
tion panel and served on the other parties or their counsel within 30 days after the
award is served upon the rejecting party." The appellees, who had appealed to the cir-
cuit court, filed a timely notice of rejection with the Director and served a copy on the
appellant, but did not file a copy with any member of the arbitration panel. 304 Md. at
365, 499 A.2d at 477.
163. 304 Md. at 368, 499 A.2d at 478.
164. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a) (1984).
165. 304 Md. at 368, 499 A.2d at 478.
166. Act of May 1, 1979, ch. 156, 1979 Md. Laws 711 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1984)).
167. 304 Md. at 368, 499 A.2d at 478.
168. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 1, § 03.01.14B(1) (1976).
169. 304 Md. at 366, 499 A.2d at 477.
170. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.")
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lyzed in two steps: (1) does due process attach? and (2) what pro-
cess is due? The first question concerns whether there is a life,
liberty, or property interest affected that would trigger the constitu-
tional guarantee. The second question concerns the type of admin-
istrative procedure that will adequately protect the individual's
interest. 171
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,'17 articulated a
three-part test for determining what process is due. A court must
balance:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedure used, and the probative
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
den that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail.1
7 3
Both of the following cases apply Mathews in upholding Mary-
land statutory procedures as constitutional.
1. Tax Refund Interception Program.-Under section 6402(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code, states must establish a mechanism to
withhold from state income tax refunds a sum equal to the tax-
payer's delinquent, court-ordered child support payments. 74 The
Maryland Statutory Tax Refund Interception Program (TRIP)175 is
one such mechanism. In McClelland v. Massinga' 76 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of TRIP.' 77 The court also held that "non-obligated spouses"-the
spouses of taxpayers delinquent in their court-ordered child sup-
port payments-had no standing to contest the validity of intercept
proceedings if they had not contributed to the income taxes paid. ' 78
TRIP permits the Administrator of the Child Support Enforce-
ment Administration (Administration) annually to certify to the
Comptroller of the Treasury persons delinquent in their child sup-
171. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
172. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
173. Id. at 334-35.
174. 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (Supp. III 1985).
175. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 10-113 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
176. 786 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1216.
178. 786 F.2d at 1210.
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port payments. 17  The Administration must notify the obligated
parent of the certification and of his or her right to an investigation
of the arrearage if the parent deems the certification inaccurate. 80
If the parent requests an investigation and if an error is found, the
Administration must correct the amount of the reported arrearage
or withdraw the certification. 18  Otherwise, the Administration
must forward the certification to the Comptroller. The Comptroller
must then withhold any tax refund due the obligated parent.' 82 The
parent must be notified within fifteen days of the intercept of the
refund check, and of the right to appeal. 8 1
In McClelland the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
against the Secretary of Human Resources and the Comptroller of
the Treasury. 184 The TRIP program, the plaintiffs charged, violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by failing to
provide a hearing before interception of tax refunds. 8 5 Addition-
ally, they contended that failure to give notification of certification
to the obligor's spouse, when a joint tax return is filed, is a violation
of the spouse's due process rights.' 86 The district court found for
the plaintiffs on both counts. i8 7
On appeal the defendants first contended that because the non-
obligated spouses had made no contributions to income taxes paid
and thus did not have claims to refunds on these tax payments, they
lacked standing to contest the validity of intercept proceedings.188
The plaintiffs responded that a tax refund resulting from the filing
of a joint return qualifies as property of both spouses as tenants by
the entireties. 8 9 The spouses, they maintained, consequently had a
property interest in the tax refunds and should have been notified of
179. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 10-113(a) (1984). A person is delinquent if he or
she is "more than 60 days in arrears of support payments under the most recent court
order." Id.
180. Id. at § 10-113(b).
181. Id. at § 10-113(d)(2)(ii).
182. Id. at § 10-113(0(1).
183. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § 07.02.03E (1986). If the obligor appeals, he or she is
accorded a hearing before an impartial review officer. The obligor also has the right of
judicial review from an adverse decision. Id. at § 07.02.05D.
184. 786 F.2d at 1206.
185. Id. at 1207.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1208.
188. Id.
189. Id. A tenancy by the entireties is one in which a husband and wife together "hold
title to the whole with right of survivorship." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1314 (5th ed.
1979). Maryland has long recognized such a tenancy. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 259 Md.




The appeals court held for the defendants. Under Maryland
law' 9 ' an estate by the entireties arises only if there has been a
"manifest intention by the parties or one of them, to create such an
estate."' 92 In this case, however, the husbands did not intend "to
create an interest in any possible overpayment in favor of the wives
as tenants by the entireties."' 9 In addition, federal tax decisions' 94
have consistently held that the filing of" 'a joint income tax return
does not create new property interests for a husband or wife in each
other's income tax overpayment.' "95
The second issue was the plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled
to a hearing before interception of their tax refund checks. The
court acknowledged that the plaintiffs have a property interest in the
refunds,' 96 and " 'that some form of hearing is required before an
individual isfinally deprived of a property interest.' ""' This hear-
ing, however, need not always take place before the deprivation of
property. For, the Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard . . . 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "198
Goldberg v. Kelly 9 is the only case in which the Supreme Court
interpreted a "meaningful time" and a "meaningful manner" as re-
quiring a full adversarial hearing before adverse government ac-
tion.2"' Since Goldberg, the Court has taken a liberal approach in
190. 786 F.2d at 1208.
191. To determine the existence of a property interest, the court must look to the
applicable state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
192. 786 F.2d at 1209; see Diamond v. Diamond, 298 Md. 24, 467 A.2d 510 (1983).
193. 786 F.2d at 1209.
194. Maryland tax law, according to the court, "was written 'with both eyes on the
federal tax laws.' " Id. at 1209-10 (quoting Comptroller of the Treasury v. The Chesa-
peake Corp. of Va., 54 Md. App. 208, 218, 458 A.2d 459, 466 (1983)).
195. Id. at 1209 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 342, 344 (E.D. Pa.
1975)).
196. 786 F.2d at 1211.
197. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (emphasis in
McClelland)).
198. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
199. 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970). Goldberg, which concerned termination of welfare
benefits, can be distinguished from McClelland. Termination of welfare benefits before a
determination of ineligibility could deprive an eligible recipient of the only means of
subsistence. Id. at 266. Interception of a tax refund ordinarily would not pose such a
drastic threat. See 786 McClelland F.2d at 1214.
200. 786 F.2d at 1211 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (1976) and Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985)); cf Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 ("in general,
'something less' than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient").
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determining "meaningful time" and in deciding when a predepriva-
tion hearing is required.2"' The McClelland court opined that "it is
particularly unnecessary to provide a party with a pre-deprivation
administrative hearing, if there is some informal procedure... avail-
able before deprivation. "202
After weighing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors,203 the court con-
cluded that the procedures specified in the TRIP program do not
violate the due process clause. 2° Procedural safeguards, including
most notably the delinquent spouse's right to demand a prompt in-
vestigation before interception, protect due process rights. 2 5 The
parent in McClelland was not in the same dire need as, for example,
the welfare recipients in Goldberg or the recipient of disability bene-
fits in Eldridge.2 0 6  The high administrative cost of providing
predeprivation hearings further justified the procedural framework
of the TRIP program.20 7
In conclusion, the court balanced the needs of society to pro-
vide support payments to children from their obligated parents
against the need to protect the obligor's due process rights. On the
strength of the Supreme Court's due process decisions, the Fourth
Circuit held that "the Maryland procedure is fair and does not of-
fend the parent's due process rights.
2 8
201. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (evidentiary hearing not required prior to ter-
mination of Social Security disability payments); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540
(1971) (prior to revoking driver's license, state need only conduct a "probable cause"
hearing, not a full adjudication of liability).
202. 786 F.2d at 1213; see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
203. See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
204. 786 F.2d at 1213-14.
205. Id. at 1213. A parent must be in arrears for at least 60 days before his name is
prepared for certification. MD. FAM. CODE ANN. § 10-113(a) (1984). Upon certification,
the parent is notified and given an opportunity to dispute the certification by requesting
an investigation into the accuracy of the allegation. Id. at § 10-113(b), (d). The State
must complete this investigation within 30 days. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § .07.02.04D
(1986). After intercept the parent is entitled to a full hearing as well as judicial review.
Id. at § .07.02.05D.
206. 786 F.2d at 1214.
207. Id. at 1215. The court remarked:
If... the procedure were revised to require the certified parent to request and
have a hearing on his delinquency even before he knows whether he is entitled
to a refund, the State would be forced to offer hearings and, in many cases
presumably, to hold hearings even though it would later be found that no re-
fund was due the particular parent. Such a procedure would represent an intol-
erable and unnecessary burden on the State, a factor said to be of great
importance in this connection, under the standards stated in Mathews.
Id. (footnote omitted).
208. Id. at 1216.
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2. Employment Discrimination.-In Vavasori v. Commission on
Human Relations2" 9 the Court of Special Appeals was confronted
with a constitutional challenge to article 49B,21° which establishes
the procedural guidelines for employment discrimination cases in
Maryland.
The plaintiff was fired from his job in July 1978 and filed a
timely complaint with the Maryland Commission on Human Rela-
tions, alleging employment discrimination. 2 1' He was notified over
a month in advance that the Commission would conduct a fact-find-
ing conference. 21 2 Both the plaintiff and his counsel attended the
conference and presented the facts of their case. 213 The Commis-
sion ultimately entered a judgment against the plaintiff, finding that
discrimination was not the probable cause for his release from em-
ployment.21 4 The plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration,
submitting new documentation for review together with the record
of the original proceeding.2 5  The Commission denied his
motion.2 16
The Court of Special Appeals, having found that the plaintiff
was entitled to due process, 217 first addressed the adequacy of no-
tice of the fact-finding conference. Quoting Bernstein v. Board of Edu-
cation,2 18 a prior Court of Appeals case, for the proposition that
"[a]dequacy of the notice must be determined in light of the particu-
209. 65 Md. App. 237, 500 A.2d 307 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 419, 504 A.2d 1152
(1986).
210. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (1979).
211. 65 Md. App. at 241, 500 A.2d at 309. Vavasori was employed as a brake operator
for Vulcan-Hart Corporation from May 1967 until being laid off in July 1978. During
this time Vavasori suffered back ailments resulting from a spinal fusion. The complaint
alleged that his inability to work more than 40 hours a week and to work 10-hour shifts
was the basis for his dismissal. Vulcan-Hart, he alleged, honored similar work restric-
tions for other employees. Id.





217. Id. at 243, 244, 500 A.2d at 309. The court's analysis of the due process clause of
article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights mirrors the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tions of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, since the two
clauses have the same meaning. Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 474
A.2d 191 (1984). Accordingly, before a violation of procedural due process could be
demonstrated, one must show that he or she has been deprived of a property interest.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). An interest in a claim of em-
ployment discrimination is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
218. 245 Md. 464, 266 A.2d 243 (1967).
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lar circumstances, ' 219 the court concluded that notice more than
one month in advance of the fact-finding conference was reasonable
and fair, as it gave the plaintiff ample time to prepare his case.2 2 °
The court next considered whether the evidentiary conference
provided an adequate opportunity to be heard. Applying Mathews v.
Eldridge,22 1 the court balanced Vavasori's interest in being heard
against the government's interest in administrative ease and the
likelihood that substitute procedures would produce significantly
better results than the current scheme.222 On this basis, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the plaintiff received due process. 2 3
He had two opportunities to obtain a remedy for the alleged dis-
crimination, one at the fact-finding conference and the other in his
appeal for reconsideration. 224 "Nothing in the due process clause
requires that all claims be afforded a full evidentiary hearing on the
merits. ' 225 And in light of the State's legitimate interest in having
discrimination cases expeditiously conducted or promptly dis-
missed, the balance tipped in favor of the procedures used.2 2 6
Hence, article 49B comports with due process because it pro-
vides an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." 227 The Court of Special Appeals thus dis-
missed Mr. Vavasori's claim.228
D. Workers' Compensation
Maryland courts considered a number of cases dealing with the
administration of the workers' compensation system. Issues consid-
ered included the reach of the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion's approval and modification powers over fees stemming from
the proceeding, award levels granted by the Commission, eligibility
for benefits, employment status under the exclusive remedy doc-
trine, and the reach of circuit court jurisdiction.
219. 65 Md. App at 250, 500 A.2d at 314.
220. Id.
221. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
222. 65 Md. App. at 250-51, 500 A.2d at 314.
223. Id. at 251, 500 A.2d at 314.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 248, 500 A.2d at 313.
226. Id. at 251, 500 A.2d at 314.
227. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
228. 65 Md. App. at 251-52, 500 A.2d at 314.
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1. Fees.-In Mitchell v. Goodyear Service Store229 the Court of Ap-
peals held that an appeal to the circuit court of the amount of the
attorney's fee in a workers' compensation case is not to be tried de
novo.23 ° Mitchell's counsel cited statutory language pertaining to
attorney's fee appeals "in like manner as awards for compensation
under this article."'2 3 ' The attorney reasoned that because appeals
as to compensation are heard de novo, appeals as to attorney's fees
must also be so heard.232 The Court of Appeals rejected this con-
tention, stating that the proper action by the circuit court is to re-
mand the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission for
reconsideration of the fee in light of the court's conclusions of
law. 233 The court reasoned that the Commission's fee-setting ex-
pertise should not be undermined and that a potential jury trial was
an inappropriate setting for an attorney's fee determination.23 4
The Court of Appeals also held that the Commission was enti-
tled to appear as an appellee in the circuit court and in any appellate
court.23 5 In reversing the Court of Special Appeals, which held that
the Commission was devoid of standing and was an interloper in
such an appeal,23 6 the court relied in part upon recognition of the
Commission as the single and essential provider of claimant protec-
tion against excessive fees.23 7
The Commission's claimant protection role was also expanded
in Shauder v. Brager.23 8 In that case the Court of Appeals held that
the Commission may approve and modify fees of physicians and
others who evaluate a claimant in preparation for trial, and who ap-
229. 306 Md. 27, 506 A.2d 1178 (1986), aff'g 63 Md. App. 426, 492 A.2d 984 (1985).
230. Id. at 34, 506 A.2d at 1182.
231. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 57 (1985).
232. 306 Md. at 31, 506 A.2d at 1180.
233. Id. at 34, 506 A.2d at 1182. This procedure first appeared in Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Bowen, 54 Md. App. 375, 387, 458 A.2d 1242, 1249 (1983).
234. 306 Md. at 34, 506 A.2d at 1182.
235. Id. at 36, 506 A.2d at 1183. The court reserved the question as to whether the
Commission appearing as an appellee in the circuit court could be an appellant in the
Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 36 n.2, 506 A.2d at 1183 n.2.
236. 63 Md. App. 426, 437, 492 A.2d 984, 990 (1985).
237. Id. at 35, 36, 506 A.2d at 1183. The Court of Appeals further relied upon two
other findings. First, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(c) (1985) provides that the Attorney
General must represent the Commission in all proceedings whenever so requested by
any of the Commissioners. The court found it significant that this language is found in
the section pertaining to appeals. Id. at 35, 506 A.2d at 1183. Second, the court cited
numerous instances in which it had permitted other boards and agencies to appear as
appellees. Id.
238. 303 Md. 140, 492 A.2d 630 (1985).
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pear for a claimant at trial.239 On an appeal brought by the plaintiff
physicians and psychologists, whose fees the Commission reduced,
the circuit court found that the Commission had no statutory au-
thority to regulate fees of evaluating physicians. 240 The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, reasoning that the fees in question arose from the
preparation and presentation of the claimant's case, without which
claimant could not effectively present his case;24 ' such fees there-
fore fit within the statutory category of "compensation for legal
services, 242 which the Commission has long regulated.243
2. Award Levels.-In Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Street 244 the Court of
Special Appeals held that the statute governing serious disability
awards 245 did not permit the merger of disability benefits for acci-
dental injury with awards for occupational disease. 246 The court
had previously held that a merger of pre-existing impairment and
accidental injury claims could not qualify for serious disability.247
Occupational disease is analogous to a pre-existing impairment in
that there is no prior incapacity until the occurrence of the acciden-
tal injury; therefore, the court rejected the occupational/accidental
disease merger of claims.2 48 The court also relied on the legislative
intent of serious disability provisions, noted in Barbee v. Hecht Co. ;249
the General Assembly, the Barbee court reasoned, attempted to
achieve only parity of benefits for certain severe injuries 250 by crea-
239. Id. at 149, 492 A.2d at 634.
240. Id. at 143, 492 A.2d at 632. The circuit court relied on Harris v. Janco Enter-
prises, 53 Md. App. 674, 455 A.2d 453 (1983), in which the Court of Special Appeals
ruled that the Commission had no authority under MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 37 (1985)
to regulate the fees of evaluating physicians. 53 Md. App. at 677, 455 A.2d at 454-55.
241. 303 Md. at 148, 492 A.2d at 634.
242. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 57 (1985) provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall charge or collect any compensation for legal services in connection with any claims
arising under this article .... unless the same be approved by the Commission."
243. 303 Md. at 149, 492 A.2d at 634. The court also relied on the need for claimant
protection, id. at 147-48, 492 A.2d at 634, as well as long-standing administrative prac-
tice, whereby forms for a petition for attorney's fees also include provisions for medical
fees, id. at 146, 149, 492 A.2d at 633, 634.
244. 63 Md. App. 664, 493 A.2d 431 (1985).
245. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4a) (1985).
246. 63 Md. App. at 664, 493 A.2d at 431.
247. Barbee v. Hecht Co., 61 Md. App. 356, 486 A.2d 785 (1985).
248. 63 Md. App. at 675, 493 A.2d at 436.
249. 61 Md. App. 356, 486 A.2d 785 (1985).
250. Before the passage of the serious disability statute, a claimant who was totally
and permanently disabled received $30,000 in benefits, while a claimant who was 99%
disabled received only $12,500. The purpose of the statute was to eliminate this dispar-
ity by providing an additional award in the form of a payment for serious disability. Id.
at 362, 486 A.2d at 788.
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tion of a fund, the liability of which should be narrowly
interpreted.2 5'
3. Eligibility.-In Adams v. Western Electric Co. 252 the Court of
Special Appeals explained the eligibility standards for benefits due
to occupational disease. The court found little dispute that the
claimant had developed an occupational disease during and as a re-
sult of employment with Western Electric. 25" Her claim for perma-
nent partial disability centered on an inability to perform her
original job, despite her return to work in another job within the
same job classification, at the same labor grade, and at the same or
higher wage rate.254
The Court of Special Appeals held that a claimant is not dis-
abled simply because of her inability to perform a particular job.255
Nor is she to be regarded as not disabled merely because of an abil-
ity to work at some other job with no actual wage lOSS. 2 5 6 Rather,
the analysis should focus on the last occupation in which the claim-
ant was injuriously exposed to the hazards of her occupational dis-
ease, and whether by reason of that occupational disease the
claimant was disabled from performing work in that occupation.257
Finally, the court implied that the evidentiary record must be
thoroughly developed; for only then can courts or the Commission
determine how the occupation may be defined and how much of the
range of activity fairly included within the occupation is in fact fore-
closed to the claimant.258 Because the factual record was inade-
quate, the court remanded. 259
4. Exclusivity Under the Act/Limitation on Other Remedies.-a. De-
liberate Intention Exception.-Generally, an employee injured in his or
her employment must seek relief through the Workers' Compensa-
251. Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 788.
252. 63 Md. App. 587, 493 A.2d 392, cert. denied, 304 Md. 301, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
253. Id. at 589, 493 A.2d at 393. The claimant, an air gun operator, developed ulnar
neuropathy and nerve palsy in the arm and hand used to operate the gun.
254. Id. The claimant's new job involved washing parts and required no hand-squeez-
ing functions. Id. at 590, 493 A.2d at 393.
255. Id. at 593, 493 A.2d at 395.
256. Id.
257. Id. In the final analysis, the court's focus was: "If, indeed, the claimant is able to
continue to perform reasonably analogous work within the same occupational classifica-
tion at the same or higher wages, he is not incapacitated 'from performing his work in
the last occupation.' " Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 22(a) (1985)).
258. Id. at 593-94, 493 A.2d at 395.
259. Id. at 594, 493 A.2d at 395.
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tion laws.2 6 ° But if the employee's injury results from "the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury," the employee may
opt out of this administrative network and sue generally in tort.26'
In Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc. 262 the Court of Appeals
rejected the argument that "deliberate intention" means that the
employer intended to do the act that happens to cause the injury, or
that the employer undertook reckless conduct with appreciation of
the great risk it poses to another.263 Such a reading of the statute
would broaden the exception to an "intentional tort" exception and
ignore the distinct legal concept of deliberate intent. 264 Rather, the
exception requires proof of "an intentional or deliberate act by the
employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the
act. "265
b. Relation to PIP and UM.-Sections 539 and 541 of the Insur-
ance Code require that every motor vehicle liability policy issued,
sold, or delivered in Maryland must contain personal injury protec-
tion (PIP) and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage.266 The Code also
provides that benefits paid under these coverages "shall be reduced
to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under work-
men's compensation laws of any state or the federal govern-
ment. ' 267 In Hines v. Potomac Electric Power Co. 2 6 8 the Court of
Appeals applied this provision in denying PIP and UM benefits to a
claimant who had already received workers' compensation benefits
in excess of the total amount of PIP and UM coverage available to
him. 269 The court defended its holding as consistent with a general
policy to compensate injured persons.27
c. Employment Status Under the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine.-Mary-
land appellate courts handed down several opinions involving the
statutory employer doctrine. This doctrine, which derives from sec-
260. MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 15 (1985)
261. Id. at § 44 (emphasis added).
262. 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986).
263. Id. at 254-55, 503 A.2d at 712.
264. Id. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712.
265. Id.
266. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539, 541 (1979).
267. Id. at § 543(d).
268. 305 Md. 369, 504 A.2d 632 (1986).
269. Id. at 376-77, 504 A.2d at 635-36. The employee had received $35,000 in work-
ers' compensation benefits. The total PIP and UM coverage provided him through his
employer was $27,500. Id. at 371, 504 A.2d at 633.
270. Id. at 374, 504 A.2d at 634-35.
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tion 62 of article 101,271 provides that a principal contractor is the
"statutory employer" of its subcontractor's employees. 272 Where
applicable, the doctrine bars recourse for injured workers except
under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
In Honaker v. W C. & A. N. Development Co. 2 7 3 the Court of Ap-
peals had previously enumerated a four-part test for the doctrine's
applicability. To invoke the statutory employer doctrine, there must
be:
(1) a principal contractor
(2) who has contracted to perform work
(3) which is a part of his trade, business or occupation; and
(4) who has contracted with any other party as a subcon-
tractor for the execution by or under the subcontractor of
the whole or any part of such work.2 7 4
In Wyatt v. Potomac Electric Power Co. 275 the Court of Special Appeals
reinterpreted the third part of the test to require that the subcon-
tracted work be an essential or integral part of the principal contrac-
tor's business.276 Applying this test, the court held that the
claimant, a subcontractor's employee injured while revamping and
retrofitting the electrical control system at the principal contractor's
power production facility, engaged in a function essential to the
principal contractor's business of providing electricity.277 The court
therefore granted statutory employer status to the principal contrac-
tor, precluding compensation for the claimant except under the
Workers' Compensation Act.2 78
The court's decision provided that the subcontracting of work
essential to the operation of a principal contractor's facility, which in
turn is engaged in the actual service or supply of goods, satisfies the
271. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62 (1985).
272. Id.; see State v. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 162, 140 A. 52, 53 (1928). Two
justifications have been offered for the doctrine. First, it resolves "the sometimes com-
plex question" of who was the employer. Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co., 278
Md. 453, 454, 365 A.2d 287, 288 (1976). Second, it prevents the principal contractor
from shifting liability for the costs of accidents on to subcontractors, who might not be
able to bear those costs. Bennett, 154 Md. at 161, 140 A. at 53.
273. 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d 287 (1976).
274. Id. at 459-60, 365 A.2d at 291. The court added that the term "principal con-
tractor" is not synonymous with the term "general contractor." Id. at 460 n.4, 365 A.2d
at 291 n.4.
275. 64 Md. App. 614, 498 A.2d 278 (1985).
276. Id. at 617, 498 A.2d at 280.




"essential part" test for granting statutory employer status.2 79 Ful-
fillment of the test also stemmed from the court's finding that the
principal contractor's compliance with federal and state pollution
laws depended upon the revamping. 280
In a case of first impression, the Court of Special Appeals in
Anderson v. Bimblich21' held that an apartment building owner was a
principal contractor within the meaning of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act and thus the statutory employer of a maintenance man
hired by the apartment building's management company.282 The
third or "essential part" prong of the Honaker test was satisfied: the
custodial work that the claimant was hired to perform qualified as an
essential or integral part of the business of an apartment owner.283
In Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc.284 the Court of Appeals
held that a worker employed by a temporary services agency was
also an employee of the company to which he was provisionally as-
signed (the utilizing employer). 2 5 This precluded the employee's
action in tort against the utilizing employer and relegated him to his
remedies under the workers' compensation laws. 286 The court men-
tioned the five traditional criteria for determining whether an em-
ployee/employer relationship existed between the parties; 287
however, it relied exclusively on the criterion relating to whether the
employer had power to control the employee's on-the-job con-
duct.2 88 That the utilizing employer assigned and supervised the
worker's activities, instructed him, and held the power to reassign or
dismiss him constituted unequivocal, undisputed, and exclusive con-
279. Id. The "essential part" test has been applied in State, Use of Reynolds v. City of
Baltimore, 199 Md. 289, 86 A.2d 618 (1952), in which the work of erecting hoists was
determined to be an essential part of the actual excavation of a water tunnel and there-
fore an essential part of the defendant's business, and Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller
Dev. Co., 285 Md. 216, 401 A.2d 1013 (1979), which held that subcontracting for the
building of a roof constituted an essential part of the business of a defendant who had
contracted to build a house.
280. 64 Md. App. at 619, 498 A.2d at 281.
281. 67 Md. App. 612, 508 A.2d 1014 (1986).
282. Id. at 613, 508 A.2d at 1014.
283. Id. at 620, 508 A.2d at 1017.
284. 304 Md. 67, 497 A.2d 803 (1985).
285. Id. at 79, 497 A.2d at 809.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 77, 497 A.2d at 808. These criteria, developed from the common-law stan-
dard for determining the master/servant relationship include (1) the power to select and
hire the employee, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power
to control the employee's conduct, and (5) whether the work is part of the regular busi-
ness of the employer. See Sun Cab Co. v. Powell, 196 Md. 572, 577-78, 77 A.2d 783, 785
(1951).
288. 304 Md. at 78, 497 A.2d at 809.
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trol sufficient to establish an employer/employee relationship as a
matter of law.289
The Court of Appeals also noted that the utilizing employer in-
directly contributed to the worker's insurance protection, as a result
of the difference in money paid to the temporary services agency
and that paid to the worker.290 Citing the strong likelihood that the
agency used part of this extra money to pay for the employee's un-
employment and workers' compensation insurance, the court found
an employer/employee relationship in which the utilizing employer
"actually contributed to the insurance protection of one of its
employees. 29 1
In Leonard v. Fantasy Imports, Inc. 292 the Court of Special Appeals
used more than one of the five traditional criteria in determining
289. Id. at 79, 497 A.2d at 809. Whitehead invoked the following language from L. &
S. Constr. Co. v. State Accident Fund, 221 Md. 51, 59, 155 A.2d 653, 659 (1959):
The fact that control over details as to what work is to be done and the way in
which it is to be done may be exercised by the person to whom the employee is
sent, will not of itself cause the employee to become the servant of the person
to whom he is sent.
In response, the Whitehead court initially attempted to distinguish L. & S. Constr. First,
Safway exercised far greater control over Whitehead than L. & S. Constr. had exercised
over its putative employee. 304 Md. at 81-82, 497 A.2d at 810-11. Second, the court
suggested that L. & S. Constr. applied only in cases involving "lent employees," not tem-
porary employees. See id. at 82, 497 A.2d at 811. Third, the court pointed out that even
the L. & S. Constr. court had envisioned a situation, such as this, in which one party had
the power to hire and fire an employee, but another had the power to control the em-
ployee while he was in its employ. Id. (citing L. & S. Constr., 221 Md. at 56, 155 A.2d at
656). Finally, however, the court found it necessary to overrule L. & S. Constr. to the
extent that the prior case suggested that in the absence of conflicting inferences, the
issue of control was a question of fact for the jury, rather than a question of law for the
court. Id.
290. 304 Md. at 79, 497 A.2d at 809.
291. Id. In dissent, Judge Eldridge cited the court's use, in previous cases, of the
other four criteria in the traditional test of employer/employee status. Id. at 87, 497
A.2d at 813-14 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). He argued that the agency's hiring of the
worker, payment of wages to the worker, and power to fire the worker led to the infer-
ence that the agency, and not the utilizing employer, was the worker's employer. Had
these other factors been applied, conflicting inferences would have arisen. The case
could then have gone to the jury. Id. at 91-93, 497 A.2d at 815-17.
The dissent further asserted that if the majority correctly construed the case as
presenting a question of law, the majority opinion would remain incorrect. For the ma-
jority failed to consider whether the worker was a casual employee of the utilizing em-
ployer, a factor that would preclude the applicability of workers' compensation
provisions. Id. at 93-94 n.3, 497 A.2d at 817 n.3 (citing Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214,
300 A.2d 665 (1973), which held that an employee hired for various odd jobs not to
exceed one or two weeks with no promise of future or continuous employment was, as a
matter of law, a casual employee).
292. 66 Md. App. 404, 504 A.2d 660 (1986).
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whether an employer/employee relationship existed. 29' Leonard
had been an equal partner with Fantasy in a sportswear sales busi-
ness run within Fantasy's separate import car dealership. After
abandoning the sportswear venture, Leonard was injured while
working on a car owned by a customer of the dealership.29 4 Alleg-
ing casual employment status, Leonard sought an extension of rem-
edies beyond the Workers' Compensation Act to include a civil tort
action against Fantasy.29 5 In assessing whether Leonard qualified as
a regular or casual employee, the court found no factual dispute as
to the arrangement between the parties and therefore made a legal
determination of casual employment status.29 6 The court relied pri-
marily on an analysis of employer control over the employee, 97 but,
notably, the court also based its finding on the scope and duration
of the hiring as well as the nature of remuneration. 298
E. Attorney Grievance Commission
Until the adoption effective January 1, 1987, of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct,299 lawyer conduct in Maryland was
regulated by the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility. 00
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility has been re-
placed, decisions that interpreted it remain relevant. This is so be-
cause many of the rules in the new Rules of Professional Conduct
are similar to the rules under the now superseded Code.
The Attorney Grievance Commission was, under the Code, and
remains under the new Rules, the administrative body charged with
applying the rules to Maryland lawyers. Appeals from the Commis-
sion were, and are, heard in the Maryland Court of Appeals."0 '
Among the most litigated disciplinary rules under the Code were
those providing that a lawyer cannot lie on the bar application,3 0 2
293. Id. at 415-16, 504 A.2d at 666.
294. Id. at 407-08, 504 A.2d at 662.
295. 66 Md. App. at 414-16, 504 A.2d at 665-66.
296. Id. at 406-07, 504 A.2d at 661. Casual employee status precludes recovery under
the Workers' Compensation Act. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 101, § 2 1(c)(4) (1985). Thus, the
casual employee has the same remedy in tort law as any private citizen.
297. Id. at 414-15, 504 A.2d at 665.
298. Id. at 415, 504 A.2d at 666. At the time of the injury Mr. Leonard was under no
obligation to perform clerical or mechanical work, though in the past he had done such
work. He was "hired" for brief jobs and was not paid for his work until 10 months later.
Id.
299. See MD. R. 1230 and Appendix.
300. See Md. Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 1-104 to 9-102 (1986).
301. See MD. R. Subtitle BV, Discipline and Inactive Status of Attorneys.
302. Md. Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 1-101(A) (1986).
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engage in fraudulent conduct,303 neglect a client's legal interests, 3 0 4
charge an excessive fee,30 5 misappropriate client funds, 0 6 or com-
mit a crime of moral turpitude.3 0 7 The Court of Appeals in 1985-86
considered each of these rules as well as the mitigating effect of
drug or alcohol addiction in cases of attorney misconduct.
1. Neglect.-In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sinclair0 ' the
court considered an attorney's neglect of his client's interests. John
Sinclair was retained by Rick Griffith in October of 1981 to repre-
sent him in a contract claim. On April 27, 1982, the defendants to
the suit filed a counterclaim for damages amounting to $100,000.309
Mr. Sinclair failed to respond to the counterclaim in a timely fash-
ion.310 Despite this failure, a default judgment against Sinclair's cli-
ent was stricken.3 1 ' Mr. Sinclair next failed to respond adequately
to interrogatories after a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogato-
ries had been granted." 2 Thus, a default judgment was eventually
entered against Griffith for $100,000.3 13 The court held that such
neglect resulting in default judgment, coupled with Mr. Sinclair's
history for neglecting legal matters, l4 warranted disbarment.3 1 5
2. Fees.-Many cases are handled by lawyers on a contingency
basis, whereby payment of the fee is contingent upon the lawyer's
ability to win the case. The lawyer's right to claim a percentage of
the recovery is deemed fair when balanced against the risk that he or
she may lose and receive nothing; the risk validates the process.
316
303. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(4).
304. Id. at DR 6-101(A)(3).
305. Id. at DR 2-106(A).
306. Id. at DR 9-102(B).
307. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(3).
308. 305 Md. 430, 505 A.2d 106 (1986).
309. Id. at 433, 505 A.2d at 108.
310. Id. at 432, 505 A.2d at 107.
311. Id., 505 A.2d at 107-08.
312. Id. at 433, 505 A.2d at 108.
313. Id.
314. Sinclair had been suspended for neglect in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sin-
clair, 302 Md. 581, 490 A.2d 236 (1985), and had received a reprimand in Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Sinclair, 299 Md. 644, 474 A.2d 1338 (1984), for neglecting legal
matters. 305 Md. at 435, 505 A.2d at 109.
315. 305 Md. at 435, 505 A.2d at 109. Former Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 6-101(A)(3), the principle provision then applicable, provided: "A law-
yer shall not . . . [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him. DR 6-101(A)(3) has been
superseded by MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.1, which requires that a lawyer provide com-
petent representation, and MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.3, which requires that a lawyer
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
316. See Ethics Comm. of the Md. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 76-1 (1976).
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Disputes arise, however, if the client's right to recover is not really
in question, yet the lawyer calculates the fee on a contingency basis.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kemp 31 7 the Court of Appeals
held that a contingency fee calculated in part from the undisputed
proceeds from a client's medical payments insurance coverage 31 8
was excessive and therefore in violation of the former Maryland dis-
ciplinary rules. t9
The court applied the conclusions reached by the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Maryland State Bar Association. 3 " The Committee
concluded that "it would be unethical, in virtually all cases, for a
lawyer to charge a contingent fee for collecting a claim against his
client's own insurance under [personal injury protection (PIP)] cov-
erage ... 321 More generally, the Committee found it "unreasona-
ble and unconscionable" to charge a contingent fee for collections
that result from mandatory statutory obligations, rather than from
the attorney's professional skills.322
While medical payments insurance, unlike PIP coverage, is not
statutorily mandated, recovery on the policy is generally automatic
regardless of fault, so long as standard forms are filed.323 Thus, the
attorney's service of filing the proper and routine form in each case
is perfunctory in nature. The collection of medical payments insur-
ance benefits rarely depends on the professional skills of the attor-
324 sicney handling the case, and since the risk and uncertainty of
recovery are low, the attorney should not use these payments in cal-
culating a contingent fee.32 5
317. 303 Md. 664, 496 A.2d 672 (1985).
318. Medical payments insurance covers the insured's medical bills in the event that
the insured requires medical attention. The extent and nature of coverage are clearly
set forth in the insurance policy.
319. Former Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(A) provided
that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or
clearly excessive fee." MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(a) is substantially similar to the
former DR.
320. 303 Md. at 676-77, 496 A.2d at 678-79.
321. Ethics Comm. of the Md. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 76-1 (1976) (cited and
quoted in Kemp, 303 Md. at 676-77, 496 A.2d at 678).
322. Id. The Committee asserted that "when there is virtually no risk and no uncer-
tainty, contingent fees represent an improper measure of professional compensation."
Id.
323. 303 Md. at 677, 496 A.2d at 678-79.
324. Id., 496 A.2d at 679.
325. Id. at 677, 496 A.2d at 679. The court noted, however, that an attorney may bill
to a client a minimal charge for the trouble of filing the appropriate papers. Id.
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3. Moral Turpitude.-Former Maryland Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(3) provided that "[a] lawyer shall not
... [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. '3 26 A vio-
lation of the rule could be proved by a criminal conviction for the
underlying offense. A violation of other disciplinary rules, such as
those concerning client funds, could also form the basis of a moral
turpitude charge. In either event, disbarment was the appropriate
sanction.327
The new Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct omit the term
"moral turpitude." New rule 8.4(b), however, does provide that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects. '3 28 The comment to rule 8.4 suggests
that the new rule represents an attempt to continue and to clarify
the traditional distinction between crimes involving moral turpitude
and other crimes. Hence, cases construing the term "moral turpi-
tude" should remain persuasive authority under the new rule.
a. Misappropriating Client Funds.-Very strict rules govern how
an attorney may handle funds, particularly those of a client. The
attorney should open separate deposit accounts 330 and maintain de-
tailed records of any transactions involving these funds. 33' "Misap-
propriation" is the use of client funds for personal benefit.3 3 2 If
improper accounting amounted to intentional, rather than merely
negligent, misappropriation of client funds, the conduct involved
moral turpitude under the former disciplinary rules; such conduct
may also constitute professional misconduct under the new Mary-
land Rules.333
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Parker3 34 Mr. Parker, a mem-
ber of the Maryland bar, became the investment advisor for Mrs.
326. Md. Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(3) (1986).
327. See, e.g., Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 520, 307 A.2d 677,
682 (1973).
328. MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(b).
329. Id. (comment).
330. Md. Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 9-102(A) (1986); MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT
1.15(a).
331. Md. Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 9-102(B)(3) (1986); MD. R. OF PROF. CON-
DUCT 1.15(a).
332. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Morehead, 306 Md. 808, 817, 511 A.2d 520, 525
(1986).
333. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Parker, 306 Md. 36, 46, 506 A.2d 1183, 1188-
89 (1986).
334. 306 Md. 36, 506 A.2d 1183 (1986).
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Dianeray Chanudet.3 35 He received $39,000 to invest as he saw
fit. 33 6 Mr. Parker first deposited the capital into an escrow account,
but then invested all but $500 in high-interest loans.33 7 The re-
maining $500 was kept in his safe.3 3 8 Though he did not keep
records of these financial transactions, he created bogus records in
response to an inquiry by Mrs. Chanudet's attorney.339 He also
cashed interest checks arising from these loans without depositing
them in Mrs. Chanudet's escrow account.3 40
The trial court first held Mr. Parker in violation of article 10,
section 44 of the Maryland Annotated Code which requires an attor-
ney expeditiously to deposit any entrusted funds into a separate ac-
count.3 4 ' His deposits into an escrow account of the capital sums
satisfied the statute, but his handling of the interest payments did
not. 3 4 2  This statutory violation constituted attorney misconduct
under the former Maryland disciplinary rules.343 The court also
held that Mr. Parker's failure to keep adequate records of the loan
transactions was incompetent and neglectful in violation of the for-
mer disciplinary rules.3 44
335. Id. at 38-39, 506 A.2d at 1184-85. Mrs. Chanudet, a Belgian woman, "was look-
ing for the American equivalent of a Thomme d'affairs' in her native land." Id. at 38, 506
A.2d at 1185.
336. Id. at 39-40, 506 A.2d at 1185.
337. Id. at 41, 506 A.2d at 1186.
338. Id. He regarded the $500 in his safe as money to use as he wished, but it re-
mained there until these proceedings began. Id. at 40-41, 506 A.2d at 1185-86.
339. Id. at 40-41, 506 A.2d at 1186. That attorney, Mr. Munday, reported Mr. Parker
to the Attorney Grievance Commission. Id.
340. Id. at 41, 506 A.2d at 1186. According to testimony at trial, Mrs. Chanudet
thought Mr. Parker would deposit any interest received into her escrow account. Mr.
Parker believed he was to hold the interest payments and reinvest them if appropriate.
Id.
341. Id. at 42, 506 A.2d at 1186; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (1987).
342. 306 Md. at 42, 506 A.2d at 1186.
343. Id. The trial court determined that the failure to expeditiously deposit Mrs.
Chanudet's interest payments constituted a violation of three subsections of the former
Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility, namely, DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (6). These
subsections stated respectively that a lawyer should not "engage in illegal conduct in-
volving moral turpitude," "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation," or "engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law." Rules 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct su-
persede DR 1-102(A)(3), (4). DR 1-102(A)(6), however, appears not to have a direct
counterpart in the new rules.
344. 306 Md. at 42-43, 506 A.2d at 1187. Maryland Code of Professional Responsi-
bility DR 6-101 provided in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle... ;
(3) neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
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The trial court found that despite both parties' denials, an at-
torney-client relationship existed between Mr. Parker and Mrs.
Chanudet. 45 This relationship triggered further provisions of the
former disciplinary rules. The court concluded that Mr. Parker did
not intentionally fail to zealously represent his client, as the evi-
dence indicated that he tried to do his very best for Mrs. Chanudet
within his abilities.3 46 But even though upon request he promptly
paid any funds in his possession, he did fail to preserve the identity
of a client's funds; for he maintained no records of the interest
payments.3 47
The Court of Appeals held that the conclusions drawn by the
trial judge from the evidence before him were not clearly errone-
ous.3 48 Therefore, the court overruled exceptions filed by both liti-
gants.3 49 Because the trial judge's findings did not indicate that Mr.
Parker actually misappropriated the funds, disbarment was not the
mandated sanction.3 50 Nonetheless, Mr. Parker's violation of the
statute and his failure to maintain records was worrisome.3 5 1 Ac-
cordingly, the court suspended him for ninety days. 5 2
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 supersedes DR 6-101 (A)(1). Maryland Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.3 supersedes DR 6-101(A)(3).
345. 306 Md. at 43, 506 A.2d at 1187. Note that neither the attorney nor the client
thought the relationship existed, there was no retainer or agreement as to a fee, id., and
Mrs. Chanudet had another attorney draft her will after initiating her relationship with
Mr. Parker, id. at 40, 506 A.2d at 1186.
346. Id. at 44, 506 A.2d at 1187. An attorney's duty to zealously represent his client's
interests previously was set forth in Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-
101. This duty is now embodied in MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.2, 1.3.
347. 306 Md. at 44, 506 A.2d at 1188. Former Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 9-102(B)(3) required lawyers to "[m]aintain complete records of all
funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the law-
yer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them." DR 9-102(B)(4) was
the prompt payment provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility. These provi-
sions have now been superseded by MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(a)-(b).
348. 306 Md. at 45, 506 A.2d at 1188.
349. Id. Mr. Parker filed seven exceptions that could be categorized as three basic
objections: (1) that there was no attorney-client relationship between himself and Mrs.
Chanudet; (2) that he did not misrepresent records to Mrs. Chanudet's attorney; and (3)
that he did not fail to deposit properly, account for, or pay the funds of a client. Id. at
45-46, 506 A.2d at 1188. The Bar Counsel, apparently seeking disbarment, excepted to
the trial judge's failure to find a misappropriation of funds, or dishonesty under former
Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4). 306 Md. at 45, 506 A.2d
at 1188.
350. Id. at 46, 506 A.2d at 1188.




b. Tax Fraud .- The Court of Appeals held in Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Osburn353 that when an individual has been convicted
for violating the Maryland Income Tax Law,3 5 4 deliberately provid-
ing inaccurate information on a Maryland State income tax return,
and submitting a fraudulent return, that individual has committed a
crime of moral turpitude.3"5 Citing cases in which an attorney has
been disbarred for filing fraudulent federal tax returns,356 the court
noted that whether the return is filed at the state or federal level
does not affect its fraudulent nature; disbarment is still the proper
sanction.3 57 In response to Mr. Osburn's contention that newly dis-
covered evidence would prove his innocence of the criminal
charges, the court declined to review findings made in the underly-
ing criminal proceeding and accepted the conviction as proper.358
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jacob159 the Court of Appeals
found that Felix Jacob, a member of the Maryland Bar, failed to re-
port $2788.32 of taxable income for the 1975 tax year. 60 Jacob is
sued checks to clients, who in turn endorsed the checks back to
Jacob. This "practice was intended to, and resulted in, a reduction
in the amount of legal fee income on the books and records of the
law firm .... "361
Jacob first contended that before disbarment he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. 62 But Maryland Rule BV6.b. l b clearly indi-
cated that such a hearing is not required if a court has previously
convicted the individual for a crime that is the basis for the discipli-
353. 304 Md. 179, 498 A.2d 276 (1985).
354. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 221, 302(a) (1980).
355. 304 Md. at 181, 498 A.2d at 277. Former Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 1-102(A)(3) prohibited a lawyer from engaging in "illegal conduct in-
volving moral turpitude." Similarly, Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b)
provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects."
356. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 340 A.2d 710 (1975); Mary-
land State Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 318 A.2d 809 (1974); Maryland State Bar
Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974).
357. 304 Md. at 181, 498 A.2d at 277.
358. Id. at 182, 498 A.2d at 278. Note that under MD. R. BVlO.e.l Osburn's convic-
tion was "conclusive proof" of his guilt. The Court of Appeals previously reviewed the
criminal case against Osburn in Osburn v. State, 301 Md. 250, 482 A.2d 405 (1984).
359. 303 Md. 172, 492 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 272 (1985).
360. Id. at 174, 492 A.2d at 906. The court based its finding on Jacob's conviction by
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for subscribing a false fed-
eral income tax return.
361. Id. at 175, 492 A.2d at 906.
362. Id. at 177, 492 A.2d at 907.
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nary proceeding.36 3 Other Maryland cases have so interpreted the
rules.3s "
Jacob next contended that disbarment was an unjustly harsh
sanction since, as a matter of fact, Jacob's tax liability turned out to
be approximately that which he indicated on his return.3 5 The
court noted, however, that Jacob's conviction was based on fraud,
for having "falsely sworn under the penalties of perjury to a tax re-
turn,"3 6 6 not on the incidental results flowing therefrom.36 7 The
court concluded that such an offense involves moral turpitude,
3 6 8
necessitating disbarment as a matter of course.3
6 9
4. Mitigation.-In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shaffer 370 the
Court of Appeals addressed charges that an attorney violated the
former Maryland disciplinary rules by handling a legal matter be-
yond his expertise and by engaging in fraudulent conduct.3 7' The
court found in Shaffer's favor on the first charge, 72 but not the
second. 73
363. MD. R. BV6.b.I provides in relevant part: "An Inquiry Panel proceeding is not
required in a case where . . .(b) The complaint is . . . (i) that there has been a final
judgment of conviction as defined by Rule BV1O.e.1 of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year;... MD. R. BVIO.e. 1 provides: "In a hearing of charges
pursuant to this Rule, a final judgment by a judicial tribunal in another proceeding con-
victing an attorney of a crime shall be conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of that
crime ...."
364. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 479, 408 A.2d 719, 722
(1979); see Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 273 Md. 351, 355, 329 A.2d 106, 108
(1974).
365. 303 Md. at 180, 492 A.2d at 909.
366. Id. Jacob violated 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1982), which prohibits the willful filing of
a false federal income tax return.
367. 303 Md. at 180, 492 A.2d at 909.
368. Id. Note that the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct have rendered obso-
lete the term "moral turpitude." It is likely, however, that Jacobs would be found to
have engaged in professional misconduct under MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(b). Rule
8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects."
369. 303 Md. at 181, 492 A.2d at 909.
370. 305 Md. 190, 502 A.2d 502 (1986).
371. Former Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101(A)(l) prohib-
ited an attorney from handling a legal matter that the attorney knows or should know he
or she is not competent to handle. MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.1, which requires an
attorney to provide competent representation, has superseded DR 6-101 (A)(1). Former
Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility DR b-102(A)(4) prohibited attorneys
from engaging in dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative conduct. MD. R.
OF PROF. CONDUCT 8.4 continues this prohibition.
372. 305 Md. at 201, 502 A.2d at 508.
373. Id. at 203-04, 502 A.2d at 509.
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A trial judge from the Fourth Judicial Circuit found that Shaffer
should have requested assistance from a competent associate to
handle a legal matter that he knew or should have known was be-
yond his own expertise.374 Shaffer's improper conduct included his
failures to call a witness to the stand despite his client's urging, to
cross-examine competently, and to conduct a pretrial factual investi-
gation.3" The trial judge deemed these shortcomings to be sub-
stantially attributable to Shaffer's inexperience as an attorney.376
The Court of Appeals held that to warrant disciplinary action,
the need for more experienced counsel must be manifest at the out-
set of proceedings.37 7 Shaffer's failure to recognize the complexity
and intricacies of litigation practice was not enough for the court to
find him in violation of the disciplinary rule. 378
The court did, however, sustain the trial court's finding that
Shaffer violated a second disciplinary rule by engaging in misrepre-
sentative conduct, as evidenced by a prior criminal case in which he
pled guilty to writing bad checks. 379 By entering such a plea, he was
deemed to have known of the insufficiency of funds.38 °
The trial court had found a causal link between Shaffer's alco-
hol abuse and his misconduct. 38 ' Recognizing that " 'the purpose
of a disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public rather than pun-
ish the erring attorney,' -3" and accepting the premise that alcohol-
ism is a disease not impossible to overcome, the Court of Appeals
suspended Shaffer indefinitely, and granted him the right to petition
for reinstatement after thirty days from suspension.3 83  This right
374. Id. at 197, 502 A.2d at 506.
375. Id. at 200, 502 A.2d at 507.
376. Id. at 201, 502 A.2d at 507.
377. Id.
378. The court did not find a violation of former Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 6-101 (A)(1), which prohibited lawyers from handling legal matters they
knew or should have known they were not competent to handle; however, the court
disagreed with Shaffer's contention that "some form of culpable negligence" is required
for a violation of this disciplinary rule. 305 Md. at 201-02, 502 A.2d at 508.
379. 305 Md. at 203-04, 502 A.2d at 509.
380. Id. at 203, 502 A.2d at 509. The court also noted that the crime of which Shaffer
was convicted-obtaining property or services by means of a bad check-requires gen-
eral rather than specific intent. See id. at 202-03, 502 A.2d at 509; MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 141(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
381. Id. at 198, 502 A.2d at 506.
382. Id. at 204, 502 A.2d at 509 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Parker, 299
Md. 435, 446, 474 A.2d 211, 217 (1984), in which the court cited Attorney Grievance




was conditioned on his participation in rehabilitative activities."8 4
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Newman3 8 5 the Court of Ap-
peals agreed with a psychiatrist's testimony that since other aspects
of Newman's moral life had not been impaired, alcoholism did not
cause Mr. Newman's fraudulent behavior.38 6 In 1984 Newman had
entered a guilty plea to federal mail fraud charges.38 7 The court
ruled that if there is no causal connection between alcoholism and
fraudulent, deceitful, and self-serving conduct, the condition can
neither mitigate such conduct nor save the individual from
disbarment.3 8 8
F. Other Developments
1. Freedom of Information.-In City of Baltimore v. Burke3 9 the
Court of Special Appeals interpreted the Maryland Public Informa-
tion Act (MPIA)39 ° in the context of an ongoing political contro-
versy. The case arose when, pursuant to the MPIA, the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore (City), and the Director of Public Works
for Baltimore City refused to disclose to a newspaper reporter cer-
tain information concerning construction of the Patapsco Waste
Water Treatment Plant. 39 ' Because the MPIA provides only for the
temporary withholding of public records, the City sought judicial
permission to continue its refusal to disclose the requested
information.
The City argued that since disclosure of the requested docu-
ments could weaken its position in a pending arbitration case3 92 and
384. Id. at 205, 502 A.2d at 509-10
385. 304 Md. 370, 499 A.2d 479 (1985).
386. Id. at 376, 499 A.2d at 482-83.
387. Id. Newman received a five-year suspended sentence. The court imposed a five-
year period of probation, conditioned on his continued treatment for alcoholism. Id. at
373, 499 A.2d at 481.
388. Id. at 377-78, 499 A.2d at 483.
389. 67 Md. App. 147, 506 A.2d 683, cert. denied sub nom. City of Baltimore v. Katz, 306
Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986).
390. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-611 to -630 (1984).
391. 67 Md. App. at 149-50, 506 A.2d at 684-85. Specifically, the reporter sought
information on the effects and costs of the design and construction of improvements to
the Patapsco plant. Id. at 149, 506 A.2d at 684. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-619
(1984) authorizes the official custodian of a public record temporarily to deny inspection
of that public record if he or she believes that "inspection would cause substantial injury
to the public interest."
392. 67 Md. App. at 153, 506 A.2d at 686. The City was involved in an arbitration
proceeding with theJ.W. Bateson Company (Bateson), a construction firm that built the
last phases of the Patapsco plant. Bateson demanded over $12 million from the City as
additional compensation for work necessitated by alleged design errors. Id. at 149 n.2,
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weaken its position in future legal proceedings stemming from the
arbitration claims, the City could properly withhold disclosure
under section 10-619 of the MPIA3 93 to prevent "substantial injury
to the public interest. 31 9 4 The court, however, held that "the tacti-
cal disadvantage which the City may suffer in resolving its pending
[arbitration] claims because of the disclosure is insufficient to estab-
lish a 'substantial injury to the public interest' .....
In ordering the City to disclose the information, the Court of
Special Appeals noted the MPIA's clear preference for public disclo-
sure;39 6 it also cited Moberly v. Herboldsheimer,397 in which the Court
of Appeals held that an individual's motive for requesting informa-
tion has no bearing on the issue of whether disclosure would result
in injury to the public interest.398 Though the reporter's motive in
Burke for requesting information was to uncover weaknesses in the
City's legal position in a collateral proceeding, such action would
not establish an injury to the public interest.3 99
The court also held that the City's denial of the reporter's re-
quest for a fee waiver, and its $50,000 charge for the reproduction
of 160,000 pages of documents, was arbitrary and capricious.4 °0
Section 10-621(d)(2) of the State Government Article permits the
waiver of fees in cases in which the circumstances indicate that a
waiver "would be in the public interest. '40i The Court of Special
Appeals adopted the federal courts' liberal construction of the fed-
eral Freedom of Information Act fee waiver provision, which fa
vors fee waivers for the media or "other requesters who will provide
broad public dissemination of the information sought. '40 3 The
506 A.2d at 684 n.2. The City argued that disclosure of the requested documents would
jeopardize its defense against Bateson's claims. Id. at 153, 506 A.2d at 686.
393. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-619 (1984).
394. 67 Md. App. at 153, 506 A.2d at 686.
395. Id. at 155, 506 A.2d at 687.
396. Id. at 153, 506 A.2d at 686.
397. 276 Md. 211, 345 A.2d 855 (1975).
398. Id. at 227-28, 345 A.2d at 864.
399. 67 Md. App. at 155, 506 A.2d at 687.
400. Id. at 157, 506 A.2d at 688.
401. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-621(d)(2) (1984). Section 10-621(d) provides:
(d) Waiver.-The official custodian may waive a fee under this section if:
(1) The applicant asks for a waiver; and
(2) After consideration of the ability of the applicant to pay the fee
and other relevant factors, the official custodian determines that the waiver
would be in the public interest.
402. 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(4) (1982).
403. 67 Md. App. at 156, 506 A.2d at 688. The court identified two community bene-
fits that would be derived from a disclosure: (1) The public would become informed of
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MPIA also provides that "other relevant factors" may be considered
in determining whether the public interest justifies a waiver.40 4 The
court noted that the benefits of publicly disclosing the information
requested is a relevant factor that the City should have, but did not,
consider; thus, the court ordered a fee waiver.40 5
2. Legislation.-Chapter 601 of the 1986 Laws of Maryland de-
fined the powers of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commis-
sion.4 °6  The Act proclaimed that unless a quorum of the
Commission or of a panel of the Commission is present, public
hearings may not be held,40 7 and no official action may be taken.4 0
Chapter 604 of the Act prohibits the Commission from estab-
lishing an impervious surfaces limitation greater than certain
amounts unless approved by the General Assembly. More specifi-
cally, "[f]or stormwater runoff, man-caused impervious areas shall
be limited to 15 percent of the parcel to be developed. However,
impervious surfaces on any lot not exceeding one acre in size in a
subdivision approved afterJune 1, 1986 may be up to 25 percent of




the health hazards associated with the dumping of inadequately treated sewage into the
Patapsco River; and (2) the public would be made aware of the high cost of improve-
ments to the Patapsco Waste Water Treatment Plant. The court also noted that a denial
of a fee waiver in this case "might have a chilling effect on the free exercise of freedom
of the press." Id. at 157, 506 A.2d at 688.
404. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-621(d)(2) (1984).
405. 67 Md. App. at 157, 506 A.2d at 688.
406. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1804(e) (Supp. 1986).
407. Id. at § 8-1804(e)(3).
408. Id. at § 8-1804(e)(4). In addition to a quorum, § 8-1804(e)(4)(ii) requires a ma-
jority vote for any official actions by the Commission or one of its panels.




1. In Personam.-In Nueva Engineering, Inc. v. Accurate Electronics,
Inc.,' an action by a Maryland corporation against a Connecticut
corporation, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland held that it had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant2 even though the plaintiff had initiated the business rela-
tionship between the two. 3
The plaintiff, a manufacturer, sued one of its principal custom-
ers for breach of contract. After reviewing the general case law on
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants,4 the court considered
whether the existence of a contract between the two parties was suf-
ficient evidence of purpose and foreseeability on the defendant's
part to confer jurisdiction on the court. In deciding that question,
federal and state courts, which are "deeply divided" on the issue,5
have considered various factors, the most important of which is
whether the nonresident defendant corporation "initiated the busi-
ness relationship in some way." 6 In addition, the Supreme Court
1. 628 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1986).
2. Since the plaintiff had served process on the defendant at the defendant's princi-
pal place of business, pursuant to F. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and the Maryland long-arm statute,
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1984), the court limited itself to considera-
tion of "whether jurisdiction over the defendant ... would violate the due process
clause." 628 F. Supp. at 954.
3. A manufacturer's sales representative for the plaintiff solicited orders from the
defendant at the defendant's place of business in Connecticut. Within two years, the
defendant became one of the plaintiff's "crucial customers." The defendant's president
made a few business trips, but he never placed any orders during these trips. All orders
were placed from Connecticut. 628 F. Supp at 955-56.
4. The court reiterated the "minimum contacts" test from International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which held that due process requires a nonresident
defendant to have had certain minimum contacts with the state such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice." Next, the court reviewed the "foreseeability" test from World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen held that a defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that he should reasonably
foresee being "haled into court" there. Finally the court discussed the then most recent
Supreme Court case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), which held
that the defendant must "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
5. 628 F. Supp. at 954 (quoting Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State
Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
6. Id. at 955. The court found that the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, a
district court in Washington, D.C., and the Supreme Court favored this approach.
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has developed a set of equitable considerations that may " 'serve to
establish the reasonableness ofjurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.' "7
Although the court found that the defendant had not initiated
the business relationship, the court concluded that the defendant
had "[taken] steps preparatory to initiating a new phase of that rela-
tionship" when its president met with the plaintiff's president in
Baltimore to discuss plans for expanding the business.' A Fourth
Circuit decision, August v. HBA Life Insurance Corp.,9 provided author-
itative precedent for granting jurisdiction on that basis. The court
also emphasized that the nature of the business relationship, "a spe-
cial, heavily interdependent one," was an important factor in the de-
cision.1 0 Finally, the court implied that in cases like this, the
defendant must make at least some showing of unfairness. The de-
fendant here, however, had not "introduce[d] a scintilla of evidence
that defending this suit in Maryland [would] impose a special hard-
ship upon it."" The court concluded that the proximity of Mary-
land and Connecticut, the interest of the forum state in providing
relief for its citizens against out-of-state debtors, and the interest of
the interstate judicial system in obtaining "the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies," outweighed the defendant's interest in de-
fending itself in its home state.' 2
In Bailey v. Stouter' 3 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to foreclose the redemption rights
Other factors include "whether the parties contemplated that the work would be per-
formed, where negotiations were conducted, [and] where payment was made." Id.
7. Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). The Burger King Court noted the fol-
lowing considerations: "the 'burden on the defendant,' the 'forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
social policies.'" 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
8. 628 F. Supp. at 956. See supra note 3 for a summary of the relationship between
the corporations.
9. 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984). In that case an Arizona insurance company mailed
to an existing policy holder in Virginia a request to sign an agreement that would
change the terms of the policy. The Fourth Circuit held that the request constituted a
"solicitation" sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the Virginia courts. Id. at 173.
10. 628 F. Supp. at 957. The court cited Burger King and Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v.
Modem Chain Co., 610 F. Supp. 285 (D.R.I. 1985), as examples of cases in which courts
took jurisdiction over foreign corporations because of a special, interdependent busi-
ness relationship. The court also noted that the plaintiff's vice president for sales had
likened the business relationship to a "marriage." 628 F. Supp at 956.
11. 628 F. Supp. at 957.
12. Id.
13. 66 Md. App. 180, 502 A.2d 1125, cert. denied, 306 Md. 288, 508 A.2d 488 (1986).
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of two Maryland residents. 14 The plaintiff had neither notified the
defendants by personal service of process nor satisfied the statutory
preconditions for reliance on notice by publication.' 5
Under article 81, section 106(a), Maryland residents who are
named as defendants in foreclosure proceedings must be personally
served with subpoenas. 16 Publication notice, which is required con-
temporaneously with personal service by section 107(a),' 7 is suffi-
cient only when two successive subpoenas have been returned non
est, t8 or when one subpoena has been returned non est and the plain-
tiff files an affidavit swearing that the defendant has attempted to
evade service or that his whereabouts are unknown.' 9
In Bailey the plaintiff ignored the owners' address listed in the
tax records and, claiming to have found "newer, more current ad-
dresses," 2 ° had the subpoenas issued to the wrong addresses. 2'
One subpoena was returned undelivered and the other was returned
non est.22 Neither subpoena was reissued.23 When no one answered
the complaint, the court entered a final foreclosure decree. 24 The
plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit asserting that he had searched
the relevant records and was unable to ascertain the present ad-
dresses of the defendants. The Court of Special Appeals, however,
held the affidavit insufficient under former Maryland Rule 105 b 1,25
14. Id. at 192, 502 A.2d at 1131.
15. Id.
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 106(a) (1980).
17. Id. at § 107(a).
18. That is, non est inventus, or "He is not found." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 950 (5th
ed. 1979).
19. Section 106(a) provides in relevant part:
Upon the filing of the bill of complaint [to foreclose the right of redemption],
the court shall issue its subpoena for all parties defendant named in the said bill
who are residents of this State and upon such bill the same process by sum-
mons, notice or otherwise shall be had to procure the answer and appearance
of all such defendants as is had in other cases in equity .... Provided that in all
cases where two successive subpoenas against a named defendant have been
returned non est or upon the return of one subpoena non est and proof by affida-
vit that a defendant has kept out of the way or has secreted himself to avoid
service of the subpoena, or whose whereabouts may be unknown, such defend-
ant shall be deemed to be served by the publication issuing under the provi-
sions of the succeeding sections as if he were a non-resident.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 106(a) (1957).
20. 66 Md. App. at 189, 502 A.2d at 1129.
21. Id., 502 A.2d at 1129-30.
22. Id., 502 A.2d at 1130.
23. Id. at 183, 502 A.2d at 1127.
24. Id. at 184, 502 A.2d at 1127.
25. Former rule 105 b 1 has been replaced by rule 2-122(a), which eliminates the
former rule's requirement that the plaintiff set forth "a circumstantial account" of the
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which required the plaintiff to set forth "a circumstantial account of
the efforts made to locate the defendant which satisfies the court
that reasonable efforts to locate the defendant have been made in
good faith."26 The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
a clerk's failure to reissue the subpoenas excused the plaintiff from
the requirement of waiting for a'second subpoena to be returned
non est before relying on publication notice.27
The plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of sec-
tion 106(a) deprived the court ofjurisdiction. Moreover, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the jurisdictional issue was properly
raised by a party who was not one of the owners at the time of the
foreclosure proceeding, but was a successor to one of the owners. 28
In addition, the court held that the plaintiff's use of three married
women's birth names instead of their marital surnames would not
render notice by publication fatally defective as a matter of law.2 9 In
general, "the notice should state the name customarily used by the
person to whom the notice is addressed and ... the failure to state
that name may, under some circumstances, cause the notice to be
fatally defective."' In this case, however, each of the married wo-
men who raised the issue actually had retained her birth name as
part of her marital name.3'
efforts to locate the defendant. The plaintiff still must show that "reasonable efforts
have been made in good faith to locate the defendant." MD. R. 2-122(a).
26. 66 Md. App. at 189-90, 502 A.2d at 1130. The court said:
Merely stating that counsel has searched the land records and other records of
the court does not appear to us to be a "circumstantial account of the efforts
made to locate the defendant" under the circumstances of this case. At the very
least, counsel should have explained why he ignored the.., address shown in
the county tax records.
27. Id. at 190-91, 502 A.2d at 1130-31. The court distinguished Piersma v. Seitz, 10
Md. App. 439, 271 A.2d 199 (1970), aff'd, 262 Md. 61, 276 A.2d 666 (1971) (per
curiam). The Piersma court held that "the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the 'proper
performance of the Clerk's duty' to reissue the summons 'as a matter of course,' and that
the action was not barred simply because the plaintiff failed to direct the clerk to do what
the law commanded him to do." 66 Md. App. at 191, 502 A.2d at 1130 (quoting Piersma,
10 Md. App. at 443, 271 A.2d at 202). Piersma, however, dealt with "the purely proce-
dural question of when a summons will be permitted to lie dormant," rather than the
dispensing of "a statutorily required form of notice." Id. at 191, 502 A.2d at 1130-31.
28. 66 Md. App. at 192, 502 A.2d at 1131. The court relied on Smith v. Watner, 256
Md. 400, 405-09, 260 A.2d 341, 344-46 (1970).
29. The three married women held remainder interests in the property, and their
whereabouts were unknown. 66 Md. App. at 185, 502 A.2d at 1128.
30. Id. at 186, 502 A.2d at 1128.
31. Two old cases, Morris v. Tracy, 58 Kan. 137, 48 P. 571 (1897), and Freeman v.
Hawkins, 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364 (1890), held notice by publication insufficient when
it identified married women by their birth names. The court, however, distinguished
Morris and Freeman on the ground that those cases were decided at a time when married
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2. Subject Matter.-In Williams v. Williams 2 the Court of Ap-
peals held that a court of equity had subject matter jurisdiction over
and could order specific performance of a marital separation and
property settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into
a divorce decree." Although courts ordinarily do not grant specific
performance of agreements to pay money, the court noted that an
exception exists for "agreements between husband and wife for pay-
ment of alimony or support."34 The court further held that the
chancellor properly had entered a money judgment against the peti-
tioner's former husband for overdue payments because once equita-
ble jurisdiction had attached, the court was entitled to grant "full
and complete relief," including relief that is "ordinarily granted at
law by way of a monetary judgment."3 5
B. FinalJudgments
1. Lower Court's Erroneous Determination.-In Houghton v. County
Commissioners of Kent County 6 the plaintiffs unwittingly lost their right
to appeal an adverse circuit court decision by relying on the Court
of Special Appeals' erroneous determination that the circuit court
women were required by law to take their husbands' surnames. 66 Md. App. at 185, 502
A.2d at 1128.
32. 305 Md. 1, 501 A.2d 432 (1985).
33. The agreement provided that it was not to be incorporated or merged into any
divorce decree. When Mr. and Mrs. Williams were divorced, the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County "ratified, approved and adopted" the agreement, but did not incorpo-
rate or merge it into its divorce decree. Id. at 2-3, 501 A.2d at 433.
Mrs. Williams had also requested that Mr. Williams be held in contempt for failure
to pay alimony. He argued that the court could not adjudicate a claim of contempt
because the separation agreement had not been incorporated into the court's divorce
decree. Id. at 4, 501 A.2d at 433. The circuit court held that the agreement could be
enforced through contempt proceedings, but the court only ordered Mr. Williams to pay
his overdue nonalimony expenses. The Court of Special Appeals held that the chancel-
lor had erred on the contempt issue, but upheld the money judgment anyway on the
ground that the court had acquired jurisdiction by way of the request for specific per-
formance. Id. at 5, 501 A.2d at 434. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 9, 501 A.2d
at 436.
34. Id. at 8, 501 A.2d at 435.
35. Id. at 7, 501 A.2d at 435 (citing C.W. Jackson & Assocs. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658,
666-67, 426 A.2d 378, 382 (1981); Charles County Broadcasting Co. v. Meares, 270 Md.
321, 329, 311 A.2d 27, 32 (1973); and Hardisty v. Kay, 268 Md. 202, 211-12, 299 A.2d
771, 776 (1973)).
The court also held that service of process on Mr. Williams was sufficient. He had
identified himself to a private process server, inquired into the nature of the documents,
and began reading them. His attempt to evade service by disavowing his identity and
refusing to accept the documents was ineffectual. Id. at 6-7, 501 A.2d at 434-35. Service
was complete when the process server left the documents at the defendant's attorney's
office in the defendant's presence. Id. at 6, 501 A.2d at 434.
36. 305 Md. 407, 504 A.2d 1145, reconsid, denied, 307 Md. 216, 513 A.2d 291 (1986).
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had not issued a final judgment. The Court of Appeals later held
that the circuit court's decision was indeed final and appealable, and
that the plaintiffs' second appeal was therefore too late." The court
later denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration despite a sup-
porting memorandum filed by the Maryland Bar Association."8
Mr. and Mrs. Edward Houghton had filed a three-count com-
plaint against the County Commissioners of Kent County.39 On
January 21, 1985, the Circuit Court for Kent County entered an or-
der granting the Commissioners' motion to dismiss counts I and
III.40 On January 23 the Houghtons filed a notice voluntarily dis-
missing count II.41 On February 19 the Houghtons filed an order of
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which the appellate court
dismissed on April 19 on the ground that the circuit court had not
yet entered a finaljudgment.42 Rather than petitioning the Court of
Appeals to review that decision, the Houghtons waited until May 1,
when the circuit court entered an order of "Final Judgment" on
counts I and III.13 The next day the Houghtons filed a second order
of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.44 Later they filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.45
The Commissioners moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that it was filed more than thirty days after the circuit court's final
judgment and therefore conferred no appellate jurisdiction.46 Con-
37. Id. at 412-13, 504 A.2d at 1146.
38. Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 513 A.2d 291
(1986).
39. 305 Md. at 409, 504 A.2d at 1146. The complaint concerned a voting project to
improve a public wharf on the Chester River. The first count alleged that two of the
three commissioners had entered into an "improper vote trading agreement." The sec-
ond count alleged that the public wharf would be a nuisance. The third count alleged
that the claimed improper agreement was made at an illegal meeting between the two
commissioners. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Id.,
504 A.2d at 1146-47.
40. Id. at 410, 504 A.2d at 1147. The court's order stated that "the Motion to Dis-
miss Counts I and III of the Complaint as Amended is GRANTED this 21st day ofJanu-
ary, 1985. The Motion is Denied as to Count II." The word "judgment" was not used
in the docket entry. Id.
41. Id. The notice of dismissal was entered on the docket the same day it was filed,
and it too did not use the word "judgment." Id.
42. Id. at 410-11, 504 A.2d at 1147. The court dismissed the appeal on its own
motion.
43. Id. at 411, 504 A.2d at 1147. The entry on the circuit court docket read: "BY
ORDER OF THE Court (Judge J. Owen Wise) Final Judgment entered in favor of De-
fendant as to Counts I & III." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id., 504 A.2d at 1147-48; see MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1984);
MD. R. 1012 a.
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trary to the Court of Special Appeals, they contended that the
Houghtons' voluntary dismissal of count II on January 23, together
with the court's order dismissing counts I and III on January 21,
amounted to a final appealable judgment.47 The Houghtons coun-
tered that the January "judgment" was "not an appealable final
judgment ... because the Court of Special Appeals said it was not
final ... and that is the law of the case." 48
The Court of Appeals rejected the "law of the case" argument,
stating that:
[A] decision of the Court of Special Appeals on an earlier
appeal is not the law of the case for purposes of this
Court's review on a later appeal in the same case .... In
other words, in this Court, the law of the case doctrine has
no applicability when the prior decision relied upon was by
a subordinate court.4 9
The court held that "an unqualified order granting a motion to dis-
miss or strike the plaintiff's initial pleading, thereby having the ef-
fect of putting the parties out of court, is a final appealable order."50
"The orders ofJanuary 21 and 23, 1985," the court continued, "to-
gether constituted the final judgment of the circuit court."' 5 1 Thus,
the court dismissed the Houghton's appeal on the ground that it
had been filed too late, in violation of Maryland Rule 1012.52
In dissent, Judge McAuliffe, joined by Chief Judge Murphy,
urged the court to make an exception to the "law of the case" doc-
trine to avoid the "harsh and inequitable result" of denying the
Houghtons their right of appeal.5" He maintained that:
47. 305 Md. at 411, 504 A.2d at 1147-48.
48. Id. at 411-12, 504 A.2d at 1148.
49. Id. at 414, 504 A.2d at 1149.
50. Id. at 412, 504 A.2d at 1148.
51. Id. at 413, 504 A.2d at 1148. The court stated: "Nothing in Rule 2-601, adopted
on July 1, 1984, and dealing with the entry of judgment, requires that the word 'judg-
ment' always be used as a prerequisite to finality." Id.
52. The court remarked: "The requirement of Rule 1012 and its predecessors, that
an order of appeal be filed within thirty days of a final judgment, is jurisdictional; if the
requirement is not met, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must
be dismissed." Id. at 413, 504 A.2d at 1148.
53. Id. at 414-18, 504 A.2d at 1149-51 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Judge McAuliffe
conceded that the Court of Special Appeals had erred in dismissing the first appeal, and
he also approved of the law of the case doctrine "as it has developed and been inter-
preted" in Maryland. But he argued for a "narrow" exception here on the ground that
the "law of the case" doctrine is basically a "matter of good sense." Id. at 415, 504 A.2d
at 1150 (citing Petition of United States Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973)). He stated:
I am aware that hard cases sometimes make bad law, and that we must avoid
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[W]here the ruling that later proves erroneous has ad-
dressed the finality and appealability of an order, and the
result of not applying the law of the case doctrine is that an
innocent party will be deprived of the right of appeal, it
seems entirely reasonable to allow the earlier ruling to con-
trol the case.
54
Judge McAuliffe saw no problem in the Houghtons' failure to peti-
tion the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari following the dis-
missal of their first appeal by the Court of Special Appeals, and he
would not penalize them "for pursuing an alternative that was the
least expensive and the least demanding of the resources of a busy
court system."
5 5
The Houghtons filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that, until this case, the Bar and the Judges of the Court of
Special Appeals had believed that an appeal could not proceed
before the word "judgment" was entered on the docket.56 There-
fore, they argued, the court's decision overruled prior precedent 57
and should be given prospective effect only.58 The Maryland State
Bar Association, as amicus curiae, filed a memorandum in support
of the motion, taking essentially the same position as the Hought-
ons.59 In addition, the Bar Association urged the court to adopt the
"unique circumstances" doctrine, which the federal courts have de-
veloped to permit certain late appeals. The doctrine is " 'used when
distortion of a rule simply to avoid a harsh result in a single case. In this in-
stance, however, I believe the rule may be applied rationally and without distor-
tion to achieve a logical and just result.
305 Md. at 418, 504 A.2d at 1151.
54. 305 Md. at 417, 504 A.2d at 1150.
55. Id., 504 A.2d at 1150-51.
56. Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 218, 513 A.2d 291,
292 (1986). The Houghtons employed a bit of sarcasm as well: "If this Court or its
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure had ever resolved that it was
not necessary to have the word 'judgment' in the docket entry, someone neglected to
inform [the Bar and] the Court of Special Appeals." Id. at 218, 513 A.2d at 292.
57. The plaintiffs suggested that Houghton had overruled Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper,
276 Md. 698, 350 A.2d 661 (1976); Aronstamn v. Coffey, 259 Md. 47, 267 A.2d 741
(1970); and Felger v. Nichols, 30 Md. App. 278, 352 A.2d 330 (1976).
58. 307 Md. at 218, 513 A.2d at 292. The Houghtons urged the court to follow the
approach taken in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975), instead
of dismissing their appeal. In that case the court had held that a statute providing for
direct appeals from the Tax Court to the Court of Appeals was unconstitutional and
that, as a result, the Court of Appeals was itself without jurisdiction; however, rather
than dismissing the action, the Shell court transferred it to the appropriate circuit court.
The Houghton court, however, distinguished Shell on its facts. 307 Md. at 227-28, 513
A.2d at 297.
59. 307 Md. at 219, 513 A.2d at 292.
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an appellant is led astray by judicial action or the like. [It] protects a
limited class of appellants who, otherwise, would be left
remediless.' "60
The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and denied the
motion. The court stated that its decision in this case was not novel
and did not overrule prior cases:6' "We are aware of no case in this
Court... even suggesting that an unqualified order granting a mo-
tion to dismiss the plaintiffs' entire initial pleading is not a final
judgment or becomes a final judgment only when the word 'judg-
ment' is used."'62 The court declined to adopt the "unique circum-
stances" doctrine for several reasons: the doctrine is based on a
federal rule that has no equivalent in the Maryland Rules; 63 other
state courts have criticized the doctrine and refused to adopt it;'
and, the policies that underlie the doctrine have never persuaded
the Maryland Court of Appeals.65 Judge McAuliffe and Chief Judge
60. Id. (quoting Memorandum of the Maryland State Bar Association in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 21-22). The Bar Association relied on three
cases: Feister v. Turner, 783 F.2d 1474 (9th Cir. 1986); Thompson v. I.N.S., 375 U.S.
384 (1964); and Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215
(1962).
61. Id. at 220, 513 A.2d at 293.
62. Id. at 223-24, 513 A.2d at 295.
63. The court stated:
[T]he holding in [Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc, 371
U.S. 215 (1962)], the case at the heart of the doctrine, is based squarely on the
federal rule allowing an extension of time for an appeal upon a showing of
"excusable neglect." The Maryland Rules do not contain a comparable provi-
sion authorizing an extension of the time for appeal.
307 Md. at 230, 513 A.2d at 298.
64. 307 Md. at 230-31, 513 A.2d at 298. The court quoted at length from Town of
South Berwick v. Maineland, Inc., 409 A.2d 688 (Me. 1980). In that case the Maine
court criticized two cases that relied on Harris, Thompson v. I.N.S., 375 U.S. 384 (1964),
and Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 486 P.2d 181, 183 (1971).
65. 307 Md. at 231, 513 A.2d at 298. The court quoted from an earlier case in which
it refused to give an appellant a second chance to make up for a trial court's mistake:
[T]he appellant and its counsel were not entitled, as of right, to rely entirely on
the judge's indicated purpose. It is settled that a party to litigation, over whom
the court has obtained jurisdiction, is charged with the duty of keeping aware of
what actually occurs in the case and is affected with notice of all subsequent
proceedings and that his actual knowledge is immaterial.
Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Ligon, 208 Md. 406, 421-22, 118 A.2d 665, 673 (1955).
The court also cited a case, exactly on point with the case at bar, to show that the
Houghton's circumstances were not so "unique." In Johnson v. Borg-Warner Accept-
ance Corp., 303 Md. 617, 495 A.2d 836 (1985) (per curiam), the circuit court entered an
order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court of Special Appeals dis-
missed the plaintiff's appeal, holding that the circuit court order was not a final judg-
ment. In that case, however, the plaintiff petitioned the Court of Appeals to review the
Court of Special Appeals' decision. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and




2. Partial Summary Judgment.-Maryland Rule 2-501 (e) permits
a trial judge to enter partial summary judgment-a judgment
against fewer than all the parties to an action, upon fewer than all
the claims in an action, or for less than all the monetary relief re-
quested.66 Under Maryland Rule 2-602, however, a partial summary
judgment becomes final and appealable only if the trial judge ex-
pressly certifies that there is no reason for delay.67 In Russell v. Amer-
ican Security Bank, N.A.6 the Court of Special Appeals held that rule
2-602 does not permit a trial judge to certify a partial summary
judgment as final if the amount of that judgment is dependent on
the resolution of undecided issues. 9
The plaintiff brought this action for nonpayment of the princi-
pal and interest on a loan.70 The trial judge granted a partial sum-
mary judgment under rule 2-501(e)(3) on the issue of the principal,
leaving only the issues of the interest and attorney's fees. 7' Pursu-
ant to rule 2-602, he certified this partial judgment as final, so as to
make it immediately appealable.72
The defendant contended that the amount of principal he owed
was contingent on the resolution of the proper interest rate.73 The
trial court, however, had never resolved that issue. 74 The appellate
court thus dismissed the appeal. The issue on which the trial court
entered summary judgment was dependent on the resolution of an
open issue; therefore, the trial judge erred in certifying the judg-
ment as final.75
66. MD. R. 2-501(e)(1)-(3).
67. MD. R. 2-602.
68. 65 Md. App 199, 499 A.2d 1320 (1985).
69. Id. at 206, 499 A.2d at 1324. This case was decided under the predecessor of
current rule 2-602. Both the former rule and the current rule are identical in effect,
though not in wording or organization. See 65 Md. App. at 203-04, 499 A.2d at 1323-
34.
70. 65 Md. App. at 200, 499 A.2d 1321.
71. Id. at 202, 499 A.2d at 1322.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 205-06, 499 A.2d at 1324. The defendant contended at trial that the bank
had charged a higher rate of interest than that specified in the note. If this issue were
resolved in the defendant's favor, some of the interest paid would have to be credited to
reduce the principal. Therefore, a determination of the principal amount was contingent
on the resolution of the interest rate issue. Id.




3. Effect of Motion to Alter or Amend.-In Unnamed Attorney v. At-
torney Grievance Commission76 the Court of Appeals held that a trial
court's judgment is not appealable if one of the parties has filed a
timely motion to modify the judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-
534.77 The trial court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1012 d, 78 must
then rule on the motion to modify the judgment before an appeal
will lie.
79
The court, in holding that this judgment was not appealable,80
stated that when a rule 2-534 "motion to alter or amend an other-
wise final judgment is filed within ten days after the judgment's en-
try, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal."'" An
appeal that has already been filed becomes ineffective, and a party
must file a new order of appeal after the court decides the motion to
alter or amend.82 This rule represents a positive change in proce-
dure because it allows the trial court judge to revise ajudgment and
thus possibly to avoid an appeal.
4. Consent Decrees.-In Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis 83 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that a trial court order that was entered by consent
76. 303 Md. 473, 494 A.2d 940 (1985).
77. Id. at 486, 494 A.2d at 946. MD. R. 2-534 provides in part: "In an action tried by
the court, on motion of any party filed within ten days after entry ofjudgment, the court
may... amend the judgement, or may enter a new judgment."
The court additionally held that when a party moves to alter or amend a judgment
after the ten-day period passes and after an appeal has been noted, appellate jurisdiction
attaches and the trial court cannot decide the motion. 303 Md. at 486, 494 A.2d at 946-
47.
78. MD. R. 1012 d provides:
In a civil action when a timely motion is filed . . . (3) to alter or amend a judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 2-534, the order for appeal shall be filed within thirty
days from the date of entry of an order denying, overruling, or dismissing a
motion for new trial or disposing of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a motion to alter or amend a judgment. An order for appeal filed
before the timely filing or the disposition of any of these motions shall have no
effect, and a new order for appeal must be filed within the time above provided.
79. 303 Md. at 486, 494 A.2d at 946.
80. Id., 494 A.2d at 947. This case arose out of the Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion's inquiry into the unnamed attorney's possible violations of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. Id. at 475, 494 A.2d at 941. OnJanuary 22, 1985, the circuit court
ordered the unnamed attorney to produce certain records. On February 1, 1985, the
Commission filed a motion to alter or amend the January 22 order. Id. at 478-79, 494
A.2d at 943. Because the Commission had thus filed its motion within ten days after the
judgment's entry, the judgment lost its finality. Id. at 486, 494 A.2d at 947.
81. Id. at 486, 494 A.2d at 946.
82. Id. Under former rule 625 the court had thirty days to revise a judgment; how-
ever, if an appeal was noted, the court lost its power to revise the judgment, and it
became final. Id. at 484-85, 494 A.2d at 946.
83. 66 Md. App. 717, 505 A.2d 899, cert. denied, 306 Md. 514, 510 A.2d 260 (1986).
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of the parties constituted a final appealable judgment because no
further action by the court was required to adjudicate the claims.8 4
Unlike a settlement order,8 5 a consent judgment is final and can be
revised only in cases of fraud, mistake, irregularity, newly discov-
ered evidence, or clerical error.8"
The Ramsey court also held that the trial court had properly re-
fused to admit extrinsic evidence to explain the intent of the parties
to the consent agreement: "A consent judgment, since it is the
product of negotiations, is subject to construction as a contract. "87
Maryland courts use an objective test in interpreting contracts.88 In
this case the court concluded that the language of the agreement
was unambiguous, and that "[t]he subjective understanding of the
consenting parties . . . [was] therefore immaterial."8 9
5. Consolidated Cases.-In Yarema v. Exxon Corp.9" the Court of
Appeals held that when a trial court consolidates several separate
and distinct cases for the purpose of trial9' and directs the entry of
separate judgments for each case,92 the consolidated cases are to be
treated as entirely separate actions for the purpose of finality of
judgment.9" Thus, ajudgment that disposes of all claims in a partic-
84. Id. at 725, 505 A.2d at 903. The court observed that the consent order "required
the defendants to pay a sum certain to the plaintiffs, dismissed all claims between the
parties, assessed court costs against the parties, and was recorded in the court's docket
by the clerk as required by Rule 2-601." Id.
85. The court distinguished Mitchell Properties, Inc. v. Real Estate Title Co., 62 Md.
App. 473, 490 A.2d 271 (1985), in which the Court of Special Appeals held that a settle-
ment order is not a finaljudgment. The settlement agreement in Mitchell made entry of
final judgment contingent upon the defendants' failure to pay the agreed damages and
costs within a specified time period. The Mitchell court had noted, however, that "[i]f the
court reduces the settlement order to a money judgment, it becomes a final judgment to
the extent the underlying agreement address [sic] the respective claims of the parties."
62 Md. App. at 483, 490 A.2d at 276 (citing Chertkofv. Harry S. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md.
544, 248 A.2d 373 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974 (1969)).
86. MD. R. 2-535 (b)-(d).
87. 66 Md. App. at 727, 505 A.2d at 904; see also authorities cited therein.
88. Id. at 727, 505 A.2d at 904. On this point the court quoted Roged, Inc. v. Paglee,
280 Md. 248, 254, 372 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1977), which states that if the language of a
contract is "plain and unambiguous," the contract will be interpreted to mean what a
"reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant."
89. 66 Md. App. at 728, 505 A.2d at 905.
90. 305 Md. 219, 503 A.2d 239, appeal after remand, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990
(1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 47, 522 A.2d 392 (1987).
91. Pursuant to rule 2-503(a)(1) (formerly rule 503), actions may be consolidated
when they involve a "common question of law or fact, or a common subject matter."
92. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-503(a)(2) (formerly Maryland Rule 606), "[i]n the
trial of a consolidated action, the court may direct that joint or separate verdicts or
judgments be entered."
93. 305 Md. at 240, 503 A.2d at 249-50.
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ular case may be appealed immediately despite the existence of un-
resolved claims in other cases that were consolidated with it for
trial.94 Rule 2-602, which bars the appeal of a decision that "adjudi-
cates fewer than all of the claims in an action" unless the court ex-
pressly finds "no just reason for delay," applies only to multiple
claims in a single action.95 The rule does not apply to consolidated
actions unless the trial court directs the entry of ajoint judgment to
dispose of all the actions simultaneously. 9
6
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Coppage v. Resolute Insur-
ance Co. 97 and overruled two cases in which the Court of Special Ap-
peals had attempted to limit or distinguish Coppage. Seizing on dicta
in Coppage, the Court of Special Appeals in Leach v. Citizens Bank of
Maryland9" had suggested that Coppage applies only when cases are
consolidated "as a matter of convenience." 99 The Leach court there-
fore distinguished Coppage on the ground that the cases in Leach
were consolidated not for convenience, but rather because of a
"common issue of fact and law."' 00 In O'Connor v. Plotkins, Inc. 101
the Court of Special Appeals followed the distinction it announced
in Leach.'0
2
The Court of Appeals stated that it did not intend Coppage's ref-
erence to convenience to serve as a standard for determining
whether consolidated actions should be treated as one action for the
94. Id. at 236, 503 A.2d at 248. That was the court's holding in Coppage v. Resolute
Ins. Co., 264 Md. 261, 285 A.2d 626 (1972), a case that was affirmed recently in Un-
named Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 494 A.2d 940 (1985).
95. 305 Md. at 236, 503 A.2d at 247-48. The court extended its interpretation of
former rule 605, discussed in Coppage, to present rule 2-602.
96. Id. at 236, 503 A.2d at 248. In this case the Yaremas and four other parties sued
Exxon and nine other defendants. The trial court consolidated the action with three
other cases in which Exxon was named as a codefendant. Exxon settled with the
Yaremas' co-plaintiffs, but was found liable to the Yaremas and the other plaintiffs. The
court denied all post-trial motions in the Yaremas' case on December 16 and entered a
"Judgment Absolute." On January 13, 1984, the court revised the Yaremas' damage
awards and re-entered judgment. Id. at 221-26, 503 A.2d at 242.
Exxon appealed on January 24, but the trial court struck the appeal due to lateness
and held that the December 16judgment was final. Exxon appealed that decision, con-
tending that the January 24 appeal was timely because the court had not entered final
judgment until January 13, or in the alternative, that the appeal was premature under
former rule 605 a (now rule 2-602) because claims in cases other than the Yaremas'
remained unresolved. The Court of Special Appeals seemed to accept Exxon's second
argument and dismissed the appeal.
97. 264 Md. 261, 285 A.2d 626 (1972).
98. 17 Md. App. 391, 302 A.2d 634 (1973).
99. Id. at 396, 302 A.2d at 636.
100. Id.
101. 32 Md. App. 329, 362 A.2d 95 (1976).
102. Id. at 338-39, 362 A.2d at 100.
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purposes of appeal.' 0 3 The court also pointed out that cases can be
consolidated only if they involve "common issues of law or fact or a
common subject matter";'0 4 therefore, the Court of Special Appeals
could not have validly distinguished Coppage on the ground that it
did not involve "common issues of fact and law."' 0 5 Moreover, in
neither Leach nor O'Connor did the Court of Special Appeals address
former rule 606. 106 Yet that rule, which allowed a court to authorize
separate judgments in consolidated actions, was the basis for the
Coppage decision.'0 7 Accordingly, both cases were overruled.
A secondary issue in Yarema involved the finality of a judgment
subsequently revised by the trial court. The Court of Appeals held
that if a court revises ajudgment within thirty days after it is entered
and before an appeal is filed, "the prior judgment loses its finality
and the revised judgment becomes the effective final judgment in
the case."' 0 6 Although the power to revise a judgment is ordinarily
authorized by a motion filed by a party under rule 2-535(a),' 0° the
court held that the same effect is possible when a court revises a
judgment sua sponte t10
6. Revision ofJudgments.-Under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) a cir-
cuit court may at any time revise a judgment tainted by fraud, mis-
take, or irregularity."' In Preissman v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore"t 2 the Court of Special Appeals held that the "mistake"
within the meaning of rule 2-535(b) is limited to procedural errors
that strip the trial court of jurisdiction."' Thus, although the City
inadvertently sold a taxpayer's property at a tax sale after having
collected the taxes due through attachment of the owner's bank ac-
103. 305 Md. at 238, 503 A.2d at 249.
104. MD. R. 2-503(a)(1) (formerly MD. R. 503).
105. 305 Md. at 237, 503 A.2d at 248.
106. MD. R. 606 is now MD. R. 2-503(a)(2).
107. 305 Md. at 238, 503 A.2d at 249.
108. Id. at 241, 503 A.2d at 250 (citing Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance
Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 484, 494 A.2d 940,946 (1985), and Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377,
387, 435 A.2d 96, 101 (1981)).
109. MD. R. 2-535(a) provides in part that: "On motion of any party filed within 30
days after entry ofjudgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the
judgment."
110. 305 Md. at 241, 503 A.2d at 250.
111. MD. R. 2-535(b). Rule 2-535(b) states: "(b) Fraud, Mistake, Irregularity.-On
motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control
over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity."
112. 64 Md. App. 552, 497 A.2d 826 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 175, 501 A.2d 1323
(1986).
113. Id. at 558-59, 497 A.2d at 829.
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count," t4 this mistake did not fall within the ambit of the rule." 5
In Balducci v. Eberly" 6 the Court of Appeals held that Maryland
appellate courts have the inherent power to revise an ambiguous
mandate even after it has been received in the court below." 7 Im-
plicitly, the court also held that the ambiguous mandate does not
become a final judgment until after the second appeal-after the ap-
pellate court has had the opportunity to explain its original
mandate.
This dispute arose out of foreclosure proceedings instituted by
the trustees of a deed of trust executed by the Eberlys. The circuit
court enjoined the foreclosure, but in an unreported per curiam
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the injunction."t 8
The appellate court observed that the Eberlys had produced no evi-
dence indicating the necessity or propriety of continuing the injunc-
tion; however, the court failed to mention whether the circuit court
should consider that evidence at a new trial." t9
The trustees resumed the foreclosure proceeding, and the
Eberlys once again sought an injunction.'t 0 At a hearing on the
merits of granting an injunction, the Eberlys were " 'well armed
with testimonial and documentary evidence to support their posi-
114. Id. at 554-55, 497 A.2d at 827. Despite the City's "mistake," Preissman in fact
opposed the attempt to revise the original decree, which divested him of title to his
properties. Apparently, the properties contained a multitude of housing violations, and
Preissman simply did not want them back. Id. at 557, 497 A.2d at 828.
115. Id. at 559-60, 497 A.2d at 829. The circuit court, which ruled in the City's favor,
had erred in failing to distinguish between two distinct meanings of the word "jurisdic-
tion." On the one hand, "jurisdiction" refers to the court's power to render a valid judg-
ment. If, for example, the court does not have personal jurisdiction over a defendant or
subject matter jurisdiction over an issue, then the court lacks power to render a valid
judgment. On the other hand, "jurisdiction" is sometimes used colloquially to refer to
the propriety of granting the particular relief sought. For the purposes of rule 2-535(b),
only the former meaning of "jurisdiction" is important. Thus, only a mistake concern-
ing the court's power to render a valid judgment can lead to the invocation of rule 2-
535(b).
The Court of Special Appeals did not question the impropriety of the 1983 decree
vesting the City with title to the property. Surely, had the circuit court known that
Preissman's debt had been satisfied, this order would never have issued. Nevertheless,
the court found that even though the debt had been satisfied, the circuit court still had
jurisdiction-i.e. power-in the quasi in rem foreclosure proceeding.
116. 304 Md. 664, 500 A.2d 1042 (1985)
117. Id. at 674, 500 A.2d at 1048.
118. Id. at 667-68, 500 A.2d at 1044.
119. See id. at 668 n.5, 500 A.2d at 1044 at n.5. The Eberlys and the circuit court
judge had apparently proceeded under the mistaken impression that the parties had
stipulated to an agreed set of facts. Id.
120. Id. at 668, 500 A.2d at 1045.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
tion.' "121 Nevertheless, the circuit court dismissed the Eberlys' pe-
tition, ruling that the Court of Special Appeals' mandate was res
judicata on the merits of the injunction.' 2 2
The Eberlys appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and won
a reversal. The court explained that its prior dissolution of the in-
junction was not a judgment on the merits; therefore, res judicata
did not bar a subsequent inquiry into the merits of granting an in-
junction.'2 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding it well within
the power of an appellate court to correct its own clerical errors
after the court below has received an ambiguous mandate. 124
C. Statutes of Limitations
1. Discovery Rule.-In O'Hara v. Kovens t25 the Court of Appeals
held that, for the purposes of the discovery rule, 126 the determina-
tion of when a cause of action accrues is a question of fact, not a
question of law.1 27 Therefore, the trier of fact, rather than the judge
acting in a judicial capacity, should make such determinations.' 2
The Court of Appeals thus rejected the authority of Moy v. Bell.'12
In that case, the Court of Special Appeals had stated that: "[T]he
application of a statute of limitations is strictly a legal question and
... the facts necessary to determine its application, such as when a
cause of action accrues, if a cause of action accrues, etc., must be
121. Id. (quoting circuit court opinion).
122. Id.
123. Eberly v. Balducci, 61 Md. App. 80, 87, 484 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1984), aff'd, 304
Md. 664, 500 A.2d 1042 (1985). The court pointed out that: "Our decision in the prior
appeal was not intended to prevent the mortgagors from presenting evidence to sustain
their burden regarding the propriety of granting the injunction; we simply held that no
interlocutory or permanent injunction could be issued based upon that record." Id.
124. 304 Md. at 674, 500 A.2d at 1048. The court relied on George v. Farmer's and
Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 155 Md. 693, 142 A. 590 (1928). In George the Court of Appeals'
mandate contained the words "judgment reversed," but did not expressly award a new
trial. On a subsequent appeal, the court termed this omission a clerical oversight and
stated that its prior opinion clearly indicated the "purpose and intention ... that a new
trial should be had ...." This purpose would be entirely frustrated if the court were
unable to correct the prior mandate. 155 Md. at 697, 142 A. at 591.
125. 305 Md. 280, 503 A.2d 1313 (1986).
126. Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact
knew or should have known of the wrong. Knowledge of facts that would put an ordi-
nary person on inquiry notice is treated as knowledge of any facts that a reasonable
inquiry would disclose. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680
(1981).
127. 305 Md. at 295, 503 A.2d at 1321.
128. Id.
129. 46 Md. App. 364, 416 A.2d 289, cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 (1980).
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made by thejudge in his judicial role."'' 3 0 According to the Court of
Appeals, the Moy court had misinterpreted decisions that predated
Maryland's general adoption of the discovery rule.' 3 '
2. Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act.-Section 525 of the Sol-
dier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act (SSCRA),13 2 a federal statute,
tolls the limitation period applicable to plaintiffs who are members
of the military services.'3 3 In McCance v. Lindau ' 3 4 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that section 525 is to be applied unconditionally to
those on active military duty.' 35 Thus, the court held that the plain-
tiff, a career military officer, could invoke the protection of the SS-
CRA without showing that his military service in any way prevented
him from filing suit in a timely fashion. 136
The trial court had emphasized that the plaintiff's status as a
career serviceman could toll that statute for decades; therefore, that
court required the plaintiff to demonstrate that his military duties
prejudiced him from filing a timely law suit.' 37 The Court of Special
Appeals disagreed. A different standard for career service person-
nel is invalid not only because the term "career" is ambiguous,13 8
130. Id. at 370, 416 A.2d at 293-94.
131. 305 Md. at 297, 503 A.2d at 1321.
132. 50 U.S.C. § 525 (1982).
133. Id. Section 525 provides:
The period of military service shall not be included in computing any pe-
riod now or hereafter to be limited by any law.., for the bringing of any action
or proceeding in any court ... by or against any person in military service...
whether such cause of action or the right or privilege to institute such action or
proceeding shall have accrued prior to or during the period of such service ....
134. 63 Md. App. 504, 492 A.2d 1352 (1985).
135. Id. at 512, 492 A.2d at 1357.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 509, 492 A.2d at 1355. The trial court found it difficult to believe that
Congress had intended to provide blanket protection to career military personnel who
might be on active duty for decades. It cited three cases that distinguished career per-
sonnel from other persons in the military service: Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) (party must be "handicapped" by military service for § 525 to
apply); King v. Zagorski, 207 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (statute's purpose is to
protect those service personnel who have been torn from their normal activity at home
to serve their country, not to protect those career service personnel who are no more
disadvantaged than the ordinary civilian); and Bailey v. Barranca, 83 N.M. 90, 488 P.2d
725 (1971) (section 525 rests on the premise that military service must be the reason for
the failure to meet obligations). On the other hand, the Court of Special Appeals found
support in Bickford v. United States, 656 F.2d 636 (Ct. Cl. 1981), which held that the
only critical factor is military service; once that is shown, the statute of limitations is
automatically tolled for the duration of the service.
138. 63 Md. App. at 509, 492 A.2d at 1355. The Court of Special Appeals wondered
when one becomes a career service person: "Does the mere act of enlistment ... consti-
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but also because it appears nowhere in the statute.'19 Furthermore,
the trial court ignored the plain language of section 525, which
states that the section applies to all military personnel.' 40 Thus,
since the statute itself does not require a showing of prejudice, the
court held it error to read this requirement into the statute. 14  Con-
gress could have granted conditional protection to service person-
nel, but it clearly chose not to do so.
The court acknowledged that because a career service person
could wait for many years to file a suit for any reason, or for no
reason at all, this decision may lead to absurd results.' 42 But
although Congress has amended other sections of the Act, in over
sixty-five years it has neither repealed nor amended section 525.'13
The court thus deferred to Congress.
3. Defense Raised in Motion to Dismiss.-In G & H Clearing and
Landscaping v. Whitworth 144 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
"statute of limitations" defense may sometimes be raised in a mo-
tion to dismiss, 14 and that a motion to dismiss may sometimes be
treated as a motion for a more definite statement.' 46 The issues
arose when the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
complaint, claiming that the action was barred by the statute of limi-
tations and that the complaint was too vague for the defendant to
frame an answer. 147 In disposing of the motion, the trial court deter-
mined that the complaint was vague as to the nature and timing of
the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct' t 48 Consequently, the
court granted the motion, but gave the plaintiffs fifteen days leave to
tute [one] a career service person or does that nomenclature apply after 60 days service,
90 days service, 5 years service, 10 years service, or during the 18th year of service?" Id.
139. Id. at 510, 492 A.2d at 1355-56. Although the statute itself fails to create an
exception for career service personnel, § 510 does state that "the following provisions
are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings .... 50 U.S.C. § 510 (1982)
(emphasis added).
140. 63 Md. App. at 510, 492 A.2d at 1356.
141. Id. at 510-11, 492 A.2d at 1356.
142. Id. at 512, 492 A.2d at 1357.
143. Id. at 513, 492 A.2d at 1357. Congress initially enacted the SSCRA during
World War I. Id.
144. 66 Md. App. 348, 503 A.2d 1379 (1985).
145. Id. at 354, 503 A.2d at 1382.
146. Id. at 356, 503 A.2d at 1383.
147. Id. at 351, 503 A.2d at 1380-81. The complaint, a legal malpractice action, was
filed in 1983. It alleged several vague acts of negligence, but did not state when the acts
had occurred. The complaint did state, however, that the plaintiffs had employed the
defendant in 1978. The defendant contended that the action was barred by the statute
of limitations because of the complaint's reference to the year 1978.
148. Id., 503 A.2d at 1381.
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amend the complaint.141 When the plaintiffs failed to do so, the
court dismissed the action with prejudice.' 5 0
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether it
was proper for the defendant to assert the defenses of limitations
and vagueness in a motion to dismiss,' 5 ' and whether the trial court
was justified in dismissing the action with prejudice. According to
rule 2- 3 23(g), the statute of limitations "is an affirmative defense, to
be raised in an answer to the complaint." 152 The court, however,
observed that both rule 2 -3 23 (g) and rule 2-322(b), which governs
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, were derived from the Federal Rules.' 53 In federal
practice, however, the defense of limitations may be raised by mo-
tion to dismiss when the time bar is apparent on the face of the
complaint.' 54 Hence, the court held that:
If the time bar ... is apparent on the face of the complaint,
the complaint would indeed fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.... [A] motion to dismiss would there-
fore be an appropriate, although not a mandatory, way in
which to assert that defense. 155
On the vagueness issue the court noted that
[U]nless the complaint actually omits essential elements of
the cause of action or is so utterly vague or deficient in ar-
ticulation as not to allege a cognizable cause of action, the
proper method for complaining about vagueness is a mo-
tion for more definite statement, not a motion to
dismiss. 156
The court held that this defendant was not entitled to the out-
149. Id. at 352, 503 A.2d at 1381.
150. Id.
151. The court reviewed the Maryland Rules as they stood before 1984. Under for-
mer rule 342, in an action at law the statute of limitations had to be specially pled; it
could not be raised by demurrer "[u]nless the time within which the action had to be
filed was an element of the cause of action itself." Id. Under former rule 371 b, in
equity actions any defense that was apparent on the face of the bill could be raised by
either demurrer or answer. The court stated that "the new Rules, unfortunately, are not
quite so clear in this regard." 66 Md. App. at 352, 503 A.2d at 1382.
152. 66 Md. App. at 352, 503 A.2d at 1382.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 354, 503 A.2d at 1382 (citing Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623
F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1980); Munshi v. New York Univ., 528 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);





right dismissal he had requested.' 5 7 By granting the plaintiffs fif-
teen days leave to amend, however, the trial court effectively had
treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for a more definite state-
ment.1 5 8 The Court of Special Appeals found that treatment appro-
priate, stating that the Maryland Rules are subject to "some
flexibility in their application, especially as to matters of form.' 59
The court thus held that upon the plaintiffs' failure to file an
amended complaint, the trial court properly dismissed the action
with prejudice. 160
D. Attorney's Fees
1. Decision to Award.-Maryland Rule 1-341 permits the court
to assess attorney's fees against a party who has maintained or de-
fended a civil action in bad faith or without substantial justifica-
tion. 61 In Kirsner v. Edelman 62 the Court of Special Appeals held
that it would award attorney's fees incurred on appeal only if it has
some reasonable basis upon which to assess the fee.' 63 To establish
a reasonable basis for rule 1-341 sanctions, the injured party ordina-
rily must present an affidavit detailing the offending party's con-
duct. '4 In some cases, however, it is enough that the court had the
opportunity to observe the offending party's conduct.' 65
Kirsner brought home the force of this ruling with particular
clarity. The court conceded that sanctions were warranted on the
facts before it. 166 But because the injured party did not submit an
affidavit, and because the court had not had the opportunity to ob-
serve counsel, the court declined to impose sanctions.' 6 7
In Century I Condominium Association v. Plaza Condominium Joint
157. Id. at 355, 503 A.2d at 1382-83.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 356, 503 A.2d at 1383.
160. Id. at 357-58, 503 A.2d at 1384.
161. MD. R. 1-341. Rule 1-341 provides:
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in main-
taining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial
justification the court may require the offending party or the attorney advising
the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of proceeding
and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by
the adverse party in opposing it.
162. 65 Md. App. 185, 499 A.2d 1313 (1985).
163. Id. at 197-98, 499 A.2d at 1320.
164. Id. at 198, 499 A.2d at 1320.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 197, 499 A.2d at 1319.
167. Id., 499 A.2d at 1320.
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Venture' 68 the Court of Special Appeals held that under rule 1-341 a
party that had frustrated its opponent's attempts to stay appellate
litigation was not entitled to all attorney's fees incurred on ap-
peal.' 6 9 In so holding, the court illustrated the broad discretionary
powers that the new rule affords the courts.
This appeal arose out of an extended legal battle in which Cen-
tury sought to block Plaza's attempt to construct an eighteen-story
condominium in Ocean City. In June 1983 the Worcester County
Board of Zoning Appeals granted a height exception and deter-
mined that Plaza did not need a conditional use permit to construct
off-site parking. 7 ° In February 1984, after several preliminary
skirmishes,' 7 ' the zoning administrator issued a building permit to
Plaza. 172 Century then counterattacked on two fronts. First, it
sought a declaratory judgment in circuit court to invalidate the ad-
ministrative decision not to require a conditional use permit. Sec-
ond, on essentially the same grounds, it went before the Board to
appeal the issuance of the building permit.' 7 3 This second claim
was before the court in Century.17 4
In June 1984 the circuit court ruled against Century in the de-
claratory judgment action. 175  The Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed that ruling in an unreported per curiam opinion issued in
March 1985.176 In the meantime, in April 1984, the Board had dis-
168. 64 Md. App. 107, 494 A.2d 713 (1985).
169. Id. at 120-21, 494 A.2d at 720. For the text of rule 1-341, see supra note 161.
Rule 1-341 is derived from former Rule 604 b, which applied only to the circuit courts
and provided as follows:
In an action or part of an action, if the court finds that any proceeding was had
(1) in bad faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3) for the purposes of
delay, the court shall require the moving party to pay to the adverse party the
amount of the costs thereof and the reasonable expenses incurred by the ad-
verse party opposing such proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Md. R. 604(b)(1983).
The new rule effected two major changes. First, because of its placement in Title 1,
it clearly applies to all courts, including the courts of appeals. Rule 604 b, in contrast,
applied only to the circuit courts. See Blanton v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 61 Md. App. 158,
161, 485 A.2d 694, 696 (1985) and authorities cited therein. Second, because the new
rule replaces the mandatory "shall" with the discretionary "may," the courts now have
the flexibility to deal equitably with litigants caught in the heat of battle.




174. Id. at 112, 494 A.2d at 716.
175. Id. at 111-12, 494 A.2d at 715-16.
176. Id. at 112, 494 A.2d at 716.
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missed Century's parallel appeal. 77 The circuit court affirmed that
decision in October 1984, while the appeal of the declaratory judg-
ment claim was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals. 178
Century initially sought to appeal the circuit court's October
1984 decision; however, in January 1985, it moved to stay the ap-
peal pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment appeal.179
In requesting the stay, Century urged the court to consider the two
appeals' identical subject matter. °8 0 Although Plaza successfully op-
posed the stay, it sought attorney's fees after prevailing on the sec-
ond appeal. 18  Because the first appeal governed the issues raised
in the second, Plaza contended Century lacked "substantial justifica-
tion," within the meaning of rule 1-341, to press the second
appeal. 18 2
Since Plaza had vigorously opposed the stay, and thus the possi-
bility of mitigating its legal fees, the court had to decide whether
Plaza was entitled to fees incurred between the date Century moved
to stay the second appeal and the date of oral argument. Plaza, the
court found, pursued its motion for fees "with ill grace.' 18 3 For,
"[h]ad Plaza agreed to the stay, none of those charges might have
accrued ... 184 Using the discretionary language in the new rule
as a vehicle for the exercise of equitable powers previously unavaila-
ble, the court declined to award fees.18 5
In addition, because Century did not dismiss this action after
losing the declaratory judgment appeal, the court had to decide
whether Plaza was entitled to fees incurred at oral argument. In re-
questing the stay, Century had conceded that the first appeal would
177. Id. at I11,494 A.2d at 715.
178. Id. at 112, 494 A.2d at 716.
179. Id. at 120, 494 A.2d at 720.
180. Id. at 120-21, 494 A.2d at 720.
181. Id. at 114, 494 A.2d at 717.
182. Id. at 115-16, 494 A.2d at 717.
183. Id. at 120, 494 A.2d at 720.
184. Id. at 121, 494 A.2d at 720.
185. Id. The court also held that despite the duplicative nature of Century's second
claim, Plaza was not entitled to compensation for expenses incurred at trial. Id. at 119,
494 A.2d at 719. While noting that Century "may have been skating on thin ice," the
court refused to hold that the trial judge had abused his discretion in refusing to impose
sanctions. The court continued:
In so holding, we emphasize the role of discretion under Rule 1-341 .... The
existence of that discretion means that the [trial] court must make a judgment
call with which we may disagree (in the sense that we might have called it other-
wise sitting at the trial bench) but which we will not disturb unless the judg-
ment call is so far off the mark as to amount to an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 119-20, 494 A.2d at 719-20.
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dispose of the substantive legal issues involved in the second ap-
peal; therefore, the court held that Century's failure to dismiss the
action was "without substantial justification" within the meaning of
rule 1-341. ta6 Thus, Plaza received attorney's fees for some of its
expenses incurred at oral argument."'a
In denying Plaza's motion for all fees incurred on appeal except
those directly related to oral argument, the court brought home the
impact of rule 1-34 l's new discretionary language18 8 and made clear
to litigants the important role that foresight and cooperation play in
streamlining litigation. The message is clear: A party cannot re-
cover fees under rule 1-341 that might have been avoided but for
some action by the moving party.
2. Local Court Rules.-In Walker v. Haywood 189 the Court of
Special Appeals held that local "policies" requiring an auditor to
place a ceiling on attorney's fees incurred in connection with pro-
ceedings on a deed of trust and in bankruptcy were not in fact court
policies or rules.'9 0 Thus, the putative "policies" applied only to
the auditor; they did not bind a court hearing exceptions to the au-
dit.' ' Since the deed of trust in question provided no set allowance
for attorney's fees, the court was required to determine whether the
fees requested were reasonable. 192
This decision will guide local and circuit courts in the adoption
of rules. Although these courts have the authority to promulgate
rules regulating auditors,19 3 a policy cannot become a rule unless it
186. Id. at 121, 494 A.2d at 720-21.
187. Id. at 122, 494 A.2d at 721. Applying its " 'own knowledge of the case and the
legal effort and expertise required,'" id. (quoting Blanton v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 61
Md. App. 158, 167, 485 A.2d 694, 699 (1985)), the court awarded Plaza $1100 in fees,
approximately half the amount it requested. 64 Md. App. at 122, 494 A.2d at 721.
188. The new rule uses the discretionary word "may"; its predecessor, rule 604 b,
used the imperative "shall." See supra notes 161 & 169.
189. 65 Md. App. 1,498 A.2d 1198 (1985).
190. Id. at 13, 498 A.2d at 1204. Walker, the substitute trustee, contended that in
foreclosing on the deed of trust he had incurred $900 in attorney's fees. In Prince
George's County, however, an unwritten court policy imposed a $750 ceiling on the fees
he could collect (10 hours of work at $75 per hour). In addition, Walker claimed $1225
in attorney's fees arising from the related bankruptcy proceeding. Another unwritten
policy imposed a $500 ceiling on the fees he could collect for this matter.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 14,498 A.2d at 1205. The deed of trust provided for the payment of rea-
sonable attorney's fees. Id.
193. Walker contended that the court had no power to establish such a rule. As the
court pointed out, however, Maryland Rule 1-102 permits the adoption of local, county,
and circuit rules covering five specific subject areas. Regulation of auditors is one of the
designated areas. 65 Md. App. at 9, 498 A.2d at 1202.
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is adopted by a formal court order in which a majority of the circuit
judges concur.' 94 This procedure, the court reasoned, establishes
the rule's provisions, sets the rule's effective dates, and evidences
the rule's adoption.' 9 '
E. Choice of Law
Under Maryland law, a party cannot secure an indemnification
agreement against liability for bodily injuries that occur during
building construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance if the inju-
ries result solely from that party's negligence. Section 5-305 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article renders these agreements
void and unenforceable as against public policy. 196 Under Penn-
sylvania common law, however, these agreements are perfectly
legal.' 97 Yet in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G. C. Zarnas & Co. 198 the Court
of Appeals found such an agreement unenforceable under section 5-
305 even though the agreement was formed in Pennsylvania and
even though Maryland adheres to lex loci contractus.'99
194. 65 Md. App. at 10, 498 A.2d at 1203. The "policies" in question had been
adopted by only three judges, not by the entire fourteen-member court; therefore, the
Court of Special Appeals concluded that the "policies" were not court policies. Id. at
11, 498 A.2d at 1203.
Neither Maryland Rule 1-102 nor its predecessor, Maryland Rule 1.f., expressly
stipulates a method for the adoption of local or circuit rules. Similarly, before 1969, the
rules stipulated no specific method. The court chose the present method of adopting
rules because that method was in use before 1969. 65 Md. App. at 10- 11, 498 A.2d at
1202-03.
Walker asserted a second possible method: "[A] settled practice adhered to for
many years and well known constitutes a rule." Id. at 12, 498 A.2d at 1203 (citing De-
troit Heating & Lighting Co. v. Kemp, 182 F. 847 (C.C.D. Md. 1910)). The court's
reaction to this statement is ambiguous. It conceded that "[t]his may well be true," but
added that "we certainly do not suggest that courts may evade the strictures on local and
circuit rule-making by informally adopting policies which are in fact rules." Id.
195. 65 Md. App. at 11, 498 A.2d at 1203. The court also reasoned that this proce-
dure facilitates appropriate publication of the rule, although it added that publication
may not always be required. Id.
196. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-305 (1984). Section 5-305 provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection
with or collateral to, a contract or agreement relating to the construction, alter-
ation, repair, or maintenance of a building . . . purporting to indemnify the
promisee against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to any person
... caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee or indemni-
tee, his agents or employees, is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable.
197. See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 425 Pa. 166, 173 n.5, 228 A.2d 656,
660 n.5 (1967).
198. 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985).
199. Id. at 189, 498 A.2d at 608. Lex loci contractus requires courts in the forum state to
determine the validity and construction of a contract according to the substantive law of
1987] 609
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In 1977 G.C. Zarnas & Co. (Zarnas), a Maryland corporation,
entered into a contract in Pennsylvania with Bethlehem Steel, a Del-
aware corporation.20 0 Under the contract Zarnas undertook to paint
parts of Bethlehem's Sparrows Point plant in Maryland.20 1 The con-
tract also required Zarnas to indemnify Bethlehem against liability
for injuries to Zarnas employees that occurred during the course of
the contract. 202 In 1978 a Zarnas employee was injured while work-
ing at Sparrows Point.2 3 After the employee filed a negligence
claim, Bethlehem sought a declaration of its rights under the indem-
204nity agreement.
Bethlehem contended that because Maryland applies the law of
the place of the contract, Pennsylvania law should govern the ques-
tion of the contract's validity. 205 Therefore, it contended, the court
should hold Zarnas to its obligations under the indemnity agree-
ment.20 6 The circuit court and the Court of Appeals disagreed.
Given its express statement that these agreements are "void and un-
enforceable," section 5-305, the court concluded, "reflects a public
policy sufficient to override the application of Pennsylvania law
under the circumstances of this case." 20 7
The court's application of public policy is suspect. If the Beth-
lehem-Zarnas contract did conflict with the public policy of Mary-
land, the proper approach would have been for the court to dismiss
the case; the court should not have used public policy as a means of
using Maryland substantive law, rather than Pennsylvania substan-
tive law, to decide the case. 20  Yet the Zarnas court's approach is sub-
tle and sophisticated. The court would probably not hold that all
legislative declarations of public policy would automatically suspend
the operation of lex loci contractus. It is unclear, for example, whether
the court would have arrived at the same result if a Pennsylvania
the state in which, under the forum's substantive law, the contract was made. Traylor v.
Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 600, 332 A.2d 651, 659 (1975). Courts have traditionally invoked
the public policy exception to lex loci contractus in order to bar the enforcement of con-
tracts considered vicious or immoral under the forum's laws. See 304 Md. at 188-89, 498
A.2d at 607-08 and authorities cited therein; Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden,
15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 527, 529 (1964).
200. 304 Md. at 185, 498 A.2d at 606.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 185-86, 498 A.2d at 606.
203. Id. at 186, 498 A.2d at 606.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 186-87, 498 A.2d at 606-07.
206. Id. at 187, 498 A.2d at 607.
207. Id. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608.
208. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 202 (1918) (Cardozo,J.).
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statute expressly created such a contract right. The court suggested
that were this so, it would have deferred to Pennsylvania law.2 °9
Moreover, while the basis of its holding is not entirely clear, it
appears that the court has employed an interest analysis. The court
balanced Maryland's interest in prohibiting indemnification agree-
ments against Pennsylvania's interest in having these agreements
enforced. 210 The court noted that if the suit had been brought in
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania courts, which employ an interest analy-
sis,2 1 ' would probably have applied Maryland law.2 1 2 Therefore, the
court seems implicitly to have found that Pennsylvania had no inter-
est, or at most a weak interest, in having its law applied.2 13 Mary-
land's strong interest in prohibiting these agreements thus
prevailed.
F. Other Developments
1. Postjudgment Attachment Procedures.-In Reigh v. Schleigh21 4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of Maryland Rule 3-645(c)(4)-(5), which governs
the form of notice contained in a postjudgment writ of garnish-
ment.2 15 The court held that to comport with the requirements of
209. 304 Md. at 191, 498 A.2d at 609.
210. See id. at 191 n.5, 498 A.2d at 609 n.5. The court seems to have used Maryland's
public policy as a surrogate for an interest analysis. Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (holding that New York's
strong public policy against damage limitations in wrongful death claims barred applica-
tion of Massachusetts damage limitation even though Massachusetts was lex loci delecti).
In addition to Maryland's strong interest in applying its own law, evidenced by the clear
language of § 5-305, other factors tipped the balance in Maryland's favor. The court
observed that: "Zarnas is a Maryland corporation. The contract involved was to be
performed entirely in Maryland. The injury occurred in Maryland.... " 304 Md. at 191
n.5, 498 A.2d at 609 n.5.
211. Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553 (1983).
212. 304 Md. at 191 n.5, 498 A.2d at 609 n.5. In attempting to discern how Penn-
sylvania courts would have decided this case, the court appears to have employed the
doctrine of renvoi. Renvoi requires the forum first to use its own choice of law rule to
determine which state's substantive law it should apply; then, however, it applies the
whole law - the substantive law and the conflicts law - of that other state. The forum
thus attempts to decide the case precisely as a court in the other state would decide it.
See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 3.13 (1982). American courts ordinarily
employ renvoi only in property law cases. See id. at 68 n.2. A forum may often employ
renvoi in other types of cases as a means of escaping the rigid rule of lex loci. See W.
REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAws 460 (1984).
213. 304 Md. at 191 n.5, 498 A.2d at 609 n.5.
214. 784 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 167 (1986).
215. Id. at 1196. Rule 3-645(c) provides:
(c) Content.-The writ of garnishment shall . . . (4) notify the judgment
debtor and garnishee that federal and state exemptions may be available,
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the writ need
only inform a judgment debtor that "there are certain exemptions
under state and federal law which the debtor may be entitled to
claim with respect to the attached property"; the writ need not in-
form ajudgment debtor of all defenses he or she may have.2 16 The
court also upheld the constitutionality of Maryland Rule 3-643(0,
which provides ambiguously for a "prompt" postjudgment hearing
at the debtor's request.2
1 7
The plaintiff, Esther Reigh, was a seventy-year-old woman
whose monthly income consisted of $380.00 in Social Security pay-
ments and $43.14 from a pension fund. 2 8 Each month both checks
were deposited directly into her bank account. 219 In September
1981 the C & P Telephone Company obtained a judgment against
Reigh.220 On July 6, 1982, Schleigh, the clerk of the District Court
for Washington County, ordered the garnishment of Reigh's bank
account. 22' The bank immediately froze Reigh's account and also
informed her by mail that it had been served with a writ of garnish-
ment. 22 2 Later that month, the District Court for Washington
County exempted Reigh's account from the garnishment on account
of her poverty.223
Reigh, joined by three other impoverished judgment debtors,
filed this challenge, charging that the then current Maryland District
Rules 22 4 deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of
law because the rules (1) failed to inform judgment debtors of all
available state and federal exemptions; (2) failed to require timely
notice served upon the judgment debtor either before or immedi-
ately after attachment; and (3) failed to require a hearing within a
specified number of days when requested by the judgment
debtor.225
(5) notify the judgement debtor of the right to contest the garnishment by filing
a motion asserting a defense or objection.
216. 784 F.2d at 1196.
217. Id. at 1199. Rule 3-643(0, which provides for the release of property from levy,
states that: "A party desiring a hearing on a motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall so
request pursuant to Rule 3-311 (d) and, if requested, a hearing shall be held promptly."
218. Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (D. Md. 1984), vacated, 784 F.2d 1191






224. Md. D. R. FI-F5 (1981). For a discussion of the now-defunct Maryland District
Rules, see 595 F. Supp. at 1542-46.
225. 595 F. Supp. at 1537.
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The federal district court found the Maryland District Rules un-
constitutional. It thus enjoined issuance of writs of garnishment un-
til the rules were revised to require that (1) the notice contain a
complete list of all exemptions available under state and federal
law,226 and (2) a postjudgment hearing requested by the debtor take
place no more than two weeks after garnishment. 27
Considering the revised Maryland Rules on appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed and adopted the reasoning advanced by the dis-
senters in the Third Circuit case of Finberg v. Sullivan.22 ' Requiring
the writ to list all possible state and federal exemptions, the court
found, would far exceed the simple notice requirements mandated
by the United States Supreme Court2 29 and would cause more harm
than good.2 30 Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to require
even a partial listing of common exemptions because it would be
impossible to determine which exemptions to include in such a
list. 231 A partial list, in the court's view, would lead to confusion
and to a flood of further litigation.2 32
The Fourth Circuit also found the rule's requirement of a
"prompt hearing" to be constitutionally adequate. 33 Absent evi-
dence of delay at the state court level, the court felt it proper to
presume "prompt hearings" were in fact taking place.2 34 The court
thus disapproved of the two-week hearing requirement that the dis-
trict court had imposed.23 5
226. Id. at 1556.
227. Id. at 1557.
228. 634 F.2d 50, 64-94 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Finberg is
the leading case for the proposition that due process requires judgment debtors to re-
ceive notice of all possible state and federal exemptions that might apply. See 784 F.2d
at 1194-95 and authorities cited therein. Many commentators have discussed the due
process implications of notice requirements for postjudgment garnishment proceedings.
See 595 F. Supp. 1535, 1551 n.10 and authorities cited therein; Motz & Baida, The Due
Process Rights of Postjudgment Debtors and Child Support Obligors, 45 MD. L. REV. 61 (1986).
229. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1978).
230. 784 F.2d at 1197. The court stated: " 'The brute fact is that there are so many
exemptions that to set forth this information on a writ would present a mass of incom-
prehensible boilerplate reeking with legalese.'" Id. at 1195 (quoting Finberg, 634 F.2d at
84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting)).
231. 784 F.2d at 1197.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1199.
234. Id.
235. Id. Judge Widener dissented on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
Id. (Widener, J. dissenting). Before filing this action, all the plaintiffs had their funds
exempted from garnishment. Id. at 1200. Thus, Judge Widener contended, "no con-
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2. Inadequate Record Extract.-Maryland Rule 1028 dictates the
contents of the record extract that a party must submit on appeal.23 6
Maryland Rule 1031 dictates the style and content of an appellate
brief.23 7 In Spivey v. Harris238 the Court of Special Appeals for the
first time dismissed an appeal sua sponte because the appellant had
failed to comply with either rule.239 By imposing the ultimate sanc-
tion of dismissal, the court set an example and sent a clear message
to the Bar: the Maryland Rules are mandatory. Failure to comply
with them may cause the sins of the attorney to be visited upon the
troversy existed when the federal suit was filed. All that was present was fear of future
controversy." Id.
Agreeing with the district court, however, the majority found a live controversy. Id.
at 1194. Following Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1982), the district court had
found that due to their poverty and continued indebtedness, the Reigh plaintiffs were
faced with a very real threat of being subjected again to the challenged procedures. 595
F. Supp. at 1542. Therefore, their claim fell within the exception to the doctrine of
standing for claims "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id.
236. MD. R. 1028. Rule 1028 a provides in part:
The extracts from the record ... shall be copied verbatim except as otherwise
provided .... The table of contents .... shall also cover the contents of an
appendix bound with the brief and shall give reference to [the] initial page of
the direct, cross, and redirect examination of each witness .... If the transcript
of testimony is reproduced, the pages shall be consecutively renumbered.
Rule 1028 b provides in part:
The printed extract shall contain such parts of the record as may reason-
ably be necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the ap-
peal and shall include:
(a) The judgment appealed from, together with the opinion or charge of
the lower court, if any.
(b) So much of the evidence, pleadings or other parts of the record as is
material to any question the determination of which depends upon the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, pleadings or other matter contained in the record to
sustain any action, ruling, order or judgment of the lower court.
Section i of rule 1028 provides that for violation of sections a or b, the court may
"dismiss the appeal, or make any other appropriate order with respect to the case."
237. MD. R. 1031. Rule 1031 prescribes such minutiae as the size and grade of paper,
the type size, the width of margins, and the length of briefs. It also requires, inter alia, a
table of contents and citations, a statement of the case, a statement of facts, and a section
for argument.
238. 64 Md. App. 619, 498 A.2d 281 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253
(1986).
239. Id. at 624, 498 A.2d at 283. Among other things, the appellant violated rule
1028 because his brief referred to pagination from the original transcript, rather than
pagination of the record extract. This placed an unnecessary burden on the court:
[I]t would be necessary for the Court to number the pages, a service which we
do not provide .... [T]here is no way for this Court to tell where a witness'
testimony begins and ends other than for the Court to read all of the testimony
from the original record. This is also a service we do not provide .... Finally,
there is no way to tell from the record extract whether objections were made




3. Forfeiture.-Article 27, section 297(a) provides for the for-
feiture of motor vehicles used in the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of controlled dangerous substances. 24'
At a forfeiture hearing, a court must adjudicate the property rights
of persons whose property has thus been seized.242 Former section
297(n) required that a forfeiture hearing be scheduled within thirty
days after the defendant's conviction of a controlled dangerous sub-
stances violation. 243
In State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson 244 the Court of Appeals held
that dismissal of the State's forfeiture petition was not a proper
sanction when, because of an administrative error, the State had
failed to meet the thirty-day scheduling requirement. 24 5 The court
stressed that the State has no control over scheduling; rather, the
court's administrative staff controls such matters.24 6 Therefore, the
court concluded that the State should not suffer for an error that it
did not commit. 247
4. Justiciability.-In Hale v. Hale241 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that an action to rescind a separation agreement may
present ajusticiable issue even if no divorce action has been filed, as
long as there are interested parties who assert adverse claims on a
state of facts, which must have accrued, wherein a legal decision is
sought or demanded.24 9
Mrs. Hale sued her husband for rescission of a separation
240. The court warned that: "Individual members of the bar have too frequently re-
garded these rules as optional and this Court has too frequently tolerated this attitude
by overlooking the omissions and performing work which would have been done by
counsel had counsel complied with the Rules." Id. at 623, 498 A.2d at 283.
241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1986).
242. Id. at § 297(h)(4).
243. Id. at § 297(n) (1982). MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(h)(4) (Supp. 1986)
superceded § 297(n) in 1984. Section 297(h)(4) requires that a hearing be scheduled
not less than 30 nor more than 60 days after the vehicle's registered owners or the
secured parties have either answered or are in default.
244. 303 Md. 154, 492 A.2d 896 (1985).
245. Id. at 160, 492 A.2d at 899. In this case the State's Attorney filed a timely re-
quest for a forfeiture hearing. Id. It is therefore unclear whether the court would have
reached the same result had the State's Attorney failed to file a timely request.
246. Id.
247. Id. The court did not indicate, however, what, if any, sanction would be
appropriate.
248. 66 Md. App. 228, 503 A.2d 271, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986).
249. Id. at 232, 503 A.2d at 273. The court took its definition of a justiciable issue
from Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 288, 380 A.2d 12 (1977). In that
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agreement, alleging that she had been induced to enter the agree-
ment by fraud, duress, and misrepresentation, and that she had suf-
fered financial loss as a result.2 5 0 The circuit court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that no justicia-
ble issue was present. 25' The court reasoned that because a separa-
tion agreement contemplates a divorce, and because no divorce
action had yet been filed, the parties could not litigate the separa-
tion agreement. 25
2
The Court of Special Appeals held that the Hales' separation
agreement was not contingent upon a filing for divorce253 and was
subject to the same general rules that govern other contracts.254
Furthermore, the court held that the case presented a justiciable is-
sue because Mrs. Hale had alleged that she was "currently being
harmed" by an agreement into which she had not freely entered,
and her husband had denied the allegations.2 55 Since there was a
justiciable issue, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction
under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. 2 56 The
Court of Special Appeals therefore reversed.
5. Determination of Employment Relationship.-In Whitehead v.
Safray Steel Products, Inc. 257 the Court of Appeals held that if the evi-
case the Court of Appeals adopted the definition stated in 1 W. ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 67 (2d ed. 1951).
250. 66 Md. App. at 231, 503 A.2d at 273.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 232-33, 503 A.2d at 274. The Court of Special Appeals did not indicate
what authority, if any, the circuit court relied upon for the proposition that separation
agreements are generally contingent upon divorce and cannot be litigated prior to the
initiation of divorce proceedings.
253. Id. at 233, 503 A.2d at 274. The court noted that a clause that would have made
part of the agreement effective only upon a decree of divorce had been stricken from the
original draft and initialed by both parties.
254. Id. The court held that since contracts are generally subject to rescission for
fraud, duress, or misrepresentation and since courts may properly issue declaratory
judgments to determine the validity of such contracts, the requested relief in the present
case was clearly within the circuit court's jurisdiction.
255. Id. at 233-34, 503 A.2d at 274. The court remarked that "this is not a situation
where the court is being asked to decide future rights in anticipation of an event which
may never take place." Id. at 233, 503 A.2d at 274.
256. The court remarked that even though the plaintiff had not specifically requested
declaratory relief, the circuit court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ment Act to issue a declaratory decree as long as a justiciable issue was present. Id. at
232, 503 A.2d at 273. The Act provides in relevant part that: "Except for the District
Court, a court of record within its jurisdiction may declare rights, status, and other legal
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-403 (1984).
257. 304 Md. 67, 497 A.2d 803 (1985).
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dence on an employment issue is undisputed, the trial court may
ordinarily decide the issue as one of law;258 however, if a party can
point to evidence that conflicting inferences can be drawn from the
undisputed facts, the issue will be one of fact.259
The court was required to resolve a conflict between two seem-
ingly divergent lines of cases. The first line of cases held that if the
facts pertaining to the existence of the employment relationship
were undisputed, the issue was one of law to be decided by the
court.2 6 0 The second line of cases held that if differing inferences
could be drawn from the undisputed facts, the issue was one for the
jury.2 6 ' In synthesizing these two lines, the court implied that it had
done nothing new;... rather, by drawing on the earliest cases on the
issue,263 the court tried to prove that the two tests, although seman-
tically different, were "merely slightly divergent roads to the same
Mecca. ' ' 26 4 Any attempt to apply a different standard, the court
stated, resulted from a misinterpretation of the test itself.2 65
6. Abuse of Discretion.-In Hart v. Miller 26 6 the Court of Special
Appeals held that a trial judge abused his discretion by dismissing a
case on the ground that the plaintiff's counsel failed to comply with
258. Id. at 76, 497 A.2d at 808.
259. Id. The court also determined that if evidence is disputed and if differing infer-
ences can be drawn, the issue is for the jury. Id.
The court appeared reluctant to concede that when evidence is undisputed, the evi-
dence may still yield conflicting inferences. Therefore, the court stated that "something
more than conjecture of a party is necessary to establish that 'conflicting inferences' are
possible in a given case." Id. Citing a recent decision, Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md.
221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982), the court stated that "[A]t the very least, a party
must point to evidence in the case" from which conflicting inferences can be drawn. 304
Md. at 76, 497 A.2d at 808.
260. See, e.g., Tavel v. Bechtel Corp., 242 Md. 299, 303, 219 A.2d 43, 45 (1966).
261. See, e.g., L. & S. Constr. Co. v. State Accident Fund, 221 Md. 51, 59, 155 A.2d
653, 657-58 (1959).
262. 304 Md. at 77, 497 A.2d at 808.
263. Deford v. State, Use of Keyser, 30 Md. 179 (1869); Sacker v. Waddell, 98 Md. 43,
56 A. 399 (1903) (if facts place employee/employer relationship in doubt, question is for
jury; however, on any given state of facts, judge should decide legal relationship); Harri-
son v. Central Constr. Co., 135 Md. 170, 108 A. 874 (1919) (if facts have been ascer-
tained or agreed upon by the parties, or are undisputed, and if there is no dispute as to
the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one of law to be de-
cided by the judge); Todd v. Easton Furniture Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 A. 42 (1925).
264. 304 Md. at 77, 497 A.2d at 808. The court reasoned that the two tests have
frequently been used interchangeably. In addition, the court referred to its long-stand-
ing policy of allowing trial courts to decide employment issues in undisputed cases. Id.
265. Id.
266. 65 Md. App. 620, 501 A.2d 872 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 621, 505 A.2d 1342
(1986). This was a tort action resulting from a collision between a motorcycle driven by
the plaintiff and an automobile driven by the defendant.
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a court order directing him to answer interrogatories within a speci-
fied time period.2 6 The trial judge had emphasized the need for
"consistency" in deciding matters in which the court has wide dis-
cretion. 268 Despite the prospective hardship to the plaintiff269 and
the recognition that the plaintiff's counsel had not wilfully at-
tempted to inhibit the defense's trial preparations,2 7 ° the judge dis-
missed the case, saying "you have to go by the rules."27'
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, stating that if consis-
tency were the goal of discretionary decisions, discretion would be
"meaningless. 272 Instead, "the trial judge is required to consider
every aspect of the case and then choose the most appropriate rem-
edy."127" The court went on to say:
Failure to exercise choice in a situation calling for choice is
an abuse of discretion, because it assumes the existence of
a rule that admits of but one answer .... When, as in the
present case, the trial court recognizes its right to exercise
discretion, but then declines to exercise it in favor of ad-
hering to some consistent or uniform policy, it errs.2 7 4
In this case, the court held that it would have been appropriate to
267. Id. at 628, 501 A.2d at 876. The plaintiff had filed suit on May 13, 1983, and the
defendant had filed interrogatories about a month later. The plaintiff's counsel delayed
answering the interrogatories despite repeated requests and warnings by the defend-
ant's counsel. On January 13, 1984, the trial judge ordered the plaintiff's counsel to file
the answers within 15 days. After further warnings with no response, the defendant's
counsel filed a motion for dismissal. On May 17, 1984, shortly before a hearing on the
motion, the plaintiff's counsel filed the answers. Id. at 621-22, 501 A.2d at 873.
268. Id. at 624, 501 A.2d at 874. The judge stated: "You have to have some sort of
method of operation for yourself, because matters like this where wide discretion is
vested in the court really isn't [sic] appropriate to decide one case one way and another
case another."
269. The plaintiff had "sustained seventeen facial fractures requiring extensive cor-
rective and reconstructive surgery. At the time of trial his special damages included
medical expenses of $54,000 and lost wages amounting to $36,000." Id. at 621, 501
A.2d at 873.
270. Id. at 624, 501 A.2d at 874. The judge said, "I find nothing wilful, nothing con-
tumacious, nothing intentionally overreaching in this action." Id. In fact, the plaintiff's
counsel stated at the hearing that the delays were due in part to a disc injury to his lower
spine, which kept him out of his office for five consecutive months. Id. at 623, 501 A.2d
at 874.
271. Id. at 625, 501 A.2d at 875.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 626, 501 A.2d at 875. The court quoted at length from rule 2-433, which
sets forth various sanctions that the court may impose upon a party who fails to comply
with an order compelling discovery. Dismissal of the action is only one possibility.
274. Id. at 627, 501 A.2d at 876 (citing Brown v. United States, 372 A.2d 557 (D.C.),




impose some sanction against the plaintiff's counsel, but not to dis-
miss the plaintiff's action altogether. 75
7. Res Judicata.-Section 384B of the Insurance Code denies
insurers the right to withhold settlement of a property damage claim
arising out of an automobile accident pending the conclusion of a
personal injury suit arising out of the same accident.276 In Dill v.
Avery 277 the Court of Appeals held that section 384B does not con-
template that a single accident gives rise to two separate causes of
action for property damage and personal injury.278 Therefore, res
judicata prohibited the plaintiffs from splitting their property dam-





275. Id. at 628, 501 A.2d at 876. The court noted that "there [was] not a scintilla of
evidence that the plaintiff was responsible for or aware of the delay in failing to respond
to Interrogatories." Id.
276. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 384B (1986).
277. 305 Md. 206, 502 A.2d 1051 (1986).
278. Id. at 215, 502 A.2d at 1055.
279. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on dicta from Gelblum v. Bloom, 21
Md. App. 406, 410, 319 A.2d 546, 548 (1974). 305 Md. at 215-16, 502 A.2d at 1055-56.
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III. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Debtors and Creditors
1. Role of Mortgage Agents.-In Coner v. Morris S. Berman Unlim-
ited, Inc.' the Court of Special Appeals held that a mortgagee's
agent, who doubled as the agent for a mortgage broker for which his
wife was the sole proprietor, could not extract a finder's fee on be-
half of the broker.2 The court observed that because of the agent's
dual role, the broker had not provided arms-length services.3 In the
absence of these services, the agent could not claim a finder's fee.
But even if the proprietorship had provided these services, the court
would have prohibited the broker-agent from placing a loan with a
company that he or she owned.4
Mr. and Mrs. Coner appealed from an order ratifying the fore-
closure sale of their house5 to Morris S. Berman Unlimited, Inc.
(Berman Unlimited).6 The couple had obtained a loan from
Berman Unlimited, securing it with a second mortgage on their
home.7 Six months later they defaulted on the loan, and Berman
Unlimited foreclosed. Morris S. Berman and his wife purchased the
house individually.8
At the time of the loan, Berman deducted a $200.00 "Broker
Fee," among other fees, from the proceeds.9 An entity known as
Mortgage Masters received the $200 as a finder's fee.'0 Mortgage
Masters was allegedly a sole proprietorship owned by Berman's
wife." Mrs. Berman, however, had nothing to do with procuring
the loan for the Coners.' 2 In fact, Berman signed the actual mort-
gage loan contract for Mortgage Masters.' 3 Berman Unlimited and
Mortgage Masters operated from the same location and shared a
telephone number.' 4 Berman acknowledged that "he act[ed] as
1. 65 Md. App. 514, 501 A.2d 458 (1985).
2. Id. at 524-25, 501 A.2d at 463.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 521, 501 A.2d at 461.
6. Id. at 517, 501 A.2d at 459.
7. Id. at 516, 501 A.2d at 459.
8. Id. at 517, 501 A.2d at 459.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 518, 501 A.2d at 460.
12. Id. at 524, 501 A.2d at 463.
13. Id. at 519, 501 A.2d at 460-61.
14. Id., 501 A.2d at 461.
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general manager of Mortgage Masters whenever his wife ... [was]
out of the office."' 15
The Court of Special Appeals found that Mr. Berman's role in
the transaction as agent for both Berman Unlimited and Mortgage
Masters violated certain provisions of the Secondary Mortgage Loan
Law and the Finder's Fee law.' 6 Under the Secondary Mortgage
Loan Law' 7 a lender "may not collect from the borrower any...
finder's fee for obtaining, procuring or placing a loan";'" rather, the
lender itself must pay any finder's fee.' 9 Under the Finder's Fee
law, 20 a mortgage broker cannot serve as a director, officer, or em-
ployee of any lender with which he or she places a loan.2'
The Court of Special Appeals linked these provisions to the
state usury law by noting that they are "intended to prohibit a
lender from collecting more than the interest or other remuneration
that the law allows by collecting as well a finder's fee for simply in-
troducing himself to the borrower."'22 The court found that, in the
context of this case, the lender had "collected" the finder's fee,
within the meaning of the Secondary Mortgage Loan Law,23
notwithstanding that he had done so for the benefit of Mortgage
Masters. 4 In contravention of the statute, Berman had "extracted a
finder's fee for doing no more than receiving appellants' application
and passing it from one of his hands to the other." 25
2. Correction of Default Prior to Institution of Foreclosure Proceed-
ings.-In Balducci v. Eberly 26 the Court of Appeals held that the pay-
ment of tax deficiencies prior to the institution of foreclosure
proceedings bars the foreclosure proceedings.2 7 The court reiter-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 525, 501 A.2d at 463-64.
17. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 12-401 to -415 (1983).
18. Id. at § 12-405(a)(1).
19. Id. at § 12-406(a).
20. Id. at § 12-801 to -809.
21. Id. at § 12-803.
22. 65 Md. App. at 523, 501 A.2d at 463 (emphasis omitted).
23. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-405 (1983).
24. 65 Md. App. at 525, 501 A.2d at 463.
25. Id. at 524, 501 A.2d at 463.
26. 304 Md. 664, 500 A.2d 1042 (1985).
27. Id. at 675, 500 A.2d at 1048. The court thus adopted the majority rule. Id. at
675-78, 500 A.2d at 1048-49.
In Balducci the mortgagors-appellees executed a deed of trust, and promised to pay
all taxes. Id. at 666, 500 A.2d at 1043. Subsequently, the mortgagors received a letter
from one of the trustees calling for acceleration of the debt under the deed of trust
because of failure to pay taxes. Id., 500 A.2d at 1044. Before the filing of the foreclo-
1987]
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ated the well-established rule that a default under a deed of trust or
mortgage resulting from the breach of a covenant to pay taxes when
due permits acceleration of the secured debt and the sale of the en-
cumbered property through foreclosure proceedings. 28 The court
explained, however, that the purpose of an acceleration clause is to
give the mortgagee some additional protection. 29 Therefore, if the
mortgagor corrects the default before the institution of foreclosure
proceedings, the threat to the mortgagee's security evaporates, and
acceleration of the debt is no longer necessary to protect the
mortgage.3 °
3. Garageman's Lien as to Purchaser Without Notice.-In Central
GMC, Inc. v. Helms3 the Court of Appeals held that a garageman's
lien32 did not attach as against a buyer who purchased a truck with-
out notice of the lien. 3 The buyer contracted to purchase a used
garbage truck.34 The parties understood that the seller would have
the truck repaired before the buyer took possession. 5 The garage
owner repaired the truck, and, shortly thereafter, the buyer took
possession.36 The seller never paid the garage owner for the re-
pairs.37 Subsequently, the garage owner repossessed and sold the
truck.38
The garage owner argued that its surrender of the truck did not
discharge the lien as against the buyer because the buyer owned the
truck when the lien attached.3 9 The court, however, applied section
2-401 of the Commercial Law Article40 and determined that title did
sure action, the mortgagors paid the taxes due on the property. Id. at 667, 500 A.2d at
1044.
28. Id. at 675, 500 A.2d at 1048.
29. 304 Md. at 676, 500 A.2d at 1049 (citing Saunders v. Stradley, 25 Md. App. 85,
96, 333 A.2d 604, 611 (1975)).
30. Id. at 678, 500 A.2d at 1050.
31. 303 Md. 266, 492 A.2d 1313 (1985).
32. The garageman's lien is set forth in MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 16-202(c)
(1983), which states in pertinent part:
Any person who, with the consent of the owner, has custody of a motor vehicle
and who, at the request of the owner, provides a service to or materials for the
motor vehicle, has a lien on the motor vehicle for any charge incurred for any:
(1) Repair or rebuilding ....
33. 303 Md. at 268, 276, 492 A.2d at 1314, 1318.
34. Id. at 268, 492 A.2d at 1314.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 268-69, 492 A.2d 1314.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 269, 492 A.2d at 1314.
39. Id. at 270-71, 492 A.2d at 1315.
40. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-401 (1975). That section states in relevant part:
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not pass to the buyer until the buyer received both the truck and its
title.4 ' Therefore, the buyer did not become the truck's owner until
he took possession.
In reaching its decision, the court recognized that if the buyer
had taken the truck with notice of the lien, the lien would not have
been extinguished.42 The court found no evidence, however, that
the buyer had notice of the garage owner's lien.43 The court also
noted that a purchaser of a used motor vehicle from an established
dealer need not inquire as to unpaid repair bills.44
4. Liability of Cosigner of Installment Sales Contract.-In General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels45 the Court of Appeals held that the
cosigner of an installment sales contract was a surety, not a guaran-
tor.4 6 Thus, the creditor could proceed directly against the co-
signer.47 In addition, the creditor's failure to notify the cosigner
that the principal had defaulted in his payments did not constitute a
discharge.48
The court reviewed the distinguishing characteristics between a
contract of suretyship and a contract of guaranty. 49 A contract of
suretyship is a tripartite agreement in which the surety is primarily
or jointly liable with the principal obligor.50 Thus, if the principal
obligor fails to perform, the surety is immediately responsible. 5'
Because the surety's duty to the creditor is to see that the debt is
(1) . . . [T]itle to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of the goods ....
41. 303 Md. at 273, 492 A.2d at 1316.
42. Id. The court found MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 16-204 (1983) pertinent. 303
Md. at 272, 492 A.2d at 1316. That section provides:
Surrender or delivery of the property subject to the lien discharges that lien
against a third person who is without notice of the lien, but does not discharge
the lien against the owner or against a third party who has notice of the lien.
43. 303 Md. at 275-76, 492 A.2d at 1317-18.
44. Id. at 275, 492 A.2d at 1317.
45. 303 Md. 254, 492 A.2d 1306 (1985).
46. Id. at 258, 492 A.2d at 1308-09.
47. Id. at 264, 492 A.2d at 1311.
48. Id. John Daniels purchased a used car from a car dealer, who required a cosigner
on the installment contract. Seymoure, John's brother, signed the contract as buyer, and
John signed the contract as co-buyer. After John defaulted on the payments, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation declared the contract in default and brought this ac-
tion. Id. at 258, 492 A.2d at 1308.
49. Id. at 259-61, 492 A.2d at 1309-10.
50. Id. at 259, 492 A.2d at 1309.
51. Id.
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paid, and because the surety is charged with knowledge of the prin-
cipal's default, the creditor need not notify the surety if the principal
obligor defaults on his or her promise.52
A contract of guaranty, on the other hand, is collateral and in-
dependent of the principal contract.53 The guarantor is secondarily
liable to the creditor and is not bound to take notice of nonperform-
ance of the contract.54 The guarantor insures the solvency of the
principal obligor.55
Hence, in a contract for guaranty, if the principal obligor fails to
perform, the guarantor promises to perform. 56 By contrast, in a
contract for suretyship, the surety promises to perform exactly what
the principal obligor does perform.5 7
In concluding that the parties had established a suretyship, the
court found it significant that the cosigner had affixed his signature
on the line designated "Buyer," and that the contract had stated
unambiguously that all buyers assumed joint and several liability.58
The court thus observed, "under the objective law of contracts, a
reasonable person knew or should have known that he was subject-
ing himself to primary liability for the purchase of the automo-
bile."59 Furthermore, the court could find no evidence that the
cosigner executed any agreement "collateral to and independent
of" the contract between the buyer and the debtor.60 But joint exe-
cution by the principal and the cosigner makes it unlikely that the
parties have created a contract of guaranty; instead, joint execution
points towards a suretyship.6 '
5. Voidable Preferences.-Section 15-101 of the Commercial Law
Article governs preferences in insolvency.62 This statute, which took
effect in 1975,63 incorporates by reference the sections of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code that concern fraudulent, void, and voidable
preferences.64 In 1978, however, Congress substantially revised the
52. Id. at 259-60, 492 A.2d at 1309.
53. Id. at 260, 492 A.2d at 1309.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id., 492 A.2d at 1310.
57. Id. at 260-61, 492 A.2d at 1310.
58. Id. at 262, 492 A.2d at 1310-11.
59. Id., 492 A.2d at 1311.
60. Id. at 263, 492 A.2d at 1311.
61. Id.
62. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-101 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
63. Id.
64. Id. at § 15-101(d).
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federal Bankruptcy Code.65
In Smith v. Plymouth Locomotive Works, Inc. 66 the Court of Appeals
held that former section 15-101 (b)6 7 includes by reference the 1978
amendments to the federal Bankruptcy Code.6" Thus, to set aside a
preferential transfer, a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding need not
show that a preferential creditor had "reasonable cause to believe"
that the debtor either was insolvent or would become insolvent
within ninety days from the date of the transfer.69 Instead, the cred-
itor need only show that the debtor made the transfer within ninety
days preceding the debtor's insolvency.7 °
In reaching its decision, the court examined the development of
preferential transfers in insolvency proceedings. 7' By enacting sec-
tions 15-101(b) and 15-101(c),72 the General Assembly intended to
65. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 85-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
66. 304 Md. 633, 500 A.2d 1027 (1985). Smith, the assignee for the benefit of the
creditors, filed suit to set aside preferential transfers made by the insolvent to Plymouth
Locomotive. Id. at 634, 500 A.2d at 1027. The parties stipulated that (1) the insolvent
made a transfer to Plymouth that occurred within the 90-day period preceding the suit,
and (2) the transfer gave Plymouth more than it would have received under Chapter 7 of
the federal Bankruptcy Code. Id., 500 A.2d at 1027-28.
67. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-101(b) (1983). In a 1985 amendment, the legis-
lature redesignated former section 15-101 (b) as present subsection 15-101 (d). The stat-
ute construed by the court provided:
(b) Preferences, payments, and transfers.-All preferences, payments, and
transfers made or suffered by the insolvent which are fraudulent, void, or void-
able under any act of the Congress of the United States relating to bankruptcy
are fraudulent, void, or voidable, respectively, under this subtitle.
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 15-101(b) (1983).
The statute currently provides:
(d) Fraudulent, void or voidable preferences.-All preferences, payments,
transfers, and obligations made or suffered by the insolvent which are fraudu-
lent, void, or voidable under any act of the Congress of the United States relat-
ing to bankruptcy are fraudulent, void, or voidable, respectively, under this
subtitle to the same extent that they would be fraudulent, void, or voidable
under applicable federal bankruptcy law.
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 15-101(d) (Supp. 1986).
68. 304 Md. at 641, 500 A.2d at 1031.
69. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 eliminated the requirement that the prefer-
ential creditor have "reasonable cause to believe" that at the time of the preferential
transfer the debtor was insolvent. Id. at 638, 500 A.2d at 1029.
70. Id. at 641, 500 A.2d at 1031.
71. Id. at 636-38, 500 A.2d at 1028-29.
72. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 15-101(c) (1983). In the 1985 amendment, the leg-
islature redesignated former section 15-101(c) as present subsection 15-101(e). The
statute formerly provided:
(c) Powers of assignee or receiver.-Any assignee for the benefit of creditors
or receiver of the assets of an insolvent may set aside any ...
(2) Preferential transfer made by the insolvent to or for the benefit of a
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allow a creditor both to set aside a preferential transfer that violated
the federal bankruptcy laws under section 15-101 (b) and to set aside
a preference that violated the Maryland insolvency laws under sec-
tion 15-101(c). 7" The court found no intention on the part of the
General Assembly to limit section 15-101(b) by the "reasonable
cause to believe" language of section 15-101(c)(2)(ii).74 Further-
more, the word "any" in the phrase "any act of the Congress" in
section 15-101(b)75 indicated to the court that the General Assem-
bly anticipated future revisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code.76
6 Priority of Antecedent Perfected Security Interest.-In Farmers &
Merchants National Bank of Hagerstown v. Schlossberg77 the Court of Ap-
peals held that the bank's antecedent perfected security interest had
priority over the State of Maryland's tax lien. 7 3 The court also held
that a debtor cannot convey to the assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors the rights of a secured party with an antecedent perfected se-
curity interest; therefore, the secured party's rights do not become
part of the fiduciary estate available for distribution.79
In Schlossberg the debtor assigned all its assets to Schlossberg for
the benefit of its creditors. At the time of assignment, Farmers &
Merchants National Bank held an antecedent perfected security in-
terest, and the State of Maryland held a lien against the debtor for
unpaid taxes.80
The court initially noted that section 15-102(b) of the Commer-
creditor within four months of the commencement of the proceeding for or on
account of an antecedent debt if:
(i) The transfer was made or suffered by the insolvent; and
(ii) The creditor receiving the preference or his agent had, at the time
when the transfer was made, reasonable cause to believe that the insolvent was
insolvent.
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-101(c) (1983).
The statute now provides:
(e) Powers of assignee or receiver.-Any assignee for the benefit of creditors
or receiver of the assets of an insolvent may set aside any: ...
(2) Preference, payment or obligation that is fraudulent, void, or voidable
under subsection (d) of this section.
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 15-101(e) (Supp. 1986).
73. 304 Md. at 638, 500 A.2d at 1029.
74. d.
75. See supra note 67.
76. 304 Md. at 638, 500 A.2d at 1029.
77. 306 Md. 48, 507 A.2d 172 (1986).
78. Id. at 61, 507 A.2d at 178.
79. Id. at 59, 507 A.2d at 177.
80. Id. at 50-51, 507 A.2d at 173.
626 [VOL. 46:620
COMMERCIAL LAW
cial Law Article,8' which governs priorities in insolvency, does not
address the rights of the secured party with an antecedent perfected
security interest.8 2 Provisions of Maryland's Uniform Commercial
Code, however, mandate that the claim of a secured party with an
antecedent perfected security interest takes priority over the claim
of an assignee for the benefit of the creditors.8" The court also de-
termined it would have reached the same conclusion even before
the enactment of section 15-102(b). 4
Section 202(b) of article 81 gives the State priority in the pro-
ceeds of a tax sale of corporate property.85 The court found that
section 202(b) conflicted with section 15-102(b). 6 When two stat-
utes conflict, however, the General Assembly is presumed to have
intended that the statute whose relevant substantive provisions were
enacted most recently implicitly repeals any conflicting provision of
the earlier statute. 7 Thus, the court held that the General Assem-
bly implicitly repealed section 202(b) to the extent that it conflicts
with section 15-102(b). 8
In assignments for the benefit of creditors, sections 343 and
394 of article 81 give priority to the State's claims for sales and use
taxes.89 The court, however, rejected the State's argument that sec-
tions 343 and 394 were controlling: "[C]ollateral securing an ante-
81. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-102 (1983).
82. 306 Md. at 58, 507 A.2d at 177.
83. See id. The court discussed MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 (1975), 9-
302(1)(g) (Supp. 1985), 9-312(5)(a) (Supp. 1985), which are part of the U.C.C., and 15-
101(d) (1983).
84. 306 Md. at 59, 507 A.2d at 177.
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 202(b) (1980). That section provides in relevant part:
[w]henever a sale of either real or personal property of a corporation, from
which State taxes are due and payable, shall be made by any sheriff, constable,
trustee, receiver, or other ministerial officer, under judicial process or other-
wise, all sums due and in arrears for State taxes from the corporation whose
property is sold shall befirst paid and satisfied, after the necessary expenses inci-
dent to the sale .... (Emphasis added.)
86. 306 Md. at 61, 507 A.2d at 179. In the distribution of an estate following an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, § 202(b) gives absolute priority to all tax claims;
however, § 15-102(b) subordinates tax claims to certain other claims.
87. Id., 507 A.2d at 178-79.
88. Id. at 63, 507 A.2d at 179.
89. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 343, 394 (1980). Sections 343 and 394 both contain
the following language:
Whenever the business or property of any person subject to tax under the
terms of this subtitle shall be placed in receivership, bankruptcy or assignment
is made for the benefit of creditors, or if said property is seized under restraint
for property taxes, all taxes, penalties and interest imposed by this subtitle for




cedent perfected security interest does not become part of the
fiduciary estate until the underlying secured indebtedness has been
satisfied." 9"
The court agreed that the tax lien was a statutory lien within the
meaning of section 9-102(b)(2) of Maryland's Uniform Commercial
Code.9 ' Nonetheless, the court found that section 9-102(b)(2) only
required the application of law predating Title 9. Before the enact-
ment of Title 9, a duly recorded chattel mortgage took priority over
a lien subsequently executed or recorded.92 Thus, on this count as
well, the secured party's claim prevailed over the statutory lien. 93
7. Acceptance of Late Payments as Waiver.-In Battista v. Savings
Bank of Baltimore94 the Court of Special Appeals held that a credi-
tor's repeated acceptance of late payments may constitute a waiver
of the creditor's contractual right to prompt payment or the right to
repossess even if the contract contains a nonwaiver clause. 95
Whether waiver has occurred is a question of fact for thejury.96 To
retract the waiver, the creditor must give reasonable notice to the
debtor that the creditor will in the future insist on performance in
strict compliance with the contract.97
Battista, the buyer of an automobile, sued the Savings Bank of
Baltimore, the secured party, for conversion.9" After Battista be-
came disabled, she made several late payments.99 The bank sent
two letters to Battista threatening repossession; however, the bank
accepted Battista's late payments each time, and continued to accept
90. 306 Md. at 64, 507 A.2d at 180.
91. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-102(b)(2) (Supp. 1985). That section states that
"[t]his title does not apply to statutory liens."
92. 306 Md. at 65-66, 507 A.2d at 181.
93. Id.
94. 67 Md. App. 257, 507 A.2d 203 (1986).
95. Id. at 270, 507 A.2d at 209. The contract contained the following provision:
Failure of Holder to exercise any of the Holder's rights hereunder pro-
vided shall not be deemed a waiver thereof, and no waiver of any such rights
shall be deemed to apply to any other of such rights, nor shall it be effective
unless in writing and signed by the Holder.
Id. at 263, 507 A.2d at 206.
96. Id. at 270, 507 A.2d at 209.
97. Id. The court found pertinent MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-209(5) (1983).
That section states in relevant part: "A party who has made a waiver affecting an execu-
tory portion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by
the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived. Id.
98. 67 Md. App. at 260, 507 A.2d at 204.
99. Id. at 263, 507 A.2d at 206. Battista invoked the provisions of her disability
credit insurance. After Battista became disabled, her insurer made the monthly pay-
ments to the bank. Id.
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various late payments for over a year.' 00 Finally, when Battista was
behind on two payments, the bank repossessed the car.'
The court determined that Maryland law clearly recognizes the
principle of waiver by conduct. 10 2 Previous Maryland cases, how-
ever, had not considered the effect of express nonwaiver clauses or
of notices of intent to repossess in retail sales installment con-
tracts.'1 3 The court found that a majority of other jurisdictions per-
mit the waiver of contractual rights despite the presence of
contractual nonwaiver clauses.'0 4 Because the decisions from other
states were consistent with Maryland decisions, the court adopted
the majority view.' 05
A waiver of the right to repossess or the right to prompt pay-
ment imposes a duty on the creditor to warn the debtor that strict
compliance will be required in the future. 0 6 Although the bank
sent two notices to Battista, the bank thereafter accepted Battista's
payments. 0 7 The court found that such conduct constituted waiver,
and that the bank's retraction of waiver did not satisfy the reason-
able notice requirement of section 2-209(5) of the Commercial Law
Article. ' 0
8
The court rejected Battista's argument that she should recover
punitive damages from the bank.'0 9 To recover punitive damages in
a claim arising out of a contractual relationship, the party seeking
the damages must prove actual malice on the part of the defend-
ant.t° For the court to find actual malice, it must find that the de-
fendant performed the unlawful act " 'intentionally or wantonly,
without legal justification or excuse but with an evil or rancorous
motive influenced by hate; the purpose being to deliberately and
100. Id. at 263-64, 507 A.2d at 206.
101. Id. at 264, 507 A.2d at 206-07. Battista later brought the account up to date, and
the bank returned the car. Id.
102. Id. at 266, 507 A.2d at 207 (citing Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Delp
& Chapel Concrete and Constr. Co., 44 Md. App. 34, 408 A.2d 1043 (1979), cert. denied,
287 Md. 751 (1980); University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 369 A.2d 570 (1977);
andJohn B. Robeson Assocs., Inc. v. Gardens of Faith, Inc., 226 Md. 215, 172 A.2d 529
(1961)).
103. 67 Md. App. at 266, 507 A.2d at 207.
104. See id. at 266-70, 507 A.2d at 207-09 and authorities cited therein.
105. Id. at 270, 570 A.2d at 210. For the minority view not allowing waiver, see Hale
v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 374 So. 2d 849 (Ala. 1979), and General Grocer Co. of
Illinois v. Bachar, 51 111. App. 3d 907, 365 N.E.2d 1106 (1977).
106. 67 Md. App. at 271, 507 A.2d at 210.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 274, 507 A.2d at 211.
110. Id.
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wilfully injure the plaintiff.' "" The court found no evidence of
actual malice, although it observed that the bank might have been
negligent." '2 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the
trial court properly withheld Battista's punitive damage claim from
the jury,"' but that the question of waiver was a question for the
jury." t4
8. Conversion on Repossession.-In Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. 1 " the Court of Special Appeals held that to maintain a suit for
conversion, the plaintiff must have had either actual possession or
the right to immediate possession of the personal property
seized." 6 In Hamilton a mother and daughter purchased a truck; the
mother signed as co-buyer and the daughter signed as buyer,
although the truck's title was in the daughter's name." 7 After the
buyers fell behind in their payments, and Ford repossessed the vehi-
cle, the mother filed this suit for conversion." 8 The court, however,
found that the mother, as co-buyer, had only a vested financial inter-
est in the truck and thus was not entitled to immediate possession.
Therefore, she as co-buyer could not maintain a suit for
conversion." 9
The court also found that Ford Motor Credit Company and its
representative Alaimo violated section 14-202(6) of the Consumer
Debt Collection Act' 20 in attempting to collect payments.' 2 ' The
court, however, declined to adopt the tort of negligent infliction of
111. Id. (quoting Drug Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352, 283 A.2d
392, 398 (1971)).
112. 67 Md. App. at 274-75, 507 A.2d at 212.
113. Id. at 275, 507 A.2d at 212.
114. Id. at 271, 507 A.2d at 210.
115. 66 Md. App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986).
116. Id. at 64, 502 A.2d at 1066.
117. Id. at 51, 502 A.2d at 1060.
118. Id. at 51-53, 502 A.2d at 1059-60.
119. Id. at 64-65, 502 A.2d at 1066.
120. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 14-202(6) (1983). That section states in pertinent
part:
[I]n collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt, a collector may not...
(6) Communicate with the debtor or a person related to him with the
frequency, at the unusual hours, or in any other manner as reasonably can be
expected to abuse or harass the debtor ....
121. 66 Md. App. at 67, 502 A.2d at 1068. Ford Motor Credit and its representative
telephoned the mother several times despite her protests that she could not pay the
debt, that she was unaware of the location of the truck, that her husband was ill, and that
the telephone calls were extremely disturbing. Ford Motor Credit called at least once at
night and, despite the mother's request, did not stop calling. Id.
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emotional distress. '
2 2
9. Fraudulent Conveyances in Administration of Estates.-Section
15-209 of the Commercial Law Article12 3 generally permits credi-
tors to ignore fraudulent conveyances.' 24 In Barter Systems v. Ros-
ner,'25 however, the Court of Special Appeals held that a creditor
cannot use section 15-209 to circumvent the procedures for enforc-
ing claims against an estate.' 26 The court conceded that section 15-
209 apparently conflicts with the statutes regulating estate proceed-
ings.' 27 After applying the rules of statutory construction, the court
concluded that the General Assembly intended the statutes regulat-
ing estate proceedings, rather than section 15-209, to govern the
claims of creditors against estates. 128
10. Subordination of Vendee's Lien Through Consent Clause.-In Ar-
undel Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lawrence ' 29 the Court of
Special Appeals held that a "consent" clause in a purchase agree-
ment for real property subordinated the vendee's lien to the
lender's lien.'3 0 The court found that the seller placed this provi-
122. Id. at 63-64, 502 A.2d at 1066. Additionally, the court found: that the facts did
not support the finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. at 59, 502 A.2d
at 1064; that malice on the part of Ford Motor Credit entitled the buyer to punitive
damages, id. at 65-66, 502 A.2d at 1067; and that evidence of Ford Motor Credit's finan-
cial worth was admissible on the issue of punitive damages. Id. at 66, 502 A.2d at 1067.
123. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-209 (1983). That section provides in relevant
part:
If a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, the creditor, when
his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase or
one who has derived title immediately or immediately from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim; or
(2) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution on the prop-
erty conveyed.
124. Id.
125. 64 Md. App. 255, 494 A.2d 964 (1985). In Barter Systems the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, sitting as an orphans' court, allowed the general creditor of an
estate to maintain a claim against the estate. Subsequently, the general creditor brought
an action seeking enforcement by issuance of a writ offierifacias against a condominium
that the decedent conveyed with right of survivorship to himself or his brother. Id. at
259-60, 494 A.2d at 966.
126. Id. at 267-68, 494 A.2d at 970.
127. Id. at 267, 494 A.2d at 970. See MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 8-104 to -108
(1981 & Supp. 1985).
128. Id. at 268, 494 A.2d at 970.
129. 65 Md. App. 158, 499 A.2d 1298 (1985).
130. Id. at 166, 499 A.2d at 1303. The Lawrences contracted to purchase a piece of
property from E. Black & Sons, Inc. (Black). Black did not own the property, but the
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sion in the contract because a lender would not have otherwise
made the loan.' 3 ' Thus, the court concluded that the parties in-
tended the provision to subordinate the vendee's lien to that of the
mortgagee.'
32
B. Corporations and Associations
1. Termination Clause in Management Contract.-In Insel v. Solo-
mon 133 the Court of Special Appeals held that a contract between
members of a professional association, which provided for termina-
tion of any stockholder, physician, or employee for moral turpitude
or misconduct, did not apply exclusively to loss of license or crimi-
nal conviction. 134
A dispute arose between the two shareholders of an ophthal-
mology corporation, Drs. Insel and Solomon, over the contract for
the management of their professional association.'3 5 The contract
provided for termination of the mutual venture under several con-
tingencies, including retirement and, in paragraph 10, loss of medi-
cal license, conviction of moral turpitude, or involvement in
unethical or immoral conduct.' 36
Relations between the two physicians began to deteriorate
when Dr. Insel was ready to retire. Dr. Solomon requested that the
corporation be involuntarily dissolved pursuant to section 3-413 of
parties understood that he would acquire it. The contract provided that "the buyers
understand and consent to the seller placing a construction mortgage on the property
for the term of this contract." Id. at 160, 499 A.2d at 1299. Subsequently, the lender
foreclosed on Black's construction mortgage. Id., 499 A.2d at 1300.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 63 Md. App. 384, 492 A.2d 963 (1985).
134. Id. at 396, 492 A.2d at 969.
135. Id. at 387, 492 A.2d at 964. The agreement provided that each physician would
have an equal voice, i.e., equal representation on the board of directors. It also stated
that:
Each physician agrees that (i) the management of the Corporation's affairs shall
be carried out through a continuous process of consultation and agreement
between them in which process they are to be completely co-equal and (ii) no
material action regarding the operation of the Corporation's practice or busi-
ness shall be taken by either of them without prior consultation with and agree-
ment of the other. Neither Physician shall be accountable to the other for his
medical decisions.
Id.
136. Id. at 387-88, 492 A.2d at 965. Paragraph 10 provided in full:
Should any physician stockholder or employee lose his medical license, be con-
victed of moral turpitude or involved in unethical or immoral conduct or em-
bezzlement, his relation to the Corporation will terminate with provisions as
above for separation from the Corporation (as in total disability).
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the Corporations and Associations Article.' 3 7 In a preliminary rul-
ing, the trial court precluded Dr. Insel from offering evidence as to
Dr. Solomon's alleged unethical or immoral conduct.'13  The court
held that paragraph 10 applied only to a member's loss of license.1
3 9
The court also held that the power to regulate the unethical behav-
ior of physicians is vested in the State Commission on Medical Disci-
pline and is beyond the courts' authority.' 40
The Court of Special Appeals analyzed the language of para-
graph 10 and found the provision ambiguous.' 4 ' The court turned
to well-established Maryland law on contract construction: "If the
language is clear, it controls; if it is ambiguous, the court may con-
sider extrinsic factors in ascertaining what the parties intended."'
42
The court concluded that in entering the agreement, each party had
wanted simply to guarantee himself an ethical partner. Therefore, it
was unreasonable to require a partner's conviction of a crime as a
prerequisite to termination of the practice. 14  Furthermore, the
court concluded that the doctors had not intended to predicate the
application of paragraph 10 on a proceeding before the Commis-
sion on Medical Discipline. 144 As a result, the court remanded the
case for further proceedings.' 45
2. Beer Franchise Fair Dealing Act.- Section 203E of the Beer
Franchise Fair Dealing Act146 prohibits the establishment of addi-
tional beer distributorships in the territory already served by a li-
censed franchisee.' 47 In addition, section 203B forbids beer
manufacturers from failing or refusing to deliver a distributor's
137. Id. at 390, 492 A.2d at 966. MD. CORPS & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-413 (1985)
provides grounds for petition by stockholders or creditors for involuntary dissolution.
138. 63 Md. App. at 391-92, 492 A.2d at 967.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 392, 492 A.2d at 967.
141. Id. at 395-96, 492 A.2d at 969.
142. Id. at 396, 492 A.2d at 969 (citing Della Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Commu-
nity Developers, Inc., 38 Md. App. 119, 130, 380 A.2d 627, 635 (1977)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 398, 492 A.2d at 970.
145. Id.
146. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 203E (1981).
147. Id. Section 203E provides:
No franchiser, who shall designate a sales territory for which any franchisee
shall be primarily responsible or in which any franchisee is required to concen-
trate its efforts, shall enter into any franchise or agreement with any other beer
distributor for the purpose of establishing an additional franchisee for its brand
or brands of beer in the territory being primarily served or concentrated upon




In Erwin & Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co. 149 the Court of Ap-
peals held that the Act does not require a beer franchiser to grant to
an existing distributor the right to distribute a brand of beer that the
franchiser acquired after the execution of the original distributor-
ship agreement.'5 0 The court also held that the Act does not grant
the beer distributor the right to order and receive a brand not speci-
fied in the distribution agreement.15 '
Erwin & Shafer, Inc. (E & S) entered into a distribution agree-
ment with Pabst under which E & S received the exclusive right to
distribute in Howard County the Pabst brands specified in the
agreement. 52 Pabst merged with Olympia Brewing Company and
awarded the distributorship of its newly acquired brands to another
distributor, A.E. Davies, Inc.'15 E & S challenged the arrangement
between Pabst and A.E. Davies, Inc., claiming that Pabst had vio-
lated sections 203B and 203E of the Beer Franchise Fair Dealing
Act. 154
According to the Court of Appeals, the General Assembly en-
acted the Act in 1974 to "protec[t] beer distributors from unlawful
inducements, threats and terminations by beer manufacturers."'155
The court recognized, however, that changes had taken place in the
industry since 1974. Specifically, "[t]here are now far fewer manu-
facturers of beer products, and distributors typically handle several
brands of beer."'
15 6
148. Id. at § 203B.
149. 304 Md. 302, 498 A.2d 1188 (1985).
150. Id. at 310, 498 A.2d at 1192.
151. Id. at 315, 498 A.2d at 1194.
152. Id. at 307, 498 A.2d at 1190.
153. Id. at 307-08, 498 A.2d at 1190-91.
154. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, §§ 203A-203G (1981). E and S sought injunctive relief
in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Pabst removed the case to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court certified two questions to
the Court of Appeals for determination:
(1) Whether § 203E of the Maryland Beer Franchise Dealing Act, Mary-
land Code (1974, 1981 Repl. Vol.), Article 2B, § 203A et seq., requires a beer
franchisor to grant to a distributor of specified brands of beer in a given terri-
tory, the right to distribute a brand of beer which the franchisor acquired after
the execution of the original distributorship agreement.
(2) Whether § 203B of the Maryland Beer Franchise Fair Dealing Act,
Maryland Code (1974, 1981 Repl. Vol.), Article 2B, § 203A et seq., grants a
beer distributor the right to order and receive a brand of beer that is not cov-
ered by the distributor's franchise agreement.
304 Md. at 305, 498 A.2d at 1189.
155. 304 Md. at 306, 498 A.2d at 1190.
156. Id. at 307, 498 A.2d at 1190.
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The court established that Pabst had not violated section 203E
of the Act even though Pabst had selected a second distributor to
market its products in Howard County. 57 A contrary construction
would "lead to absurd consequences."' t 58 First, the court stated that
"to adopt such an interpretation would be to bestow upon all dis-
tributors a right akin to a first refusal in all those brands of beer
made or acquired by their manufacturers, without regard to existing
franchise agreements."' 59 Second, a contrary interpretation would
force Pabst either to terminate existing Olympia distributorships in
Maryland counties having a Pabst distributor or to violate section
203E by using both distributors.' 6 ° The court thought it clear that
the General Assembly had never intended to create such a
situation. 161
E & S contended that even if Pabst's conduct was in accordance
with section 203E, it violated section 203B since Pabst did not fulfill
E & S's order.16 2 The court did not agree.' 63 "IT]he Act bestows
no such authority upon a distributor such as E & S, simply by virtue
of a distributorship agreement."'" Under the court's interpreta-
tion of the statute, unless a beer distributor is authorized to dis-
tribute the brands of beer it orders, it is not entitled to delivery. 165
C. Insurance
1. Method of Computing Period of Incontestability.-In Equitable Life
Assurance v. Jalowsky '66 the Court of Appeals held that in computing
the two-year period of an incontestability clause in a life insurance
policy, one should exclude the date of the policy's issuance and be-
gin counting from the first full day following the issuance of the
policy.
16 7
Dr. David Jalowsky applied for life insurance with the Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States and named his parents
157. Id. at 311, 498 A.2d at 1192.
158. Id. The court cited Coerper v. Comptroller, 265 Md. 3, 6, 288 A.2d 187, 188
(1972), and Doswell v. State, 53 Md. App. 647, 653, 455 A.2d 995, 999 (1983) for the
proposition that "[a] court must shun a construction of a statute which will lead to ab-
surd consequences." 304 Md. at 311, 498 A.2d at 1192.
159. 304 Md. at 311, 498 A.2d at 1192.
160. Id. at 311-12, 498 A.2d at 1193.
161. Id. at 312, 498 A.2d at 1193.
162. Id. at 314, 498 A.2d at 1194.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 315, 498 A.2d at 1194.
165. Id.
166. 306 Md. 257, 508 A.2d 137 (1986).
167. Id. at 267, 508 A.2d at 142.
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as beneficiaries.' 8 In completing the application, Dr. Jalowsky mis-
represented his health by indicating that he had never been treated
for cancer and had not consulted a physician for five years. 6 ' In
fact, at the time of the application, Dr. Jalowsky was undergoing
treatment for Hodgkin's Disease, a form of cancer, and in the month
preceding his application, had undergone two biopsies and other
surgical procedures. 70 Equitable issued the policy on April 16,
1981. Dr. Jalowsky died precisely two years later, on April 16,
1983.'17
Dr. Jalowsky's parents filed a claim with Equitable for the pro-
ceeds of their son's policy.' 7 2 Pointing to the insured's misrepre-
sentations and to the policy's two-year incontestability clause,
Equitable rejected the claim.17 3
Two Maryland statutes were relevant to the dispute. First, sec-
tion 390 of the Insurance Code provides that after a life insurance
policy has been in effect for a period of two years from its date of
issue, it shall become incontestable. 174 Second, section 2 of article
94 provides that "[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or de-
fault, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not
to be included."' 175
The trial court held that the life insurance policy took effect on
April 16, 1981, and that the date of Dr. Jalowsky's death was thus
beyond the period of contestability. 176 The Court of Special Ap-
peals affirmed, relying upon the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Holtze v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. 17 7 In Holtze
the court held that the date of issue was to be included in the two-
year period of contestability. 178 InJalowsky, however, the Court of
168. Id. at 258, 508 A.2d at 138.




173. Id. In full, the incontestability clause of the policy provided:
All statements made in the application are representations and not warranties.
We have the right to contest the validity of this policy based on material mis-
statements made in the application. However, this policy will become incon-
testable after it has been in effect during the life time of the Insured for two
years from the Date of Issue shown on page 3.
Id.
174. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 390 (1986).
175. MD. ANN. CODE art. 94, § 2 (1986).
176. 306 Md. at 259, 508 A.2d at 138.
177. 276 Md. 681, 351 A.2d 139 (1976).
178. Id. at 689, 351 A.2d at 143.
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Appeals declined to view Holtze as an unconditional ruling that the
date of a policy's issuance is included in the period of incontestabil-
ity. 179 Instead, theJalowsky court distinguished Holtze on the ground
that in the prior case the court had not considered the effect of sec-
tion 2 of article 94.180
Section 2, which codifies the general common-law rule, 81 is in
accord with early Maryland decisions. 18 2 On this basis, the court
concluded that the General Assembly intended section 2 to provide
a uniform schedule for the computation of time. 1 3 To construe
section 2 and section 390 "in harmony and full effect,"'18 4 the court
limited the scope of section 390. The purpose of that statute is "to
put insurers and insureds on notice of the time during which a pol-
icy can be contested, rather than delineating a rigid time of com-
mencement for the two year contestability period."'8 5 Thus article
94's general rule for the computation of time prevails even over a
conflicting provision in the Insurance Code.
2. Distribution of Dividend to Former Mutual Policyholders.-In
Spence v. Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society '86 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that former policyholders of a mutual insurance
company were not entitled to participate in the distribution of divi-
dends from earned surplus stemming from a year in which they had
policies in effect. 18 7 The distribution of the contested dividend was
consistent with the issued policy, the company's by-laws, and the
relevant Maryland statutes. 188
In December 1983 Medical Mutual's Board of Directors de-
clared that current policyholders who had also been insured by the
Society in 1975 were eligible for the company's first dividend.' 89 In
response to this decision, Dr. James Spence and other physicians
who had been policyholders in 1975 brought a class action claiming
that they were entitled to participate in the distribution of the divi-
dend even though they were not current policyholders.' 9° The
179. 306 Md. at 261, 508 A.2d at 139.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 262, 508 A.2d at 139.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 265, 508 A.2d at 141.
185. Id. at 264-65, 508 A.2d at 141.
186. 65 Md. App. 410, 500 A.2d 1066 (1985).
187. Id. at 413, 500 A.2d at 1067.
188. Id. at 425, 500 A.2d at 1073.
189. Id. at 413, 500 A.2d at 1067.
190. Id. at 414, 500 A.2d at 1067. The circuit court certified the class, which included
1987]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs contended that the dividend distribution unfairly discrimi-
nated against them, in violation of section 264 of the Insurance
Code.' 9 ' By excluding former policyholders, the plaintiffs main-
tained, the Society had effectively rewritten the insurance policy and
caused them to pay a higher premium for their 1975 coverage than
current policyholders had paid.' 9 2 The trial court rejected this
claim and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 193
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Court of Special
Appeals explained that an insurance policy must be construed in ac-
cordance with the company's charter and by-laws.' 9 4 Although the
policy was ambiguous, the company's by-laws stated that only cur-
rent policyholders were entitled to participate in the distribution of
dividends.'" 5 Addressing the charge of unfair discrimination, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs were no longer members of the
same classification as the current policyholders; therefore, the divi-
dend distribution did not unfairly discriminate against the plain-
tiffs. 196 The dividend distribution was consistent with the insurance
"all of those persons, partnerships and professional corporations" who were insured by
Medical Mutual under 1975 policies, but who were no longer insured by Medical Mutual
on December 6, 1983, and therefore were not declared eligible to receive a share in the
$500,000 dividend. Id.
191. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 264 (1979). Section 264 provides in pertinent part
that:
Any domestic stock or domestic mutual insurer may issue any or all of its poli-
cies with or without participation in profits, savings or unabsorbed portions of
premiums, may classify policies issued on a participating or nonparticipating
basis, and may determine the right to participate and the extent of participation
of any class or classes of policies. Any such classification or determination shall
be reasonable, and shall not unfairly discriminate as between policyholders
within the same such classifications.
192. 65 Md. App. at 416-17, 500 A.2d at 1069. The plaintiffs argued that the initial
premiums, paid in 1975, represented an inflated estimate of the policy's cost. They ex-
pected that the company would refund the excess premium once the company had de-
termined its actual costs. Thus, they contended, the dividend paid to current
policyholders effectively enabled those policyholders to pay less for their 1975 coverage
than the plaintiffs paid. Id. at 417, 500 A.2d at 1069.
193. Id. at 414, 500 A.2d at 1067.
194. Id. at 419, 500 A.2d at 1070 (citing Condon v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n,
89 Md. 99, 42 A. 944 (1899)).
195. Id. at 420, 500 A.2d at 1070. Medical Mutual's by-laws stated that "the Board of
Directors shall determine the amount, if any, of the premium contributions to be re-
turned to the members as dividends." Id. The by-laws specified further that
"[m]embers whose policies terminate shall automatically be dropped from membership
in the Society." Id.
196. Id. at 422, 500 A.2d at 1072. The court found that the current and former policy
holders did not belong to the same class simply because the former policyholders no
longer held policies with Medical Mutual. Id.
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policy, the company's by-laws, and the controlling statutes; there-
fore, the court considered it immaterial that the policy had some of
the aspects of a tontine policy 197 or that plaintiffs effectively paid
more for their 1975 insurance coverage than did current
policyholders. 98
3. Intended Damages Clauses.-In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sparks 199
the Court of Special Appeals held that an "intended damages"
clause in a homeowner's insurance policy excluded from coverage
only those results ("damages") the insured actually intended.2 °0
Thus, the clause would not exclude from coverage even the foresee-
able results of the insured's intentional acts, unless the insured actu-
ally intended those results.20 '
On the night of October 4, 1981, James Sparks borrowed his
mother's car and drove to a mill.20 2 While stealing gas from another
car, James ignited gas fumes and caused a fire that destroyed the
mill.203 Ms. Sparks' insurance company, Allstate, challenged a lower
court decision holding it liable for the fire's damages.20 4 Because
the fire resulted from an intentional act, the insurance company
contended that the policy's intended damages clause placed the loss
on Ms. Sparks.20 5
The policy expressly excluded from coverage "property dam-
age which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the
Insured."20 6 In reaching its holding, the court distinguished four
Court of Appeals cases that interpreted clauses excluding losses not
"caused by accident."20 7 "Caused by accident" clauses exclude ob-
197. A tontine policy is a type of life insurance policy issued only in states that require
an annual distribution of dividends. Under a tontine plan, contributors agree that they
may share in the surplus only if they outlive the period of distribution. Id. at 424, 500
A.2d at 1073.
198. Id. at 426, 500 A.2d at 1073.
199. 63 Md. App. 738, 493 A.2d 1110 (1985).
200. Id. at 742, 493 A.2d at 1112.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 740, 493 A.2d at 1111.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 741, 493 A.2d at 1111. Allstate also appealed the lower court's decision
holding it liable for damages under Ms. Sparks' automobile insurance policy. Id. On
this ground, the Court of Special Appeals reversed. The automobile policy did not ap-
ply "because the loss did not arise out of the 'use' or 'loading and unloading' of Ms.
Sparks's car." Id. at 744, 493 A.2d at 1113. Furthermore, "the fire was the result of an
'independent cause' unrelated to the use of the Sparks car itself." Id.
205. Id. at 741, 493 A.2d at 111 I.
206. Id., 493 A.2d at 1112.
207. Id. at 742, 493 A.2d at 1112. The court found the following cases inapposite:
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Treas, 254 Md. 615, 255 A.2d 296 (1969); Glens Falls
1987] 639
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
jectively foreseeable damages that result from intentional acts.2 °s
The Sparks court, however, invoked "the very real distinction be-
tween intending an act [and] intending a result."2 °9 The language
of Ms. Sparks' policy, particularly the words "expected or intended
from the standpoint of the Insured," clearly mandated a subjective
inquiry into the result the insured intended to bring forth.2 10
While James Sparks may have intended to steal the gas, he
never intended or expected to cause the resulting fire.2 " Thus, the
court concluded, the intended damages clause did not enable All-
state to escape liability.212
4. Named Excluded Driver Provisions.-Section 240C- 1 of the In-
surance Code 2 13 permits insurers to exclude named drivers from au-
tomobile liability coverage.2 14 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Miller2 15 the Court of Appeals held that a passenger injured while
travelling in an automobile driven by a "named excluded driver"
cannot circumvent a "named excluded driver provision" by claiming
instead under the uninsured motorist portion of the owner's insur-
ance policy.2 16 It was significant, however, that the injured passen-
ger had automobile insurance coverage of his own.2 1 7
Miller was injured in an automobile accident while he was a pas-
senger in a car owned by Darlene Rush, but driven by her hus-
band.2 18 Ms. Rush's policy with Nationwide expressly excluded her
husband from coverage if he was injured while driving the car.219
Miller, the passenger, carried his own automobile insurance with an-
other carrier, but sought recovery for his injuries under the unin-
sured motorist provision of Ms. Rush's policy. 2
20
Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 254 A.2d 658 (1969); Harleysville Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 235 A.2d 556 (1967); and Haynes v. Ameri-
can Cas. Co., 228 Md. 394, 179 A.2d 900 (1962).
208. See 63 Md. App. at 742, 493 A.2d at 1112 and authorities cited therein.
209. Id. at 742, 493 A.2d at 1112.
210. Id. at 743, 493 A.2d at 1112.
211. Id. at 744, 493 A.2d at 1113.
212. Id.
213. MD. ANN. CODE art 48A, § 240C-1 (1979).
214. Id.
215. 305 Md. 614, 505 A.2d 1338 (1986).
216. Id. at 618, 505 A.2d at 1340.
217. Id. at 615, 505 A.2d at 1338.
218. Id.
219. Id. The provision stated: "With this endorsement, the ALL coverages in your
policy are not in effect while the following named person is operating any motor vehicle:
Michael A. Rush." Id. at 617, 505 A.2d at 1339.
220. Id. at 615, 505 A.2d at 1338.
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Miller's insurance company advocated a narrow construction of
section 240C-1. That statute, the insurer contended, should apply
only to the excluded driver's claims, not to uninsured motorist
claims of injured passengers. 221 The court disagreed:
If the uninsured motorist coverage on a vehicle were
deemed applicable when the driver is excluded from the
vehicle's ordinary liability coverage, then the insurer would
in effect still be insuring the liable driver, who had a bad
claims or driving record, but the insurer would be denied
the appropriate premium.222
Uninsured motorist coverage, the court added, "allows ... recovery
from the insurer in a position to calculate and charge for the risk
assumed. ' 223 Under the circumstances of Nationwide, Miller's insur-
ance company was best able to take into account the risks of injury
caused by uninsured motorists. 224 Thus, in this case, it was consis-
tent with the legislative policy underlying the uninsured motorist
statute to impose liability on Miller's insurance company.
225
5. Uninsured Motorist Coverage.-Section 543(d) of the Insur-
ance Code226 provides that personal injury protection (PIP)22 7 and
uninsured motorist coverage (UM) 2 2 8 shall be reduced to the extent
the recipient has recovered benefits under any workers' compensa-
tion statute.229
In Hines v. Potomac Electric Power Co. 230 the Court of Appeals held
that section 543(d) prevents an employee injured in an insured au-
tomobile from receiving PIP and UM benefits if the employee has
already received workers' compensation benefits in excess of the
PIP and UM coverage available under the employer's certificate of
self-insurance or under the employee's own automobile insurance
221. Id. at 618, 505 A.2d at 1340.
222. Id. at 618-19, 505 A.2d at 1340.
223. Id. at 619, 505 A.2d at 1340.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 620, 505 A.2d at 1341.
226. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(d) (1986).
227. See id. at § 539(a) (defining personal injury protection).
228. See id. at § 541 (c) (defining uninsured motorist coverage).
229. Section 543(d) provides:
Benefits payable under the coverages required in §§ 539 [providing for per-
sonal injury protection] and 541 [uninsured motorist coverage] of this article
shall be reduced to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under
workmen's compensation laws of any state or the federal government.




In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Reliance Insurance Co. 232 the Court of
Special Appeals held that a passenger injured while riding in a vehi-
cle that is being used without the owner's permission is not a "per-
son insured" under the owner's uninsured motorist endorsement
provision.233 Thus, the passenger cannot hold the owner's insur-
ance company liable for damages.234
D. Uniform Commercial Code-Measure of Damages for Breach of
Warranty of Title
By its terms, section 2-714(2) of the Commercial Law Article
provides the measure of damages for a breach of warranty in the
sale of goods. 23 15 In Metalcraft, Inc. v. Pratt23 6 the Court of Special
Appeals held that section 2-714(2) also provides the measure of
damages in an action for breach of warranty of title.23 7
E. Contracts-Failure of Condition
In Laddon v. Rhett Realty, Inc.238 the Court of Special Appeals
held that purchasers could recover a deposit from their real estate
broker if the contract of sale between the purchasers and the seller
were expressly contingent upon the occurrence of an event that
failed to occur through the fault of neither party.239 According to
the court, the purchasers stated a claim against the broker for
money had and received, not for breach of contract. 240 Thus, the
231. Id. at 378-79, 504 A.2d at 637. Hines argued that because PEPCO, his employer,
was self-insured, its potential liability was not limited to the amount of insurance cover-
age required under §§ 539 and 541. Id. at 373, 504 A.2d at 634. The court, however,
held that under the plain meaning of the insurance statutes, no insurer is liable for the
amounts exceeding the statutory limit. Id.
232. 63 Md. App. 612, 493 A.2d 405 (1985).
233. Id. at 617, 493 A.2d at 407.
234. Id. at 617-18, 493 A.2d at 407.
235. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-714(2) (1975). This section provides:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount.
236. 65 Md. App. 281, 500 A.2d 329 (1985).
237. Id. at 293, 500 A.2d at 336.
238. 63 Md. App. 562, 493 A.2d 379 (1985).
239. Id. at 570, 493 A.2d at 383. The contract of sale was expressly contingent upon
the purchasers' ability to obtain financing. The purchasers alleged that they were unable
to obtain financing. Id. The court stated: "Under the allegations of the declaration, the
contractual obligations regarding performance were terminated for failure of a condi-
tion precedent." Id.
240. Id. at 572, 493 A.2d at 384. A claim for money had and received lies " 'whenever
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claim could proceed despite the absence of contractual agreement
between the purchasers and the broker.24 '
F. Banking
1. Conversion of Capital Stock Savings and Loan to Commercial
Bank.-Chapter 591 of the Laws of 1986 added sections 9-631
through 9-640 to the Financial Institutions Article of the Maryland
Code.242
Pursuant to the new law, a capital stock savings and loan associ-
ation 2 4 3 may convert to a commercial bank if it meets certain condi-
tions.2 4 4 These conditions include approval of the conversion by
the stockholders and the Bank Commissioner, and amendment of
the association's charter to reflect the conversion. 245 The associa-
tion must insure all deposits throughout the conversion.24 6 The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation must insure all the new
commercial bank's deposits up to the maximum amount provided
by law.2 47 Persons who were depositors at the time of the conver-
sion are entitled to deposits of like amounts in the newly created
commercial bank under the same interest rates and terms as their
previous accounts, without interruption of interest. 248 Finally, the
conversion must be in accordance with Title 3 of the Corporations
and Associations Article 249 and all the applicable provisions of the
Financial Institutions Article.250
Chapter 591 also specifies procedures for the conversions. 25
The association must file with the Bank Commissioner the appropri-
the defendant has obtained possession of money which, in equity and good conscience,
he ought not be allowed to retain.'" Id. at n. 1 (quoting 1 POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTiCE
§ 117, at 143 (6th ed. 1970)).
241. 63 Md. App. at 571-72, 493 A.2d at 384. Insisting that the complaint stated only
a single claim for money had and received, the court also held that the complaint was
not duplicitous. Id. at 573, 493 A.2d at 385.
242. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 591, 1986 Md. Laws 2085 (codified at MD. FIN. INST.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-631 to -640 (1986)).
243. A "capital stock savings and loan association" or "capital stock association" is "a
savings and loan association that has authority under this title to issue capital stock."
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 9-101(d) (1986).
244. Id. at § 9-631(1)-(3).
245. Id.
246. Id. at § 9-631(4).
247. Id. at § 9-631(6).
248. Id. at § 9-631(5).
249. Id. at § 9-631(7). MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-301 to -360 (1985) cov-
ers extraordinary actions of corporations in general.
250. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 9-631(8) (1986).
251. Id. at § 9-632.
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ate filing fee, an application for conversion, and other supporting
252documentation. In addition to the authority to approve or disap-
prove applications for conversion, Chapter 591 vests in the Bank
Commissioner the authority to review and to promulgate regula-
tions concerning conversions. 253
Following the ratification of the application and the completion
of the appropriate procedural measures, the new commercial bank
"may exercise all the powers of, and shall be subject to all the re-
strictions imposed on, a commercial bank" under the Financial In-
stitutions Article, 54 with certain exceptions.255
Nothing in the new act contravenes the validity of any obliga-
tions, transactions, or loans of the savings and loan prior to its con-
version to a commercial bank. 25 6
2. Acquisition of Maryland Bank by Out-of-State Holding Company.-
Chapter 325 of the Laws of 1986257 amended section 5-1003 of the
Financial Institutions Article 258 to shorten the number of years from
four to three that a Maryland bank must have "been in existence and
continuously operated ' 259 prior to its acquisition by an out-of-state
holding company. 260 This three-year requirement is just one of sev-
eral necessary for the State Bank Commissioner's approval of the
acquisition.261
G. Consumer Protection-Automotive Repair Facilities Law and
Commercial Customers
In Rogers Refrigeration Co., Inc. v. Pulliam's Garage, Inc.262 the
Court of Special Appeals held that the Maryland Automotive Repair
252. Id.
253. Id. at § 9-633.
254. Id. at § 9-640(a).
255. Generally, for five years after the conversion, the new commercial bank may hold
assets and conduct business activities, but it may not hold insurance assets or conduct
insurance activities. Id. at § 9-640(b). If, however, the bank held insurance assets or
conducted insurance activities prior to its conversion then, generally, for two years after
the conversion the bank may continue to hold those assets or conduct those activities. Id.
at § 9-640(c).
256. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 591, 1986 Md. Laws 2085.
257. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 325, 1986 Md. Laws 1296 (codified at MD. FIN. INST.
CODE ANN. § 5-1003(a)(2)(iii).2 (1986)).
258. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-1003 (1986).
259. Id. at § 5-1003(a)(2)(iii)2.
260. Id.
261. See id. for the other conditions, unchanged by the new law.
262. 66 Md. App. 675, 505 A.2d 878 (1986).
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Facilities Law (ARFL)2 65 protects commercial customers of automo-
tive repair facilities as well as consumer customers. 26 4 The court
also held that if a repair shop's failure to give the notice of "cus-
tomer's rights" required under the ARFL is inconsequential, the
failure does not excuse the customer from paying for the services
rendered. 65
Rogers owned a fleet of motor vehicles used by its employees in
carrying out its commercial refrigeration business.266 Pulliam's Ga-
rage was a small automobile repair facility.267 In February of 1981,
Rogers and Pulliam's entered into an agreement whereby the ga-
rage would repair the Rogers fleet. 68 Pulliam's submitted invoices
for each repair job to Rogers on completion of the work.269
Eventually, Rogers became delinquent in its payments to Pul-
liam's.270 The repair shop sought recovery for materials provided
and services performed.2 7' Rogers claimed that it had not paid be-
cause Pulliam's had not properly performed the repairs. 72 The trial
court disagreed and awarded recovery to the garage.273
On appeal Rogers challenged the judgment below on the
ground that Pulliam's had failed to comply with the ARFL.274 This
failure, Rogers maintained, barred Pulliam's recovery. 75 Specifi-
cally, Rogers relied on the garage's failure to comply with section
14-1008 of the ARFL. That section stipulates that if a customer is
charged more than fifty dollars for a repair, the invoice for that re-
pair must, under the printed heading "Customer's Rights," inform
the customer of certain rights, including the right to request a writ-
ten estimate for repairs over fifty dollars, and the right to the return
of any replaced parts.2 76 None of the invoices submitted to Rogers
Refrigeration by Pulliam's Garage contained the requisite statement
of "Customer's Rights. 277
263. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-1001 to -1009 (1983).
264. 66 Md. App. at 682, 505 A.2d at 881.
265. Id. at 686, 505 A.2d at 883.
266. Id. at 678, 505 A.2d at 879.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 679, 505 A.2d at 880.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 677, 505 A.2d at 879.
272. Id. at 680, 505 A.2d at 880.
273. Id. at 677, 505 A.2d at 879.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 14-1008 (1983).
277. 66 Md. App. at 682, 505 A.2d at 881-82.
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Pulliam's urged the court to reject this defense, claiming that
the ARFL did not apply to commercial entities.2 7 8 The garage
based its argument on a statutory definition of the word "con-
sumer."2 79 Title 13 of the Commercial Law Article, "The Con-
sumer Protection Act," defines a "consumer" as one who receives
goods or services "primarily for personal, household, family, or ag-
ricultural purposes. "280
The Court of Special Appeals, however, relied on ARFL provi-
sions that, it said, clearly reflected legislative intent to extend cover-
age of the ARFL to commercial users as well as to persons entitled
to benefit from the Consumer Protection Act.2 8 ' Certain provisions
refer to a customer covered by the ARFL as a "person. 2 8 2 Other
language in the ARFL defines a "person" to include "an individual,
corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,
two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any
other legal or commercial entity. "283
Nonetheless, the court rejected Rogers' argument that the ab-
sence of the notice of Customer's Rights required by section 14-
1008 on the invoices from the garage barred the garage's recov-
ery.2 8 4 The object of the contract, the repair of the vehicles, was
accomplished at a reasonable cost. Thus, any breach of the contract




278. Id. at 680-81, 505 A.2d at 880-81.
279. Id.
280. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1983).
281. 66 Md. App. at 681, 505 A.2d at 881.
282. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-1005 to -1007 (1983).
283. Id. at § 14-1001(d).
284. 66 Md. App. at 686, 505 A.2d at 883-84.
285. Id., 505 A.2d at 884.
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A. Maryland Constitutional Law
1. Equal Rights Amendment.-In Burning Tree Club v. Bainum I the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a statutory provision granting
preferential tax treatment to country clubs operating primarily to
benefit members of a particular gender2 violated the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).3 The court decided, however,
that the objectionable provision was not severable from the broader
language in the statute that bars preferential tax assessments to
clubs practicing gender discrimination.4 The net effect of the
court's decision was to permit country clubs discriminating against
women to continue receiving preferential tax benefits.5
In 1965 the Maryland General Assembly authorized the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation to offer private country
clubs reduced assessments on the clubs' land in exchange for a com-
mitment by the club to preserve its open spaces. 6 A 1974 amend-
ment to the law, Chapter 870, denied the preferential tax
assessment to country clubs discriminating on the basis of race,
color, creed, gender, or national origin. 7 But the amendment cre-
ated an exception for clubs whose primary purpose is to benefit
members of a particular gender.'
1. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(4) (1980).
3. 305 Md. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832.
4. Id., 501 A.2d at 832-33.
5. On April 4, 1986, the Maryland General Assembly passed a bill that eliminated
Burning Tree's preferential tax assessment. On July 1, 1986, Burning Tree filed suit in
Anne Arundel County Circuit Court claiming that the new law breached the contract the
club signed with the State. The club asked that the new law not be enforced until that
contract expired. In addition, the suit claimed that the new law violated Maryland's
Equal Rights Amendment because the law permited clubs to engage in "periodic dis-
crimination," such as separate tee-off times for men and women. Wash. Post, July 2,
1986, at B7, col. 5.
6. 305 Md. at 56-57, 501 A.2d at 818; see Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 399, 1965 Md.
Laws 570 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e) (1980)).
7. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 870, 1974 Md. Laws 2913 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980)).
8. The "primary purpose" provision states:
The provisions of this section with respect to discrimination in sex shall not
apply to any club whose facilities are operated with the primary purpose, as
determined by the Attorney General, to serve or benefit members of a particu-





In 1978 Maryland's Attorney General determined that Burning
Tree Country Club did not discriminate on the basis of race, creed,
color, or national origin and that the gender discrimination prohibi-
tion was inapplicable since Burning Tree was operated "with the
primary purpose of serving members of one sex."9 In 1981 Burning
Tree entered into a fifty-year agreement with the State to maintain
the club's open space in exchange for a tax deferral.'" In 1983 the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County held that the "primary pur-
pose" provision violated the ERA because of the provision's dis-
criminatory effect." Burning Tree appealed, and the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari. 12
The Court of Appeals' decision was rendered in a complicated
opinion by a divided court. Judge Eldridge commanded a majority
for the view that the State's role in granting the preferential assess-
ments constituted "state action," and that the "primary purpose"
provision was unconstitutional. 13 Judge Murphy, however, wrote
for a majority that the "primary purpose" provision could not be
severed from the broader statutory language barring discrimination
on the grounds of race, color, creed, gender, or national origin.'
4
Thus, if the "primary purpose" provision fell, the antidiscrimination
language must also fall.' 5
The Court of Appeals first considered whether the "primary
purpose" provision involved state action sufficient to implicate the
9. 305 Md. at 59, 501 A.2d at 820. Burning Tree, an all-male golf club occupying
approximately 225 acres in Montgomery County, is the only single-sex club benefitting
from the "primary purpose" provision. Id., 501 A.2d at 819-20.
10. Id., 501 A.2d at 820.
11. Id. at 60, 501 A.2d at 820. The plaintiffs, a taxpayer and a woman seeking mem-
bership in the club, sought a declaration that the "primary purpose" provision violated
the ERA, an injunction against preferential tax treatment for Burning Tree, and an or-
der requiring Burning Tree to accept membership applications from women. The Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County held that § 19(e)(4), though facially neutral, had a
discriminatory effect, and thus violated the ERA. The court enjoined the State from
giving preferential tax assessments to Burning Tree as long as the club continued to
discriminate on the basis of gender. The court, however, refused to order Burning Tree
to accept membership applications from women. Id. at 59-62, 501 A.2d at 820-21.
12. Id. at 62, 501 A.2d at 821.
13. Id. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 83-84, 501 A.2d at 832-33 (opinion of Murphy, C.J.).
15. Id. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832. Judge Rodowsky's concurring opinion argued that the
"primary purpose" provision is "facially unconstitutional under the ERA but that the
unconstitutional portion is clearly nonseverable." Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833 (Rodowsky,
J., concurring). "In effect, the court's entire mandate in this case reflects the conclu-
sions of only one member, Judge Rodowsky." Id. at 91 n.5, 501 A.2d at 836 n.5 (El-
dridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ERA. 16 The court noted that the original statute 17 permitting tax
breaks to country clubs for "open spaces" made no mention of gen-
der, race, or any other suspect classifications; however, it was the
1974 amendment,'8 Chapter 870, that was under attack in this
case.' 9 The court said that Chapter 870 specifically deals with dis-
crimination and yet explicitly distinguishes between gender-based
discrimination and other kinds of discrimination.20 In addition,
Chapter 870 employs the administrative machinery of the State to
enforce the law's provisions. 2' Therefore, the court decided that
the State's involvement in the discrimination amounted to state ac-
tion.2 2 The court readily distinguished a number of cases in which
the Supreme Court had found no state action.23 The statutory lan-
guage in those cases was neutral and did not specifically sanction the
challenged discrimination.24
The court then addressed whether the "primary purpose" pro-
vision violated the ERA. A majority of the court rejected the view
that the ERA is implicated only when the government "imposes a
burden on one sex but not the other, or confers a benefit upon one
sex but not the other."' 25 The majority applied Maryland State Board
16. Id. at 90, 501 A.2d at 836 (Eldridge,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 399, 1965 Md. Laws 570 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, § 19(e) (1980)).
18. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 870, 1974 Md. Laws 2913 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980)).
19. 305 Md. at 92, 501 A.2d at 837 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The court said it would not decide whether the tax exemption granted Burning
Tree under the original 1965 statute amounted to state action because the issue was not
raised or argued in this case. Id. at 102 n.13, 501 A.2d at 842 n.13.
20. Id. at 92, 501 A.2d at 837. The court noted that the statute also distinguishes
between two types of gender discrimination, allowing discrimination when it is the pri-
mary purpose of the club and not allowing it otherwise.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 92-93, 501 A.2d at 837.
23. Id. at 93, 501 A.2d at 837 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982); and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
24. 305 Md. at 93-94, 501 A.2d at 837 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Chief Judge Murphy argued that there was no state action because the
discriminatory policies at Burning Tree were neither created nor encouraged by the
State. Id. at 76, 501 A.2d at 828-29 (opinion of Murphy, CJ.).
25. Id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 87, 501 A.2d at 834 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). The three judges in
the minority on this issue found there would be no violation of the ERA so long as there
was no causal relationship between the statute and the alleged discrimination. In other
words, since the "primary purpose" provision did not cause there to be no all-female
country clubs in Maryland that could enjoy the benefits of the statute, the provision was
not violative of the ERA. Id. at 78, 501 A.2d at 829-30.
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of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn,26 in which the Court of Appeals stated
that gender-based classifications are "suspect" and are subject to
"stricter scrutiny."' 27 The court examined similar decisions 28 from a
number of other states before concluding that under the ERA classi-
fications based on gender should be "subject to at least strict scru-
tiny.1 29 In applying this strict test, the court placed the burden of
persuasion "upon those attempting to justify the classifications. 0
Since no arguments were offered to the court to justify the gender-
based classification in Chapter 870,31 the court concluded that the
"primary purpose" provision violated the ERA.3 2
The court split over whether the unconstitutional provision was
severable from the rest of the statute. 3 In resolving severability
26. 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973).
27. Id. at 506-07, 312 A.2d at 222 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973)).
28. 305 Md. at 96-98, 501 A.2d at 839-40 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing Opinion of theJustices, 374 Mass. 836, 839-40, 371 N.E.2d 426,
428 (1977); Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 378
Mass. 342, 354, 393 N.E.2d 284, 291 (1979); People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 132-33, 311
N.E.2d 98, 101 (1974); and People v. Barger, 191 Colo. 152, 155, 550 P.2d 1281, 1283
(1976)).
29. Id. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840. The court indicated that gender-based classifications
might call for an even stricter standard than "strict scrutiny." Quoting Rand v. Rand,
280 Md. 508, 512, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977), the majority noted that the "'broad
sweeping, mandatory language of the amendment'" indicated an "'overriding compel-
ling state interest' " in equality of rights for both sexes. 305 Md. at 95-96, 501 A.2d at
838-39 (the language quoted from Rand was itself a quote from Darrin v. Gould, 85
Wash. 2d 859, 871, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 889, 893 (1975)).
30. 305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840. Judge Eldridge then stated:
Of course, because of the inherent differences between the sexes, some sex-
based classifications may be justified after such scrutiny, whereas comparable
race-based classifications could not be sustained. As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963),
'racial classifications are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious.' " Thus, separate
restroom or locker room facilities for blacks and whites cannot be tolerated, but
such separate facilities for men and women can be justified by the State.
305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840 (parallel citations omitted).
31. 305 Md. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841.
32. Id. The court said that even if the statute were not discriminatory on its face, an
examination of its discriminatory purpose and impact would render it unconstitutional.
"It is undisputed that the sole purpose of the provision was to allow Burning Tree to
continue discriminating against women and still receive the state subsidy. This has also
been the sole effect of the provision since 1974." Id.
33. Even though the three judges who announced the opinion of the court would
have found the "primary purpose provision" constitutional and thus would not have
reached the severability issue, since a majority of the court found the provision unconsti-
tutional these judges did express their opinions on severability. Id. at 80, 501 A.2d at
830-31. Because Judge Rodowsky agreed with these judges on this issue, id. at 85, 501
A.2d at 833, they commanded a majority.
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questions, courts look to "what would have been the intent of the legis-
lative body, if it had known that the statute could be only partially
effective." 34 Furthermore, "when the dominant purpose of a statute
may largely be carried out notwithstanding the invalid provision,
courts will ordinarily sever the statute and enforce the valid por-
tion."35 A majority of the Burning Tree court wrote that Chapter
870's dominant purpose was to "avoid, as much as possible, dis-
turbing existing, sexually discriminatory practices of country clubs
without completely deleting sex as one of the bases of prohibited
discrimination. '3 6 In the court's view, Chapter 870 contained a
nearly "complete, intrinsic contradiction ' 37 concerning gender dis-
crimination; therefore, the court was unable to conclude that the
dominant purpose of the statute was "to enact a bar against sex dis-
crimination which was to operate absent the primary purpose provi-
sion."883 Thus, the language in Chapter 870 that prohibited gender
discrimination fell along with the "primary purpose" provision.39
The reasoning of the majority on the issue of severability seems
strained. Chapter 870's dominant purpose would appear to be the
prohibition of a variety of discriminatory practices. The "primary
purpose" provision is thus a minor exception to a broad policy.
Thus, the dissent wrote that "the dominant purpose was not the
preservation of a subsidy for a single discriminatory country
club."40
2. Power of Counties to Enact Ordinances.-In Holiday Universal
Club of Rockville, Inc. v. Montgomery County4 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that the Montgomery County Council had the power to
enact an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation.4" The court also held that even though it did not
define the word "discrimination," the ordinance was not unconstitu-
34. Id. at 103, 501 A.2d at 843 (quoting Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 383-84, 451
A.2d 107, 114 (1982), which quoted O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Ocean
City, 280 Md. 585, 600, 375 A.2d 541, 549 (1977) (emphasis in OC. Taxpayers).
35. Id. (quoting Davis, 294 Md. at 384, 451 A.2d at 114).
36. 305 Md. at 83, 501 A.2d at 832.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832-33.
40. Id. at 104, 501 A.2d at 843 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
41. 67 Md. App. 568, 508 A.2d 991, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d 314 (1986),
appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 920 (1987).




The case arose when three men were denied admission to an
aerobics class at the Rockville Holiday Spa (Spa).44 The men filed
complaints with the Montgomery County Human Relations Com-
mission (HRC), alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in vi-
olation of the Montgomery County Public Accommodation
Ordinance.4 5 Before the HRC could hold hearings, the Spa sought
a declaratory judgment that the Public Accommodation Ordinance
was unconstitutional and an interlocutory injunction staying the
HRC proceedings. 46 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County de-
nied the injunction, and the Spa appealed.47
The Spa argued (1) that Montgomery County lacked the power
to enact ordinances of this type; and, (2) that the ordinance was un-
constitutionally vague.4" The Court of Special Appeals noted that a
charter county derives its power from article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution and the Express Powers Act.4 9 Article XI-A shifts local
lawmaking powers from the state legislature to county governments
for all matters covered by the Express Powers Act.5" The Express
Powers Act grants charter counties "a general police power to enact
ordinances for the public good," provided the ordinances do not
conflict with other state laws. 5
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Montgomery Citizens League v.
Greenhalgh 5 2 had previously held that Montgomery County had the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 570, 508 A.2d at 992.
45. Id. The relevant portion of MONTGOMERY CouNTv, MD., CODE § 27-9 (1977)
stated:
It shall be unlawful for any owner, lessee, operator, management, agent or em-
ployee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the
county:
(a) To make any distinction with respect to any person based on race,
color, sex, marital status, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, handicap, or
sexual orientation in connection with admission to, service or sales in, or price,
quality or use of any facility or service of any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement in the county.
67 Md. App. at 571-72, 508 A.2d at 993.
46. 67 Md. App. at 570, 508 A.2d at 992-93.
47. Id. at 570-71, 508 A.2d at 993. A refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction is
appealable under MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-303(3)(iii) (Supp. 1985).
48. 67 Md. App. at 571, 508 A.2d at 993.
49. Id. at 573, 508 A.2d at 994. The Express Powers Act is codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 25A, § 5 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
50. 67 Md. App. at 574, 508 A.2d at 994 (citing Montgomery Citizens League v.
Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 159-60, 252 A.2d 242, 246 (1969)).
51. Id. at 573, 508 A.2d at 994.
52. 253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969).
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power to pass an ordinance prohibiting housing discrimination. 53
The Greenhalgh court reasoned that since the state legislature could
unquestionably pass such a law, 54 and since the Express Powers Act
granted charter counties a "co-extensive police power,"' '55 the
county could enact a similar provision.56 Although the Greenhaigh
decision dealt with a fair housing ordinance, the Court of Special
Appeals extended Greenhalgh's rationale to the Public Accommoda-
tions Ordinance. 5
7
The Spa also argued that the ordinance, by failing to define
"discrimination," was unconstitutionally vague because it did not
provide adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited. The
Court of Special Appeals held that in a case such as this, which in-
volved civil rather than criminal penalties,58 the strict standard for
vagueness urged by the Spa did not apply.5 9 The court further
noted that even under the strict standard, the ordinance was accept-
able, because. it gave " 'fair notice' to the public and 'fixed stan-
dards' to those enforcing the law."6
3. Conflict between County Charter and Public General Law.-In
Rowe v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. 6 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held inoperative 62 a Montgomery County charter amend-
ment63 that prohibited the county from obtaining goods and
53. Id. at 164-65, 252 A.2d at 248-49.
54. Id. at 164, 252 A.2d at 248; cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) (recognizing state's compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination in
some private social clubs).
55. 67 Md. App. at 574, 508 A.2d at 994.
56. 253 Md. at 165, 252 A.2d at 249.
57. 67 Md. App. at 575, 508 A.2d at 995.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Spa urged application of the standard announced in Miller v. Maloney
Concrete Co., 63 Md. App. 38, 491 A.2d 1218 (1985), a case involving a criminal statute.
The court in that case said that when imposing criminal penalties it is required:
(1) that the statute give fair notice of what is required or prohibited so that
persons of ordinary intelligence and experience may be able to govern their
conduct accordingly, and (2) that it "provide legally fixed standards and ade-
quate guidelines" for those charged with administering and enforcing the law.
63 Md. at 49, 491 A.2d at 1223 (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 121, 389 A.2d
341, 345 (1978)).
60. 67 Md. App. at 575, 508 A.2d at 995.
61. 65 Md. App. 527, 501 A.2d 464 (1985).
62. If there is a conflict between a charter provision and a public general law, the
charter provision is generally held to be inoperative. Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections of Baltimore City, 273 Md. 296, 302, 328 A.2d 305, 309 (1974).
63. The amendment, § 313A of the Montgomery County Charter (1982), stated:
The county government may not purchase and contract for goods and services
with the C & P Telephone Company (C&P) unless C&P includes telephone sub-
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services from the C&P Telephone Company unless the phone rates
charged county residents in Montgomery Village and Gaithersburg
were no higher than the rates charged residents in other parts of the
county.6 The court held the provision inoperative because it con-
flicted with a public general law6 5 that grants the Public Service
Commission the sole power to regulate public utility telephone rates
in Maryland.6" Previously, the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County had held the amendment unconstitutional, terming it "an
effort to intrude into the administration of the affairs of Montgom-
ery County Government specifically delegated to the County Coun-
cil or the County Executive."'6 7 The Court of Special Appeals
declined to decide the constitutional issue, opting instead to dispose
of the case on narrower grounds.68
Under the Maryland Constitution, a conflict between a county
charter provision and a public general law is resolved in favor of the
public general law. 69 Section 27 of article 7870 requires the Public
Service Commission to authorize the rates charged and services ren-
dered by a public service telephone company. 71 The court acknowl-
edged that the county charter amendment did not attempt directly
to regulate C&P's rates.72 In that respect, the court noted, this case
scribers in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and Montgomery Village in the Washing-
ton Metropolitan Telephone Exchange (MET) at local rates no higher than
local rates charged MET subscribers in Bethesda, Silver Spring, Kensington
and Rockville telephone exchange areas.
65 Md. App. at 528-29, 501 A.2d at 465.
64. 65 Md. App. at 533, 501 A.2d at 468.
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 27 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
66. 65 Md. App. at 533, 501 A.2d at 467-68. The charter amendment resulted from
a May 1981 petition drive that succeeded in placing the proposed amendment on the
ballot in November 1982. The charter amendment was approved by the voters despite
the opposition of the County Executive. C&P sought a declaratory judgment that § 313A
was unconstitutional and an injunction to prevent the county from enforcing it. Mont-
gomery County declined to offer any arguments in its defense. Two county residents,
Richard Rowe and Chester Julian, intervened. Id. at 529-30, 501 A.2d at 465-66.
As a preliminary matter, the Court of Special Appeals determined that there was a
justiciable controversy. Id. at 532, 501 A.2d at 467. Because the county did not contest
C&P's motions, the intervenors argued that there was no controversy and hence no jus-
ticiable issue for the court below to have ruled on. The Court of Special Appeals upheld
the lower court on this point, stating that the existence and opposition of the interven-
ors created a justiciable controversy. Id. at 530-32, 501 A.2d at 466-67.
67. Id. at 529, 501 A.2d at 465.
68. Id. at 532, 501 A.2d at 467.
69. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 273 Md. 296, 301, 328
A.2d 305, 308 (1974)); MD. CONST., art. XI-A § 3.
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 27 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
71. 65 Md. App. at 532, 501 A.2d at 467.
72. Id. at 532-33, 501 A.2d at 467.
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differed from East v. Gilchrist,73 in which a charter provision forbid-
ding the expenditure of funds for a landfill directly conflicted with a
public general law "mandating the expenditure of those funds."7 4
Nevertheless, the court recognized that the amendment's
"plain intent" was to force C&P to change its rates.75 Such a rate
change could occur, however, only if C&P violated the Public Ser-
vice Commission's order establishing the phone rates, or if the
Commission changed C&P's rates "irrespective of the usual factors
involved in public utility ratemaking." 76
The court carefully pointed out that, as in East, its decision did
not render the charter amendment unconstitutional. Rather, the de--
cision means only that the amendment cannot be given effect as
long as the public general law with which it conflicts remains
operative.77
B. Commerce Clause
In Turner v. Smalis, Inc. 78 the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland adopted a magistrate's finding that Maryland
law 79 does not require a foreign corporation doing only interstate
business in Maryland to register80 with the state in order to assert a
defense of limitations.8' The Supreme Court has held that the com-
merce clause precludes a state from requiring a foreign corporation
"to qualify to do interstate business in that state before according to
that corporation the same rights, remedies, and judicial fora as are
available to domestic corporations." 82 It is unclear whether a state
could constitutionally require a foreign corporation doing only in-
terstate business merely to register rather than to qualify.83 By de-
73. 296 Md. 368, 463 A.2d 285 (1983).
74. 65 Md. App. at 533, 501 A.2d at 467.
75. Id.
76. Id., 501 A.2d at 468.
77. Id.
78. 622 F. Supp. 248 (D. Md. 1985).
79. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 7-202, 7-203 (1985).
80. Registration under § 7-202 requires only that the corporation notify the state of
its address and the name and address of its registered agent within the state. Qualifica-
tion under § 7-203 requires the above as well as filing a certificate executed by an official
of the place where the corporation is organized attesting that the corporation is in good
standing in that place. Id.
81. 622 F. Supp. at 249.
82. Id. at 252 (citing Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974)) (emphasis
in original).
83. 622 F. Supp. at 254.
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termining that there is no such registration requirement in
Maryland, the Turner court side-stepped this constitutional issue.
The plaintiff, Turner, was injured while using a conveyor device
manufactured and sold by Smalis, a Pennsylvania corporation. 4
The accident occurred in 1980, but Turner did not file suit against
Smalis until 1983.85 Smalis argued that Turner's claim was barred
by Maryland's statute of limitations.8 6 Turner claimed that Smalis
could not raise the statute of limitations defense because under sec-
tion 5-204 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, "a foreign
corporation, required by law to qualify or register to do business in
Maryland, cannot raise" the defense of limitations if it fails to qualify
or register under the applicable statutes.8 7
Section 7-202 of the Corporations and Associations Article pro-
vides that a corporation doing only interstate business in Maryland
need not qualify, but must register.8 8 Smalis never qualified or reg-
istered; this apparently barred its statute of limitations defense.8 9
As the magistrate noted, however, in G.E.M., Inc. v. Plough, Inc.9 the
Maryland Court of Appeals construed an earlier registration re-
quirement9 ' as applying only to foreign corporations "doing busi-
ness" in Maryland.92 Similarly, in Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co. 93 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that section 7-301, which
denies access to state courts to unqualified and unregistered foreign
corporations, applied only to those foreign corporations "doing
business" in Maryland. 4 "The 'doing business' test," the Turner
court wrote, "requires far more than occasional interstate sales ac-
tivity conducted in Maryland .... Rather, 'doing business' requires
84. Id. at 250.
85. Id. The accident occurred in February 1980 and Turner received his first work-
ers' compensation award in April 1980. Turner did not file suit until June 1983. Id.
86. Id. at 251. Maryland's general limitations period is three years, but workers'
compensation law effectively extends that period by two months. Id.; MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985). Turner waited
three years and three months to sue.
87. 622 F. Supp. at 251; see MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-204 (1984).
88. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 7-202 (1985).
89. See MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-204 (1984).
90. G.E.M., Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 228 Md. 484, 180 A.2d 478 (1962).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 90 (1957).
92. 622 F. Supp. at 252; see Plough, 228 Md. at 486-89, 180 A.2d at 480-81. In
Plough the defendant corporation solicited orders for goods to be shipped into Mary-
land, but maintained no Maryland office, paid no Maryland taxes, and owned no prop-
erty in Maryland. 228 Md. at 486-89, 180 A.2d at 480-81.
93. 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, cert. denied, 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
94. Id. at 245-46, 469 A.2d at 894-95.
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a permanent corporate presence. 95
The magistrate determined that Smalis' business activity in
Maryland was limited to interstate sales and occasional in-state de-
liveries.9 6  Therefore, Smalis was not "doing business" in
Maryland.97
The magistrate further concluded that Maryland courts would
construe "doing business" for purposes of section 5-204 as they had
in analyzing the statutes at issue in Plough and Finch.9" Since Smalis
was not "doing business" in Maryland, it was not required to regis-
ter; therefore, its failure to do so did not prevent Smalis from rais-
ing the limitations defense.99 By employing this analysis, the court
avoided the question of whether a state would violate the commerce
clause by requiring registration before allowing a limitations
defense.
The Turner court acknowledged that the magistrate's reading of
"doing business" effectively erases the distinction made in section
7-203 between "doing any interstate or foreign business" and "do-
ing any intrastate business."' 00 Still, the court noted that the Court
of Appeals' decision in Plough construed the forerunners of sections
7-202 and 7-203 to require a "doing business" test, but had "made
no distinction in that regard between qualification and
registration."'10
C. Freedom of Speech-Public Employees
In Leese v. Baltimore County 102 the Court of Special Appeals held
that Leese, a county employee, had no property interest in receiving
a new, upgraded position, and that his liberty interest in future em-
ployment was not abridged by the county's actions.'0 3 The court
held, however, that Leese had stated a cause of action by alleging
that the county dismissed him for exercising his first amendment
rights: 10 4 the county and its supervisory employees are not immune
from first amendment claims.O° This decision illustrates that while
95. 622 F. Supp. at 253.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 254.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 249.
101. Id.
102. 64 Md. App. 442, 497 A.2d 159, cert. denied, 305 Md. 106, 501 A.2d 845 (1985).
103. Id. at 458-63, 497 A.2d at 167-70.
104. Id. at 463-66, 497 A.2d at 170-71.
105. Id. at 476-85, 497 A.2d at 177-81.
1987] 657
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"the employment at will doctrine is alive and well in Maryland, there
are certain constitutional limitations on the government's authority
to fire its employees."'
' 0 6
Leese had worked for six years in an untenured, part-time posi-
tion as director of Baltimore County's Senioride program. At
Leese's suggestion, the county upgraded the position to full-time
merit status. Leese applied for the newly upgraded position, but
was not hired.' 0 7 When he appealed the hiring decision, Leese was
fired. He filed suit, alleging that the hiring process had denied him
due process, and that his firing was an unconstitutional retaliation
for exercising his first amendment rights to criticize the hiring deci-
sion. The circuit court dismissed his suit for failure to state a cause
of action.' 8 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part.' 0 9
The court first considered Leese's due process claims. In Board
of Regents v. Roth to the Supreme Court held that an employee alleg-
ing deprivation of a property interest in ajob must have "more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.""' Under the Baltimore County Code,
filling a merit position is discretionary. Because Leese alleged no
facts showing that the county had to exercise discretion in his favor,
the court affirmed the dismissal of this claim."' The court further
held that Leese had no property interest in his part-time job since
the county codes and regulations make clear that part-time employ-
ees are terminable at will."' Although Leese might reasonably have
expected to be hired, or at least not to be fired, the court followed
the clear weight of authority in holding that these reasonable expec-
tations did not rise to the level of constitutional entitlements.' 14
The court also rejected Leese's claim that the county abridged
106. Id. at 463, 497 A.2d at 170.
107. Instead, Leese was "retained in a new, non-merit, part-time position, at a re-
duced salary," in which his duties were the same as before. Id. at 452, 497 A.2d at 164.
108. Id. at 450-53, 497 A.2d at 163-65.
109. Id. at 450, 497 A.2d at 163. On the aspects of Leese's appeal not reaching con-
stitutional issues, the court held that Leese stated a cause of action for abusive dis-
charge; failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress;
stated a cause of action for libel per quod; but that governmental immunity barred claims
of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abusive discharge against
the county. Id. at 467-79, 497 A.2d at 172-78.
110. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
111. Id. at 577.
112. 64 Md. App. at 458, 497 A.2d at 167.
113. Id. at 459, 497 A.2d at 168.
114. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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his liberty interest in future employment by firing him and placing
unfavorable remarks in his personnel record." 5 To support such a
claim, a plaintiff must allege that the former employer has published
false statements so stigmatizing as to foreclose "his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities." ''"6 To be stigma-
tizing, the reasons given for a dismissal "must impute some sort of
'dishonesty, immorality, pressure to drop criminal charges, intoxica-
tion and the like.' "'1'7 False statements about an employee's work
performance do not necessarily violate a liberty interest. 18 The
court concluded that the statements in question amounted to noth-
ing more than negative comments about Leese's job performance,
insufficient in themselves to make out a cause of action."19
The court next considered Leese's claim that he was fired in
retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights. There are two
elements to such a claim. First, the plaintiff must show that he or
she was engaged in constitutionally protected speech or conduct at
the time of the discharge. Second, he or she must show that the
protected speech or conduct motivated the employer to fire the
employee. 120
Leese 'claimed he was fired because he appealed the county's
decision not to hire him for the new merit position.12i The court
first noted that Leese had a constitutional right to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of a grievance. In addition, the object of his
petition was a public concern, the integrity of the county merit sys-
tem. The court therefore concluded that Leese was engaged in con-
stitutionally protected conduct when he was fired.' 2 2 Leese's
allegation that he was fired because of the protected conduct satis-
fied the second element of the claim as well. Thus, the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the circuit court on the first amendment
issue. t23
Finally, the court concluded that with respect to the first
amendment claim, the officials named as defendants merited neither
115. 64 Md. App. at 463, 497 A.2d at 170.
116. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
117. 64 Md. App. at 462, 497 A.2d at 169 (quoting Smith v. Board of Educ., 708 F.2d
258, 266 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 463, 497 A.2d at 170.
120. Id. at 464-65, 497 A.2d at 170-71.
121. Id. at 466, 497 A.2d at 171.
122. Id. at 466-67, 497 A.2d at 171-72.
123. Id. at 467, 497 A.2d at 172.
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absolute nor qualified immunity. 12 4 Absolute immunity shields only
those "officials whose special functions or constitutional status re-
quires complete protection from suit.' t2 5 The court found that the
defendants in this case lacked the status entitling them to absolute
immunity.' 26 Qualified immunity shields "government officials per-
forming discretionary functions . .. insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."'1 27 The court rea-
soned that because the officials should have realized the unconstitu-
tionality of a retaliatory dismissal of Leese, they lacked even
qualified immunity.' 21
D. Due Process
In Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Associa-
tion 129 the Court of Special Appeals held unconstitutional a portion
of Maryland's Real Property Article' 30 that requires a defendant re-
questing a jury trial in a summary eviction proceeding to pay into
escrow all rent that is allegedly past due. Specifically, the court
found part of section 8-118 repugnant to article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights,' 3 ' because the statute presupposes that the
defendant in fact owes the rent 3 2 and effectively places "a premium
on the exercise of one's inviolate right to a civil jury."' 1 3
124. Id. at 476-85, 497 A.2d at 177-81.
125. Id. at 482, 497 A.2d at 180 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807
(1982)).
126. 64 Md. App. at 482-83, 497 A.2d at 180. Absolute immunity extends only to
legislators, in their legislative functions, see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975); judges, in theirjudicial functions, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978); prosecutors and similar officers and administrative officials in adjudicative
functions, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); and the President of the United
States, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
127. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
128. 64 Md. App. at 484, 497 A.2d at 181.
129. 64 Md. App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985).
130. Section 8-118 provides:
Rent escrow account in certain landlord-tenant actions.
(a) Tenant to pay rents into account.-In an action under § 8-401, § 8-402, or § 8-
402.1 of this article in which a party prays a jury trial, the District Court shall enter
an order directing the tenant or anyone holding under the tenant to pay all
accrued and unpaid rents, and all rents due and as they come due during the
pendency of the action ....
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN, § 8-118 (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
131. Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees a right to a jury trial
in all civil proceedings when the amount in controversy is over five hundred dollars.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 23.
132. 64 Md. App. at 230, 494 A.2d at 951.
133. Id. at 233, 494 A.2d at 953.
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Lucky Ned's, the defendant in a summary eviction proceed-
ing,134 requested a jury trial. Pursuant to section 8-118, the court
ordered Lucky Ned's to pay allegedly past due rent into escrow. 135
When Lucky Ned's refused to pay, the court granted the landlord's
motion for summary judgment.13 6
The issues presented on Lucky Ned's appeal were: (1) whether
section 8-118 unconstitutionally interferes with the right to a jury
trial; and (2) whether the statute violates due process by permitting
payment of money and entry of a judgment without a hearing. 137
The court examined cases upholding the constitutionality of statutes
that require payment as a prerequisite to a jury trial.13 8 The court
found that in those cases "the amounts involved were minor and the
purpose of the requirements were related to court administra-
tion." '3 9 The court conceded that summary eviction proceedings
are designed to protect legitimate property interests and noted that
the prompt relief available in such proceedings can easily be frus-
trated by a tenant's request for ajury trial.' 40
Nevertheless, the court found that requiring the tenant to pay
accrued rent into escrow is unreasonable for three reasons. First,
the escrow account gives the landlord unwarranted security that he
or she may collect ajudgment.14 Second, section 8-118 could place
a jury trial beyond the tenant's financial reach. And third, because
section 8-118 requires a judicial determination of the amount owed
before a tenant can present its case to a jury, the statute effectively
preempts the jury's function. 142
134. The action was brought under MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401 (Supp. 1986),
which provides for a summary eviction proceeding upon a tenant's failure to pay rent.
135. 64 Md. App. at 226, 494 A.2d at 949. As of the scheduled district court trial
date, Lucky Ned's allegedly owed approximately $7000 in unpaid rent. The defendant
requested a hearing in order to show that the landlord's claim was fraudulent. Id.
136. Under § 8-118(c), if the tenant refuses to pay accrued rent or rent as it comes
due pursuant to the court order, the court may grant judgment in favor of the landlord
and issue a warrant for possession. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-118(c) (Supp. 1986).
137. 64 Md. App. at 228, 494 A.2d at 950.
138. See, e.g., Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 624-27, 40 A. 890,
891-93 (1898) (upholding constitutionality of requirement that court costs be paid as a
condition precedent to a jury trial). See generally Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112
A.2d 625 (1955) (collecting cases upholding the constitutionality of requiring a party
seeking a civil jury trial to pay additional fees incurred as a result of the request for a
jury).
139. 64 Md. App. at 232, 494 A.2d at 952.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 230, 494 A.2d at 951. By contrast, the court found no such encroachment
on the jury function in the statute's requirement that future rents be paid into escrow as
they become due during the pendency of the action. Relying on Lindsey v. Normet, 405
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Lucky Ned's also argued that article 24 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights143 and the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution require a due process hearing before the court
may force a tenant to pay future rent as it becomes due during the
pendency of the trial. The court agreed. 14 4 Because section 8-118
makes no provision for a hearing, the court looked elsewhere to de-
termine whether the tenant's due process rights were adequately
safeguarded. The court cited Maryland Rule 2-311(f), which pro-
vides that "the court ... may not render a decision dispositive of a
claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested." '1 45
After eliminating the unconstitutional portion of section 8-
118(a), the only sanction remaining in the statute for a tenant's fail-
ure to make escrow payments is contained in subsection (c).' 46 The
court may invoke this sanction only if a landlord moves for judg-
ment, but once a landlord moves for judgment, the tenant may re-
U.S. 56 (1972), the court found that, to the extent that a tenant's request for a jury will
delay an otherwise speedy proceeding, there is no constitutional barrier to providing
escrow protection to a landlord. In this situation, the escrow fund simply represents
money that the tenant should pay for the continued privilege of occupying the premises.
64 Md. App. at 233-34, 494 A.2d at 953.
The court had no difficulty severing that portion of § 8-118 requiring payment of
accrued rent from the remainder of the statute. Id. at 229-30, 494 A.2d at 951; cf. Tur-
ner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 576, 474 A.2d 1297, 1303 (1984) ("[A] legislative body gener-
ally intends its enactments to be severed if possible.").
143. Article 24 states that "no man ought to be... deprived of his.., property but by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land." Supreme Court interpretations
of the fourteenth amendment are authority for interpretation of article 24. See Depart-
ment of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 415-16, 474 A.2d 191 (1984) (citing Pit-
senberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056, appeal dismissed, 449
U.S. 807 (1980)).
144. 64 Md. App. at 237, 494 A.2d at 955. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). The Fuentes court held unconstitutional state prejudgment replevin statutes pro-
viding for seizure of property upon the issuance of a writ. Anyone asserting an interest
in the property could obtain the writ by posting a bond and obtaining what amounted to
no more than "rubber stamp" approval from the court clerk. Because the statutes made
no provision for a prompt hearing after the seizure, the Court held that they did not
comply with the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Cf Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (defining due process requirements of sequestration proce-
dure); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (establishing due process
requirements for prejudgment wage garnishment); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (extending Fuentes and Sniadach to prejudgment attach-
ment of bank account).
145. 64 Md. App. at 238, 494 A.2d at 955-56.
146. Subsection (c) provides:
(c) Failure to pay rent.-In an action under § 8-401 ... if the tenant fails to pay
rent accrued or as it comes due pursuant to the terms of the order, the circuit
court, on motion of the landlord .. .shall give judgment in favor of the land-
lord and issue a warrant for possession.
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-118(c) (1981).
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quest a hearing under Maryland Rule 2-311 (f). Thus, when section
8-118(c) is read in conjunction with Maryland Rule 2-31 1(f), it be-
comes clear that the due process hearing requirement has been ade-
quately met. After severing the unconstitutional portion of section
8-118(a), the court held, the remainder of the statute affords ade-




In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard '48 the Court of Ap-
peals upheld the constitutionality of section 5-108 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.' 49 Section 5-108 is a statute of repose
that exempts architects and professional engineers (design profes-
sionals) from liability for certain claims resulting from the defective
condition of an improvement to real property if the claim arises
more than ten years after the property improvement first became
available for its intended use.' 5 ° Although the statute, as it stood at
the time this claim arose, favored design professionals over contrac-
tors, 151 suppliers, owners, tenants, and all other parties,' 52 the court
147. 64 Md. App. at 239, 494 A.2d at 955-56.
148. 304 Md. 340, 499 A.2d 178 (1985).
149. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(b) (1980). Although this case is con-
cerned with the statute as it stood prior to the 1980 amendments, it implicates the cur-
rent statute as well.
150. At the time this action arose, § 5-108 provided:
Injury to person or property occurring after completion of improvement to
realty.
(b) Action against architect or professional engineer. -A cause of action for dam-
ages does not accrue and a person may not seek contribution or indemnity
from any architect or professional engineer for damages incurred when wrong-
ful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property, resulting from
the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, occurs
more than 10 years after the date the entire improvement first became available
for its intended use.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1980).
For convenience the court adopted three definitions: (1) "Design Professionals"
means "any architect or professional engineer"; (2) "Injury" means "wrongful death,
personal injury, or injury to real or personal property"; and (3) "Completion" means
"the date the entire improvement first became available for its intended use." 304 Md.
at 346, 499 A.2d at 181-82.
151. Subsection (b) was amended July 1, 1980, after the cause of action arose in this
case. It now exempts "any architect, professional engineer, or contractor .. " (emphasis
added).
152. Under MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(a) (1984), all other parties may
be sued for injuries occurring up to twenty years after the property improvement first
became available for its intended use.
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held it did not violate the equal protection guarantees found in the
United States and Maryland Constitutions.'
5 3
In April 1980 a man was seriously injured after falling through
a second story window in a parking garage.' 54 He sued the owner,
the tenant, the contractor, and the architect of the garage.' 55 The
first three defendants settled with the plaintiff, then sued the archi-
tect, Coupard, for contribution or indemnity.' 56 The trial court
granted the architect's motion for summary judgment, holding that
section 5-108(b) barred all claims against the architect; the ten-year
period of repose had elapsed since the building became available for
use in 1969.'15 The settling defendants appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari on its own motion, prior to consideration by
the Court of Special Appeals.15 8
A key to the court's holding was its decision to apply a "rational
basis" test instead of the "heightened scrutiny" test advocated by
the appellants. 59 The court reasoned that the right to sue for in-
demnity, though concededly a "personal" right, is not as important
as other rights that require a "heightened scrutiny" test. 160 More-
over, the overwhelming majority of decisions evaluating statutes of
repose on equal protection grounds use a "rational basis" test.16'
Thus, the court concluded, "the challenged portion of the Act,
which enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality, can be inval-
idated only if the classification is without any reasonable basis and is
153. 304 Md. at 352-60, 499 A.2d at 185-89.
154. Id. at 346, 499 A.2d at 182.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 346-47, 499 A.2d at 182.
157. Id. at 347, 499 A.2d at 182.
158. Id. at 346-47, 499 A.2d at 182.
159. Id. at 350, 499 A.2d at 183-84. The appellants invoked the "heightened scru-
tiny" test set forth in Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
The court described this test as follows:
[W]here a statute creates a "sensitive," though not "suspect" criteri[on] of clas-
sification, affects "important," though not fundamental personal rights or
works a "significant interference" with a liberty or benefit vital to the individ-
ual, the courts will apply a standard more exacting than the rational basis test
but less rigorous than the strict scrutiny analysis.
304 Md. at 350, 499 A.2d at 183-84 (quoting Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299
Md. 392, 410, 474 A.2d 191, 200 (1984)).
160. 304 Md. at 350, 499 A.2d at 184. The court noted that the right to a certain
period of time in which to sue for indemnity is not as important as "the right not to be
discriminated against based on sex alone" or "the rights arising under statutes or consti-
tutional provisions dealing with free public education." It is "more like a hospital's right
to select members of its staff, a right which has been regulated by the podiatrists' stat-
ute." Id.




Applying the rational basis test, the court adopted the position
of the Supreme Court of Michigan.' 61 Thus, the court emphasized
the differences between contractors and design professionals" 6 and
viewed the reduction of potential liability for design professionals as
a legislative means of encouraging design creativity and experimen-
tation. 165 Moreover, the court noted that Maryland law allows con-
tractors to limit their personal liability by doing business as a
corporation, whereas design professionals who incorporate remain
exposed to personal liability for individual negligence.166 The stat-
ute of repose therefore permits design professionals to enjoy a ben-
efit-limited liability-that other professionals already enjoy.
Whiting-Turner argued there was no rational basis for the dis-
tinction between contractor and architect in the case because of the
unusually close relationship between the parties: the architect had
been hired by and was working for the contractor, who was respon-
sible to the owner for both designing and building the garage.' 67
The court, however, dismissed this argument with a quotation from
Justice Powell: the statutory classification "need not be drawn so as
to fit with precision the legitimate purposes animating it .... That
Maryland might have furthered its underlying purpose more art-
fully, more directly, or more completely, does not warrant a conclu-
sion that the method it chose is unconstitutional."' 168
The appellants also argued that the statute of repose improp-
erly favored design professionals over owners and occupiers.' 69 But
the court justified that distinction on the ground that the design
professional usually surrenders control of the premises upon com-
162. Id. at 352, 499 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added).
163. See O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980).
164. The court, quoting O'Brien, stated:
Architects and engineers are required by law to be licensed, while non-residen-
tial contractors are not. The Legislature might have concluded that the differ-
ent education, training, experience, licensing and professional stature of
architects and engineers made it more likely that a limitation on their tort liabil-
ity would not reduce the care with which they performed their tasks than would
be the case with contractors.
304 Md. at 354, 499 A.2d at 186 (quoting 410 Mich. at 17-18, 299 N.W.2d at 342 (foot-
note omitted)).
165. 304 Md. at 354, 499 A.2d at 186.
166. Id. at 354-55, 499 A.2d at 186 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 470(c)(5) (1983)
(architects) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 75 1/2, § 19A (1980) (professional engineers)).
167. Id. at 357, 499 A.2d at 187.
168. Id. at 357-58, 499 A.2d at 187-88 (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976)).
169. Id. at 355, 499 A.2d at 186.
19871 665
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pletion, whereas owners and occupiers usually retain control, along
with the responsibility for maintenance. 170 The court also approved
a distinction between design professionals and suppliers of material
or equipment, noting that the latter are in a better position to detect
defects and thus reasonably may be held liable to a greater extent
than the former.' 71
The court acknowledged that courts of other jurisdictions have
struck down statutes of repose favoring design professionals and
contractors over owners, occupiers, and suppliers. 172 The court dis-
tinguished those cases on the ground that almost all of them fol-
lowed an Illinois precedent, Skinner v. Anderson, 173 which was "not an
equal protection holding."' 74 Skinner was decided on the basis of a
section of the Illinois Constitution that prohibited the "granting to
any corporation, association or individual of any special or exclusive
privilege, immunity or franchise."'175 The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that those cases did not "give to the legislative judgment the
degree of deference required under the rational basis test. "176
In State v. Wyand 177 the Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 356, 499 A.2d at 187.
172. Id. at 356-57, 499 A.2d at 187.
173. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
174. 304 Md. at 357, 499 A.2d at 187.
175. 38 Il. 2d at 459, 231 N.E.2d at 590.
176. 304 Md. at 357, 499 A.2d at 187. The court also rejected three minor arguments
that the appellants had raised in addition to their equal protection claims. First, the
appellants contended the statute violated the restriction against passage of a "special"
law for a case that was already covered by an existing "general" law. Id. at 358, 499 A.2d
at 188 (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 33). The court said the prohibition against "special"
laws applies only to laws passed to benefit particular parties known to the lawmakers,
which was not the case here. Id. at 358-59, 499 A.2d at 188.
Second, the appellants contended that the statute violated the policy of providing a
remedy for every injury. Id. at 359, 499 A.2d at 188 (citing MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS.
art. 19). The court said that "the test for determining whether access to the courts ha[s]
been denied in violation of art. 19 look[s] to the reasonableness of the restriction," which
the court had already demonstrated. Id. at 360, 499 A.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
Third, the appellants contended the statute violated the requirement that "every
Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject," because it con-
tained both a grant of immunity and a statute of limitations. Id. at 360-61, 499 A.2d at
189 (quoting MD. CONST. art III, § 29). The court said that "[t]he purpose of the ...
provision is 'to prevent the combination in one act of several and distinct incongruous
subjects .... .' " Id. at 361, 499 A.2d at 189 (quoting Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 614, 150 A.2d 421, 426 (1959)). The
court noted that the statute in question concerned only "the single subject of time bars
against claims arising out of Injury." Id. at 361, 499 A.2d at 190.
177. 304 Md. 721, 501 A.2d 43 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1492 (1986).
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tionality of a Maryland statute17 8 that provides exemptions from
gaming laws for certain civic and charitable organizations in speci-
fied counties. The statute was challenged for the first time by three
men who had been convicted of operating an illegal gambling estab-
lishment in Washington County.' 79 They contended the statute de-
nied them equal protection'8 0 on the ground that their activities
would have been exempted from the gaming laws had they been
conducted by one of the types of organizations enumerated in the
statute.'' The Circuit Court for Washington County agreed and
dismissed all charges against the defendants, declaring the statute
unconstitutional.18 2 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a ra-
tional basis for the enactment of the statute.18 3
178. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 255(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Section 255(a) lists
the counties to which the section applies. Section 255(b) provides in relevant part:
(1) This subtitle may not be construed to make it unlawful for any volun-
teer fire company or bona fide fraternal, civic, war veterans', religious or chari-
table organization or corporation to conduct or hold a carnival, bazaar, or raffle
for the exclusive benefit of any such volunteer fire company or fraternal, civic,
war veterans', religious or charitable organization or corporation, if no individ-
ual or group of individuals benefits financially from the holding of any bazaar,
carnival, or raffle or receives or is paid any of the proceeds from any carnival,
bazaar, or raffle, for personal use or benefit.
(2) The organization or corporation may award prizes in cash or in mer-
chandise by such devices as are commonly designated as paddle wheels, wheels
of fortune, chance books, bingo, or any other gaming device.
179. 304 Md. at 723, 501 A.2d at 44. Roy Miller Snyder, Jr. was convicted for viola-
tions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 237 (1982) (keeping a gaming table); MD. ANN. CODE.
art. 27, § 356 (1982) (selling lottery tickets); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 360 (1982) (keep-
ing a place for selling lottery tickets); and MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 362 (1982) (posses-
sion of lottery tickets). His employees, Richard W. Wyand, Sr., and Albert L. Bryan,
were each convicted for violations of § 356 and § 362.
180. 304 Md. at 724, 501 A.2d at 45. The defendants based their equal protection
challenge on the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 24
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
181. Id. at 723, 501 A.2d at 44. The defendants also averred that the "clubs in Wash-
ington county that operate [exempt] gambling operations, including the same type as is
involved in this case, utilize the net profits therefrom for the general benefit of the mem-
bers themselves in that the net proceeds are normally deposited among the general rev-
enues of the club." Id. at 724, 501 A.2d at 45 (quoting defendants' motion to dismiss in
circuit court).
182. Id. at 725, 501 A.2d at 45. The circuit court judge said:
There is no justifiable, legitimate reason to grant such privileges as those be-
stowed by Section 255(a) to such fraternal and veteran's organizations. Such
legislation does, in fact, constitute class legislation in its purest sense. It is dis-
criminatory, arbitrary and has no reasonable relationship to the subject matter
of the gaming or lottery subtitles.
Id.
183. Id. at 730, 501 A.2d at 48. The Court of Appeals granted the State's petition for




The court quoted the general rule that legislation challenged
on equal protection grounds " 'is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally re-
lated to legitimate state interest .... When social or economic leg-
islation is at issue the Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide
latitude.' ",184 The court rejected both the "strict scrutiny" and
"heightened scrutiny" standards of review, because the statute does
not make distinctions based on suspect classifications, nor does it
pertain to a fundamental right.'" 5 The court found that the pre-
sumption of constitutionality of a statute enacted under the state's
police power is so strong that " 'if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute,
the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the
law must be assumed.' "186
In applying the rational basis test to the statute, the court ob-
served that, in general, "the promotion of general charitable, civic,
educational and public safety purposes is a proper object of legisla-
tion. '  The General Assembly, the court stated, could have con-
cluded that the exempt organizations contribute to the general
welfare and well-being of the community;18 8 that, as to veterans' or-
ganizations, serving one's country is a reason for special considera-
tion; i1 9 that there is a difference " 'between gambling for profit and
professional fund raising by a bona fide charitable organiza-
tion' " ;19 and that " 'bingo games and raffles are not inherently im-
moral, and . . . do not have a totally pernicious influence on the
character of the player.' " 191 Thus, a rational basis existed for the
enactment of the statute.1
9 2
184. 304 Md. at 726-27, 501 A.2d at 46 (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
185. Id. at 727, 501 A.2d at 46 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442).
186. Id. at 727-28, 501 A.2d at 46 (quoting Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 286
Md. 611, 616-17, 409 A.2d 250, 253 (1979), which quoted Edgewood Nursing Home v.
Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 427, 384 A.2d 748 (1978)).
187. Id. at 728, 501 A.2d at 47.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 729, 501 A.2d at 47.
190. Id. (quoting State v. Gedarro, 19 Wash. App. 826, 830, 579 P.2d 949, 951
(1978)).
191. Id. (quoting State v. McCleary, 65 N.C. App. 174, 188, 308 S.E.2d 883, 893
(1983), aff'd per curiam, 311 N.C. 397, 316 S.E.2d 870 (1984)).
192. Id. at 730, 501 A.2d at 48. The defendants raised an additional argument pro-
posing an alternate wording of the statute to make it fairer. They said that "it would be
proper.. . to exempt gambling in the enumerated organizations if (i) all the net pro-
ceeds were returned to the players, or (ii) all net proceeds were devoted to religious,
charitable, civic, or benevolent purposes without any of the net profits going to the ben-
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F. Right to Jury Trial
In Bailey v. State' 9 the petitioner sought reversal of his rape
conviction on the ground that, because blacks and young people are
underrepresented in Prince George's County jury pools,' 94 he was
denied the "right to a jury selection from a fair cross section of the
community guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."' 95 The Court of
Special Appeals held that the underrepresentation of age groups in
a jury pool cannot form the basis for a sixth amendment chal-
lenge.1 96 The court further held that the evidence failed to show an
unfair and unreasonably low percentage of blacks in Prince
George's County jury pools. 19 7
The Supreme Court, in Duren v. Missouri,'98 announced a three-
part test for analyzing fair cross-section claims.' 99 A court should
find a sixth amendment violation if:
1) the groups alleged to be excluded are "distinctive groups"
in the community; and
2) the representation of these groups is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
3) this underrepresentation is due to the "systematic exclu-
sion" of these distinctive groups.2 ° °
efit of the members of the clubs themselves." Id. at 724, 501 A.2d at 45 (quoting de-
fendants' motion to dismiss in circuit court). The court dismissed this argument as
reaching only the wisdom of the statute and not its constitutionality. Id. at 730, 501
A.2d at 48.
193. 63 Md. App. 594, 493 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
194. Id. at 602, 493 A.2d at 399.
195. Id. at 601, 493 A.2d at 399. Such underrepresentation can also be challenged
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Alexander v. Loui-
siana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). One reason for not doing so in cases involving age groups is
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to "extend heightened review to differential treat-
ment based on age." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 441 (1985). Furthermore, some courts hold that a defendant must be a member of
the underrepresented group in order to raise an equal protection claim. See Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (dicta); Morgan v. United States, 696 F.2d 1239,
1240 (9th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Sneed, 729 F.2d 1333, 1334 (1 th Cir.
1984) (stating that defendant not belonging to the underrepresented group may raise an
equal protection claim). The defendant need not be a member of the underrepresented
group to have standing to raise a sixth amendment claim. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
196. 63 Md. App. at 603, 493 A.2d at 399.
197. Id. at 604, 493 A.2d at 400.
198. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
199. Id. at 364.
200. Among the groups recognized as distinctive for sixth amendment fair cross-sec-
tion purposes are: American Indians (United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 984 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983)); Mexican Americans (Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954)); daily wage earners (Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946));
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Bailey argued that both blacks and persons aged eighteen to
twenty-nine are distinctive groups.2"' The Court of Special Ap-
peals, relying on "the overwhelming weight of the authority,
' 202
particularly Hopkins v. State,2°3 ruled that age groups are not distinc-
tive for purposes of analyzing fair cross-section claims.2 0 4 Under
Hopkins, for a group to be distinctive:
[1]t must be shown that the particular group has a definite
composition and that membership does not shift from day
to day. The group must have cohesion. "There must be a
common thread which runs through the group, a basic sim-
ilarity in attitudes or ideas or experience which is present
in members of the group and which cannot be adequately
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection
process." 20 5
The Hopkins court concluded that there was no evidence to indi-
and Jewish persons (United States v. Siragusa, 450 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 974 (1972)). The Supreme Court, in Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758,
1765 (1986), recently held that jurors excluded in death penalty cases for absolutely
opposing the death penalty did not constitute a distinctive group for sixth amendment
purposes. The Court said, "We have never attempted to precisely define the term 'dis-
tinctive group', and we do not undertake to do so today." Id. Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that because "death-qualified" jurors are excluded for reasons related to their
ability to serve as jurors, because the attribute on which their exclusion is based is within
their control, and because their exclusion is limited to death penalty cases, they are not a
distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. Id. at 1766.
201. 63 Md. App. at 602, 493 A.2d at 399.
202. Id. Every United States Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held
that age groups are not distinctive for sixth amendment purposes: Brown v. Harris, 666
F.2d 782, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 (1982); United States v.
DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Davis v.
Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975 (1982); United States v.
Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); United States v.
Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir.
1976); Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036, 1038 (11 th Cir. 1983). See also United States
v. Blair, 493 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D. Md. 1980), aft'd, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing that age boundaries of 18 and 29 "are entirely arbitrary and are not an inherent
attribute of the group"). The leading case holding that age groups are distinctive for
sixth amendment purposes was formerly United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir.
1970), in which the court held that "young adults" (18-34 years old) constituted a dis-
tinct group for fair cross-section analysis. The First Circuit recently overturned Butera in
Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985).
203. 19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973). In Hopkins a petitioner unsuccessfully
challenged his conviction on the grounds that persons aged 18 to 21 were under-
represented on jury rolls. At the time, those aged 18 to 21 were not allowed to serve as
jurors.
204. 63 Md. App. at 602, 493 A.2d at 400.
205. 19 Md. App at 421, 311 A.2d at 487 (quoting United States v. Guzman, 337 F.
Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973)).
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cate that the attitudes, ideas, or experiences of those aged eighteen
to twenty-one differed materially from those of people over the age
of twenty-one.2 °6 Furthermore, the Hopkins court said that there
was no evidence that the rights of those aged eighteen to twenty-one
were inadequately represented by those eligible for jury duty.20 7
The Court of Special Appeals adopted this reasoning in deciding
that persons aged eighteen to twenty-nine are not a distinctive
group 208
Relying on Peters v. K/if 2 ° 9 the court found that blacks are a dis-
tinctive group, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Duren test.2 1 0
As to the second prong, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the
lower court's finding that the representation of blacks in the jury
pool was not "unfair and unreasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community."' 2 l" The court noted that while "no
precise mathematical standards ' 212 exist for determining unreason-
able underrepresentation, all Supreme Court cases finding a sixth
amendment violation had absolute disparity values approaching
forty percent.21 3 Since the absolute disparity in the present case was
less than fourteen percent, the court concluded that Bailey failed to
satisfy the second prong of Duren.214
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 63 Md. App. at 603, 493 A.2d at 400. The court quoted only Hopkins on this
point although it also cited Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1983), and
United States v. Blair, 493 F. Supp. 398 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.
1981).
The difficulty with the Hopkins standard is that it is hard to imagine any group's
qualifying as distinctive under it. All groups-blacks, women, persons aged 18 to 21-
have daily shifts in membership as people are born, grow older, die, or move. Further-
more, it is utterly implausible to suggest that all women or all blacks share the same
attitudes, ideas, or experiences.
Two other rationales, however, militate against age groups as distinctive. First,
since most people will be members of the full spectrum of age groups during their lives,
a jury adequately represents all age groups regardless of the present age of the jurors.
In this sense age is unlike immutable characteristics such as race and gender. Second,
the boundaries of any age group are arbitrary. See Blair, 493 F. Supp. at 406. Because
no reasonable cut-off point can be established, no particular age group can be consid-
ered distinctive.
209. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
210. 63 Md. App. at 603, 493 A.2d at 400.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 604, 493 A.2d at 400.
213. Id. Absolute disparity figures are calculated by subtracting the group's percent-
age in the jury pool from the group's percentage in the community. Id., 493 A.2d at
401. In this case, blacks constituted 34.7% of the county population, but only 21.27% of
the jury pool. The absolute disparity, therefore, was 13.5%.
214. Id., 493 A.2d at 400-01.
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The court rejected Bailey's argument that the second prong
could be satisfied if the court considered comparative disparity
figures,21 5 which in this case approached thirty-nine percent. 21 6 The
court noted that most federal courts reject the use of comparative
figures,217 albeit for contradictory reasons. Some courts have said
that the use of comparative disparity figures is inappropriate if the
excluded group composes more than ten percent of the total com-
munity.218 Others have held that comparative disparity is inappro-
priate if the excluded group is a very small proportion of the
population. 2 9 Given this confusion over the usefulness of compar-
ative disparity figures, the Court of Special Appeals' failure to ex-
amine more closely the merits of this approach is unfortunate.220
215. Id., 493 A.2d at 401. " '[C]omparative disparity' figures are calculated by divid-
ing the absolute disparity number by the percentage of the cognizable class in the eligi-
ble population." Id. at 605, 493 A.2d at 401. In this case 13.5 divided by 34.7 (the
percentage of blacks in the county population) equals .389.
216. Id. at 604, 493 A.2d at 401.
217. Id. at 605. Decisions rejecting comparative disparity analysis include: United
States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[W]here small absolute
disparities are proven.., and the minority group exceeds ten percent of the population
... it is not necessary to consider other statistical methods."); United States v. Hafen,
726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984) (rejecting comparative dispar-
ity if underrepresented groups form a very small portion of total population); United
States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (ac-
cepting absolute, rather than comparative, disparity as the measure of fairness intended
by Congress); United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir. 1974) (rejecting
comparative disparity as distorting reality when a very small proportion of the total pop-
ulation was black); State v. Castonquay, 194 Conn. 416, 481 A.2d 56 (1984) (rejecting
comparative disparity where small proportion of the population was Hispanic). But see
Alston v. Mann, 791 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1285 (1987)
(suggesting, in dicta, that the "absolute disparity approach employed in Jenkins may be
outmoded and should be discarded").
Decisions accepting comparative disparity include: United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d
825, 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 834-
35 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); People v. Guzman, 89 A.D. 2d 14, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852,
(1982), af'd, 60 N.Y.2d 403, 457 N.E.2d 1143,469 N.Y.S.2d 916, (1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 951 (1984).
218. See United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Duran de Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. 1326, 1330-31 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
219. See United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962
(1984); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 355-56 (D.N.J. 1982).
220. Because Bailey failed to satisfy the second prong of the Duren test, the court
declined to consider whether his claim would satisfy the third prong: that the under-
representation of the distinctive groups must be due to systematic exclusion. 63 Md.
App. at 605, 493 A.2d at 401. In dicta, however, the court indicated that satisfying the





In two recent decisions, Maryland courts considered whether
the National Labor Relations Act2 2 ' (NLRA) preempted state court
jurisdiction over claims involving union activities.
The Court of Appeals determined in Vane v. Nocella222 that be-
cause the NLRA "arguably prohibited" the allegedly illegal union
activities, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rather than
the state court had jurisdiction.2 23 Vane sued in state court for tor-
tious interference with contractual relations, alleging that the union
coerced his employer into firing him.224 Applying the test enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck v. San Diego County Dis-
trict Council of Carpenters,225 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the suit. 226 The court found that Vane's state
claim for tortious interference was identical to his possible NLRA
claim for unfair labor practices, since both claims would require
Vane to prove that the union caused his discharge. 2 7 Thus, the
NLRA preempted the state's common-law jurisdiction.
In Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,2 2 8 however, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the NLRA did not preempt state court
jurisdiction over claims of invasion of privacy and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.229 Applying the Sears test, 230 the court
221. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
222. 303 Md. 362, 494 A.2d 181 (1985).
223. Id. at 385, 494 A.2d at 192.
224. 303 Md. at 365, 494 A.2d at 182. Vane worked for H.L. Hartz and Sons as an
industrial engineer. As one of his duties, Vane negotiated piece rates with the employ-
ees' union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textiles Workers of America. After the
union objected to the piece rates he had set, Vane was fired. Id.
225. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). To determine whether conduct is "arguably prohibited" by
the NLRA, the Sears Court said that "[t]he critical inquiry [is] . .. whether the contro-
versy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from that which could
have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board." Id. at 197. Sears refined the rule
first enunciated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959):
"When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S.
at 245 (emphasis supplied).
226. 303 Md. at 385, 494 A.2d at 192.
227. Id. at 383, 494 A.2d at 192.
228. 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 306 Md. 289, 508 A.2d 488, cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 571 (1986).
229. Id. at 144, 502 A.2d at 1106. The plaintiff alleged that the company's conduct
included "placing [him] under surveillance, circulating documents pertaining to his
criminal record to members of Local 24, and sending reports of his marital infidelity to
his wife." Id.
230. See supra note 225.
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found that the state claims extended "beyond an arguable [sic] un-
fair labor practice" and thus "would be of merely 'peripheral con-
cern' to the NLRB but of significant interest to the state."'2 3 ' The
evidence necessary to find an unfair labor practice under the NLRA
might not establish that the defendants committed the common-law
torts. 2  Thus, because the claims were not identical, no preemp-
tion occurred. 233 The state court, therefore, retained jurisdiction





231. 66 Md. App. at 155, 502 A.2d at 1112.





1. Probable Cause.-Section 26-202 of the Transportation Arti-
cle allows police officers to effect warrantless arrests if they have rea-
sonable grounds to believe that a person will disregard a traffic
citation.' Construing this provision for the first time in Parker v.
State,2 the Court of Special Appeals held that when the defendant
was stopped for a defective brake light, could produce no identifica-
tion other than a prison I.D. card, and acted in an extremely nervous
manner, the police officer had reasonable grounds to arrest under
section 26-202(a)(2)(ii).2 Equating "reasonable grounds" with
probable cause, the court found that the trial judge correctly deter-
mined that the officer had probable cause to believe Parker would
not honor a citation.4
2. Double Jeopardy.-In State v. Boozer 5 the Court of Appeals
considered the application of the doctrine of double jeopardy6 as it
1. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 26-202 (1984 & Supp. 1986) provides in relevant part:
(a) In general.-A police officer may arrest without a warrant a person for a
violation of the Maryland Vehicle Law, including any rule or regulation
adopted under it, or for a violation of any traffic law or ordinance of any local
authority of this State, if:
(2) The person has committed or is committing the violation within the
view or presence of the officer, and either:
(i) The person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity; or
(ii) The officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person will
disregard a traffic citation.
2. 66 Md. App. 1, 502 A.2d 510, cert. denied, 306 Md. 70, 507 A.2d 184 (1986).
Parker challenged the arrest in order to suppress evidence seized during the search of
his car incident to the arrest. Id. at 4, 502 A.2d at 511.
3. Id. at 14, 502 A.2d at 516-17.
4. Id. at 7, 502 A.2d at 513. In his dissent, Judge Bell contended that the arrest
based on the traffic citation was a subterfuge to enable the police officer to search
Parker's car without a warrant and to confirm the officer's suspicions of criminal activity.
Judge Bell reasoned that Parker's failure to provide adequate identification-the only
factor present that justified an arrest under the statute--could not be used to legitimize
the arrest, for the officer never asked Parker to provide further details as to his identity
or address. Id. at 19-23, 502 A.2d at 519-21 (Bell, J., dissenting).
5. 304 Md. 98, 497 A.2d 1129 (1985).
6. The doctrine of double jeopardy is embodied in the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provides that no person shall "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
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relates to crimes committed as separate acts that occur in close
proximity to each other and are part of a single criminal episode.
Specifically, the court held that a defendant once placed in jeopardy
on a charge of committing a fourth-degree sexual offense may be
subjected to a second prosecution for an attempted fourth-degree
sexual offense if both charges arise out of the same criminal transac-
tion, but involve different acts prohibited by the statute.7
The court reasoned that because the two crimes are not the
same offense under article 27, section 464C,' it is constitutionally
permissible to charge them as separate offenses.9 Thus, the court
held that the double jeopardy clause does not preclude the State
from bringing more than one charge of sexual offense in the fourth-
degree resulting from a single criminal transaction.'" The court
found that the vast majority of other jurisdictions had reached this
same conclusion even when the separate acts were part of a single
transaction." After examining the language, structure, and legisla-
tive history of article 27, section 464C, the court concluded that the
General Assembly could have intended Maryland to follow this ma-
jority rule. 1 2
7. 304 Md. at 113,497 A.2d at 1137. The defendant had initially been charged with
committing a sexual act in the fourth degree. At trial, however, the State's Attorney
sought leave to amend the charges to allege that the defendant engaged in sexual contact
without consent. The trial judge denied the motion to amend and the State's Attorney
subsequently entered a nolle prosequi. The State then filed a new statement of charges,
alleging that defendant had attempted to commit vaginal intercourse, another sexual
offense in the fourth degree. Id. at 100-01, 497 A.2d at 1129-30.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464C (1982) provides in part:
(a) What constitutes.-A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the fourth degree
if the person engaged:
(1) In sexual contact with another person against the will and without the
consent of the other person; or
(2) In a sexual act with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and
the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the other
person; or
(3) In vaginal intercourse with another person who is 14 or 15 years of
age and the person performing the act is four or more years older than the
other person.
9. 304 Md. at 102, 497 A.2d at 1131. The court found that "many of the various
acts of criminal conduct grouped together in § 464C historically and customarily have
been considered sufficiently separate and distinct from each other to justify separate
punishment, even though occurring in close temporal proximity and within the same
criminal episode." Id. at 104, 497 A.2d at 1132.
10. Id. at 113, 497 A.2d at 1136. The court expressly avoided the question of
"whether an attempt is the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as the substantive
crime attempted." Id. at 102, 497 A.2d at 1131.
11. See id. at 105-08, 497 A.2d at 1132-34 and authorities cited therein.
12. Id. at 108-09, 497 A.2d at 1134-35. As part of its examination of legislative in-
tent, the court noted that the General Assembly specifically permitted the use of the
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In Copsey v. State" the Court of Special Appeals held that the
doctrine of double jeopardy precluded successive prosecutions of a
defendant for a continuing sexual offense committed in neighboring
counties." The defendant was initially charged and convicted in St.
Mary's County of a continuing sexual offense against a minor.' 5
The criminal conduct took place both in St. Mary's County and
Charles County and involved regular transportation across the bor-
der. The State subsequently charged the defendant in Charles
County for what was in effect a continuing sexual offense against the
same minor over a shorter, but included, period of time.' 6 A
Charles County trial court rejected the defendant's plea of double
jeopardy. 17
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, pointing out that the
State could have charged, tried, and convicted the defendant in
either St. Mary's or Charles County since the sexual offenses took
place in both counties during overlapping periods of time.' Since
St. Mary's County moved first against the defendant, however, by
filing a criminal information and calling his case for trial, jeopardy
first attached, and was exhausted, in that jurisdiction for all offenses
short form of a charging document in sexual offense cases. The defendant had argued
that the use of the short form was inconsistent with the concept of separate offenses.
The court stated that if the State uses the short-form charging document, then it is lim-
ited to a single conviction and punishment for conduct within the Code section specified
even though the defendant may have committed more than one offense embraced by
that section. In this case, however, the State did not elect to use the short form, but
brought separate charges instead. Id. at 111-13, 497 A.2d at 1136-37.
13. 67 Md. App. 223, 507 A.2d 186 (1986).
14. Id. at 234, 507 A.2d at 192.
15. Id. at 226, 507 A.2d at 187. During a five-year period the defendant, who was 59
years old at the time charges were filed, engaged in anal intercourse and fellatio on an
almost daily basis with a young boy. The State had strong proof of general criminal
behavior, but could not pinpoint precise dates, so it charged the defendant with a single
continuing offense over the course of the five-year period. The defendant pleaded
guilty to a sexual offense in the second degree and received a suspended sentence. d. at
226-27, 507 A.2d at 187-88.
16. Id. at 226, 507 A.2d at 187. Public dissatisfaction with the defendant's sus-
pended sentence led to the subsequent prosecution in Charles County. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 228-29, 507 A.2d at 188-89. The court cited two statutes that make it eas-
ier for the State to charge and to prove a crime in cases in which there is uncertainty as
to the county in which the crime occurred. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 590 (1982),
if a crime is committed on or near boundary lines of counties so as to render it doubtful
in which county the offense was committed, then the county that by issuing process for
arrest and prosecution first assumes jurisdiction may charge, try, convict, and sentence
the defendant. Also, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 465 (1982), states that if a defendant
transports a person, intending to violate the sexual offenses subtitle, then the defendant
may be tried in any county where the transportation was offered, solicited, begun, con-
tinued, or ended. 67 Md. App. at 229, 507 A.2d at 189.
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committed during the period charged.'" The court thus held that
because the defendant stood in obvious jeopardy in St. Mary's
County for the criminal offenses committed in both St. Mary's and
Charles Counties, his fifth amendment protection against double
jeopardy barred prosecution in Charles County.20
3. Right to Counsel.-In Harris v. State (Harris 111)21 the Court of
Appeals affirmed the circuit court judge's denial of Harris' motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas, holding that Harris' counsel had not
been constitutionally ineffective. 22 The court applied the two-prong
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington 23 to find that the attorney's
conduct had been neither deficient nor prejudicial to Harris' de-
fense.24 Thus, the court refused to reverse the murder conviction
for which Harris had received the death sentence.25
Under the Strickland test to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that the attorney's perform-
19. 67 Md. App. at 229-30, 507 A.2d at 189. The court pointed out that if St. Mary's
County and Charles County had carefully orchestrated their charging documents, the
defendant could have stood trial in both counties. This could have been accomplished if
each respective county had confined its charging document to the specified criminal con-
duct that occurred within its boundaries. Id. at 231-32, 507 A.2d at 190.
20. Id. at 234, 507 A.2d at 192.
21. 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985), vacated on appeal after remand, 306 Md. 344,
509 A.2d 120 (1986). For a discussion of Harris IV, see infra text accompanying notes
180-190.
22. Id. at 723, 496 A.2d at 1093.
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Harris pleaded guilty to all charges. 303 Md. at 690, 496 A.2d at 1076. He and
an accomplice had robbed a sporting goods store and killed the owner's son. This ap-
peal marked the third time that Harris' case had come before the Court of Appeals. In
the first appeal, Harris I, 295 Md. 329, 455 A.2d 979 (1983), Harris argued that his guilty
pleas and waiver of jury sentencing had been involuntary. The court found that while
the pleas had been made knowingly and voluntarily, the waiver of a jury for sentencing
had not been; therefore, the court remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 338-
40, 455 A.2d at 984.
On remand, before resentencing, Harris moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claim-
ing that he had entered them involuntarily and without the effective assistance of coun-
sel. The judge denied the motion, and the jury imposed a sentence of death. Harris
appealed a second time, arguing that the denial of his motion was erroneous. 303 Md. at
691, 496 A.2d at 1076-77. In Harris H, 299 Md. 511, 474 A.2d 890 (1984), the court
agreed with Harris because the circuit court judge had improperly ruled that a claim of
ineffective counsel could only be resolved in a postconviction hearing. The court there-
fore remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing concerning the effectiveness of coun-
sel. Id. at 518-19, 474 A.2d at 893-94. On remand, after a full hearing, the judge again
denied the motion to withdraw the pleas. In the instant appeal Harris asserted that the
circuit court judge erred in determining that counsel had been effective; therefore, he
contended, the circuit court judge erred in denying the motion. 303 Md. at 690-92, 496
A.2d at 1076-77.
25. 303 Md. at 723, 496 A.2d at 1093.
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ance was deficient and that the performance prejudiced the de-
fense.2 6 For prejudice to result, the defendant must demonstrate a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result would have been different."27 Both prongs of the
test involve mixed questions of law and fact.28
The Harris court analyzed the requirements of Strickland, noting
that the defendant has a "heavy burden" to establish ineffective
counsel.2 9 The defendant may discharge this burden by identifying
specific deficient acts, by showing that counsel's conduct was objec-
tively unreasonable, and by overcoming the presumption that the
attorney's actions are part of "trial strategy."3 0 In proving preju-
dice, the defendant may not merely show that "the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,"'" but must in
fact establish that prejudice actually resulted.32
The court also evaluated the requirements of Strickland con-
cerning judicial review of a claim of ineffective counsel. A court
must evaluate the reasonableness of an attorney's actions based on
the facts of the case at the time the attorney acted and must decide
whether, in light of the circumstances, the attorney's actions were
professionally incompetent.33 The court must allow for attorney
discretion in planning trial strategy, however, when it evaluates the
counsel's professional judgment. 34 In considering whether preju-
dice resulted, the court "must consider the totality of the evidence
before the judge or jury."3 5
Applying the Strickland test to Harris' numerous allegations of
error,36 the court summarily rejected the contention that the attor-
ney's heavy workload and inexperience had made his performance
ineffective.3 7 In addition, the court found that no prejudice resulted
26. 466 U.S. at 693.
27. Id. at 695.
28. Id. at 698.
29. 303 Md. at 697, 496 A.2d at 1080.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 700, 496 A.2d at 1081 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 699, 496 A.2d at 1081.
33. Id. at 700-01, 496 A.2d at 1081-82.
34. Id. at 698-99, 496 A.2d at 1080-81.
35. Id. at 701, 496 A.2d at 1082.
36. Id. at 704-05, 496 A.2d at 1083-84.
37. Id. at 720, 496 A.2d at 1091-92. The attorney had worked as an Assistant Public
Defender for four years. During that time, he had tried about 1000 circuit court cases,
but only about 12 were jury trials. Half of those were murder cases, though only four
were for first-degree murder. Id. at 693, 496 A.2d at 1078. The attorney handled 20
cases a week. Id. at 720 n.15, 496 A.2d at 1092 n.15. The court cited United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), in which the Supreme Court stressed that "[t]he character
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from the attorney's decision to enter a guilty plea for first-degree
rather than felony murder, since Harris could have received the
death penalty for either offense.38
The court analyzed Harris' remaining allegations under the de-
ficiency component of Strickland, but found that the attorney's ac-
tions reflected a reasonable trial strategy. Thus, the attorney acted
reasonably in attempting to throw Harris on the mercy of the court
by having him plead guilty to first-degree murder.39 Likewise, the
court deferred to the attorney's decision to accept a State-proffered
statement of facts establishing that Harris was a principal in the first
degree. Harris had agreed to the statement; furthermore, the attor-
ney's action fell within the realm of reasonable trial strategy.40
Moreover, the court found that the attorney's investigation of the
case was not deficient, even though he failed to locate an alleged
third accomplice.4'
Finally, the court evaluated Harris' allegation that his counsel
of a particular lawyer's experience may shed light in an evaluation of his actual perform-
ance, but it does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness in the absence of such an
evaluation." Id. at 665.
38. 303 Md. at 710-12, 496 A.2d at 1086-87. The court acknowledged that a sen-
tencing jury might react less adversely to felony murder than to first-degree murder, but
stressed that Harris must do more than establish the possibility of prejudice. Id. at 710-
11, 496 A.2d at 1087.
39. Id. at 709-10, 496 A.2d at 1086. To his attorney Harris had stated that he was
the triggerman in the shooting. Because of Harris' statement and because his counsel
knew what evidence was available to the State, his counsel believed the case against
Harris was overwhelming. Furthermore, the defense had originally removed the case
from Baltimore County to Kent County, but the attorney then determined that Harris
would have a better chance of leniency from the jury if the case were moved back. The
guilty plea was part of the agreement reached with prosecutors to have the case returned
to Baltimore County even though the State made it clear that it would seek the death
penalty. Id. at 706-07, 496 A.2d at 1084-85. The circuit court judge's thorough plea
litany established that Harris' plea was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 707-09, 496 A.2d
at 1085-86.
40. Id. at 716, 496 A.2d at 1089. Harris asserted that the attorney should have in-
cluded additional facts in the statement. The statement would then have alleged that
Harris had two accomplices, one of whom had recruited Harris. Harris' version did not
alter his statement that he pulled the trigger. Id. at 714-15, 496 A.2d at 1088-89.
41. Id. at 717-19, 496 A.2d at 1090-91. Harris' accomplice, Brown, had made a plea
bargain with the State concerning the crimes. Although Brown told police that a third
person was also involved, he provided little specific information concerning the third
person's identity or whereabouts. In his first statement to a police informant, Brown
stated that the third person, not Harris, pulled the trigger. Id. at 702-03, 496 A.2d at
1082-83. Brown later changed his story twice: he told the State's Attorney that Harris
fired the gun, but on the stand he testified that he did not know who pulled the trigger.
Harris maintained that the third person drove the getaway car. The prosecution never
located the third person. Id. at 717-18, 496 A.2d at 1090. The court stressed that the




was deficient in failing to comprehend the difference between a
principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree in a
case of first-degree murder.42 The court acknowledged that the at-
torney may not have appreciated the difference between the two de-
grees.43 Harris, however, had informed his attorney that he had
fired the shot that killed the victim.44 Because Harris was therefore
a principal in the first degree, the court concluded that the attor-
ney's failure to distinguish the degrees was not unreasonable.45
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Cole argued that "trial
counsel's performance here is a textbook example of ineffective
assistance of counsel."46 While the State could place Harris at the
scene of the crime, the State's only evidence that Harris pulled the
trigger came from an accomplice who had changed his story three
times.47 Furthermore, if the State could not establish that Harris
had fired the gun and was therefore a principal in the first degree, it
could not sentence him to death.4' Therefore, the difference be-
tween a principal in the first degree and a principal in the second
degree took on life and death proportions. By unnecessarily enter-
ing a plea of guilty to first-degree murder, the attorney deprived
Harris of his right to put the State to its proof.49 Therefore, Judge
Cole found that the attorney had "failed to advocate his client's
cause with the zeal and vigor demanded," '5 and thus had acted both
deficiently and prejudicially. 5'
In White v. State52 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that a
criminal defendant has no right to have counsel present at a tape
replay of a voice line-up.5" In White the defendant's counsel was
present at the original "live" voice line-up, but was not present at a
taped replay two months later at which the victim identified the de-
42. Id. at 712, 496 A.2d at 1087. The difference is significant. A principal in the first
degree, the person who actually commits a crime, may be sentenced to death; however, a
principal in the second degree, a person who aids in the commission of a crime, may not
be sentenced to death. Id. at 712-13, 496 A.2d at 1088.
43. Id. at 714, 496 A.2d at 1088.
44. Id. at 715, 496 A.2d at 1089.
45. Id. at 713-14, 496 A.2d at 1088.
46. Id. at 724, 496 A.2d at 1093-94 (Cole, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 725, 727, 496 A.2d at 1094, 1095. Harris confessed to his attorney, not to
the police, that he pulled the trigger; therefore, the confession was not part of the
State's evidence. Id. at 732, 496 A.2d at 1097-98.
48. Id. at 734, 496 A.2d at 1098-99.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 733, 496 A.2d at 1098.
51. Id. at 734, 496 A.2d at 1099.
52. 66 Md. App. 100, 502 A.2d 1084 (1986).
53. Id. at 109, 502 A.2d at 1089.
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fendant's voice as that of her assailant. 54 The court noted that the
sixth amendment requires that the State permit counsel to attend
visual line-ups,55 but likened the tape replay to the photo array con-
text for which no constitutional right to the presence of counsel ex-
ists. 56 Because the taped replay could be duplicated in court, the
Court of Special Appeals adopted the reasoning of United States v.
Otero-Hernandez5 7 and concluded that the Constitution does not
mandate the presence of counsel at a replay of a voice line-up. 58
In Johnson v. State51 the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial
court does not violate a defendant's right to a fair trial if the court
concurrently accepts a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel, a
defendant's assertion of the right to self-representation, and a de-
fendant's waiver of the right to be present at trial. 60 In so ruling,
the court rejected the defendant's argument that he had no right to
waive his right to counsel, proceed pro se, and then waive his right to
be present at trial, simply because his decisions were foolish.6"
The court noted that the law does not require defendants to be
wise in order to stand trial; instead, it requires only that they be
competent.62 Thus, if the trial court has properly concluded that
54. Id. at 105, 502 A.2d at 1087. During the first voice line-up, the victim, who had
been raped and robbed, selected the defendant and one other individual. Id. The court
did not have to decide whether a defendant had a right to the presence of counsel at the
original voice line-up, but cited cases in a number ofjurisdictions that have held that a
criminal defendant has no right to counsel at the time of voice line-up procedures. Id. at
108 n.3, 502 A.2d at 1088 n.3.
55. Id. at 107, 502 A.2d at 1088; see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
56. 66 Md. App. at 107, 502 A.2d at 1088; see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321
(1973).
57. 418 F. Supp 572, 574-75 (M.D. Fla. 1976). The defendant did not attend the
replay session; therefore, he could not raise a confrontation clause challenge. 66 Md.
App. at 109, 502 A.2d at 1089.
58. 66 Md. App. at 109, 502 A.2d at 1089.
59. 67 Md. App. 347, 507 A.2d 1134, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d 314, cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 594 (1986).
60. Id. at 373, 507 A.2d at 1147-48.
61. Id., 507 A.2d at 1148. In the present case the defendant dismissed his attorney,
finding the attorney's efforts insufficient. Id. at 355-56, 507 A.2d at 1138-39. The de-
fendant then proceeded to represent himself; however, on the day the trial was sched-
uled to begin, the defendant declared that he was disqualifying himself as his own
attorney and would hire another attorney. The court would not permit the defendant to
withdraw his waiver of counsel. The defendant then refused to participate in the trial
and asked that he be allowed to leave the courtroom. Id. at 357, 507 A.2d at 1139. The
trial judge conducted a thorough examination of the defendant and determined that he
was competent to stand trial. Ruling that the court could not force the defendant to
employ a lawyer or to remain in the courtroom, the judge accordingly granted the de-
fendant's request to leave the courtroom. Id. at 357-58, 507 A.2d at 1139-40.
62. Id. at 373, 507 A.2d at 1148.
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the defendant is competent to stand trial and that the defendant has
knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights, the trial court
need not appoint alternate counsel for the defendant and may con-
tinue the trial without representation for the defendant. 63
The court likened Johnson's situation to that of the pro se de-
fendant who actively brings about his or her 6wn conviction by sys-
tematically putting forth unfavorable evidence, and to the pro se
defendant who simply chooses to remain silent, thus refusing to par-
ticipate at all. 64 In these situations, the courts have refused to im-
pose a duty upon the defendant to conduct an effective defense,
despite the seeming imprudence of the defendant's proceeding on
this course.65 Thus, the court concluded that a trial court need not
ensure representation for a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se
and then declines the right to be present at trial.
4. Miranda.-In State v. Quinn66 the Court of Special Appeals
held that after a suspect in police custody has requested counsel, the
presentation to the suspect of an "Application for Statement of
Charges "67 that contains incriminating statements by codefendants
and that induces the suspect to make an incriminating statement vi-
olates the suspect's fifth amendment rights.68 In Bryant v. State69 the
Court of Special Appeals had held that if the accused had invoked
the right to counsel and was then placed in a room with a codefend-
ant who implicated the accused in the crime, causing the accused to
make an incriminating statement, the police had violated the ac-
cused's right against self-incrimination.70 In Quinn the court fol-
lowed Bryant. While the police had not actually interrogated the
defendant, the effect of giving him the Application containing his
63. Id. at 373-74, 507 A.2d at 1148.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593, 600-01 (11th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 464 U.S. 78 (1983), reh'g denied, 465 U.S 1014 (1984); People v. Teron, 23 Cal.
3d 103, 115, 588 P.2d 773, 779, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1979); Bishop v. State, 95 Nev.
511, 517, 597 P.2d 273, 276 (1979).
66. 64 Md. App. 668, 498 A.2d 676 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253
(1986).
67. The statement of charges is a charging document that consists of a "written accu-
sation alleging that a defendant has committed an offense." It is filed in a district court
by a peace officer or ajudicial officer. MD. R. 4-102(i). The Application for Statement of
Charges is a written presentation of those facts known to the charging officer that give
him or her cause to believe that the accused should be charged with a particular crime.
64 Md. App. at 672, 498 A.2d at 678.
68. 64 Md. App. at 670-71, 498 A.2d at 677.
69. 49 Md. App. 272, 431 A.2d 714, cert. denied, 291 Md. 772 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 949 (1982).
70. Id. at 283, 431 A.2d at 720.
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codefendant's incriminating statement was "precisely the same" as
if the police had orally interrogated the defendant.7 ' Thus, the
court held that under the tenets of Miranda v. Arizona 72 and Edwards
v. Arizona,'73 the lower court had properly suppressed Quinn's in-
criminating statements.' 4
5. Self-Incrimination.-In Smith v. State' 5 the Court of Special
Appeals overturned a trial court's denial of a new trial motion that
was based upon the trial judge's failure to compel a witness' testi-
mony. 76 The witness had previously entered into a plea bargain
agreement to charges arising out of the same incident." During a
hearing on the new trial motion,78 the witness had successfully in-
voked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 79
The court held that the trial judge should have compelled the wit-
ness' testimony, because the State could not have charged the wit-
ness with any further crimes related to the incident.8" The court
reasoned that the witness was immune from further prosecution be-
cause none of the charges contained in the indictment against the
71. 64 Md. App. at 673, 498 A.2d at 678.
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
73. 451 U.S. 477, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981). In Miranda the Supreme Court
held that under the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination, if an ac-
cused exercises the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, "interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 526. The Court has recognized that the
accused may subsequently waive this right; however, in Edwards the Court found that a
waiver is invalid if the defendant makes incriminating statements in response to police-
initiated interrogation. 451 U.S. at 485. This occurs after the defendant has requested
counsel.
74. 64 Md. App. at 674, 498 A.2d at 679.
75. 63 Md. App. 311, 492 A.2d 926 (1985).
76. Id. at 313-14, 492 A.2d at 927.
77. Id. at 316, 492 A.2d at 928. Facing an 18-count indictment, the witness pled
guilty to a single count in exchange for a suspended sentence and probation. The State
nol prossed the remaining counts. Id.
78. The defendant's new trial motion was based upon the existence of newly discov-
ered evidence not available to him at trial. Id. at 314, 492 A.2d at 927.
79. Id. at 316-18, 492 A.2d at 928-29. The witness' testimony was necessary to eval-
uate the new evidence. Id.
80. Id. at 320-22, 492 A.2d at 930-31. The court stated that the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination
"must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to ap-
prehend danger from a direct answer .... The witness is not exonerated from
answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
himself-his say-so does not itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is
for the court to say whether his silence is justified .... and to require him to
answer if 'it clearly appears that he is mistaken.' "
Id. at 320, 492 A.2d at 931 (quoting Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 266, 401 A.2d
1021, 1023 (1979), which quoted Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
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witness could have been reinstated following his plea agreement,8'
and because no uncharged offenses arising out of the same incident
could subsequently have been brought against him.8 2
6. Right to Jury Trial.-Section 4-302(e)(2)(ii) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article and its predecessor, section 4-
302(d)(2)(ii), limit the right to a jury trial in the first instance. 83 In
Fisher v. State84 the Court of Appeals held that section 4-302 (d) (2) (ii)
was unconstitutional85 under Maryland law8 6 when applied to one
charged with driving while intoxicated. 7
The court based its opinion largely upon the principles estab-
lished in its earlier decision, Kawamura v. State. 8 In Kawamura the
81. 63 Md. App. at 319, 492 A.2d at 930. The State could not have reinstated any of
the remaining charges against the witness since jeopardy attached when the witness ac-
cepted the plea agreement and pleaded guilty. Id.
82. Id. The court determined that the one-year statute of limitations barred a possi-
ble conspiracy charge against the witness. It also found that the witness' guilty plea to
felony theft made him a principal to all crimes charged, thereby precluding a possible
future conviction as an accessory. Id. at 319-20, 492 A.2d at 930.
83. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-302(e)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (formerly § 4-
302(d)(2)(ii) (1984)) provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the pre-
siding judge of the District Court may deny a defendant a jury trial if:
1. The prosecutor recommends in open court that the judge not impose
a penalty of imprisonment for a period in excess of 90 days, regardless of the
permissible statutory or common law maximum;
2. The judge agrees not to impose a penalty of imprisonment for a period
in excess of 90 days; and
3. The judge agrees not to increase the defendant's bond if an appeal is
noted.
84. 305 Md. 357, 504 A.2d 626 (1986). The court's opinion followed an earlier per
curiam order.
85. Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in relevant part: "That
the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to . . . trial by jury .... " Article 21 of the
Declaration of Rights states: "That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right
... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not
to be found guilty." Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights provides in relevant part:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact,
except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a convic-
tion." Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides: "That no man ought to be taken
or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges ... or, in any manner,
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers,
or by the Law of the land."
86. The court based its decision in this case completely upon Maryland constitu-
tional law, rather than upon federal law. 305 Md. at 368, 504 A.2d at 631-32. The court
had no choice but to follow this course since the United States Supreme Court in Lud-
wig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), had upheld a similar Massachusetts statute as
valid under the federal constitution.
87. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-902(a) (1984).
88. 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
court found that section 4-302(d)(2)(ii) unconstitutionally denied a
jury trial in the first instance to a defendant charged with theft.89
The court conceded that some minor offenses do not give rise to the
right to a jury trial;90 however, offenses subject to infamous punish-
ment, such as imprisonment in the penitentiary, are not within the
realm of the petty offenses to which the right to ajury trial does not
attach.9' Because a court could impose a sentence of imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for the offense of theft,9 2 the court found
that Kawamura had a right to a jury trial; therefore, section 4-
302(d)(2)(ii) could not be applied under the Maryland
Constitution.9 3
In Fisher the court cited three factors as important in determin-
ing whether the right to a jury trial under the State Constitution
attaches to a particular offense. These factors are: (1) whether the
offense historically had been subject to the summary jurisdiction of
justices of the peace, or had instead been tried before juries at and
before the adoption of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; (2)
whether the offense is an infamous crime or a crime subject to infa-
mous punishment, as indicated by the place or length of incarcera-
tion; and (3) whether the offense is commonly viewed as
"serious."94
As to the first factor, the court noted that the consideration of
whether the offense had historically been subject to trial by jury or
to the summary jurisdiction of the justices of the peace was inappli-
cable: the offense of driving while intoxicated was unknown at the
time of the adoption of the Declaration of Rights.95 As to the sec-
ond factor, the court noted that the offense of driving while intoxi-
cated is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of one year for
the first offense and two years for the second offense. 96 Because no
statutory provisions limit the place of confinement to local jails, a
89. Id. at 286, 473 A.2d at 443-44. The Maryland consolidated theft statute appears
in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1982).
90. Specifically, the Kawamura court cited State v. Glen, 54 Md. 572 (1880), which
held that a right to ajury trial does not attach in various minor offenses that were histori-
cally subject to the summary jurisdiction of justices of the peace. 299 Md. at 290, 473
A.2d at 446.
91. 299 Md. at 291, 473 A.2d at 446.
92. The court noted that while § 342(d)(2) does not specifically state the punishment
for theft, under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 690(b) (1982) one convicted of theft under
§ 342(f)(2) and sentenced to three months or more imprisonment could be confined in
the penitentiary. 299 Md. at 295, 473 A.2d at 448.
93. 299 Md. at 297, 473 A.2d at 449.
94. 305 Md. at 365-66, 504 A.2d at 630.
95. Id. at 366, 504 A.2d at 630.
96. Id., 504 A.2d at 630-31; MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 27-101(i)(2) (1984).
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court may order a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to
serve his or her sentence in the penitentiary.9 7 The court thus
found that the possibility of two years' imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for driving while intoxicated satisfied the second factor
of infamous punishment.9" Finally, because driving while intoxi-
cated frequently results in the loss of human life and is thus re-
garded with great concern by the public, the court concluded that
this offense also meets the test of seriousness. 99 The Fisher factors
therefore indicated that the General Assembly could not constitu-
tionally deprive persons charged with driving while intoxicated of
the right to trial by jury.
In State v. Huebner' 00 the Court of Appeals held former section
4-302(d)(2)(ii) unconstitutional as applied to the offenses of re-
sisting arrest and assault and battery.' 0 ' More important, the court
held that the State cannot enter a nolle prosequi only to those
charges for which the defendant could demand a jury trial-thereby
defeating the right to ajury trial-and, at the same time, continue to
prosecute lesser offenses in district court, without a jury. 0 2
In this widely reported case10 3 Prince George's County police
arrested the defendants, Hans Heubner and his daughter Gisela, on
numerous charges, including disorderly conduct, resisting arrest,
and assault and battery on a police officer.' 0 4 The defendants made
clear to the district court judge their desire for a jury trial;' 0 5 there-
fore, in light of Kawamura,10 6 it was unclear whether the district
court could constitutionally retain jurisdiction under section 4-
302(d)(2)(ii). The prosecutor, however, attempted a new ploy: he
97. 305 Md. at 366-67, 504 A.2d at 631.
98. Id. at 367, 504 A.2d at 631.
99. Id. While holding § 4-302(d)(2)(ii) unconstitutional as applied to one charged
with drunk driving, the court in dicta stated that it would not reach a similar conclusion
in the case of one charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of alco-
hol; for the latter offense carries a maximum sentence of only two months imprison-
ment. Id. at 368-69, 504 A.2d at 631-32.
100. 305 Md. 601, 505 A.2d 1331 (1986).
101. Id. at 609-10, 505 A.2d at 1335.
102. Id. at 613, 505 A.2d at 1337.
103. As the court observed, the publicity this case engendered "prompted the Chief
Judge of the District Court of Maryland to assign a judge from Baltimore City, 'outside
the sphere of influence of the Washington Post,' to preside at the trial of the cases." Id.
at 603 n.l, 505 A.2d at 1332 n.l (quoting the Chief Judge of the District Court of
Maryland).
104. Id. at 603, 505 A.2d at 1332. The defendants also faced charges of tampering
with a motor vehicle and hindering a police officer. Id.
105. Id.
106. 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984).
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entered a nolle prosequi to each of the charges except disorderly
conduct, a petty offense for which a defendant may not demand a
jury trial. 10 7
Applying the test of Kawamura and Fisher,t' the Court of Ap-
peals held that, under the Maryland Constitution, the right to a jury
trial attaches in the first instance to the offenses of resisting arrest
and assault and battery. 10 9 Both offenses, the court reasoned, are
"serious" crimes subject to "infamous punishment."" 0 Thus, if the
State had attempted to use section 4-302(d)(2)(ii) to prosecute these
charges in the district court, the statute would have been "unconsti-
tutional as applied."t1it
Because the State entered nolle prosequis to these charges,
however, it was necessary for the court to decide whether the district
court properly retained jurisdiction over the charges of disorderly
conduct.i 12 The court observed first that under former section 4-
302(e),"t 3 "once the circuit court obtains jurisdiction of a charge, it
has exclusive original jurisdiction over all the offenses 'arising from
the same circumstances,' even though those other offenses were
'otherwise within the District Court's exclusive jurisdiction.'"114
But when the Huebners asserted their right to ajury trial, the Mary-
land Constitution divested the district court of jurisdiction under
former section 4-302(d)(2)(ii) i 5 to entertain the prosecutions for
resisting arrest and assault and battery; therefore, under former sec-
tion 4-302(d)(1), t'6 the Huebners immediately became entitled to a
jury trial in circuit court.ii7 Consequently, when the Huebners as-
serted their right to a jury trial, section 4-302(e) vested the circuit
court with jurisdiction over all of the charges against them, includ-
ing disorderly conduct. Citing Thompson v. State,' 8 the court con-
cluded that once the circuit court obtained jurisdiction, the entrance
107. 305 Md. at 606, 505 A.2d at 1333-34.
108. 305 Md. 357, 504 A.2d 626 (1986); see supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
109. 305 Md. at 609, 505 A.2d at 1335.
110. Id. at 608-09, 505 A.2d at 1335.
111. Id. at 609-10, 505 A.2d at 1335.
112. Id. at 610, 505 A.2d at 1335-36.
113. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-302(e) (1984). Section 4-302(f) has super-
seded the former § 4-302(e).
114. 305 Md. at 610, 505 A.2d at 1336 (quoting MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 4-302(e) (1984)); see Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 47, 359 A.2d 203, 206-07 (1976).
115. Section 4-302(d)(2)(ii) has been recodified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 4-302(e)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1986).
116. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-302(d)(1) (1984). Section 4-302(e)(1) has
superseded the former § 4-302(d)(1).
117. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-302(d)(1) (1984).
118. 278 Md. 41, 359 A.2d 203 (1976).
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of the nol prosses could not thereafter deprive the circuit court of
jurisdiction." 9 Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the en-
try of the nolle prosequi was a nullity."' 2 °
7. Right to Confrontation.-In Thomas v. State12 1 the Court of
Special Appeals held that a witness' invocation of the fifth amend-
ment in response to questions that go merely to the witness' credi-
bility does not impair a defendant's right to confrontation. 122 The
defendant claimed that the trial judge erred by denying his motion
to strike the testimony of a Mr. Dexter Marshall, who had invoked
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 123  The
court concluded that Marshall only invoked his fifth amendment
rights in response to questions concerning collateral matters,
namely, his involvement in the drug operation run by the victim.'
2 4
The questions were designed to explore Marshall's general credibil-
ity, not to establish his untruthfulness in testifying to specific events
of the crime.' 25 Therefore, Marshall's invocation of the privilege did
not deprive the defendant of the right to confront Marshall through
cross-examination. '
2 6
8. Identification Evidence.-In Evans v. State 127 the Court of Ap-
peals held that exhibiting a single photograph of the defendant to a
grand jury witness did not taint that witness' in-court identification
of the defendant. 128 In so holding, the court affirmed the conviction
and death sentence of the defendant, Vernon Lee Evans, for first-
degree murder and related offenses. 129
At trial a Mr. Harper testified concerning Evans' acquisition of
the weapon allegedly used in the murder.' 0 After his testimony,
119. 305 Md. at 610, 505 A.2d at 1336.
120. Id.
121. 63 Md. App. 337, 492 A.2d 939 (1985).
122. Id. at 346, 492 A.2d at 944.
123. Id. at 342-43, 492 A.2d at 942. When witnesses invoke their fifth amendment
rights, "[i]t is for the court to say whether.., silence is justified." Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951). In Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265, 401 A.2d
1021, 1023 (1979), the Court of Appeals set forth the procedures to be used to make
this determination.
124. 63 Md. App. at 346, 492 A.2d at 944.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 345-46, 492 A.2d at 943-44 (citing United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606,
611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963)).
127. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), reconsid denied sub nom. Foster, Evans and
Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986).
128. Id. at 499-502, 499 A.2d at 1267-68.
129. Id. at 494, 499 A.2d at 1264.
130. Id. at 496, 499 A.2d at 1265-66.
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the defense discovered that during his grand jury testimony, Harper
had identified Evans from a single photograph. The trial judge de-
nied the defendant's motions for a mistrial and to suppress Harper's
in-court identification. 13'
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that
because of the suggestive and unreliable pretrial identification pro-
cedure, due process required suppression of Harper's in-court iden-
tification.'3 2  The court considered the pertinent factors13 3 and
concluded that the pretrial identification was reliable and "unlikely
to produce an irreparable misidentification."'13 4 The court also re-
jected the defendant's contention that he was entitled to a mis-
trial. 3 5  The court held that any sanction for violation of the
discovery rules is left to the discretion of the trial judge, and, in this
case, the violation did not result in prejudice to the defendant.13 6
In Branch v. State"' the Court of Appeals held that a robbery
victim's identification of the defendant sufficed to establish that the
defendant was the robber, despite substantial variation between the
victim's initial description and the defendant's actual appearance.'3 8
Branch involved a robbery at gunpoint. Shortly after the inci-
dent, the victim described one of her assailants as being approxi-
mately five feet seven inches tall, fifteen to sixteen years old, and
110 to 125 pounds in weight.'3 9 She could not identify her assailant
from two books of photographs, but did identify Branch from one of
three pictures shown to her by police. 4 ' At the time in question,
131. Id. at 498, 499 A.2d at 1266.
132. Id. at 499, 499 A.2d at 1267. In Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 474 A.2d 1305
(1984), the court reviewed the criteria for determining such a due process claim. First,
the court must determine whether the identification procedure was suggestive. Second,
for suppression of the identification, the defendant must show that it was unreliable
under the circumstances. Id. at 599, 474 A.2d at 1314.
133. These factors "include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description
of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time
between the crime and the confrontation." Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114
(1977).
134. 304 Md. at 500, 499 A.2d at 1267.
135. Id. at 502, 499 A.2d at 1268. The defendant moved for mistrial pursuant to MD.
R. 4-263. 304 Md. at 500, 499 A.2d at 1267.
136. 304 Md. at 500-01, 499 A.2d at 1268. Because the trial court conducted a full
hearing on the motion, the in-court identification did not prejudice the defendant. Fur-
thermore, after the hearing, the trial judge allowed the defendant to recall Harper for
full cross-examination. Id.
137. 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986).
138. Id.




Branch was nineteen years old, six feet three inches tall and weighed
185 pounds.' 4 ' He was also missing two front teeth, a feature the
victim failed to note.' 42 Despite the discrepancy between the vic-
tim's initial description and Branch's actual physical appearance, the
victim's confused testimony, and Branch's alibi,' 43 the jury con-
victed Branch of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a hand-
gun in a crime of violence.' 44
In affirming Branch's conviction, the Court of Appeals stated
that under Maryland law the testimony of a single eyewitness, if be-
lieved, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 45 Asserting that the dis-
crepancy in the description went to the weight rather than the
sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that the victim's photo-
graphic identification of Branch shortly after the incident could en-
able a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that Branch committed the crime. 14 6
9. Search and Seizure.-In Bates v. State "47 the Court of Special
Appeals held that a paying passenger has standing to object to the
unconstitutional search of a taxicab. 148 The court refused to en-
dorse a "bright line formula" that would limit standing solely to ve-
hicle owners or drivers.149 It thus distinguished the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois,'5 ° choosing to rely
instead on that Court's decision in Katz v. United States.' 15
The Rakas defendants, guests in a private automobile, had
failed to offer any proof concerning their expectation of privacy. 152
141. Id. at 179, 502 A.2d at 496.
142. Id., 502 A.2d at 496-97.
143. Id. at 179-81, 502 A.2d at 497-98.
144. Id. at 177, 502 A.2d at 496.
145. See id. at 183-84, 502 A.2d at 499 and authorities cited therein.
146. 305 Md. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499. Judge Eldridge, in dissent, termed the majority
opinion a shortsighted extension of the single eyewitness rule. He stated that in holding
that such a substantial discrepancy affects only the weight and not the sufficiency of the
evidence, the majority failed to recognize that certain forms of eyewitness testimony are
inherently unreliable. In a case such as Branch, in which several factors weigh against the
single eyewitness' identification testimony, the dissent would have held that testimony
insufficient to convict. Id. at 190, 502 A.2d at 502 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
147.. 64 Md. App. 279, 494 A.2d 976 (1985).
148. Id. at 281, 494 A.2d at 977.
149. Id. at 283, 494 A.2d at 978.
150. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
151. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
152. 439 U.S. at 148. Note also that in Rakas the search involved the glove compart-
ment and the area under the car seat. As the Court observed, "Like the trunk of an
automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not nor-
mally have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 148-49.
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Bates, however, was not merely a passenger. Rather, by hiring the
cab, he and his fellow passenger had acquired a significant measure
of control over the vehicle.'15 Thus, the Bates court found this situa-
tion more closely analogous to that of Katz. 154
In Katz the government had attached a listening device to the
outside of a public phone booth in order to intercept private con-
versations.' 55 By depositing his money into the phone, the defend-
ant had acquired a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the phone
booth.' 5 6 Therefore, it was irrelevant that the phone company re-
mained the booth's true owner and that the defendant was arguably
only a guest: without a warrant, the government could not eaves-
drop on the defendant's conversation. In Bates the cab's ownership
and the defendant's status were similarly irrelevant."' By hiring the
cab, the defendant had acquired a reasonable expectation of privacy
therein.' 58 Thus, without a warrant, the police could not constitu-
tionally search the cab.
In Cable v. State 159 the Court of Special Appeals expanded the
implied scope of a search warrant to include items in the construc-
tive as well as the actual possession of the person named in the war-
rant.'60 The police had obtained a search warrant against the
defendant, based on information that he would arrive at Baltimore-
Washington International Airport transporting illegal drugs.' 6'
The warrant authorized the search of the defendant "and any lug-
gage, suitcase, briefcase or any items carried or possessed by
him."' 62 After his arrival at the airport, the police observed the de-
fendant carrying a briefcase, followed him to a hotel, and arrested
153. 64 Md. App. at 285, 494 A.2d at 979. The court looked to the rights that a taxi
passenger would acquire upon payment of the fare. These included the rights to name a
destination, to choose a route, to exclude other passengers, and to object to the solicita-
tion of other fares during the journey.
The court dismissed as irrelevant the State's contention that the taxi driver still
retained a "significant measure of residual control." Id. at 286, 494 A.2d at 979. At
issue were the rights of the passenger vis d vis the police, not the driver. Id. at 286, 494
A.2d at 979.
154. Id. at 287, 494 A.2d at 980.
155. 389 U.S. at 348.
156. Id. at 352.
157. 64 Md. App. at 284, 494 A.2d at 979.
158. Id. at 287, 494 A.2d at 980.
159. 65 Md. App. 493, 501 A.2d 108 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 621, 505 A.2d 1342,
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986).
160. Id. at 498, 505 A.2d at 111.




him. 163 At the time of his arrest, the defendant was not carrying his
briefcase.' 64 While searching the defendant at the police station,
however, the police found a claim ticket.' 65 Using the ticket, police
officers claimed the briefcase from the hotel security room, searched
it, and discovered that it contained a large quantity of illegal
drugs. 166
The defendant contended that because he had not "carried or
possessed" the briefcase at the time of his arrest, the police had ex-
ceeded the scope of the warrant. 167 The court disagreed. Drawing
an analogy to the possession of contraband, the court observed that
under Maryland law either actual or constructive possession would
sustain a conviction. 16  Thus, the court reasoned, search warrants
should extend to items in the defendant's constructive posses-
sion.' 69 By virtue of the claim ticket, the defendant had a possessory
interest in the briefcase at the time of his arrest; therefore, the
search warrant extended to the briefcase even though it was not in
the defendant's actual possession.17 0
In Payne v. State1 7 ' the Court of Special Appeals clarified the
justification necessary for a Terry "stop" and "frisk." 1 72 A police of-
ficer can effect neither a stop nor a frisk without a reasonable suspi-
163. Id. at 494-95, 505 A.2d at 109.




168. Id., 501 A.2d at 109-10; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 277(s) (1982).
169. 65 Md. App. at 495, 501 A.2d at 110.
170. Id. The court was careful to note that the warrant mentioned the briefcase. The
police do not have free rein to manufacture theories of constructive possession; they
cannot, for example, search the room of a defendant who was arrested carrying a hotel
key. Id. at 495-96, 501 A.2d at 110.
Since the police officers had acted in good faith upon a warrant signed by a judge,
the court would also have admitted the product of the search under the rationale of
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 65 Md. App. at 497, 501 A.2d at 110-11.
On this point, the court's reasoning is tenuous. The Leon case held that a court should
not exclude evidence obtained "by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsup-
ported by probable cause." 468 U.S. at 900. Cable, however, did not involve an underly-
ing determination of probable cause; rather, it involved the interpretation of a warrant's
language and scope.
171. 65 Md. App. 566, 501 A.2d 484 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 621, 505 A.2d 1342
(1986).
172. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry the Supreme Court attempted to rec-
oncile a concern for police flexibility and safety with the constitutional imperative of
protecting citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court thus permitted
police briefly to detain suspects and to conduct a limited search for weapons on grounds
less than the traditional fourth amendment requirement of probable cause. Id. at 21.
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cion flowing from "specific and articulable facts."' 1 7 ' The court
emphasized, however, that a stop and a frisk are independent proce-
dures; therefore, independent considerations govern their valid-
ity. 174 A stop is a brief detention for investigatory purposes; a frisk,
on the other hand, is a carefully limited search "designed exclu-
sively to detect the presence of offensive weapons."'175 A lawful de-
tention, therefore, does not necessarily authorize a lawful search.
In Payne, for example, the police officer was authorized to make
a stop, since the defendant's car was double-parked.' 76 The defend-
ant's attempt to conceal a bag, however, even when combined with
his passenger's nervous behavior, did not authorize the officer's
subsequent search of the bag.' 77 The officer had no basis for con-
cluding that the bag contained a weapon, as opposed to narcotics or
other contraband.' 78 Absent a suggestion of danger, therefore, the
frisk was not justified.' 79
10. Death Penalty.---a. Allocution.-In Harris v. State (Harris
IV) 18 1 the Court of Appeals held that the Maryland death penalty
statute' 8' does not permit a sentencing court to condition a defend-
ant's right to allocution' 82 on the forfeiture of the right to have
counsel present a closing argument. 83 The sentencing court had
focused on Maryland's death penalty statute, which provides that
"the defendant or his counsel may present argument ... against the
sentence of death."'8 4 Reasoning that allocution is a form of argu-
ment, the sentencing court had obliged Harris to choose between
173. Id. at 21.
174. 65 Md. App. at 569-70, 501 A.2d at 486.
175. Id. at 570, 501 A.2d at 487.
176. Id., 501 A.2d at 486.
177. Id. at 574, 501 A.2d at 488.
178. Id. The bag did in fact contain a handgun. Id. at 569, 501 A.2d at 486.
179. Note that in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court had
extended the scope of a frisk in an automobile stop to include the entire passenger
compartment. Id. at 1035. The Court of Special Appeals, however, insisted that the
threshold criteria for such a frisk remained a reasonable belief in the suspect's danger-
ousness. 65 Md. App. at 572-74, 501 A.2d at 488.
180. 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986).
181. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1982).
182. Section 413(c)(2) of article 27 enables a defendant to make an "unsworn state-
ment in mitigation of the death penalty"; the statement is not subject to cross-examina-
tion and, unlike closing argument, is "not limited to the record in the case, inferences
from material in the record, and matters of common human experience." 306 Md. at
351-52, 509 A.2d at 123.
183. Id., 509 A.2d at 123-24.
184. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(2) (1982)
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addressing the jury personally or through his attorney.18 - The
Court of Appeals disapproved of this procedure. "[A]llocution,"
the court asserted, "is neither synonymous with nor encompassed
by the term 'argument.' "186
The new Maryland Rules clearly guarantee capital defendants
the right prior to sentencing to "present evidence in mitigation of
punishment."'' 8 7 The new rules, however, were not yet in effect at
the time of Harris' sentencing.' 8 8 Thus, in Harris' case, the com-
mon law, rather than a statute or rule, would govern the right of
allocution."t 9 The court concluded that, under the common law, a
"defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an
acceptable proffer, must be provided a fair opportunity to exercise
that right."190
b. "Death Qualified"Juries.-Anticipating the Supreme Court's
decision in Lockhart v. McCree, t 9 ' the Court of Appeals in Foster v.
State'9 2 held that exclusion of jurors so opposed to the death pen-
alty as to affect their impartiality does not deny a criminal defendant
a fair trial.' 93 A jury convicted Foster of felony murder; the same
jury sentenced her to death.' 94 Foster had filed a pretrial motion
requesting separate juries for each phase of the trial; statistics, she
asserted, prove that "death qualified" juries, which exclude persons
so opposed to the death penalty as to affect their impartiality, are
conviction prone.' 95 Exclusion of such persons from the jury dur-
185. 306 Md. at 350-51, 509 A.2d at 123.
186. Id. at 352, 509 A.2d at 123-24.
187. Id., 509 A.2d at 124. MD. R. 4-343(d) provides that in capital cases, "Before
sentence is determined, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally
and through counsel, to make a statement."
188. The rule became effective on July 1, 1984. Between January 1, 1962 and January
1, 1979, former rules 761 and 762 governed the right to allocution in capital cases. 306
Md. at 352, 509 A.2d at 124.
189. 306 Md. at 353, 509 A.2d at 124.
190. Id. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127; see Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914)
(allocution is strongly endorsed in capital cases).
191. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
192. 304 Md. 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985), reconsid. denied sub nom. Foster, Evans and
Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326 (1986).
193. Id. at 466, 499 A.2d at 1249-50.
194. Id. at 442, 499 A.2d at 1237.
195. Id. at 447-48, 499 A.2d at 1240. Ajury is "death qualified" by a process of deter-
mining during voir dire whether any of the prospective jurors are unalterably opposed
to capital punishment or would never vote to impose it regardless of the evidence. To
obtain the death qualified jury, such jurors are excused for cause. Ifjurors are generally
opposed to the death penalty, but could subordinate personal views and apply the law of
the jurisdiction, they are qualified; similarly, jurors not opposed to the death penalty are
qualified. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ing the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, according to Foster,
would deny her a fair trial. 196
The trial judge denied the motion. 197 Later, the State success-
fully challenged for cause a prospective juror because he was op-
posed to the death penalty, and because he stated that his
opposition would affect his impartiality. 98 Foster objected to the
excusal of the potential juror. 199 On appeal Foster asserted that the
denial of her motion for bifurcated jury and the excusal of the one
juror were error.
The court first dealt with the defendant's argument for a bifur-
cated jury, stating that, in this case, the relevant section of the Mary-
land death penalty statute 20 0 required that a single jury both convict
and sentence the defendant.20 ' The court then addressed Foster's
challenge to the exclusion of the prospective juror, finding that in
light of the juror's statements during voir dire, the trial judge cor-
rectly applied Maryland law governing challenges to prospective
jurors.
02
The court rejected Foster's argument that juries from which
persons opposed to the death penalty have been excluded are more
prosecution-prone and, therefore, are not properly representative
of the community.203 The court reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois20 4 and subsequent
cases in which the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts ad-
dressed the issue of the impartiality of death qualifiedjuries. 20 5 The
Supreme Court and most of the lower courts had found that the use
of death qualified juries did not violate the defendant's right to a fair
trial.20 6 The court also termed it unrealistic to assume that prospec-
196. 304 Md. at 447-48, 499 A.2d at 1240.
197. Id. at 449, 499 A.2d at 1241.
198. Id. at 449-50, 499 A.2d at 1241.
199. Id. at 450, 499 A.2d at 1241.
200. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
201. 304 Md. at 453, 499 A.2d at 1243.
202. Id. at 454, 499 A.2d at 1243. The court explained that a challenge for cause was
warranted if the prospective juror either was "'unable to apply the law' " or " '[held] a
particular belief ... that would affect his ability or disposition to consider the evidence
fairly or impartially.'" Id. (quoting King v. State, 287 Md. 530, 535, 414 A.2d 909, 912
(1980)).
203. 304 Md. at 456-57, 499 A.2d at 1244-45.
204. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon the Court held that the exclusion ofjurors
opposed to capital punishment does not automatically result in an unrepresentative jury
on the issue of guilt. Id. at 516-18.
205. See 304 Md. at 457-66, 499 A.2d at 1245-50 and authorities cited therein.
206. Id. at 458-64, 499 A.2d at 1246-48. Foster challenged the use of the death quali-
fied jury, stating that over two dozen studies showed that death qualified juries are more
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tive jurors in capital cases, whose opposition to the death penalty
would prevent their imposing it or would prevent them from ever
rendering a guilty verdict, would suddenly become unbiased on the
question of guilt or innocence if they knew that a different jury, or a
jury from which they were excluded, would determine the sentence
instead.20 7  For these reasons, the court rejected Foster's
arguments.
c. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors.-Maryland's death penalty
statute208 permits the imposition of capital punishment only for
murder in the first degree; in such cases, life imprisonment is the
alternative sentence. 20 9 Before a defendant may be sentenced to
death, the statute requires that the sentencing authority-the judge
or jury-find at least one aggravating circumstance. 2t0 Against this
aggravating circumstance it must weigh any mitigating circum-
stances.2 1 ' If the sentencing authority finds that the mitigating cir-
cumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the
defendant may receive the sentence of death.212
The judge or jury may consider it a mitigating factor that "It]he
act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's
death.1 213  In Evans v. State214 the Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the acts of a hired killer were not the "sole proxi-
mate cause" of the victim's death.2 15 Correctly, therefore, the de-
fendant's participation in a contract to kill cannot serve to mitigate
the sentence he or she would otherwise receive.
favorable to the prosecution than juries that do not exclude persons opposed to the
death penalty. The court, however, minimized the importance of the studies; instead, it
cited to post-Witherspoon decisions that also held that exclusion of such persons from
juries in capital cases did not result in an unrepresentative or biased jury. The court
flatly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 229
(8th Cir. 1985), which the Supreme Court has since reversed. See 304 Md. at 458-64,
499 A.2d at 1246-48; Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
207. 304 Md. at 466, 499 A.2d at 1249-50. The court also held that by accepting the
jury, the defense abandoned earlier objections to the composition of the jury made in
the pretrial motion and during voir dire. Id. at 452-53, 499 A.2d at 1242-43.
208. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414 (1982).
209. Id. at § 412(b).
210. Id. at § 413(d), (f).
211. Id. at § 413(g)-(h).
212. Id. at § 413(h)(2).
213. Id. at § 4 13(g)(6).
214. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), reconsid denied sub nom. Foster, Evans and
Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986).
215. 304 Md. at 531-34, 499 A.2d at 1284-86. Evans had contracted with Anthony
Grandison to kill two witnesses scheduled to testify against Grandison in a federal nar-
cotics trial. Id. at 494, 499 A.2d at 1265.
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The Court of Appeals analyzed the history of the term "proxi-
mate cause," noting that at common law and by statute, "the act of
hiring another to commit murder is a proximate cause of that mur-
der."'216 The court determined, however, that in the death penalty
statute the General Assembly had not used the term "proximate
cause" in this "ordinary" sense.21 7 But, as the court pointed out,
"under the ordinary meaning of the word 'mitigating,' there is noth-
ing mitigating about a murder because it was done pursuant to a
contract. ' 2 ' 8 Thus, the court reasoned, in the death penalty statute
the term "proximate cause" referred "only to direct physical causes
of the victim's death"; it does not refer "to acts of a principal in the
second degree or an accessory before the fact which aided or abet-
ted the act directly causing death."
219
In Foster, Evans, and Huffington v. State220 the Court of Appeals
held that the prosecution bears the burden of proof as to whether
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. 22 '
The court thus rejected the contentions of three capital defendants
who, on motions for reconsideration,22 2 argued that article 27, sec-
tion 413(h)223 violated due process by placing the burden of persua-
216. Id. at 533, 499 A.2d at 1285.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 534, 499 A.2d at 1285.
219. Id. Similarly, in Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985), reconsid.
denied sub nom. Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3315 (1986), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's acts can be
the proximate cause of the victim's death even if a codefendant has been convicted of
felony murder in connection with the death of the same victim. 304 Md. at 574, 500
A.2d at 279. The court reiterated that the term "proximate cause" refers only to the
direct physical cause of the victim's death, not to the acts of principals in the second
degree. Id.
As an additional mitigating factor, Huffington had urged that, by accompanying
known drug dealers to a rural rendezvous, "the victim ... consented to the act which
caused his death." Id. at 581, 500 A.2d at 283; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 413(g)(2)
(Supp. 1986) (making it a mitigating circumstance that the victim consented to the act
that caused his or her death). The court dismissed this conduct as unrelated to the true
cause of the victim's death-gunshot wounds inflicted by Huffington. 304 Md. at 588,
500 A.2d at 284.
220. 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3315 (1986).
221. Id. at 311-14, 503 A.2d at 1329-30.
222. In three prior cases, the Court of Appeals had upheld the imposition of death
sentences upon each defendant: Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985);
Evans v. State, 304 Md. 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985); and Foster v. State, 304 Md. 487,
499 A.2d 1261 (1985). Because each motion for reconsideration presented the same
principal argument, the court chose to rule upon all three in a single opinion.
223. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h) (1982) reads as follows:
(h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances-.
(1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circum-
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sion upon the defendant.2 24
After examining its prior decisions interpreting section 413(h),
the court concluded that it had never placed the burden of persua-
sion upon the defendant.225 In fact, on a number of occasions the
court had held to the contrary. 226 The defendants' assertions,
therefore, were "flatly erroneous. 2
27
In Bowers v. State221 the Court of Appeals held that a trial court
need not make requested additions to Maryland's statutory list of
mitigating factors.229 Maryland provides an option on capital crime
verdict sheets for juries to consider any other mitigating circum-
stances. 23 0 The Bowers court found this option sufficient to meet the
Supreme Court's requirements under Lockett v. Ohio 23 1 that no rele-
vant mitigating factors be precluded from consideration in capital
sentencing procedures.23 2
stances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death.
(3) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life.
224. 305 Md. at 309, 503 A.2d at 1327.
225. Id. at 311, 503 A.2d at 1329.
226. For example, in Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) (Tichnell1),
the first case decided under Maryland's current death penalty statute, the Court of Ap-
peals stated that "[b]ecause the State is attempting to establish that the imposition of the
death penalty is an appropriate sentence, the statute places the risk of nonpersuasion on
the prosecution with respect to whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors." 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848-49. In two subsequent cases, the court reaf-
firmed the holding of Tichnell I. See Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 479, 499 A.2d 1236,
1257 (1985); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 415 n.16, 478 A.2d 1143, 1157 n.16 (1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
227. 305 Md. at 311, 503 A.2d at 1329.
228. 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 292 (1986).
229. Id. at 150, 507 A.2d at 1087. In a capital case, the verdict sheet lists aggravating
and mitigating factors that the sentencing jury may find and weigh to assist their deter-
mination of either a life or death sentence. See MD. R. 4-343(e).
230. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 13(g)(8) (1982).
231. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
232. 306 Md. at 150, 507 A.2d at 1087. In Lockett the Supreme Court found Ohio's
death penalty law unconstitutional because it limited a sentencing jury to considering
only three mitigating factors. 438 U.S. at 608. The Court held that in a capital case no
relevant mitigating factors may be precluded. Id. at 604. In Maryland, the legislature
had determined seven factors that must be considered mitigating if found by a prepon-
derance of the evidence in a capital case. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (1982). In
response to Lockett, an eighth point was appended to the Maryland statute, allowing the
sentencing authority to consider any other factors it finds mitigating. 306 Md. at 150,
507 A.2d at 1087; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(8) (1982).
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11. Speedy Trial.-In Ferrell v. State 2S3 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that a thirteen-month trial delay2 4 had violated the de-
fendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. 235 The court noted
that because a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
stand trial within a specified period of time, all determinations as to
possible violations of that right must occur on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 23 6 The Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo, 23 7 provided a four-
prong balancing test to determine whether the State has denied a
defendant's right to a speedy trial. The four factors are: (1) the
length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's
assertion of the right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant result-
ing from the delay. 38
The court found that the length of the delay, a total of eighteen
months and twenty-six days between the initiation of prosecution
and the date of trial, was of "constitutional dimension. '239 As for
the reason for this delay, five months of pretrial preparation and a
one-month trial postponement were chargeable to neither party;2 4
0
however, the court did charge the remaining thirteen months of de-
lay solely to the State.24' In addition, the court weighed the defend-
ant's timely motion for a speedy trial as favorable to his claim. 42
Finally, the court considered the defendant's six weeks of pretrial
incarceration to be presumptively prejudicial.243 Balancing these
233. 67 Md. App. 459, 508 A.2d 490 (1986).
234. The defendant was arrested on October 12, 1983, for breaking and entering a
storeroom. Trial was scheduled for March 6, 1984, but was postponed for plea bargain-
ing purposes. The case was scheduled for trial four other times, but was postponed each
time. The trial finally began on May 8, 1985. Id. at 461-62, 508 A.2d at 491.
235. Id. at 465, 508 A.2d at 493. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution as well as by article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.
236. Id. at 462, 508 A.2d at 491.
237. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
238. Id. at 530. The length of the delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism";
before the court can inquire into the other factors, there must be some delay that is
"presumptively prejudicial." Id.
239. 67 Md. App. at 463, 508 A.2d at 492. The Court of Appeals had previously held
that a delay of one year and 15 days was "presumptively prejudicial." Epps v. State, 276
Md. 96, 111, 345 A.2d 62, 72 (1975).
240. 67 Md. App. at 463-64, 508 A.2d at 492.
241. Id. Nine months of that delay were due to prosecutorial indifference. The court
based this finding on the State's lack of an excuse for the delay. Id.
242. Id. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on December 19, 1983, for failure to
grant a speedy trial. The trial court denied this motion during a pretrial hearing. Id. at
462, 508 A.2d at 491.
243. Id. at 464-65, 508 A.2d at 492-93. The court accorded the defendant's six-week
period of incarceration "some," but "not great weight in the balancing process." Id. In
Barker, the Supreme Court stated that "[p]rejudice... should be assessed in the light of
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factors, the court concluded that the defendant's right to a speedy
trial had been violated.244
B. Crimes
1. Elements.-a. Criminal Attempt.-In Young v. State245 the Court
of Appeals adopted the Model Penal Code's "substantial step" test for
determining whether a defendant is guilty of criminal attempt. 246
The court thus alleviated the confusion concerning whether the of-
fense of criminal attempt requires that the defendant commit an
"overt act." To demonstrate that a defendant has taken a "substan-
tial step" toward the commission of a crime, it must be clear from
the defendant's conduct that he or she performed an overt act be-
yond mere preparation.247
Thus, for example, the court affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion for attempted armed robbery: he had, inter alia, reconnoitered
or "cased" several banks, endeavoured to conceal his presence, dis-
guised himself, and carried on his belt a scanner with a police band
frequency. 248 But even assuming that these acts constituted mere
preparation, by attempting to enter a bank after hours, the defend-
ant had committed the requisite overt act and had thus taken a sub-
stantial step towards the commission of a crime.2 4 9
b. Assault.-The crime of common-law assault encompasses
two categories: (1) the act of attempted battery, or criminal assault;
and (2) the act of placing another in reasonable fear of an imminent
the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect." 407
U.S. at 532. The Court then identified three such interests: "(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration, (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (iii) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Id.
244. 67 Md. App. at 465, 508 A.2d at 493.
245. 303 Md. 298, 493 A.2d 352 (1985).
246. Id. at 311, 493 A.2d at 358; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). Eight federal circuits and 23 states have also adopted the substantial step
test. 303 Md. at 315-17, 493 A.2d at 361. The court, however, found it most persuasive
that the commission charged with the revision of the State's criminal code had endorsed
a version of the Model Penal Code's approach. Id. at 311, 493 A.2d at 358-59; STATE OF
MARYLAND COMM'N ON CRIMINAL LAW, MD. PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE ANN. § 111.00
(1972). In fact, the court adopted the Commission's version. 303 Md. at 311, 493 A.2d
at 358-59. Under the Proposed Code: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which constitutes a
substantial step toward the commission of that crime whether or not his intention be
accomplished ...." MD. PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE ANN. § 110.00 (1972).
247. 303 Md. at 314, 493 A.2d at 360.
248. Id. at 313-14, 493 A.2d at 359-60.
249. Id. at 314, 493 A.2d at 360.
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battery, or tortious assault.25 ° In Harrod v. State25' the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that the victim's awareness of the defendant's ac-
tions is not an absolute prerequisite for criminal assault.252
Reasoning by analogy, the court observed that every battery,
including an attempted battery, contains or is preceded by an as-
sault.253 A battery victim, however, may be totally unaware of the
battery; for example, the victim might have been struck while
asleep.254 Similarly, then, the victim of an attempted battery need
not have been aware of the defendant's acts.255 On the other hand,
"tortious" assault requires that the defendant place the victim in
reasonable fear of imminent harm; therefore, this category of as-
sault clearly requires that the victim be aware of the defendant's
acts.256
c. Gambling.-In State v. One Hundred and Fifty-Eight Gaming De-
vices2 57 the Court of Appeals held that a "true amusement device"-
a device that awards only free plays-is not an illegal slot machine
unless the device itself is adapted for gambling.258 Specifically, the
court rejected the State's contention that all free plays are "object[s]
representative of and convertible into money," within the meaning
of article 27, section 264B, the statute that outlaws slot machines. 259
The State had termed a free play the "functional equivalent" of
250. Harrod v. State, 65 Md. App. 128, 131, 499 A.2d 959, 960 (1985).
251. 65 Md. App. 128, 499 A.2d 959 (1985).
252. Id. at 135, 499 A.2d at 962.
253. Id. at 133, 499 A.2d at 961.
254. Id. at 134, 499 A.2d at 962.
255. Id. at 135, 499 A.2d at 962.
256. Id. at 138, 499 A.2d at 964.
257. 304 Md. 404, 499 A.2d 940 (1985).
258. Id. at 432, 499 A.2d at 954.
259. Id. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 264B (1982) provides in relevant part:
Any machine, apparatus or device is a slot machine within the provisions of this
section if it is one that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of the
insertion or deposit therein, or placing with another person of any piece of
money, coin, token or other object, such machine, apparatus or device is caused
to operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of change or of
other outcome of such operation unpredictable by him, the user may receive or
become entitled to receive any piece of money, coin, token or other object rep-
resentative of and convertible into money, irrespective of whether the said
machine, apparatus or device may, apart from any element of change or unpre-
dictable outcome of such operation, also sell, deliver or present some merchan-
dise or money or other tangible thing of value.
I. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to locate, pos-
sess, keep, maintain or operate any slot machine within this State, whether as
owner, lessor, lessee, licensor, licensee, or otherwise, except as provided in
paragraph II hereof.
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the coin or token otherwise necessary to activate the machine; there-
fore, the State maintained, a free play fell within the ambit of section
264B. 6 ° The court, however, distinguished free plays registered
upon a true amusement device from those registered upon a gam-
bling device. A gambling device contains features such as odds
mechanisms 26' and meters for recording the number of free plays
released.262 A true amusement device, on the other hand, contains
none of these features.263 The court accordingly found that a free
play is not an "object representative of and convertible into
money," within the meaning of section 264B, unless the free play is
registered upon a machine adapted as a gambling device. 26
d. Homicide.-In Ferrell v. State265 the Court of Appeals held
that the intent to kill expressed in a self-defense plea may not be
sufficient evidence to establish premeditation. 66 In Ferrell the jury
rejected the defendant's self-defense claim and convicted him of
first-degree murder.267 On appeal Ferrell questioned only the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to establish premeditation for his first-degree
murder conviction. 68 Upholding the conviction, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals concluded that Ferrell could not on the one hand state
that he had intended to kill, albeit in self-defense, but on the other
hand claim that his actions were not premeditated. 69
While conceding that the Court of Special Appeals reached the
proper result, the Court of Appeals found the lower court's reason-
ing erroneous.2 7 ° In some circumstances, one may unintentionally
kill another in self-defense. 271 Furthermore, the crime of premedi-
tated murder requires more than the simple intent to kill; 272 there-
fore, one might have intentionally killed another in self-defense, yet
260. 304 Md. at 432, 499 A.2d at 954.
261. Id., 499 A.2d at 955.
262. Id. at 432, 499 A.2d at 955.
263. Id., 499 A.2d at 954.
264. Id.
265. 304 Md. 679, 500 A.2d 1050 (1985).
266. Id. at 688, 500 A.2d at 1054.
267. Id. at 683, 500 A.2d at 1051.
268. Id. at 681, 500 A.2d at 1051.
269. Id. at 687, 500 A.2d at 1054.
270. Id. at 685, 500 A.2d at 1053.
271. Id. at 686, 500 A.2d at 1054 (citing Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 P. 627
(1903)).
272. Id. at 688, 500 A.2d at 1055. In addition to the simple intent to kill, the crime of
premeditated murder requires willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 407 (1982). For a discussion of Maryland's view of these terms, see
Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 106, 95 A.2d 577, 585-86 (1953).
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not have formed the requisite intent for premeditated murder.
Thus, courts must proceed on a case-by-case basis in determining
whether a failed self-defense plea should yield a conviction for pre-
meditated murder.273
In Stewart v. State274 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
conviction for homicide is warranted if the defendant's act is the
proximate cause of the victim's death, regardless of whether the de-
fendant inflicted any physical injury on the victim. 275 The defendant
along with three accomplices robbed a sixty year old motel desk
clerk. 276 The desk clerk died of heart failure approximately two
hours after the robbery.277 The defendant conceded that he partici-
pated in the robbery. 278 Finding that the victim's death resulted di-
rectly from the robbery, the jury convicted the defendant of felony
murder.2 7
9
At issue was whether the evidence presented at trial was suffi-
cient to prove a causal relationship between the robbery and the
victim's death.280 The defendant argued that an unarmed robbery
was insufficient to be the legal cause of the victim's death.28 ' The
court disagreed and stated that "if a direct causal link between the
accused's actions and the victim's death can be established, no more
is required. '28 2 The court found particularly significant the expert
testimony of two cardiologists, who concluded that the victim's
emotional stress from the robbery resulted in an adrenaline-induced
heart failure. 2 3 Thus, after examining the evidence, the court held
that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the fright or
shock of the robbery had caused this victim's heart failure.28 4
273. 304 Md. at 688, 500 A.2d at 1055.
274. 65 Md. App. 372, 500 A.2d 676 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 599, 505 A.2d 856
(1986).
275. Id. at 386, 500 A.2d at 683. A number of other jurisdictions have also reached
this result. See id. at 378-83, 500 A.2d at 679-82 and authorities cited therein.
276. 65 Md. App. at 374, 500 A.2d at 677.
277. Id. at 374-75, 500 A.2d at 677.
278. Id. at 375, 500 A.2d at 677.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 377, 500 A.2d at 678. The defendant did not use a gun during the robbery.
He merely handed the victim a bag with a note attached, which read: "Don't say a word.
Put all the money in this bag and no one will get hurt!" Id. at 374, 500 A.2d at 677.
282. Id. at 379, 500 A.2d at 679.
283. Id. at 386, 500 A.2d at 682-83.
284. Id., 500 A.2d at 683.
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e. Sexual Act.-In Partain v. State28 5 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that the sexual act cunnilingus, as defined in article 27,
section 461(e),286 does not require that the defendant's mouth or
tongue penetrate the victim's genitals. 8 7 Thus, even without pene-
tration, the defendant's act of licking the victim's genitals was suffi-
cient contact to support a sexual act conviction.288 This ruling is in
accord with Thomas v. State,289 in which the Court of Appeals had
held that the sexual act fellatio, which is also defined in section
461(e), does not require that the defendant's penis penetrate the
victim's mouth.290
f Theft.-In Craddock v. State291 the Court of Special Appeals
held that under Maryland's consolidated theft statute,292 jurors
could convict the defendant if they agreed that the defendant had
committed a theft, even if they could not agree as to the type of theft
involved. 29 ' The court explained that the General Assembly had
consolidated all theft offenses into one statute "to avoid the subtle
distinctions that existed and had to be alleged and proved to estab-
lish the separate crimes under the former law."'294 Furthermore,
"the gravamen of the offense of theft is the depriving of the owner
of his rightful possession of his property," regardless of what
method is employed to do so. 295 Thus, the jurors need not unani-
mously agree on how the theft was committed so long as they unani-
285. 63 Md. App. 260, 492 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 304 Md. 299, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985).
286. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(e) (1982) provides that:
(e) Sexual act.-"Sexual act" means cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or anal in-
tercourse, but does not provide for vaginal intercourse. Emission of semen is
not required. Penetration, however slight, is evidence of anal intercourse. Sex-
ual act also means the penetration, however slight, by any object into the geni-
tal or anal opening of another person's body if the penetration can be
reasonably construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratifica-
tion or for abuse of either party and if the penetration is not for accepted medi-
cal purposes.
287. 63 Md. App. at 266, 492 A.2d at 672. The court chose to rely on the ordinary
meaning of "cunnilingus," which is " 'a sexual activity involving oral contact with the
female genitals.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 445
(2d ed. 1977)).
288. Id. at 266-67, 492 A.2d at 672.
289. 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985).
290. Id. at 321, 483 A.2d at 20.
291. 64 Md. App. 269, 494 A.2d 971 (1985).
292. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 341-342 (1982).
293. 64 Md. App. at 278, 494 A.2d at 975.
294. Id. at 277, 494 A.2d at 975. The statute declares: "An accusation of theft may be
proved by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this
subheading." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 341 (1982).
295. 64 Md. App. at 278, 494 A.2d at 975.
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mously decide that the defendant committed a theft. 29 6
2. Defenses-Entrapment.-In Adcock v. State29 7 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that, as a matter of law, a defendant cannot estab-
lish a prima facie case of entrapment if he or she denies commission
of the crime.29 8 Citing other commentators, 29 9 the court announced
that to establish a prima facie case of entrapment, the defendant
must produce sufficient evidence showing two dependent acts: (1)
that the government improperly induced the defendant to commit
the crime, and (2) that the defendant actually succumbed to that in-
ducement.3 0 0 The court ruled that Adcock failed the second re-
quirement because during her testimony she had clearly denied
committing the crime."'
C. Procedure
1. Indictments.-In State v. Chaney 302 the Court of Appeals held
that a murder indictment could confer jurisdiction upon a circuit
court even though the indictment failed to list all the common-law
or statutory elements of the crime.303 The indictment omitted sev-
eral terms that, by statute, must appear in a murder indictment;30 4
nevertheless, the court held that the omitted terms were implicit in
the indictment's parenthetical reference to the statutes defining
first-degree murder.3 0 5 Therefore, the indictment reasonably in-
296. Id.
297. 66 Md. App. 454, 504 A.2d 1160 (1986).
298. Id. at 456, 504 A.2d at 1161.
299. E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 371 (1972); C. WHrrE-
BREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.01, at 564 (1980).
300. 66 Md. App. at 456, 504 A.2d at 1161.
301. Id. at 457-58, 504 A.2d at 1162. The defendant was accused of acting as an
intermediary between a seller and buyer of cocaine. The buyer was a police informant.
During testimony, the defendant swore unequivocally that she committed no crime and
had no idea that any crime was to take place. Nevertheless, the jury found the defendant
guilty of distribution of cocaine and the possession of cocaine with the intent to dis-
tribute. Id.
302. 304 Md. 21, 497 A.2d 152 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 824 (1986).
303. Id. at 27, 497 A.2d at 155.
304. Id. at 26, 497 A.2d at 154. The indictment charged that Chaney
"did wilfully and deliberately, with premeditation kill and slay Elizabeth Ann
Metzler, contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and
provided and against the peace, government, and dignity of the State (Com-
mon Law and Art. 27, Sec. 407-410)."
Id. at 23, 497 A.2d at 153 (quoting grand jury idictment).
Section 616 of article 27, however, requires that indictments for murder contain the
words "felonious," "malice aforethought," and "murder." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 616 (1982).
305. 304 Md. at 26, 497 A.2d at 154. The statutes cited in the indictment-sections
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formed the defendant of the charges against him. °6 The court ac-
knowledged that if the defendant had challenged the defects in a
pretrial motion, dismissal might have been appropriate; however,
because he had raised the issue only on postconviction, the court
found he had waived the challenge.30 7
2. Discovey.-In Bailey v. State3"" the Court of Appeals held
that a defendant's statements to an out-of-state police officer are
discoverable under former Maryland Rule 741 b 2.309 In Bailey
statements that the defendant made to a New Jersey state trooper
407 through 4 10 of article 27-classify certain forms of common-law murder as murder
in the first degree.
The court distinguished Brown v. State, 44 Md. App. 71, 410 A.2d 17 (1979), in
which the Court of Special Appeals had held insufficient an indictment that, the Court of
Appeals asserted, lacked even a parenthetical reference to "murder" or "malice afore-
thought." 304 Md. at 25-26, 497 A.2d at 154; 44 Md. App. at 79, 410 A.2d at 22. The
deficient indictment in Brown read as follows:
THE GRAND JURY, for the State of Maryland, sitting in Anne Arundel
County, upon their oaths and affirmations, charge that MICHAEL ALLEN
BROWN, Defendant, did unlawfully, willfully, deliberately and with premedita-
tion kill and slay George Wesley Jones on or about the twenty-second (22nd)
day ofJuly, 1978, in Anne Arundel County (Article 27, Section 407) MUR 1.
44 Md. App. at 73, 410 A.2d at 19.
While the Chaney court averred that the Brown indictment lacked any reference to
murder, the statute cited in that indictment defines murder in the first degree. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1982).
306. 304 Md. at 26, 497 A.2d at 155. Thus, the court found that the indictment did
not contravene article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which provides: "That
in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation
against him .... "
307. 304 Md. at 27, 497 A.2d at 155. Judge Cole dissented, noting that Chaney could
only know of the charges against him through the parenthetical reference to the statute.
Id. at 28, 497 A.2d at 155 (Cole, J., dissenting). Citing Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 166-
68, 433 A.2d 1150, 1158 (1981), Judge Cole asserted that the court may not consider
citations to statutes in determining the sufficiency of an indictment. 304 Md. at 28-29,
497 A.2d at 155-56.
308. 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985).
309. Id. at 652, 496 A.2d at 666. Former rule 741 was the applicable discovery rule
for criminal cases. It has since been recodified as MD. R. 4-263. The pertinent provi-
sions of former rule 741 are as follows:
a. Disclosure Without Request.-Without the necessity of a request by the defend-
ant, the State's Attorney shall furnish to the defendant:
2. Any relevant material or information regarding: (a) specific searches
and seizures, wire taps and eavesdropping, (b) the acquisition of statements
made by the defendant, and (c) pretrial identification of the defendant by a
witness for the State.
3. The State's Attorney's obligations under this section extend to mate-
rial and information in the possession or control of members of his staff and of
any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case
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were introduced at trial over the objections of defense counsel. 3 0
The State had denied the existence of these statements when the
defendant, pursuant to rule 741 b 2, requested the discovery of "the
substance of each oral statement" and "a copy of all reports of each
oral statement made by the defendant to a State agent which the
State intends to use at trial. '3 1 ' The trial court held that the trooper
was not a "State agent" under the rule and would thus be treated as
a private citizen for discovery purposes.3 1 2
The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that a New Jersey
state trooper was a "State agent" for purposes of rule 741 b 2.
The court reasoned that any other interpretation would undercut
the design of the rule, which is to minimize suppression motions
during the course of trial.3 14 If rule 741 b did not apply to agents of
other states, then rule 741 a would require that the State automati-
cally disclose the means by which it obtained a statement; however,
under rule 741 b, the defendant could not obtain the substance of
that statement.31 5 Thus, in cases involving agents from other states,
the defendant might not, until trial, have the information needed for
a decision whether to move to suppress.
3. Injunctions.-In Levitt v. State316 the Court of Special Ap-
peals heard two related appeals from orders issued by the Baltimore
City Circuit Court. 1 7 In the first appeal the court held that the cir-
cuit court had the authority to issue a prejudgment injunction limit-
ing the defendant's expenditures; 318 in the second the court held
b. Discovery by the Defendant.-Upon the request of the defendant, the State
shall:
2. Statements of the Defendant. As to all statements made by the defend-
ant to a State agent which the State intends to use at a hearing or trial, furnish
the defendant: (a) a copy of each written or recorded statement and (b) the
substance of each oral statement and a copy of all reports of each oral
statement.
Rule 4-263 is substantially identical to former rule 741.
310. 303 Md. at 653-54, 496 A.2d at 666-67.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 654, 496 A.2d at 667. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of
robbery with a deadly weapon. Id. He was also convicted in New Jersey of receiving
stolen goods. Id. at 660, 496 A.2d at 670.
313. Id. at 656, 496 A.2d at 668.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 66 Md. App. 524, 505 A.2d 140 (1986).
317. Id. at 526-27, 505 A.2d at 141.
318. Id. at 537, 505 A.2d at 147.
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that the circuit court could enter a contempt judgment for disobedi-
ence of the same injunction. 1 9
In the first case the State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund
Corporation (MDIF), the court-appointed conservator for Old
Court Savings and Loan Association, brought suit against the de-
fendants for fraudulent misappropriation of funds.3 2 0 MDIF sought
an interlocutory injunction to prevent the dissipation of the defend-
ant's assets pending a decision on the merits.3 2' The defendants
claimed that the circuit court lacked equity jurisdiction to provide
this relief.3 2
2
Although neither case law nor statute provides for prejudgment
attachment on an allegation of fraud, "equitable principles are
broad, and a court of equity is not deprived of jurisdiction because
the subject before it is new."'3 23 The Levitt court found that ex-
traordinary circumstances called for extraordinary relief 3 24 Consid-
ering the massiveness of the alleged fraud, the "substantial
likelihood" that the fraud had occurred, and the probability that the
defendants would dissipate their assets, the court held that the cir-
cuit court had equity jurisdiction to enjoin assets under such unu-
sual circumstances.3
25
In the second case the defendants attacked a contempt convic-
tion for failure to obey the modified consent order.326 The defend-
319. Id. at 550, 505 A.2d at 153.
320. Id. at 527-28, 505 A.2d at 142.
321. Id. at 528, 505 A.2d at 142.
322. Id. The defendants had entered into a consent order enjoining dissipation of
their assets, with an exception for ordinary and necessary personal, business, and legal
expenses. As a condition of the consent order, they agreed to cooperate with MDIF's
discovery. When one defendant refused to comply with requests to produce documents
and interrogatories, MDIF sought and obtained a modification of the consent order.
The modification limited the defendants' expenditures to $1000 per week, with certain
exceptions. The defendants again asserted that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion to enter the original consent order, a deficiency that cannot be cured by consent.
Id. at 529-33, 505 A.2d at 142-45.
323. Id. at 536, 505 A.2d at 146. See generally Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Mary-
land, 39 MD. L. REV. 427, 436 (1980).
324. 66 Md. App. at 537, 505 A.2d at 147.
325. Id. The defendants claimed that the modification of the consent order was a
punishment for the exercise of their fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
The circuit court, however, expressly recognized the defendants' fifth amendment rights
and modified the consent order only to aid its enforcement. A court must have the
authority to amend orders as necessary to meet changing conditions. Id. at 538-44, 505
A.2d at 147-50.
326. Id. at 545, 505 A.2d at 151. Ninety days after the modified consent order took
effect, MDIF alleged that the defendants had withdrawn $211,000 from five different
accounts, in flagrant disregard of the court order. The defendants claimed that these
violations were "technical." They also alleged that they understood the order to mean
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ants asserted that MDIF is a private party and therefore has no
standing to bring criminal contempt charges.3 27 The court rejected
this argument because the records showed that the circuit court ap-
pointed MDIF's counsel as prosecutors.3 2 The Levitt court further
held that the defendants' jail sentences and fines for contempt did
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.3 29
4. Pretrial Motions.-Maryland Rule 4-252(f) requires that with
the exception of speedy trial motions, pretrial motions shall be de-
termined prior to trial.330 In McMillian v. State33' the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that generally the rule does not require a trial
court to hold a hearing; however, a court must conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing if a factual dispute is "central to the resolution of the
motion. ' 3 2 McMillian's suppression motion presented such a sig-
nificant factual issue; therefore, the court remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the matter.333
that the weekly $1000 limit was on personal expenses only and that they could continue
to meet business expenses beyond that limit. Id. at 544-45, 505 A.2d at 150-51.
327. Id. at 546, 505 A.2d at 151.
328. Id. at 547, 505 A.2d at 151. MD. R. P4.d.1 states: "The court may designate the
State's attorney or any other member of the bar to prosecute ...." Id. In addition, the
defendants' guilty pleas cured all defects in the proceedings except jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, the challenge to MDIF's prosecutorial powers was not raised below and there-
fore was not properly before the Levitt court. 66 Md. App. at 547, 505 A.2d at 152.
329. Id. at 549, 505 A.2d at 153. On September 17, 1985, the court had limited the
defendants to $1000 per week in expenditures. Between that date and December 4,
1985, the defendants withdrew $211,000 from various bank and savings and loan ac-
counts. The court sentenced Jeffrey Levitt to 18 months in prison and payment of a
$200,000 fine. Karol Levitt was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment, to be served over
15 weekends, and was fined $50,000. Id. at 544-45, 505 A.2d at 150-51.
330. According to MD. R. 4-252(f):
[M]otions filed pursuant to [rule 4-252] shall be determined before trial...
except that the court may defer until after trial its determination of a motion to
dismiss for failure to obtain a speedy trial. If factual issues are involved in de-
termining the motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
331. 65 Md. App. 21, 499 A.2d 192 (1985).
332. Id. at 30, 499 A.2d at 196.
333. The defendant sought an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress certain
evidence seized in a warrantless search of a friend's apartment. Id. at 29, 499 A.2d at
196. The trial court denied this request, ruling that the defendant lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the search. Id. The Court of Special Appeals dis-
agreed. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether, under the "totality
of the circumstances," id. at 33, 499 A.2d at 198, the defendant had a " 'legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the area invaded at the time of the search,' "id. at 31,499 A.2d at
197 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). The court ordered a lim-
ited remand under MD. R. 1071 for the sole purpose of holding a suppression hearing.
65 Md. App. at 36-37, 499 A.2d at 199-200.
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5. Recusal.-In Brent v. State"3 4 the Court of Special Appeals
had occasion to examine Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(5), which requires
trial judges, upon objection, to recuse themselves from bench trials
if they learn of a plea agreement from which the defendant has sub-
sequently withdrawn. 3 5 The Brent court broadened the applicabil-
ity of rule 4-243(c)(5) to cases in which the "totality of the
circumstances" suggest that the judge was presented with the "func-
tional equivalent" of a formal plea agreement.33 6 As a result, the
court agreed with the defendant that the trial judge in this case
should have recused himself after he learned of the defendant's
prior willingness to plead guilty and had heard facts that supported
the defendant's guilt.
3 3 7
In Cason v. State3 38 the Court of Special Appeals held that trial
judges must recuse themselves after learning that a defendant has
failed a lie detector test.3 3 9 The court believed that, with the added
insight acquired from knowledge of the test, a judge could not re-
tain the impartiality necessary to preside over a case.3 40 Further-
more, the court noted that the request for recusal in this case had
not been made in bad faith.3 4'
6. Judicial Conduct.-In Smith v. State3 4 2 the Court of Special
Appeals discussed the discretionary right of a trial judge to question
witnesses,3 43 noting that judges must take care not to inject them-
selves into a trial in such a way as to damage their roles as impartial
arbiters.344 Although the trial judge erred in being overly inquisi-
tional, his conduct did not influence the jury verdict; thus, the error
334. 63 Md. App. 197, 492 A.2d 637 (1985).
335. MD. R. 4-243(c)(5). Thus, the rule now applies even if the parties have not en-
tered into a formal plea bargain agreement.
336. 63 Md. App. at 207, 492 A.2d at 642.
337. Id. at 202, 492 A.2d at 640.
338. 66 Md. App. 757, 505 A.2d 919 (1986).
339. Id. at 770, 505 A.2d at 926.
340. Id. The results of a lie detector test, as well as evidence that the defendant took
such a test, are inadmissible at trial in Maryland. Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658-
59, 480 A.2d 800, 803 (1984).
341. 66 Md. App. at 772-73, 505 A.2d at 927. The court also held that, having failed
to recuse himself, the trial judge should have granted the defendant's motion to with-
draw his waiver of the right to a jury trial. Id. at 770, 505 A.2d at 926.
342. 66 Md. App. 603, 505 A.2d 564, cert. denied, 306 Md. 371, 509 A.2d 134 (1986).
343. Id. at 610-20, 505 A.2d at 567-72.
344. Id. at 618, 505 A.2d at 571. The court found that despite repeated defense ob-
jections, the trial judge rephrased many of the State's questions and frequently took
over the questioning of the State's two primary witnesses. When the State attempted to
introduce photographs into evidence without laying a foundation, the judge laid the
foundation for the State. Id. at 611-18, 505 A.2d at 568-71.
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was harmless.3 4 5 Similarly, the court held that the trial judge's con-
versations with the jury during deliberations were also harmless
error.
3 4 6
7. Illegal Sentence.-In Campbell v. State3 4 7 the Court of Special
Appeals held that an improper failure to merge two offenses for sen-
tencing purposes can result in an illegal sentence, even if the trial
court imposes concurrent sentences . 48  The illegality occurs be-
cause the imposition of any additional sentence, even though con-
current, can affect the defendant's chance for parole. 49
In Valentine v. State3 10 the Court of Appeals held that an appeal
from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a
direct appeal from the original sentence.35' Rather, such a motion
is "in the nature of a collateral attack" on the original sentence.352
Thus, a challenge to the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sen-
tence can reach the State's appellate courts only if the defendant
follows the procedures of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act.353 Because Valentine failed to follow those procedures, the
court held that the Court of Special Appeals had correctly dismissed
his appeal.3 54
According to the court, Maryland Rule 4-345, which governs
345. Id. at 620, 505 A.2d at 572. The court deemed the error harmless because the
transcript did not indicate that the judge's questions reflected any opinion as to the
defendant's guilt. Id. at 619, 505 A.2d at 572. Furthermore, the court found that the
State had established "overwhelming evidence" of the defendant's guilt prior to the
judge's misconduct. Id. at 619-20, 505 A.2d at 572.
The dissent, however, contended that the appearance of a fair trial was sacrificed
when the trial judge took over the function of the prosecution. Viewing the trial as a
whole, the dissent maintained that the judge's conduct prejudiced the defendant. The
judge in effect conducted the prosecution's case, while demeaning the defense. Thus,
the defense was waged against both the judge and the State's attorney. Id. at 625-29,
505 A.2d 575-76 (Adkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
346. Id. at 624-25, 505 A.2d at 574. The trial judge failed to follow MD. R. 4-326(c),
which requires consultation with both the defense and the prosecution before the judge
communicates with the jury during deliberations. Id. at 625, 505 A.2d at 574.
347. 65 Md. App. 498, 501 A.2d 111 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 599, 505 A.2d 856
(1986).
348. Id. at 510, 501 A.2d at 118. MD. R. 4-345(a) provides that a court may correct an
illegal sentence at any time.
349. 65 Md. App. at 511, 501 A.2d at 118. The court held that the defendant's con-
victions for child abuse and battery did not merge and that the concurrent sentences
were proper. Id. at 513, 501 A.2d at 118-19.
350. 305 Md. 108, 501 A.2d 847 (1985).
351. Id. at 120, 501 A.2d at 853.
352. Id.
353. Id. The Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act is codified in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 645(A) (1982).
354. 305 Md. at 120, 501 A.2d at 853.
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motions to correct illegal sentences, 355 is a "statutory remedy" gov-
erned by the Post Conviction Procedure Act.3 56 To reach this inter-
pretation, the court looked to article IV, section 18(a) of the
Maryland Constitution, which lends the " 'force of law' " to " 'rules
and regulations concerning the practice and procedure ...in the
courts of this State.' ,,357 In arriving at this result, however, the
court found it necessary to disapprove of "dictum" in the recent
case of Coles v. State,358 relying instead on an older line of cases.359
D. Sentencing
1. Accessory After the Fact.-In Osborne v. State360 the Court of
Appeals held that the appropriate punishment for an accessory after
the fact to first-degree murder is imprisonment for between eight-
een months and five years, as prescribed by article 27, section
626.361 In so ruling, the court rejected the State's argument that the
punishment for this offense should be governed by Maryland's mur-
der statute,362 which prescribed a sentence of life imprisonment.
3 63
The court based its ruling upon several factors that distinguish
the offense of acting as an accessory after the fact from that of acting
as the principal in the commission of a crime. At early common law
an accessory after the fact received the same punishment as did the
principal. 364 The courts, however, generally allowed an accessory
after the fact the defense of benefit of clergy,365 a defense that the
355. MD. R. 4-345.
356. 305 Md. at 120, 501 A.2d at 853.
357. Id. (quoting MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a)). In dissent, three judges contended that
the term "statute" applies only to enactments of the General Assembly; therefore, even
though the Rules have the force of law, they are not "statutes" and do not afford "statu-
tory remedies." Id. at 123, 501 A.2d at 854 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
358. 290 Md. 296, 429 A.2d 1029 (1981).
359. 305 Md. at 112-18, 120, 501 A.2d at 848-52, 853.
360. 304 Md. 323, 499 A.2d 170 (1985).
361. Id. at 337, 499 A.2d at 177. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 626 (1982) provides:
All claims to dispensation from punishment by benefit of clergy are forever
abolished; and every person convicted of any felony heretofore deemed clergy-
able shall be sentenced to undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for any
time not less than eighteen months nor more than five years, except in those
cases where some other specific penalty is prescribed by this Code. And every
person who shall be convicted of any felony heretofore excluded from the ben-
efit of clergy, and not specified in this Code, shall be sentenced to undergo a
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than five nor more than twenty
years.
362. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1982).
363. See id.; 304 Md. at 332, 499 A.2d at 174.
364. 304 Md. at 327, 499 A.2d at 172.
365. The benefit of clergy was a common-law defense afforded to members of the
clergy and later to all individuals who qualified to be admitted into the clergy by virtue
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courts denied to all principal offenders and, in many cases, to acces-
sories before the fact as well. 66 Although Maryland initially recog-
nized this defense, the State abolished it in 1809367 and instead
prescribed a punishment of imprisonment for between eighteen
months and five years for "any felony heretofore deemed clergy-
able" except in cases in which the Maryland Code prescribed some
other specific penalty.36 Thus, because the offense of acting as an
accessory after the fact was clergyable at common law, it falls within
the class of crimes subject to the punishment prescribed in section
626.369
The court rejected the prosecution's contention that the enact-
ment of the State's murder statute had altered the punishment for
the crime of acting as an accessory after the fact.370 Instead, the
court remarked that "neither the present version of the statute nor
past enactments show a legislative intent to include accessories after
the fact in the punishment for first degree murder."'3 7' In addition,
the court stated that the offense of acting as an accessory after the
fact is distinct from that of acting as an accessory to the principal3 72
in that an accessory after the fact, unlike the principal or an acces-
sory to the principal, plays no part in the commission of the
crime.373
2. Restitution.-In In rejose S. 374 the Court of Appeals held that
if restitution is sought against the parents of two unrelated
juveniles, each parent is potentially liable for the entire sum, pro-
vided he or she receives proper notice. 75 In addition, the court
held that the juvenile court could not award restitution in an
of their ability to read. The defense originated with the claim that the clergy was not
answerable to the secular courts for any crime. After successfully pleading this defense,
defendants could have their cases brought before an ecclesiastical court, which generally
would impose a more lenient punishment than would a secular court. 304 Md. at 327-
28, 499 A.2d at 172. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW § IA, at 4 (2d ed. 1957).
366. 304 Md. at 327-28, 499 A.2d at 172.
367. Id. at 329, 499 A.2d at 173.
368. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 626 (1982).
369. 304 Md. at 336, 499 A.2d at 177.
370. Id. at 332, 499 A.2d at 174.
371. Id.
372. The court appears to use the term "accessory to the principal" to denote princi-
pals in the second degree. The court also appears to use the term "principal" to denote
principals in the first degree. See id.
373. Id.
374. 304 Md. 396, 499 A.2d 936 (1985).
375. Id. at 400-01, 499 A.2d at 938-39. By statute, however, a parent's liability cannot
exceed "$5,000 for all acts arising out of a single incident." MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1984).
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amount greater than the amount specified in the juvenile's guilty
plea.3 7
6
In In re Herbert B.377 the Court of Appeals held that a juvenile
court may order children or their parents to pay restitution even
before an adjudication of delinquency.3 78 The sole prerequisite for
an award of restitution is a finding that a juvenile has committed a
delinquent act in which he or she has stolen, damaged, or destroyed
the victim's property.
3 79
3. Enhanced Punishment Statute.-In Blandon v. State38 0 the Court
of Appeals held that rape in the second degree is a "crime of vio-
lence" for the purposes of Maryland's enhanced sentencing statute
for repeat offenders. 38' The statute provides that if a person has
been convicted on two separate occasions of crimes of violence not
arising from the same incident and has served at least one term in
prison, that person shall be sentenced to at least twenty-five years in
prison upon the third conviction for a violent crime.382 In addition,
the statute lists the crimes defined as "crimes of violence."
383
The defendant contended that the list of violent crimes was am-
biguous since the statute distinguishes "sexual offenses in the first
376. 304 Md. at 399-400, 499 A.2d at 938. The court had accepted the juvenile's
guilty plea. Id. at 398, 499 A.2d at 937.
377. 303 Md. 419, 494 A.2d 680 (1980).
378. Id. at 428, 494 A.2d at 684. The juvenile court, in an adjudicatory hearing,
found that Herbert B. had committed a break-in. At a restitution hearing one month
later, a master assessed restitution in the amount of $228.50 against Herbert B. and his
mother. At the disposition hearing the same day, the juvenile court affirmed the restitu-
tion order, finding that Herbert B. was not a delinquent child even though he had com-
mitted a delinquent act. Id. at 422, 494 A.2d at 681.
379. Id. at 426-27, 494 A.2d at 683-84. The court found that its conclusion followed
directly from the language of the applicable statute, MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 3-
829(a) (1984):
(a) The court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a
child, or the child in any case in which the court finds the child has committed a
delinquent act and during the commission of that delinquent act has:
(1) stolen, damaged or destroyed the property of another;
(2) inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the injured person to incur
medical, dental, hospital or funeral expenses.
380. 304 Md. 316, 498 A.2d 1195 (1985).
381. Id. at 318, 498 A.2d at 1196.
382. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
383. Id. at § 643B(a). The statute reads:
As used in this section, the term "crime of violence" means abduction; arson;
kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; mayhem; murder;
rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual offense in the first degree;
sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid
offenses; assault with intent to murder; and assault with intent to rape.
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degree" from "sexual offenses in the second degree," but it fails to
specify degrees of rape.384 In rejecting the defendant's arguments,
the court relied both on legislative history and on canons of statu-
tory construction. Stressing that "a statute must be construed to
effectuate the real and actual intention of the legislature, "385 the
court stated that it should therefore "reject a proposed statutory in-
terpretation if its consequences are inconsistent with common
sense."38 6 The court then compared the statutes for rape and sex-
ual offenses, noting that the only difference between second-degree
rape and second-degree sexual offense was in the type of sexual act
involved.3 87 The court reasoned that since the General Assembly
had treated second-degree rape and second-degree sexual offenses
equally in terms of regular sentencing,388 it must have intended to
classify the crimes together for enhanced sentencing. 8 9
The legislative history of the rape statute and the enhanced sen-
tencing statute also provided a basis for the court's holding. When
the General Assembly enacted the original enhanced sentencing
statute in 1975, rape had not yet been classified in degrees.3 9 0 In
1976, however, the General Assembly divided rape into two degrees
and outlined four degrees of sexual offenses;3 9 ' furthermore, the
General Assembly amended the enhanced sentencing statute to in-
clude the first and second degrees of sexual offenses as crimes of
violence. 39 2 The court found that this amendment reflected a clear
legislative intent to include all degrees of rape in the statutory defi-
nition of a "crime of violence," so that the defendant's enhanced
sentence under the statute was valid.3 93
384. 304 Md. at 319, 498 A.2d at 1196.
385. Id. (citing State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137, 486 A.2d 174, 176
(1985), in which the court construed MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1982 & Supp.
1984) as giving a judge power to issue a search warrant for evidence within the judge's
jurisdiction even if the cime to which the evidence applies was committed elsewhere).
386. Id.
387. 304 Md. at 319-20, 498 A.2d at 1197. Rape and sexual offenses differ in the
nature of the sexual act involved: rape involves vaginal intercourse, while a sexual of-
fense involves almost any sexual act other than vaginal intercourse. MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, §§ 461(e), 462-464C (1982).
388. Both crimes merit imprisonment of not more than twenty years. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 463(b), 464A(b) (1982).
389. 304 Md. at 321, 498 A.2d at 1197.
390. Id. at 322, 498 A.2d at 1198.
391. Id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 462-464C (1982).
392. 304 Md. at 322, 498 A.2d at 1198.
393. Id. The court reasoned that because the General Assembly had placed express
limitations on the "sexual offenses" that were "crimes of violence," but had made no
similar qualifications concerning the degrees of rape, the General Assembly must have
intended for all degrees of rape to remain classified as "crimes of violence." Id.
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In Teeter v. State3 94 the Court of Special Appeals considered the
type of evidence admissible at a sentencing hearing, the level of
proof required concerning the existence of violence in the acts un-
derlying prior convictions, and the constitutionality of a mandatory
sentence.395
The court reaffirmed the rule that the State cannot seek the
mandatory sentence under the statute unless it establishes the de-
fendant's prior convictions and incarceration beyond a reasonable
doubt. 396 But even though hearings under the enhanced sentencing
statute differ from normal sentencing hearings, the court declared
that cumulative hearsay evidence is admissible for sentencing pur-
poses at both types of hearings.39 Thus, at the sentencing hearing
the trial court did not err in admitting an affidavit prepared for liti-
gation, even though the affidavit was hearsay.398
The court also held that defendant's prior convictions could
constitute "crimes of violence," within the meaning of the statute,
even if the state did not prove that the prior convictions had actually
involved violence.3 99 The court deferred to the General Assembly's
compilation of "crimes of violence."4 ° ° Thus, the State may estab-
lish the requisite "violence" merely by demonstrating that a Mary-
land court had previously convicted the defendant of crimes
enumerated in article 27, section 643(B)(a). In so holding, the court
distinguished Temoney v. State,4° t an earlier case under the enhanced
sentencing statute, in which the Court of Appeals had required the
State to prove that the defendant's prior convictions actually in-
394. 65 Md. App. 105, 499 A.2d 503 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253
(1986).
395. Id. at 108-09, 499 A.2d at 504-05.
396. Id. at 112, 499 A.2d at 506 (citing Sullivan v. State, 29 Md. App. 622, 631, 349
A.2d 663, 669 (1976)).
397. Id. at 113-14, 499 A.2d at 507. Hearsay evidence is admissible in sentencing
hearings because it is believed that the judge is able to weigh carefully the credibility of
the evidence in imposing the sentence. Id. In a hearing under the enhanced sentencing
statute, however, the lack of judicial discretion in determining the actual sentence im
posed may diminish the need to admit hearsay evidence.
398. Id. at 114-15, 499 A.2d at 507-08. The affidavit established that the defendant
had actually been incarcerated. Because the State had produced other evidence that was
not hearsay to establish the existence of the prison term, the hearsay evidence was
merely cumulative. Had the hearsay evidence been the only evidence establishing the
defendant's prior imprisonment, the admission of the hearsay evidence could have been
reversible error. Id.
399. Id. at 115, 499 A.2d at 508.
400. Id. at 117, 499 A.2d at 509. Section 643B(a), the statute that defines the term
"crime of violence," is set out supra at note 383.
401. 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981).
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volved violence.4 °2 The court pointed out that Temoney involved
prior convictions for District of Columbia offenses; therefore, the
State was obliged to prove that the earlier offenses met the Mary-
land definition of a "crime of violence. '"403
Finally, the court addressed the constitutionality of the
mandatory sentence set by the statute. The court held that the de-
fendant had not been deprived of due process merely because the
statute gives the prosecutor, rather than the judge, the discretion to
invoke the statute.4 °4 The court stressed that "there is no right
under the Constitution to ajudicially imposed sentence," and noted
that "our criminal justice system bestows upon the prosecutor
broad discretion at various stages of a criminal proceeding.-
40 5
Thus, the State's decision to invoke the enhanced sentencing statute
against a particular defendant does not necessarily deprive the de-
fendant of due process.40 6
In Bryan v. State4"7 the Court of Special Appeals again upheld
the constitutionality of Maryland's enhanced sentencing statute.408
A Baltimore County jury convicted Bryan of burglary and theft.40 9
Because of his two prior convictions involving crimes of violence,410
the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory twenty-five year term
of imprisonment pursuant to the enhanced sentencing statute.4'1
The Court of Special Appeals stated that it found no evidence that
this sentence contravened the eighth amendment's prohibition
402. Id. at 263, 429 A.2d at 1024.
403. 65 Md. App. at 115-16, 499 A.2d at 508. The defendant also asserted that a
"crime of violence" must be a crime against a person, and that, therefore, housebreak-
ing fell outside the statutory definition. Id. In Temoney, however, the Court of Appeals
specifically stated that the statute enumerated offenses against both persons and prop-
erty. Temoney, 290 Md. at 263, 429 A.2d at 1024; Teeter, 65 Md. App. at 116 n.3, 499
A.2d at 508 n.3.
404. 65 Md. App. at 119, 499 A.2d at 510. In addition, the court briefly addressed
and dismissed the defendant's allegation that the mandatory sentence violated the con-
stitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment: " '[I]ndividualized' sen-
tencing is not a constitutional mandate unless the death penalty is implicated." Id. at
118, 499 A.2d at 509.
405. Id. Examples of prosecutorial discretion cited include the decisions to call a
grand jury, to charge with specified crimes, not to prosecute, to negotiate the terms of a
plea agreement, and to recommend a particular sentence. Id.
406. Id.
407. 63 Md. App. 210,492 A.2d 644, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
408. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
409. 63 Md. App. at 212, 492 A.2d at 645.




against cruel and unusual punishment.41 2 To support its holding,
the court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Rummel v.
Estelle41 3 as well as numerous other state and federal cases that have
upheld the constitutionality of mandatory recidivist statutes.4 14
In Middleton v. State415 the Court of Special Appeals held that in
this case the absence of a uniform statewide policy for applying the
statute did not deprive the defendant of equal protection.416 Fur-
thermore, the court ruled that while the State bears the burden of
proving the existence of the underlying convictions and incarcera-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need not separately prove
the constitutional validity of the convictions unless that issue is
before the court.41 7
The court ruled that the defendant would not have been denied
equal protection unless he could prove that uneven enforcement
" 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discrimi-
natory purpose.' -418 The court acknowledged that the absence of a
uniform statewide policy might mean that the statute had a discrimi-
natory effect; 4 19 however, the court held that the defendant had not
established that the State was motivated by a discriminatory purpose
in opting to apply the statute to him.42 °
The court also refuted the defendant's argument that the State
had failed to prove the constitutionality of the predicate convictions
and incarceration. The State may not use a predicate conviction to
obtain the mandatory sentence unless at the prior proceeding the
defendant enjoyed the right to counsel; furthermore, the State may
not invoke the defendant's prior guilty plea unless the defendant
entered the plea freely and voluntarily.42 The court, however, de-
clared that the State need not prove the constitutionality of every
412. Id. at 216-17, 492 A.2d at 647.
413. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
414. 63 Md. App. at 214-19, 492 A.2d at 646-48.
415. 67 Md. App. 159, 506 A.2d 1191 (1986).
416. Id. at 172, 506 A.2d at 1198.
417. Id. at 179, 506 A.2d at 1201.
418. Id. at 170, 506 A.2d at 1196 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985), which held that passive enforcement of Selective Service registration is not nec-
essarily unconstitutional).
419. Id. at 171, 506 A.2d at 1197. The defendant presented testimony concerning the
existing policy in 18 Maryland jurisdictions. Of the 18, nine had had no cases involving
the statute; of those nine. two had no policy for invoking the statute, six would apply the
statute automatically, and one would proceed on a case-by-case basis. Of the nine that
had had cases involving the statute, four invoked the statute automatically, and five ap-
proached the issue on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 166-67, 506 A.2d at 1195.
420. Id. at 171-72, 506 A.2d at 1197.
421. Id. at 175, 506 A.2d at 1199.
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predicate conviction as a separate matter unless the question of con-
stitutional validity was raised by documentary evidence,422 by the
circumstances of the case, or by the defendant.42 3 Since neither the
existence nor the constitutionality of the prior convictions had been
questioned at trial, the court ruled that the State had met its burden;
therefore, the defendant's conviction could stand.424
4. Probation.-In Matthews v. State425 the Court of Appeals held
that a trial court may revoke a defendant's probation even before
the probationary portion of the sentence has begun if, between the
grant of probation and its formal commencement, the defendant
commits a felony.426 In addition, the court held that the judge may
not cause the probationary portion of a sentence to begin while the
defendant is imprisoned on the same charge.427
In Donaldson v. State4 21 the Court of Appeals held that a trial
judge may extend the duration of a defendant's probation if the de-
fendant has committed a probation violation.429 Neither statute430
nor the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy431 de-
prives the trial judge of this power.4 32 The length of further proba-
tion is at the trial judge's discretion, provided it does not exceed five
years.433
In Smith v. State434 the Court of Appeals held that due process
prevents the revocation of probation if the defendant's probation
violation was not willful, but was rather the result of factors beyond
422. The State had introduced certified records of the prior convictions to establish
the convictions and the prior incarceration. The court contrasted the situation in Middle-
ton with that in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), in which the records on their face
raised a presumption that the defendant had been deprived of counsel. 67 Md. App. at
176, 506 A.2d at 1200.
423. 67 Md. App. at 178, 506 A.2d at 1200-01.
424. Id. at 179, 506 A.2d at 1201.
425. 304 Md. 281, 498 A.2d 655 (1985).
426. Id. at 292, 498 A.2d at 660. Between the grant of probation and its formal com-
mencement, the defendant is imprisoned. While imprisoned, however, defendants are
under an implied obligation to obey all laws. Id.
427. Id. at 286, 498 A.2d at 657. Note that, by statute, the period of probation begins
on the actual date of the defendant's release from prison. Id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 641A (1982). Note also that the term "imprisonment" includes a variety of state pro-
grams, such as work release, that are not characterized by confinement. Id. at § 645K.
428. 305 Md. 522, 505 A.2d 527 (1986).
429. Id. at 530, 531, 505 A.2d at 531, 532.
430. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 642 (1982).
431. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
432. 305 Md. at 530, 531, 505 A.2d at 532.
433. Id. at 527, 505 A.2d at 530. The five-year limit is imposed by statute. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641A(a) (1982).
434. 306 Md. 1, 506 A.2d 1165 (1986).
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the defendant's control.43 5 Smith, for example, was indigent and
thus unable to pay fines imposed as a condition of probation; there-
fore, the trial court could not constitutionally revoke Smith's
probation.43 6
In Nelson v. State43 7 the Court of Special Appeals held that if a
trial court reinstates multiple sentences, but fails to specify whether
the sentences are concurrent or consecutive, the sentences must be
treated as concurrent. 438 The court relied on the maxim that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the State, especially in
cases of doubt concerning the severity of a sentence.439
In Edwards v. State4 4 0 the Court of Special Appeals held that if a
defendant misses a payment on a schedule imposed by the proba-
tion division, a judge may revoke probation only if the sentencing
judge required that payment be made pursuant to that schedule.4 4 '
This decision stems from the general rule that the probation divi-
sion may not institute probation conditions harsher than those that
the trial court established.44 2







435. Id. at 7, 506 A.2d at 1168. The court relied on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983). In that case the United States Supreme Court held that ifa defendant breaches a
condition of probation by failing to pay a fine, a court cannot constitutionally revoke
probation without inquiring whether the defendant willfully failed to pay. Id. at 672-73.
436. 306 Md. at 8, 506 A.2d at 1168.
437. 66 Md. App. 304, 503 A.2d 1357 (1986).
438. Id. at 312, 503 A.2d at 1361. The court thus held that the defendant was entitled
to resentencing. Id. at 314, 503 A.2d at 1362.
439. Id. at 314, 503 A.2d at 1362.
440. 67 Md. App. 276, 507 A.2d 212 (1986).
441. Id. at 281-82, 507 A.2d at 215-16. The judge ordered the defendant to pay a
sum of money within a year's time. The probation division demanded payment in
monthly installments. Id.
442. Id. at 281, 507 A.2d at 215. As the Court of Special Appeals held in Costa v.
State, 58 Md. App. 474, 473 A.2d 942 (1984), the probation division may only institute
rules that lie within the ambit of the special probation conditions imposed by the trial




In Hopper v. State ' the Court of Special Appeals determined that
the trial court erred in preventing the cross-examination of the vic-
tim of an attempted robbery concerning his award from the Crimi-
nal Injuries Compensation Board. This testimony, the court stated,
would have been probative of the victim's pecuniary interest in falsi-
fying his testimony.2 The defendant, a male prostitute, had testified
that the victim's injury occurred accidentally after the two had ar-
gued about payment for sexual services.' In an earlier proceeding,
however, the victim had received a monetary judgment from the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board only after establishing that
he had no sexual relationship with the defendant and had not con-
tributed in any way to his own injuries.4
The Court of Special Appeals stressed that a witness' possible
bias is always relevant, and evidence of bias is admissible as to the
credibility of the witness or the weight of his or her testimony.5 The
witness stood to lose an earlier award if he admitted the sexual rela-
tionship with the defendant; thus, the court found that the issue of
the award was relevant to show bias or pecuniary interest, and that
the jury should have been allowed to consider this testimony in its
1. 64 Md. App. 97, 494 A.2d 708 (1985).
2. Id. at 106, 494 A.2d at 712-13.
3. Id. at 100, 494 A.2d at 710. During the argument the defendant pulled out a
knife, and, according to the defendant, in the ensuing conflict the victim was accidentally
cut. The defendant denied any intent to kill, injure, or rob the victim. Id.
4. Id. at 101, 494 A.2d at 710. According to the defendant, the Board initially de-
nied the victim an award, invoking the "family crime" exclusion of article 26A of the
Maryland Code, which disallows awards to "any person maintaining a sexual relation-
ship" with the person inflicting the injury. See id. at 101, 101 n.2, 494 A.2d at 710, 710
n.2 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b) (Supp. 1985)). In addition, § 12(e) of the
same article disallows awards if the victim contributed to the infliction of the injury. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(e) (1987). The Board subsequently granted the victim an
award after he submitted a written denial of a sexual relationship with the defendant. 64
Md. App. at 99, 494 A.2d at 109.
5. 64 Md. App. at 102-05, 494 A.2d at 711-12. See Caldwell v. State, 276 Md. 612,
349 A.2d 623 (1976) (scope of cross-examination is normally left to the trial judge);
Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973) (same); State v. DeLawder, 28
Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975) (jury has right to hear testimony that could affect
credibility of a witness); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (sixth amendment
right to confrontation includes the right to cross-examine a witness on matters affecting
bias, interest, or motive to falsify).
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decision.6 The court further ruled that the error in disallowing the
cross-examination was prejudicial to the defendant; therefore, the
court remanded the case for a new trial.7
B. Character and Reputation-Prior Bad Acts
In Foster v. State8 the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not err in admitting evidence of a witness' entire judgment of
conviction, including the sentence imposed, for the purpose of im-
peaching her testimony.9 The court recognized the lack of a con-
sensus of opinion in other jurisdictions on this issue.'
Nevertheless, it found support in the Maryland cases and elsewhere
for the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence." The court
concluded that the sanction imposed "reflects upon the nature of
the conviction and, hence, is relevant to the credibility issue"'" and
should be admitted.
In Cason v. State'" the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior convictions for
possession of heroin in order to impeach the defendant's credibil-
ity. l" The court observed that while evidence of a conviction for an
infamous crime' 5 is always admissible for purposes of impeach-
ment,' 6 " '[t]he admissability of a witness' prior conviction of a non-
infamous crime is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge
.... ,-17 Possession of heroin is not considered an infamous crime
6. 64 Md. App. at 106, 494 A.2d at 712-13.
7. Id.
8. 304 Md. 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985), reconsid denied, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326,
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986).
9. Id. at 470, 499 A.2d at 1252.
10. Id. at 469 n.14, 499 A.2d at 1251 n.14.
11. Id. at 470-71, 499 A.2d at 1252.
12. Id. at 470, 499 A.2d at 1252.
13. 66 Md. App. 757, 505 A.2d 919 (1986).
14. Id. at 774-76, 505 A.2d at 929.
15. The court stated:
"'The crimes which the common law regarded as infamous because of their
moral turpitude were treason, felony, perjury, forgery and those other offenses,
classified generally as cimenfalsi, which impressed upon their perpetrator such
a moral taint that to permit him to testify in legal proceedings would injuriously
affect the public administration of justice."
Id. at 774-75, 505 A.2d at 928 (quoting Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631,
633 (1905)).
16. 66 Md. App. at 774, 505 A.2d at 928; see MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-
905 (1984).
17. 66 Md. App. at 774, 505 A.2d at 928 (quoting Duckett v. State, 61 Md. App. 151,
154, 485 A.2d 691, 692 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
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or a crime involving moral turpitude."8 Accordingly, the evidence
of the defendant's convictions should only have been admitted if, in
the discretion of the trial court, the probative value of the convic-
tions outweighed the prejudice to the defendant in asserting his
defense. 19
In this case, however, the prior convictions were more than ten
years old, and were very similar in nature to the crime for which the
defendant was on trial; therefore, the prejudicial effect of those con-
victions was greater than their probative value.2 0 Thus, the court
held that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the
prior convictions. 2'
In Anaweck v. State22 the Court of Special Appeals held that
"other crimes" evidence was admissible in the defendants' trial for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 2' Generally, evi-
dence of other crimes is inadmissible. 24 This rule, however, con-
tains "a built in limitation when the evidence of 'other crimes' has a
direct bearing on an issue in the case."' 25 Examples of this limitation
occur in cases in which the evidence tends to show motive, intent,
absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or the identity of the
person charged.26 In the instant case, the court found that the sale
of drugs at the defendants' home on each of the two days prior to
their arrest for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
tended to establish each of the factors listed above. 27 Thus, the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence. 28
Similarly, in Waddell v. State2 9 the Court of Special Appeals
ruled that the defendant's out-of-court statement concerning his
previous drug dealings with the victim was admissible in the defend-
ant's trial for first degree murder. Since the defendant's prior state-
ment tended to establish both motive and identity, the court found
18. Id. see supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 775, 505 A.2d at 928.
21. Id.
22. 63 Md. App. 239, 492 A.2d 658, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
23. Id. at 259, 492 A.2d at 669.
24. Id. at 256, 492 A.2d at 667 (quoting Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d
680, 684 (1976)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 256-57, 492 A.2d at 667.
27. Id. at 257-59, 492 A.2d at 668.
28. Id. at 259, 492 A.2d at 669.




In Savoy v. State"' the Court of Special Appeals clarified the ex-
tent to which a court may admit evidence under the so-called "open
door" theory.3 2 The defendant contended that the prosecution ac-
ted prejudicially by establishing that the defendant had previously
been arrested for a narcotics violation and was presently suspected
of involvement in the sale of narcotics. 3 The Court of Special Ap-
peals agreed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error
by admitting this testimony.
34
In cross-examination, the arresting officer stated that after the
defendant assaulted him, he had chased the fleeing defendant,
rather than merely filing charges, because he hoped that additional
charges might arise out of an arrest.35 On redirect, the officer stated
that he expected to bring additional charges because the defendant
had previously been arrested for controlled dangerous substance vi-
olations and was then involved in the sale of controlled dangerous
substances.36 This evidence of other crimes was irrelevant for any
purpose other than to show the accused's bad character; therefore,
in order to have the evidence admitted, the State maintained that by
inquiring into the officer's motivation, the defendant's counsel initi-
ated the inquiry and thus opened the door to the evidence of other
crimes.37
The court rejected this argument, stating that "evidence admit-
ted under the 'open door' theory does not give an unbridled license
to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence beyond the extent
necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might have ensued
from the original evidence. "38 The arresting officer was properly
permitted, on cross-examination, to explain his motivation for stop-
ping the defendant. The "questioning on cross-examination," how-
30. Id. at 610, 501 A.2d at 867. One of the defendant's statements concerned a pre-
vious drug transaction between the defendant and the victim. It thus provided some
evidence of motive. The statements, according to the court, also tended to show the
identity of the defendant: they provided a reason for the defendant being in the victim's
car-the scene of the crime-on the day of the murder. Id.
31. 64 Md. App. 241, 494 A.2d 957 (1985).
32. Under this theory, a party that has "opened the door" by effecting the admission
of incompetent evidence cannot prevent its opponent from admitting like evidence. E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1984).
33. 64 Md. App. at 250, 494 A.2d at 961.
34. Id. at 254, 494 A.2d at 963.
35. Id. at 250, 494 A.2d at 961.
36. Id. at 250-51, 494 A.2d at 961-62.
37. Id. at 252, 494 A.2d at 962.
38. Id. at 254, 494 A.2d at 963.
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ever, "did not mandate an outlet for the introduction of specific past
unrelated criminal conduct of the accused when he had not placed
his character in issue."
39
In Howard v. State40 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
trial court may not preclude criminal defendants from disclosing
their prior convictions on direct examination.41 While not address-
ing this precise issue, the court previously ruled in Whitehead v.
State42 that defendants are entitled to a limiting instruction concern-
ing evidence of prior convictions if the defendants had themselves
introduced the evidence.4" And in Chadderton v. State,44 the court
permitted the prosecution to anticipate attacks on witnesses' credi-
bility by questioning them on direct examination about their prior
convictions. 4' The reasoning in Whitehead and Chadderton led the
court to conclude that the trial court erred in forbidding the defend-
ant to disclose prior convictions on direct examination.46 The
court, however, found that the trial court's error in this case was
harmless.4 7
C. Hearsay
1. Prior Recorded Testimony.-In Huffington v. State48 the Court of
Appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by re-
fusing to allow the defendant to introduce the prior testimony given
by a State's witness at the trial of the defendant's alleged
accomplice. 49
Deno Kanaras, Huffington's alleged accomplice, was convicted
in an earlier proceeding of felony murder, theft, and daytime house-
breaking.5" At Kanaras' trial, Stephen Rassa testified on behalf of
the State that Kanaras was involved in drugs only a few days before
39. Id.
40. 66 Md. App. 273, 503 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 306 Md. 288, 508 A.2d 488 (1986).
41. Id. at 289-90, 503 A.2d at 747. As a matter of trial strategy, criminal defendants
often prefer to disclose prior convictions on direct, rather than cross, examination.
42. 54 Md. App. 428, 458 A.2d 905 (1983).
43. Id. at 437-38, 458 A.2d at 910-11.
44. 54 Md. App. 86, 456 A.2d 1313 (1983).
45. Id. at 94-95, 456 A.2d at 1318.
46. 66 Md. App. at 290, 503 A.2d at 747.
47. Id. at 290, 503 A.2d at 747-48. The court reasoned that since the other evidence
against the defendant was substantial, the disallowed testimony would not have altered
the trial's outcome. Id.
48. 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272, reconsid. denied sub nom. Foster, Evans, and Huf-
fington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3315 (1986).
49. Id. at 574, 500 A.2d at 279.
50. Id. at 564, 500 A.2d at 274; Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 460 A.2d 61, cert.
denied, 297 Md. 109 (1983).
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the incident in question. 5' Huffington sought to admit this testi-
mony in order to show that Kanaras might have killed the victim in
the case at bar.52
The court looked to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allow
introduction of former testimony as long as the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or the party's predecessor in interest,
had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony in
a prior proceeding. 53 The court concluded that since Rassa was the
State's witness at the earlier trial, and since Huffington sought to
use Rassa's testimony against the State, the party against whom the
testimony was offered before did not have a motive in developing
the testimony similar to that of the party against whom it was later
offered.54 Therefore, the trial judge did not err by refusing to admit
the testimony.55
In Cordovi v. State56 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that a
court may admit the prior recorded testimony of an absent witness,
provided certain requirements are met concerning the witness' un-
availability and the character of the recorded testimony. During the
trial, the State introduced the recorded testimony of a witness who,
on the trial date, was in South America.5 ' The defendant argued on
appeal that his constitutional right of confrontation had thus been
violated.58
The court noted the valid reasons underlying the right of crimi-
nal defendants to confront witnesses against them.59 Citing a recent
United States Supreme Court decision,60 however, the court held
that the admission of the prior recorded testimony of an absent wit-
ness does not violate the confrontation clause if the State proves
51. 304 Md. at 565, 500 A.2d at 274-75.
52. Id. at 565, 500 A.2d at 275.
53. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
54. 304 Md. at 574, 500 A.2d at 279.
55. Id.
56. 63 Md. App. 455, 492 A.2d 1328, cert. denied, 304 Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1184
(1985).
57. Id. at 461,492 A.2d at 1331. At a preliminary hearing, the witness had stated on
the record that although he was going to South America for the holidays, he would
return in time for the trial. Id. at 465, 492 A.2d at 1332-33.
58. Id. at 460, 492 A.2d at 1330. The sixth amendment states in part that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. 63 Md. App. at 461-62, 492 A.2d at 1331. Confrontation allows the defendant
an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the witness' testimony by cross-examination.
Furthermore, the right of confrontation enables the fact-finder to judge the witness'
credibility and demeanor. Id. at 462, 492 A.2d at 1331.
60. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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that the witness is unavailable,6' and that the recorded testimony
contains a "particularized guarantee of truthfulness." 62
Because the witness was in South America, and because the
State had not in bad faith failed to procure his presence, the witness
was truly "unavailable." 6 Furthermore, the defendant had the op-
portunity in a prior judicial proceeding to confront and to cross-
examine this witness; therefore, the witness' testimony contained
the requisite "guarantee of truthfulness."' Thus, the trial court
properly admitted the recorded testimony.
2. Business Records Exception.-In Evans v. State65 the Court of
Appeals appears to have broadened the scope of the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.66 The defendant attacked the
admissibility of a Baltimore City Jail visitor's card and a hotel regis-
tration form on the theory that these records were made by third
persons, rather than by custodians or officials under a duty to make
a truthful report.6 7 The court rejected this argument, stating that
"[e]ach document was clearly a record made in the regular course of
business within the contemplation of the ... statutory language. '"68
Thus, the court refused to distinguish the situation in which a busi-
ness official fills out a form with information supplied by a third per-
61. The State must demonstrate that it undertook " 'a good faith effort to obtain [the
witness'] presence at trial.'" Id. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25
(1968) (emphasis in original)). If, however, the witness is abroad, a simple showing of
unavailability should suffice. 63 Md. App. at 463-64,492 A.2d at 1332. As the Supreme
Court stated in Roberts:
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of
procuring the witness exists .... "good faith" demands nothing of the prosecu-
tion. But, if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might
produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their
effectuation.
448 U.S. at 74-75.
62. 63 Md. App. at 465-66, 492 A.2d at 1333.
63. Id. at 464-65, 492 A.2d at 1332-33. The witness was a resident alien, was em-
ployed in the area, had family nearby, had come forward to testify at the preliminary
hearing, and had agreed to return for the trial. Thus, the court concluded that the State
had acted in good faith in relying on the witness' promise to return. Id.
64. Id. at 465-66, 492 A.2d at 1333.
65. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), reconsid denied sub nom. Foster, Evans and
Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986).
66. Id. at 516, 499 A.2d at 1276.
67. Id. at 517, 499 A.2d at 1277. The jail visitor normally enters the names of those
visiting and their relationship to the prisoner. And hotel guests normally fill out their
names and addresses. Thus, neither of these forms are filled out by the custodians or
officers of the entity for which the forms are required in the normal course of business.
Id. at 516-17, 499 A.2d at 1276-77.
68. Id. at 519, 499 A.2d at 1277.
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son from the situation in which the third person actually fills out the
form.6 9
3. Present Sense Impression Exception.-In Booth v. State7 the
Court of Appeals adopted the present sense impression exception
to the hearsay rule.7' The court discussed the history and status of
the present sense impression exception, 72 noting that the Federal
Rules of Evidence 73 and a majority of states have adopted it.74 In-
voking an analogy to the excited utterance exception, which Mary-
land had previously adopted,75 the court concluded that the present
sense impression exception was based on a "firm foundation of
trustworthiness," and that Maryland would adopt it in the form in
which it appears in the Federal Rules of Evidence.76
In addition, the court further considered problems in applying
the exception.77 Statements offered under this exception must have
been uttered contemporaneously with or very close in time to the
event perceived. 78 Declarants need not have participated in per-
69. Id.
70. 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986).
71. Id. at 316, 508 A.2d at 977. The witness testified that on the day of the murder
she telephoned the victim. As they were speaking, the victim told her that a friend was
about to leave. The witness testified that she heard the door and questioned the victim
as to who was there. The victim told her that "some guy" was at the door talking with
the departing guest. The witness further testified that the tone of the conversation with
the victim was normal and the victim did not sound nervous or anxious. Id.
72. Id. at 317-23, 508 A.2d at 977-79. The court traced the exception from the nine-
teenth century scholar James Bradley Thayer, through the scholarly writings of Wig-
more, to current approval in E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF
EVIDENCE § 298, at 860 (3d ed. 1984).
73. 306 Md. at 320, 508 A.2d at 976. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condi-
tion, or immediately thereafter.
74. 306 Md. at 321, 508 A.2d at 979. The court noted that at least 28 states recog-
nized the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
75. Id. at 323, 508 A.2d at 981. See, e.g., Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 452 A.2d
661 (1982) (excited utterance exception); Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 73, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963) (excited utterance exception); Wright v. State, 88 Md. 705,
41 A. 1060 (1898) (res gestae exception).
76. 306 Md. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981. The court reasoned that both the excited utter-
ance and present sense impression exceptions are based on the same rationale: both
"preserve the benefit of spontaniety [sic] in the narrow span of time before a declarant
has an opportunity to reflect and fabricate." Id.
77. Id. at 324-31, 508 A.2d at 981-85.
78. Id. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981. The court noted that the appropriate test for sponta-
neity is whether, considering the circumstances, sufficient time had elapsed to permit
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ceived events, but they must at least speak from personal knowl-
edge. 79 A court may admit a statement containing a present sense
impression even if the statement appears merely to express the de-
clarant's opinion.80 Finally, the court rejected the view that corrob-
oration by an independent and equally percipient observer is a
requirement of admissibility."
4. Excited Utterance Exception.-In Johnson v. State 2 the Court of
Special Appeals ruled that statements made by an eighty-nine year
old victim shortly after she had been beaten and robbed were admis-
sible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, even
though the victim was incompetent to testify at the time of trial.8"
The court thus rejected the defendant's contention that the trial
court had erred in not determining whether the victim was compe-
tent at the time she made the statements.8 4
The court noted its holding in Moore v. State 5 that testimonial
incompetence did not bar admissibility of spontaneous declarations
of a young child;8 6 however, rather than concluding that testimonial
competence is always irrelevant, the court stated that the admissibil-
reflective thought. The court recognized that precise spontaneity is not always possible
and that a slight delay in converting observation into speech is acceptable. Id.
79. Id. at 325, 508 A.2d at 981. The court defined personal knowledge as "the de-
clarant's own sensory perceptions." As to the quantity and quality of evidence required
to support personal knowledge, the court stated that in some instances the statement
itself might be enough, while in others extrinsic evidence might be required to permit
admissibility. Identification of the declarant is not a condition of admissibility. Id., 508
A.2d at 981-82.
80. Id. at 325-27, 508 A.2d at 982. Noting the difficulty sometimes encountered in
distinguishing between fact and opinion, the court stated:
A statement that at first blush appears to represent the opinion of the speaker
may prove upon more careful analysis to be non-judgmental in character, or it
may represent a shorthand rendition of facts. Additionally, we recognize that
evidence which enjoys a significant presumption of reliability, and which may
be of significant assistance to the trier of facts ... may be lost if it is excluded
because perceptions are cast in opinion form.
Id. at 325, 508 A.2d at 982.
81. 306 Md. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984. The court did conclude that just as extrinsic
evidence may sometimes be required in order to prove contemporaneity or personal
knowledge, so, too, corroboration of the declarant's perception may in some cases be
required. Id.
82. 63 Md. App. 485, 492 A.2d 1343, cert. denied, 304 Md. 298, 498 A.2d 1185
(1985).
83. Id. at 494, 492 A.2d at 1347-48. The victim was 90 years old at the time of the
trial and confined to a nursing home. The State conceded at the beginning of the trial
that the victim was incompetent to testify at trial. Id. at 490, 492 A.2d at 1345.
84. Id. at 488, 492 A.2d at 1344-45.
85. 26 Md. App. 556, 561, 338 A.2d 344, 347 (1975).
86. 63 Md. App. at 491, 492 A.2d at 1346.
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ity of spontaneous declarations is best determined on a case-by-case
basis.8 7 Reviewing the facts in Johnson, the court observed that the
victim had maintained herself in her own apartment and, in an ex-
cited state, was able to tell a neighbor that she, the victim, had been
beaten and robbed.88 The court thus ruled that the victim's state-
ments were reliable and trustworthy; therefore, they qualified as ex-
cited utterances when made, despite her inability to testify later in
court.
8 9
5. "Catch-A1" Exception.-In Cain v. State90 the Court of Special
Appeals refused to establish a "catch-all" exception 9' to the hearsay
rule, despite the declarant's unavailability at trial and the trial
court's determination that the hearsay statement contained substan-
tial indicia of reliability.92 The declarant had refused to testify at
trial concerning the contents of a written, unsworn statement which
he had previously made to police and which implicated the defend-
ant.9" The trial court then permitted the State to introduce the
statement through the testimony of a police officer.9 4 The appellate
court, however, determined that the statement was hearsay and that
it did not fit any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.9 5 Mary-
land has not recognized a "catch-all" exception, which permits the
admission of any hearsay evidence if the evidence contains sufficient
indicia of reliability; therefore, the court reversed the defendant's
conviction. 96
87. Id. at 493, 492 A.2d at 1347. The court stated that a review of case law led to the
conclusion that a single rule governing admissibility or rejection of excited utterance
testimony was inappropriate. While imbecility or hopeless insanity would rule out ad-
missibility, an individual's simple inability to comprehend an oath is not enough to de-
termine rejection of the testimony. Id.
88. Id. at 494, 492 A.2d at 1347-48.
89. Id. The court also concluded that the victim's statements to a police officer who
arrived shortly after the robbery satisfied the excited utterance exception. Id. at 495,
492 A.2d at 1348.
90. 63 Md. App. 227, 492 A.2d 652, cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
91. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
92. 63 Md. App. at 232-34, 492 A.2d at 654-56.
93. Id. at 230-31, 492 A.2d at 653-54.
94. Id. at 231, 492 A.2d at 654.
95. Id. at 232-34, 492 A.2d at 654-56. Because the witness would not testify, the
statement was not past recollection recorded. Id. at 232, 492 A.2d at 655. Nor did the
statement fall within the business records exception as a police report. Id. at 233, 492
A.2d at 655. Because the statement was not former sworn testimony, the unavailable
witness exception was also inapplicable. Id. at 233-34, 492 A.2d at 655-56.
96. Id. at 234, 492 A.2d at 656.
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D. Failure to Preserve Evidence; Spoliation
In Bailey v. State9 7 the Court of Special Appeals ruled the State's
failure to follow standard forensic procedures and properly to pre-
serve evidence was relevant to the defendant's case; therefore, the
trial court should have admitted this evidence.98 The defendant, on
trial for rape, kidnapping, robbery, and murder, was not allowed to
question an FBI agent concerning standard procedures for examin-
ing the pubic hairs of the alleged rape victims.99 The defendant also
sought to prove that because the State had contaminated the only
semen slides available, the State was unable to perform routine fo-
rensic procedures that could have provided better scientific proof of
the defendant's guilt or innocence.' 0 0
In Eley v. State '0 ' the Court of Appeals had held that "where a
better method of identification may be available and the State offers
no explanation whatsoever for its failure to come forward with such
evidence, it is not unreasonable to allow the defendant to call atten-
tion to its failure to do so."'0 2 Applying this rule in Bailey, the court
found that the trial court had erred in barring testimony concerning
the State's failure to follow routine forensic procedures.'0°
In addition, the Court of Special Appeals found no error in the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse
inference from the State's failure to preserve and analyze the hair
and semen samples.'0 4 The decision whether to issue a "missing
97. 63 Md. App. 594, 493 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
98. Id. at 610, 493 A.2d at 403-04.
99. Id. A hair found in the victim's car was identified as being of Negroid origin.
The State did not send that hair sample or a pubic hair sample from the victim to the
FBI for a comparison analysis. Id. at 608, 493 A.2d at 402.
100. Id., 493 A.2d at 402-03. The defendant wished to call a forensic serology expert
to testify that the Medical Examiner's Officer should have produced an additional set of
semen slides so that a more accurate blood grouping analysis could have been per-
formed. Id.
101. 288 Md. 548, 419 A.2d 384 (1980).
102. Id. at 554, 419 A.2d at 387. In Eley the Court of Appeals held it reversible error
not to allow defense counsel to comment on the State's failure to produce fingerprint
evidence. Id., 419 A.2d at 388.
103. 63 Md. App. at 610, 493 A.2d at 403-04. This error was, however, harmless. Id.
at 610, 493 A.2d at 404. The trial court had permitted the chief investigating officer to
testify that if proper procedures had been followed, both hair samples would have gone
to the FBI for a comparison analysis. The excluded cross-examination concerning this
issue would only have been cumulative in nature. Id. The excluded testimony of the
forensic serology expert concerning the blood grouping analysis would also have been
cumulative: an FBI agent had already testified that a routine analysis could not be per-
formed on the defendant's semen because the Medical Examiner's Office had contami-
nated the only set of semen slides that office had produced. Id. at 611,493 A.2d at 404.
104. Id. The court observed that the defendant had laid a foundation for the negative
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evidence" instruction is within the trial court's discretion.,0 5
In Miller v. Montgomery County '06 the Court of Special Appeals
held that the alleged destruction of evidence by a party to a civil suit
does not give rise to a separate cause of action. 0 7 According to the
court, spoliation (i.e., the destruction, mutilation, or alteration of ev-
idence by a party to the action)'0 " gives rise only to inferences or
presumptions unfavorable to the spoliator, and the correct remedy
is appropriate jury instructions.' 0 9
E. Qualification of Expert Witness
In Miller v. Montgomery County 'O the Court of Special Appeals
also held that an expert witness was competent to offer an opinion
concerning an alleged defect in a traffic light, despite the witness'
lack of expertise in the repair and maintenance of the particular
piece of equipment involved.'' The expert witness, a civil engineer
with a specialty in traffic engineering, had been qualified as an ex-
pert in "traffic signalization" in other judicial proceedings., 2 He
rendered an opinion concerning a possible signal malfunction that
may have contributed to the automobile accident at issue in the
case. "3 The court reiterated the Court of Appeals' statement in Wil-
son v. State:" 14 Expert testimony is admissible if it will assist the jury
in an unfamiliar area and if the court is satisfied that the expert's
inference at trial and had argued it to the jury during closing remarks. Id. Moreover,
the court noted that no Maryland court has ever held that a party is entitled to a missing
evidence instruction. This is perhaps because, as with missing witness instructions, the
failure to give a missing evidence instruction neither removes the inference nor renders
the inference weightier than other inferences. Id. at 611-12, 493 A.2d at 404; see Yuen v.
State, 43 Md. App. 109, 403 A.2d 819 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980) (failure
to grant missing witness instruction is not error).
105. 63 Md. App. at 612, 493 A.2d at 405.
106. 64 Md. App. 202, 494 A.2d 761, cert. denied, 304 Md. 299, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985).
107. Id. at 214, 494 A.2d at 768. Miller involved a personal injury suit resulting from
an automobile accident. Id. at 205, 494 A.2d at 763.
108. Id. at 214, 494 A.2d at 767.
109. Id. at 213-15, 494 A.2d at 767-68.
110. Id. at 202, 494 A.2d at 761.
111. Id. at 211-13, 494 A.2d at 766-67. In a negligence action for personal injuries
that Miller suffered in an automobile accident, the lower court directed a verdict in favor
of Montgomery County and two other parties. The primary point at issue was the func-
tioning of a traffic light at the site of the accident. Id. at 205, 494 A.2d at 763.
112. Id. at 211-12, 494 A.2d at 766. The expert witness had a Ph.D. in civil engineer-
ing and taught courses at Georgia Tech in traffic signals and coordinated systems. Id. at
211, 494 A.2d at 766.
113. Id. at 212, 494 A.2d at 766.
114. 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942).
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background is credible."15 The court found the expert witness in
Miller to have met this standard" 16 even though the witness was per-
sonally unable to repair the allegedly faulty component." 17
F. Sequestration
In McCray v. State" 8 the Court of Appeals held that a trial court
errs by invoking a sequestration rule violation" 9 to bar a defense
witness from testifying, if the State had not requested sequestration
and if the court has not entered a sequestration order.' 20 The court
recognized that trial judges possess broad discretion in the conduct
of trials.' 2  Nonetheless, the sequestration rule requires judges to
enter an order of sequestration before they may impose sanctions
for violation of the rule.' 2 2 Without an order, therefore, a judge
lacks the power to prevent a witness from testifying.
G. Testimonial Competence
In Myers v. State 121 the Court of Appeals held that under section
9-104 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a person
found guilty of perjury, but given probation before judgment, 24 is
competent to testify.' 25 In doing so, the court analyzed the meaning
115. Id. at 6, 26 A.2d at 773.
116. 64 Md. App. at 212, 494 A.2d at 766-67.
117. Id. The expert witness testified that he did not and could not perform the actual
repair of signal components, but that he relied on an electronic technician to do so. Id.,
494 A.2d at 766. That an expert witness with sufficient factual knowledge in an area has
never actually performed a particular procedure is not a disqualifying factor. Rodman v.
Harold, 279 Md. 167, 367 A.2d 472 (1977).
118. 305 Md. 126, 501 A.2d 856 (1985).
119. MD. R. 2-513, the sequestration rule, provides in part: "On motion of any party
made before testimony begins the court shall order that witnesses other than parties be
excluded from the courtroom except when testifying .
120. 305 Md. at 128, 501 A.2d at 857.
121. Id. at 133, 501 A.2d at 860.
122. Id. at 134, 501 A.2d at 860.
123. 303 Md. 639, 496 A.2d 312 (1985).
124. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (Supp. 1986) provides in part:
(a) Probation after plea or finding of guilt; power of court to provide terms and conditions;
waiver of right to appealfromjudgment of guilt-(1) (i) Whenever a person accused of
a crime pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of an offense, a
court exercising criminal jurisdiction, if satisfied that the best interests of the
person and the welfare of the people of the State would be served thereby, and
with the written consent of the person after determination of guilt or accept-
ance of a nolo contendere plea, may stay the entering ofjudgment, defer fur-
ther proceedings, and place the person on probation subject to reasonable
terms and conditions as appropriate.
125. MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-104 (1984) provides that "a person con-
victed of perjury may not testify."
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of the term "conviction" in section 9-104 and concluded that "a
person is not 'convicted' of an offense until the court enters a judg-
ment upon the verdict of guilty." 126 The court then turned its atten-
tion to whether the disposition of probation before judgment alters
its determination as to the meaning of "conviction."' 127
Citing the legislative history of Maryland's probation before
judgment statute, 2 1 the court held that "probation before judg-
ment ... is not a 'conviction,' and a person who receives probation
before judgment is not convicted of the crime for which he has been
found guilty, unless the person violates the probation order and a
court enters a judgment on the finding of guilt.' 2 9 The court re-
jected the argument that its holding frustrated the legislature's in-
tent, reasoning that if the General Assembly had intended for those
found guilty but not convicted of perjury to be disqualified, it could
easily have done so by avoiding the use of the words "convicted of
perjury."'' 3 0
H. Arguing Law
In White v. State13' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that the concepts of reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence
may not be argued to thejury.132 During final argument, the prose-
cution read passages from two Maryland appellate cases concerning
reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.133 The defendant
contended that the trial court erred in allowing the reading of these
126. 303 Md. at 645, 496 A.2d at 315. The court found that the term "convicted" has
two different meanings: (1) in the general sense it means the establishment of guilt,
independent of the judgment of the court; and (2) in its "legal" sense it means "the final
judgment and sentence rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty, and it
is frequently used to denote the judgment or sentence." Id. at 642-43, 496 A.2d at 313-
14. The court concluded that "conviction" has generally been defined in its legal and
technical sense when a legal disability is at stake. Id. at 643, 496 A.2d at 314.
127. Id. at 645, 496 A.2d at 315.
128. Id. at 645-47, 496 A.2d at 315-16.
129. Id. at 647-48, 496 A.2d at 316. The Court of Special Appeals recently addressed
this issue and similarly concluded that probation before judgment does not constitute
"conviction." Tate v. Board of Educ. of Kent County, 61 Md. App. 145, 149, 485 A.2d
688, 690, cert. denied, 303 Md. 42, 491 A.2d 1197 (1985).
130. 303 Md. at 648-49, 496 A.2d at 317. The court refused to "attribute the legisla-
ture's choice of words to careless draftsmanship or accident." Id.
131. 66 Md. App. 100, 502 A.2d 1084 (1986).
132. Id. at 120, 502 A.2d at 1094-95.
133. Id. at 116, 502 A.2d at 1092. The first passage was from Pressley v. State, 295
Md. 143, 454 A.2d 347 (1983), which dealt with the chain theory versus the cable theory
of evidence. The second passage, from Roeder v. State, 4 Md. App. 705, 244 A.2d 895
(1967), cert. denied, 252 Md. 732 (1969), related to defining reasonable doubt. 66 Md.
App. at 116, 502 A.2d at 1092-93.
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passages, because it constituted an invasion of the court's preroga-
tive to instruct the jury, and because the passages were inconsistent
with the actual instructions given.13 4
The Court of Special Appeals held that its prior decision in
Newman v. State ' 3 5 was dispositive. ' 3 6 According to Newman, counsel
may argue law to the jury only if a dispute exists concerning the
"law of the crime.'1 3 7 In the absence of a dispute, counsel may not
argue law even if the argument is "consistent" with the court's
instructions. 13 8
Applying Newman, the court ruled that the trial court erred in
allowing the prosecutor to explain the concepts of reasonable doubt
and circumstantial evidence.'33 The court, however, determined
that this error was harmless 14 and found that the jury would have
returned the same verdict without the prosecutor's improper argu-
ment.' 4 ' The court cautioned, nonetheless, that it might not reach
134. 66 Md. App. at 117, 502 A.2d at 1093.
135. 65 Md. App. 85, 499 A.2d 492 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 419, 504 A.2d 1152
(1986).
136. 66 Md. App. at 117, 502 A.2d at 1093.
137. Id. at 118, 502 A.2d at 1093. In Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558
(1980), the Court of Appeals distinguished matters of law for the court from matters of
law for the jury. In Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), the court
further refined the distinction by listing six characteristics of our criminal justice system
that are not the law of the crime and cannot be argued by counsel:
(1) The accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty by the State by evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) The State has the burden to produce evidence of each element of the crime
establishing the defendant's guilt.
(3) The defendant does not have to testify and the jury may infer no guilt be-
cause of his silence.
(4) The evidence to impeach the defendant bears only on his credibility and
may not be used to prove the substance of the offense.
(5) The evidence is limited to the testimony (and reasonable inferences there-
from) and the exhibits admitted into evidence.
(6) Evidence does not include the remarks of the trial court or arguments of
counsel.
Id. at 91, 437 A.2d at 658.
138. 66 Md. App. at 118, 502 A.2d at 1093-94.
139. Id. at 120, 502 A.2d at 1094-95.
140. Id. at 120-21, 502 A.2d at 1095.
141. Id. at 122-23, 502 A.2d at 1095-96. Since the passages read by the prosecutor
were very similar to the instructions given by the trial court, the error was harmless. Id.
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the same result in all cases involving this type of error, and that its
decision was not intended to encourage prosecutorial embellish-




142. Id. at 123-24, 502 A.2d at 1096.
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VII. FAMILY LAW
A. Monetary Award Under the Marital Property Act
The Marital Property Act' was designed to adjust the equities
between a husband and a wife in a divorce proceeding.2 The statute
calls for a determination of a financial award based upon nonmone-
tary as well as monetary contributions to a marriage.' In addition,
since Maryland's title system of property traditionally discriminated
against women,4 the Act rejects a legalistic notion of property.
Under the Marital Property Act a trial judge must follow a
three-step process in adjusting the rights and equities of the parties.
These steps involve: (1) the determination of what is marital prop-
erty;5 (2) the valuation of all marital property;6 and (3) the determi-
nation of the amount of the award on the basis of ten statutory
factors.7 The trial judge must perform each step separately and in
strict succession.
Many disputes have arisen in Maryland under the Marital Prop-
erty Act. Some have involved the general purpose of the Act or the
judge's application of the three-step process. But while all three
steps are necessary for any monetary award, appeals have often fo-
cused on one of the steps. The following cases will be grouped
accordingly.
1. Three-Step Process: General Provisions of the Marital Property
Act.-Administration of the Marital Property Act rests upon the
traditional presumption that judges know and will properly apply
the law. In reviewing a trial court's monetary award, an appellate
1. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 8-201 to -205 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
2. See Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 595, 505 A.2d 849, 853 (1986).
3. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(a) (1984 & Supp. 1986); see Rosenberg v. Ro-
senberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 519-21, 497 A.2d 485, 501-02 (1985).
4. See Spessard v. Spessard, 64 Md. App. 83, 94, 494 A.2d 701, 706-07 (1985). The
General Assembly itself stated:
[I]t is the policy of this State that marriage is a union between a man and a
woman having equal rights under the law .... [W]hen a marriage is dissolved
the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably,
with careful consideration being given to both monetary and nonmonetary con-
tributions made by the respective spouses to the well-being of the family ....
1978 Md. Laws 2305.
5. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-203 (1984).
6. Id. at § 8-204.
7. Id. at § 8-205.
738
court should reverse only in cases of clear error.' Nonetheless, this
presumption will give way when the trial record does not indicate
adequate support for the judge's decision.
In Campolattaro v. Campolattaro9 the Court of Special Appeals
held that the record below did not adequately reflect that the chan-
cellor properly applied the three-step process for determining the
amount of the monetary award. The appellate court questioned the
chancellor's application of each of the three necessary steps. His
oral opinion did not specifically designate marital property,' and it
erroneously used the date of the separation agreement, rather than
the date of the divorce decree, to determine what were marital as-
sets." t It did not value any of the spouses' property.' 2 Finally, the
opinion gave no indication of which of the ten statutory factors' 3 the
chancellor had considered in determining the amount of the
award. ' 4
The presumption that judges know and properly apply the law
does not require that a judge enumerate every step in the decision-
making process.' 5 But if the circumstances of the case do not indi-
cate a well-reasoned decision, the presumption will be rebutted.' 6
The court did not mandate a particular form of opinion or checklist,
but it warned that failure to recite a standard checklist of issues may
give the impression that the trial court neglected the law.' 7 There-
fore, the trial court should set forth in some detail the basis for its
conclusions. 18
Based upon the incomplete trial record, the Court of Special
Appeals vacated the chancellor's monetary award.' 9 In addition, the
court vacated the alimony award despite support from the record,
8. Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 78, 502 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1986).
9. Id. at 68, 502 A.2d at 1068.
10. Id. at 78, 502 A.2d at 1073.
11. Id. at 82, 502 A.2d at 1075. The chancellor thus failed to consider a home ac-
quired by the husband in his name after separation but before divorce.
12. Id. at 78, 502 A.2d at 1073.
13. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205 (1984).
14. 66 Md. App. at 78, 502 A.2d at 1073.
15. Id. at 79-80, 502 A.2d at 1074. In fact, in Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md. App. 710, 717-
18, 493 A.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (1985), the court found that the chancellor properly ap-
plied the law in an oral opinion in which he neither discussed all of the statutory factors
nor articulated all of the bases for his conclusions. The court held that the circum-
stances supported the presumption that the chancellor properly understood and applied
the law.
16. 66 Md. App. at 80, 502 A.2d at 1074.
17. Id. at 81, 502 A.2d at 1075.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 83, 502 A.2d at 1076.
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since alimony and monetary awards are so closely intertwined. °
In Spessard v. Spessard2 1 the Court of Special Appeals held that
the traditional rules of contribution for cotenants do not apply in
establishing a monetary award under the Maryland Marital Property
Act. The court therefore remanded without affirmance or
reversal.22
The husband in Spessard sought contribution for home expenses
as part of the monetary award upon divorce. 3 Traditionally, one
cotenant who pays the mortgage, taxes, and carrying costs ofjointly
owned property is entitled to collect proportionately from the other
cotenant.2 4 In the event of an ouster, however, the tenant in posses-
sion generally forfeits the right to contribution. 5
The Court of Special Appeals held that the common-law doc-
trine should not apply so strictly to a divorce proceeding.26 The
court stated that a trial judge must apply the three-step statutory
process by determining what constitutes marital property, assessing
its value, and adjusting the equities in the instant case. 27
Although an ouster may affect contribution in setting a mone-
tary award, it is not determinative, but merely another factor for
consideration.2 8 While it may request contribution as part of a mon-
etary award, the court is not required to do so. Any other holding
would negate the equitable purpose of the Marital Property Act. 9
In determining whether to require contribution, the court must con-
sider what equitable adjustment will conform to the statute's
intent.3 °
20. Id. at 75, 502 A.2d at 1071. Even though the purposes of alimony and monetary
awards differ, the court must consider the awards in their "mutual context" to provide
an equitable result. See Cotter v. Cotter, 58 Md. App. 529, 535, 473 A.2d 970, 973
(1984).
21. 64 Md. App. 83, 93, 494 A.2d 701, 706 (1985).
22. Id. at 96, 494 A.2d at 708.
23. Id. at 87, 494 A.2d at 703.
24. Id. at 88, 494 A.2d at 704.
25. Id. In this case, the Court of Special Appeals found the record unclear as to
whether an ouster had in fact occurred, although the lower court held that there was no
ouster. Since the basis for establishing no ouster was unclear on the record and there-
fore not clearly erroneous, the Court of Special Appeals remanded for determination of
that issue. Id. at 90, 494 A.2d at 705.
26. The court stressed that the rules of contribution are time-honored and are not to
be overruled. Rather, the rules no longer apply in the same way under the Marital Prop-
erty Act. Id. at 93, 494 A.2d at 706.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 95, 494 A.2d at 707.




The Spessard decision illustrates the equitable nature of the Mar-
ital Property Act. There are no hard and fast rules, such as the strict
common-law rules of contribution. Every aspect of the case is sim-
ply a factor for the judge to consider in fashioning an appropriate
remedy.
2. Determination of Marital Property.-a. Definition of "Prop-
erty. "--The first determination that a Maryland court must make in
establishing a monetary award under the Marital Property Act is
which assets of the husband and wife constitute "marital property"
subject to equitable distribution. The Maryland Code defines "mar-
ital property" generally as all "property, however titled, acquired by
1 or both parties during marriage."' The scope of marital property
is often the subject of litigation. Frequently a case will center on
whether the "property" in question is a present interest or a mere
expectancy of future benefit.
One area of particular controversy in the law has been the ex-
tent to which professional degrees constitute marital property. In
the usual scenario, one spouse has supported the other through
school, and wishes to share in the financial benefits associated with
the degree upon divorce. The Maryland Court of Appeals ad-
dressed this issue for the first time in Archer v. Archer."
In Archer the Court of Appeals held that a medical degree and
license earned during marriage did not constitute marital property
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce under the Marital
Property Act.33 The court acknowledged that a broad concept of
property is appropriate under Maryland's statute, the purpose of
which is to recognize all monetary and nonmonetary contributions
to a marriage.3 4 Other Maryland cases have construed "property"
under the statute to include goodwill, 35 obligations, and rights. 6
The court wrote, however, that a professional degree does not
contain the traditional attributes of property, as it is "neither trans-
31. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(1) (1984).
32. 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
33. Id. at 357-58, 493 A.2d at 1079-80.
34. Id. at 352, 493 A.2d at 1077.
35. See Schill v. Remington Putnam Co., 179 Md. 83, 88-89, 17 A.2d 175, 177-78
(1941) (quoting Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
193 (1936): "The primary aim of the law is to protect the property-namely, the good
will--of the producer, which he still owns.").
36. Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942) (" '[P]roperty'...




ferable, assignable, devisable, nor subject to conveyance, sale,
pledge, or inheritance."3 7 A degree is merely an intellectual attain-
ment, not a present property interest, and it remains personal to the
holder.3 8 There is neither an assignable value that can be ascribed
to a degree, nor a guarantee of future income. 9 A mere potential
to increase earning capacity is too uncertain and speculative to be
considered marital property within the Maryland statute, and noth-
ing within the Marital Property Act suggests that the legislature
meant to extend the scope of property to include a professional
degree.4 0
The court reached its conclusion after reviewing similar rulings
in other jurisdictions and reinforced the trend away from recogniz-
ing professional degrees as marital property. Of the twenty-four ju-
risdictions that had considered the issue, all but two had clearly held
that a degree does not constitute marital property.4 ' Most courts
reasoned that a professional degree simply lacks the traditional at-
tributes of property.42
In addition, the Court of Appeals distinguished a medical de-
37. 303 Md. at 353, 493 A.2d at 1077.
38. Id. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080.
39. Id. ("[A]t best it represents a potential for increase in a person's earning capacity
.... .).
40. Id., 493 A.2d 1079.
41. Id. at 352-56, 493 A.2d at 1077-79. The other two jurisdictions, Michigan and
New York, were less clear, yet they also seemed to agree with the majority view. In
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1983), the
Michigan Court of Appeals, an intermediate court, held that a professional degree was
marital property. Two subsequent Court of Appeals decisions, however, cast doubt on
the strength of this holding. A professional degree was held not to be marital property
in Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984), and in Watling v. Watling,
127 Mich. App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983), the court held that the benefits the wife
received during the marriage sufficiently compensated her for her contributions to the
degree. Two New York cases advanced the notion that the need to reach an equitable
solution outweighed the fact that a degree is not traditional property. Both cases were
reversed on appeal. Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 109 A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338
(1985), vacated, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1985); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982), modified, 106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985).
Note, however, that on December 26, 1985, six months after the Archer decision, the
New York Court of Appeals reversed O'Brien and held a professional degree to be mari-
tal property. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
42. 303 Md. at 353-54, 493 A.2d at 1077-78. Other rationales given by courts in-
clude: (1) a degree is too speculative in value; (2) if spousal contribution is viewed as an
investment, it demeans the concept of marriage; (3) future earnings are personal to the
worker and constitute a mere expectancy; and (4) a degree is best considered when es-
tablishing alimony. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339-41, 631 P.2d 115, 121-
23 (1981) ("[E]ducation is an intangible property right, the value of which, because of its
character, cannot properly be characterized as property subject to division between the
spouses.").
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gree from vested pension rights, which have been held to constitute
"property" within the meaning of the statute.43 The court con-
cluded that although pension rights also were not traditional prop-
erty interests, they were contractual rights that could be valued, not
the mere expectancy of value associated with a professional
degree.44
The court noted that a professional degree is not without signif-
icance in a divorce proceeding, since the court may consider a
spouse's earning capacity when establishing an alimony award.45
Using one spouse's degree as a factor under the alimony statute is
the most appropriate means of providing economic compensation
to the other spouse, if public policy warrants such compensation.46
In Unkle v. Unkle 47 the Court of Appeals held, in a case of first
impression,4 s that an inchoate personal injury claim 49 which arose
during the time between separation and divorce, and for which the
injured spouse had communicated with an attorney but had not filed
an action, is not "marital property. ' 50  The court deemed the hus-
band's injuries to be uniquely personal. 5' Although an inchoate per-
sonal injury claim has some aspects of property, it is a mere
expectancy, not an existing property interest.5 2 It is therefore not
considered an asset "acquired during marriage" for purposes of the
Marital Property Act.5"
The court defended its conclusion despite the broad construc-
tion to be given "marital property" under the Marital Property Act.
Explicit in the legislative history of the Act is the notion that equita-
43. 303 Md. at 356, 493 A.2d at 1079; see Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 128, 437
A.2d 883, 890 (1981) (holding that "a spouse's pension rights, to the extent accumu-
lated during the marriage, constitute a form of 'marital property' ").
44. 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079-80.
45. Id. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1080.
46. Id., 493 A.2d at 1081. In establishing alimony, the court in the instant case up-
held the lower court's consideration of earning capacity.
47. 305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986).
48. The court considered the case sufficiently significant to grant certiorari before
disposition by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 590, 505 A.2d at 850.
49. The husband was injured in an accident at the Wild World amusement park in
Largo, Maryland. Id. at 589, 505 A.2d at 850.
50. Id. at 596, 505 A.2d at 854.
51. Id.
52. Id. An unliquidated tort claim is considered to be a chose in action and recover-
able in a suit at law. Technically the claim is assignable, but the mere fact of assignability
does not mean it constitutes marital property under the Act. Id. at 595, 505 A.2d at 853.
53. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(1) (1984). The court distinguished con-
tractual rights, such as pension funds, from mere expectancies, such as professional de-
grees that have only speculative value. 305 Md. at 590-91, 505 A.2d at 851; see Archer v.
Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985).
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ble distribution of property upon divorce recognizes the duty of
each spouse to contribute his or her best efforts to the marriage.54
However, the husband did not acquire his inchoate personal injury
claim, which was purely fortuitous, while attempting to acquire mar-
ital assets. 55 Thus, the claim is not the type of resource contem-
plated by the legislature in drafting the Marital Property Act. 6
The court further held that the trial court abused its discretion
in establishing an in futuro modification of child support. The trial
court may modify child support only upon an affirmative showing of
a material change in the child's needs or a parent's ability to pay.57
The court may not anticipate that such changes will occur. 5s There-
fore, the trial court's decree was vacated, and the case was re-
manded for further proceedings.5 9
In Green v. Green6 ° the Court of Special Appeals reviewed a
chancellor's monetary award. The court focused primarily on
whether unexercised stock options constituted marital property, and
how certain property should be valued. 61
In Green a wife claimed that the trial court had incorrectly ex-
cluded from marital property unexercised stock options provided to
her husband through employment. In a case of first impression, the
Court of Special Appeals agreed.62 The court compared stock op-
tions to pension funds, and characterized both as forms of compen-
sation that granted an employee a chose in action if the employer
tried to rescind them.65 Although the stock options were not assign-
54. 305 Md. at 595-96, 505 A.2d at 853.
55. Id. at 596, 505 A.2d at 854.
56. Id. The court noted that other jurisdictions considered the purpose of recovery in
determining whether a personal injury claim is marital property. If recovery is sought
for noneconomic losses, then the compensation is not marital property. But if lost
wages or other economic losses form the basis of recovery, then the claim is considered
marital property. Id. at 593, 505 A.2d at 852. Having based its holding on the legislative
purpose behind the statute, the court in Unkle did not need to use this distinction. See id.
at 596, 505 A.2d at 854.
57. Id. at 597, 505 A.2d at 854.
58. Id. at 597-98, 505 A.2d at 854-55. The court had ordered the father to pay the
children's insurance as well as the utility bills and half of the mortgage payment on the
marital home until the home was sold. After the sale, his weekly payments were to drop
to $50 per child.
59. Id. at 598, 505 A.2d at 855.
60. 64 Md. App. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1985).
61. The valuation issues are treated separately. See infra notes 98-109 and accompa-
nying text.
62. 64 Md. App. at 136, 494 A.2d at 728.
63. Id. ("[S]tock option plans, like other benefits in an employee's compensation
package, constitute 'property' as used in the definition of marital property.").
744 [VOL. 46:738
able, they were "an economic resource" that could be valued.'
Thus, they constituted property. Since the husband received the
stock options during the term of the marriage, the options qualified
as marital property. 65 The court remanded the case to the chancel-
lor for an adjustment of the monetary award based on this
holding.66
b. Time Limit: The Ninety-Day Rule.-The court must determine
what constitutes marital property when the court grants a divorce
decree or within ninety days of the decree, unless the court extends
the deadline before the ninetieth day and the parties consent to the
extension. Thus, in Ticer v. Ticer68 the Court of Special Appeals
held that a trial court lost its jurisdiction to designate a pension fund
as marital property because the court failed to make a designation
within ninety days and the parties did not properly consent to an
extension. The parties must give consent within ninety days.6 9
In Zorich v. Zorich7 the Court of Special Appeals stated an ex-
ception to the ninety day rule. The court held that the trial judge
did not err in granting a monetary award to the wife even though
the supplemental decree granting the award was filed more than
ninety days following the divorce decree. The trial judge had orally
reserved the issues of monetary awards and alimony when granting
the divorce decree, and had requested that the wife's counsel draft a
supplemental decree granting the monetary award.7 '
The court acknowledged the general rule that a party's failure
to initiate an action within the statute of limitations will serve as a
bar to the action.71 In this instance, however, the arbiter of the con-
troversy was responsible for the delay. The trial judge bears the re-
sponsibility for filing the supplemental decree; merely requesting a
64. Id. at 137, 494 A.2d at 728.
65. Id. at 136, 494 A.2d at 728.
66. Id. at 138, 494 A.2d at 729.
67. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-203(a) (1984).
68. 63 Md. App. 729, 737, 493 A.2d 1105, 1109, cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d
1186 (1985).
69. The court held that a 1982 amendment to the statute authorizing extension by
mutual consent still required that the parties give consent within 90 days. Id. If, as here,
parties attempt to extend the deadline by consenting after the 90 day period, they are in
essence privately conferring jurisdiction, which is impermissible. In sum, if the parties
consent within 90 days to extend the deadline beyond the 90th day, the court has juris-
diction to designate marital property. But if the consent itself is given after the 90th day,
there is no jurisdiction. Id. at 737-38, 493 A.2d at 1110.
70. 63 Md. App. 710, 714, 493 A.2d 1096, 1098 (1985).
71. Id. at 713, 493 A.2d at 1097.
72. Id. at 715, 493 A.2d at 1098.
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party to draft a document does not shift that duty.73 The Court of
Special Appeals declined to bar the wife's action for monetary relief
solely on the basis of the judge's failure to act.74
c. Separation Agreements and Marital Property.-The Marital Prop-
erty Act provides that what might otherwise be marital property may
be "excluded by valid agreement. ' 75 Parties often attempt to alter
the character of marital property through antenuptial or separation
agreements. Appellate cases in the past year considered both the
specificity of an exclusion from marital property and the validity of
the agreement itself.
In Falise v. Falise 76 spouses had entered into a separation agree-
ment containing a waiver of ownership provision as to property then
held or after-acquired.7 7 After the agreement, the parties recon-
ciled, and built and titled a house in both names. 78 Following a brief
reconciliation, the parties filed for divorce. The question presented
was what impact the separation agreement had upon the classifica-
tion of the land and house as marital or nonmarital property under
the Marital Property Act.7 9
The Court of Special Appeals held that to be excluded from the
statute, property must be specifically designated in a separation
agreement as nonmarital.8 ° In this case, when the spouses executed
the agreement, the court had no jurisdiction to make a marital dis-
tribution, and the spouses had not yet acquired the land and house;
therefore, the wife could not release a right that she did not have
73. Id. at 716, 493 A.2d at 1099. The court noted that the trial judge "could and
should have imposed strict guidelines for the submission of the decree, and, in any
event, made sure that it was submitted prior to the expiration of the 90th day." Id. at
716 n.5, 493 A.2d at 1099 n.5.
74. Id. at 716, 493 A.2d at 1099. In this instance the parties were not attempting to
confer jurisdiction by consent where none existed. Jurisdiction still existed because of
the nature of the delay. See id. at 714, 493 A.2d at 1098.
75. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(2)(iii) (1984).
76. 63 Md. App. 574, 493 A.2d 385 (1985).
77. The agreement provided, in part: "[T]he parties ... do hereby mutually release
... all rights .. .which said parties might now have or may hereafter have as the hus-
band, wife .... or otherwise, in and to any property, real or personal, that either of said
parties may own or hereafter acquire...." 63 Md. App. at 578 n.1, 493 A.2d at 387 n.l.
78. The husband originally purchased a tract of land in his name only. As the parties
began discussing a possible reconciliation, they jointly planned construction of a home
on the land. When the parties received financing for the house, a new deed was issued
titling the property in both names. Id. at 577-78, 493 A.2d at 387.
79. Id. at 579, 493 A.2d at 388.
80. Id. at 581, 493 A.2d at 389 ("[T]he parties must specifically provide that the
subject property must be considered 'non marital' or in some other terms specifically
exclude the property from the scope of the Marital Property Act.").
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and could not fairly anticipate."1 The "after acquired" property
provision in the separation agreement was by no means specific
enough to exclude the land and house from consideration under the
Marital Property Act. 2
If the separation agreement does not categorize property, the
court must make a determination under the statutory "source of
funds" test for purchased goods: if marital assets fund a particular
property item, then the item is considered marital property.83 Be-
cause the source of funds for the land and house was traceable to
the Falises' marital assets, and the couple acquired the property
before the divorce decree, the land and house were marital property
that the court should distribute equitably.8 4 The Court of Special
Appeals remanded the case for a readjustment of the equities.8 5
In Carsey v. Carsey 8 6 a husband abandoned his wife of fourteen
years. Upon leaving, he left two notes and a tape in which he relin-
quished all rights to the marital estate. 7 Both spouses petitioned
for divorce, and the court granted the husband a divorce on no-fault
grounds. In a subsequent hearing concerning distribution of mari-
tal property, the husband argued that the notes and tape were inva-
lid.88 The trial judge determined that the three communications
81. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 72 NJ. 350, 358-59, 371 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1977)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 582-83, 493 A.2d at 389-90.
84. Id. at 582-85, 493 A.2d at 388-91. The court further upheld the trial judge's
determination that titling the property jointly did not create a presumption that the hus-
band intended the house to be a gift to his wife. The legalistic notion of property is not
appropriate in establishing a monetary reward: "source of funds" remains the yardstick.
Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 269-72, 477 A.2d 1163, 1167-69 (1984).
85. The trial judge granted the wife a monetary award of $2500 "as her interest in
the real estate." 63 Md. App. at 584, 493 A.2d at 390. The facts of the case indicate that
the husband should have received a monetary award. Apparently, the judge believed that
his action denied the wife any interest in the real estate other than the $2500. Id. Such a
settlement would effectively constitute a transfer of title to the property. But "the court
may not transfer the ownership of personal or real property from 1 party to the other."
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-202(a)(3) (Supp. 1986). Furthermore, the court may not
grant a fixed sum monetary award, in settlement of the one party's interest in property,
without carefully considering the ten statutory factors listed in § 8-205. 63 Md. App. at
585, 493 A.2d at 391; see Ward v. Ward, 48 Md. App. 307, 311, 426 A.2d 443, 446
(1981). Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings. 63
Md. App. at 585-86, 493 A.2d at 391.
86. 67 Md. App. 544, 508 A.2d 533 (1986).
87. Id. at 547, 508 A.2d at 534. The first of the two notes contained the following:
"I hereby irrevocably, and for the future, relinquish all claims to any estate ofJ.N. & N.S.
Carsey. I also disclaim any responsibility for liabilities related to that estate." Id.
88. Id. at 549, 508 A.2d at 535. The husband advanced three arguments: the agree-
ment was simply a statement of intention and thus lacked specificity; there was no con-
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constituted an offer, accepted by the wife, 89 that precluded the hus-
band's estate from being categorized as marital property.9° Pursu-
ant to the agreement, the court declared the wife the sole owner of
her husband's abandoned estate.9'
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the decision below as not
clearly erroneous.92 The court distinguished Falise on the ground
that the instant agreement specifically dealt with identifiable prop-
erty in the parties' possession at the time of the agreement. The
specificity of the husband's description created "a valid agreement"
for purposes of the Marital Property Act.93 The court ordered title
in the estate transferred to the wife.94
3. Valuation of Marital Property.-The second step in determin-
ing a proper monetary award under the Marital Property Act is the
valuation of all marital assets.95 The court seeks to assign each asset
a current fair market value, which is defined as "the amount at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller."96 The determination of value is an arduous and often spec-
ulative endeavor, frequently requiring detailed expert testimony, 97
but it is a necessary step towards fair distribution of marital assets.
In Green v. Green98 the Court of Special Appeals held that a hus-
band's unexercised stock options constituted marital property. 99
The court then turned its attention to valuing the stocks options and
partnership interests.
The court recommended an elastic approach to valuing stock
options, which would not compel the holder to exercise the op-
sideration for the agreement; and his mental incapacity, caused by alcohol and financial
problems, rendered the agreement invalid.
89. The trial court did not elaborate as to what form her acceptance took, but noted
that she "apparently pursued and was successful in sorting out the financial situation
with which she was left." Id. at 547, 508 A.2d at 535.
90. Id. at 548, 508 A.2d at 535.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 552, 508 A.2d at 537.
93. Id. at 552-54, 508 A.2d at 537-38. The court pointed out that the wife, "through
her conduct, accepted the unilateral offer." Id. at 553, 508 A.2d at 537.
94. Id. at 554, 508 A.2d at 538.
95. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-204 (1984).
96. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 537 (5th Ed. 1979).
97. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 497 A.2d 485 (1985), dis-
cussed infra at notes 120-229 and accompanying text.
98. 64 Md. App. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1985).
99. Id. at 136, 494 A.2d at 728. The court's handling of the property issue is de-
scribed supra at notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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tion.' 0 0 By determining the market value of the stock at the date of
the decree and the cost to exercise the option, and then establishing
a percentage by which profits would be divided, if, as, and when the
options are exercised, the court can assign a value to the options.' 0 '
The trial court had classified the husband's interest in a part-
nership as marital property. The Court of Special Appeals reversed
the lower court's method of valuing this interest, holding that the
lower court erred in deducting the losses incurred in a bad partner-
ship investment from the value of the marital estate. A partnership
with liabilities in excess of assets has a value of zero, not a negative
value. 102
The court further found that the trial court incorrectly catego-
rized certain indebtedness of the husband as marital debts. Marital
debts are " 'directly traceable to the acquisition of marital prop-
erty.' "10' Marital property represented by a marital debt has not
yet been acquired for purposes of distribution upon divorce. Thus,
the court must decrease the value of marital property by the amount
of any attaching marital debt. 104 On the other hand, a nonmarital
debt does not affect the value of the marital property, but does off-
set the balancing of the equities in determining a monetary
award. 10 5
The court applied this distinction to several debts in reclassify-
ing them as nonmarital. The first was a debt that the husband in-
curred in financing a loan to his partnership. While the court could
trace the debt directly to the acquisition of a promissory note from
the partnership to the husband, marital debt may only reduce the
value of the corresponding marital property. Since the court had
previously declared the note valueless,'0 6 the debt could not reduce
100. Id. at 137, 494 A.2d at 729. To compel the option holder to exercise the option
for valuation purposes would deprive the holder of the essence of the property interest,
which is the right to choose whether to purchase.
101. Id. at 137-38, 494 A.2d at 729. This valuation method has been used for unma-
tured pensions. See Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 129-30, 437 A.2d 883, 890-91
(1981).
102. 64 Md. App. at 141-42, 494 A.2d at 731.
103. Id. at 146, 494 A.2d at 733 (quoting Schweitzer v. Schweitzer, 301 Md. 626, 636,
484 A.2d 267, 272 (1984)).
104. Id.
105. In practice, therefore, either type of debt may affect the monetary award. The
difference concerns the stage at which the debt is considered. Marital debt affects the
value of marital property, the second step in the three-step process. Nonmarital debt
affects the amount of the actual award, the third step. See id. at 146, 494 A.2d at 733.
106. Id. at 138-39, 494 A.2d at 729.
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the note's value further.'t 7 The court also held that federal and
state income taxes due upon a sale of stock, the proceeds of which
were used to buy a new home, did not constitute a marital debt,
since the tax liability could not be traced directly to the purchase of
the horiie.' 08 The court thus ordered that on remand the trial judge
should increase the value of the marital property by the amount of
these improper deductions. 0 9
B. Alimony
Maryland courts award alimony under the principle of rehabili-
tation. Alimony payments aim to help the economically dependent
spouse become self-supporting, and therefore should end when that
spouse is financially independent." 0 Under certain circumstances,
however, the trial court may order that alimony payments continue
indefinitely."' The case of Brandon v. Brandon"t 2 concerned the
propriety of an indefinite alimony award.
In Brandon the chancellor had held, after multiple remands for
factual findings by the Master for Domestic Relations Causes
(master)," 13 that a husband was to provide alimony payments for an
indefinite period of time." 4 The husband, citing section 11-106(c)
of the Family Law Article, appealed on the ground that the award of
indefinite alimony was clearly erroneous.' 15 Section 11-106(c) pro-
107. Id. at 146, 494 A.2d at 733.
108. Id. at 147, 494 A.2d at 733-34.
109. Id. at 148, 494 A.2d at 734.
110. See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465 (1984), in
which the court stated:
It is apparent, therefore, that the concept of alimony as a lifetime pension en-
abling the financially dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of
living has largely been superceded by the concept that the economically depen-
dent spouse should be required to become self-supporting, even though that
might result in a reduced standard of living.
111. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(c) (1984).
112. 66 Md. App. 214, 503 A.2d 264 (1986).
113. The master is a ministerial officer who conducts a full evidentiary hearing, then
reports findings of fact and recommendations to the chancellor. The chancellor is
charged with determining the parties' legal status. The chancellor gives great deference
to the master's findings of fact, but the master's recommendations serve as nothing
more than a guide. See Wenger v. Wenger, 42 Md. App. 596, 602-08, 402 A.2d 94, 97-
100 (1979) (distinguishing between the master's findings of fact, which are based on
first-hand observation of the witnesses, and the master's recommendations, which are
findings of law).
114. The trial court set alimony at $450 per month, awarded the wife a 50% vested
interest in her husband's pension, and awarded attorney's fees to the wife. 66 Md. App.
at 227, 503 A.2d at 271.
115. Id. at 224, 503 A.2d at 269.
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vides that the court may award indefinite alimony payments only if:
(1) the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to be-
come self-supporting; or (2) even after that party becomes self-sup-
porting, the respective living standards of the parties will be
unconscionably disparate. 16
The Court of Special Appeals noted that the master had never
made either of the two findings necessary to justify indefinite ali-
mony. 117 Upon reviewing the master's findings, the chancellor
chose to set no termination date for alimony, thus in effect creating
indefinite alimony." 8 While the court could not deem the chancel-
lor's actions erroneous, it did remand the case to the chancellor to
review the evidence, test it against the two statutory criteria, and
determine if any basis existed for indefinite alimony." 9
Alimony issues were also raised in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg. These
issues are discussed in subpart C, below.
C. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg
Perhaps the most publicized family law case in Maryland in the
past year was the Rosenberg divorce proceeding. 120 Henry Rosen-
berg, Jr. is the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
the Crown Central Petroleum Corporation (Crown). His net worth
approached $33,000,000 at the time of the divorce trial.'12  The
Court of Special Appeals' lengthy opinion examined many issues
concerning the determination and valuation of marital property,
and the establishing of a proper monetary award and alimony.
While the precedential value of the court's opinion is not yet clear,
Rosenberg stands as a vivid illustration of the type of detailed analysis
that trial and appellate courts must conduct when dividing a marital
estate.
On June 15, 1984, a chancellor in Baltimore City granted a di-
116. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-106(c) (1984).
117. 66 Md. App. at 224, 503 A.2d at 269.
118. Id. at 224-25, 503 A.2d at 269-70. Upon receiving the master's report, the chan-
cellor may order de novo fact findings or rely exclusively on the master's findings.
Wenger v. Wenger, 42 Md. App. 596, 607-08, 402 A.2d 94, 100 (1979). The chancellor
should, however, afford the master's report great deference. See supra note 113.
119. 66 Md. App. at 225, 503 A.2d at 270. The court affirmed the amount of the
alimony award and the award of attorney's fees. The status of the husband's pension
depended upon the duration of alimony, as monetary awards and alimony are so closely
interrelated. Id. at 227, 503 A.2d at 271.
120. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 497 A.2d 485, cert. denied, 305 Md.
107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985).
121. Id. at 496, 497 A.2d at 489.
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vorce decree ending the thirty-two year Rosenberg marriage. 22 The
chancellor found that both parties had committed adultery; 21
grounds for absolute divorce lay in either these adulterous acts or
the parties' two year separation. 1
24
The chancellor ordered that: (1) the husband pay his wife a
monetary award of $1,750,000; (2) the husband pay alimony of
$275,000 per year; (3) the marital home and its contents be sold at
public auction if the parties could not reach an agreement regarding
disposition of the property within eighteen months; (4) the husband
pay the wife's attorney's fees; and (5) the husband pay the wife's
court Costs. 1 2 5 Following slight revisions of the court order, 26 the
chancellor held a hearing on the wife's litigation expenses, and or-
dered Mr. Rosenberg to pay approximately $225,000 to his wife's
attorney for those expenses. 2 7
On appeal Mr. Rosenberg raised four issues: the amount of the
monetary award; the amount of the alimony award; the award of at-
torney's fees; and the award of litigation expenses. 2 On cross-ap-
peal Ms. Rosenberg raised the issue whether the court should have
included the increased value of certain gifts in marital property. 129
1. Monetary Award.-a. Inclusion of Loans and Cash Advances.-
The chancellor's determination of marital property included an in-
terest-free promissory note from Dorothy Bohny, I'3 the interest
foregone on that note, and the amount of cash advances made to
Ms. Bohny.' 3 ' Mr. Rosenberg contended that the court erred in
deeming these items marital property, because there was no evi-
122. Id. at 498, 497 A.2d at 490.
123. Id. at 493-94, 497 A.2d at 488.
124. Id. The court's opinion does not specify on which ground the divorce a vinculo
matrimonii was granted.
125. Id. at 498-99, 497 A.2d at 490-91.
126. OnJuly 13, 1984, the trial court issued a supplemental opinion finding that the
wife obtained her interest in the marital residence by personal gift, and that the husband
intended his wife to be the sole owner ofjewelry he had given her as gifts. On August 6,
1984, the court granted Mr. Rosenberg's motion to stay the payment of the monetary
award upon his posting a bond, and delayed the sale of the marital residence until after
he paid the monetary award, but denied motions to stay the payment of alimony and
counsel fees. Id. at 499-500, 497 A.2d at 491.
127. Id. at 500, 497 A.2d at 491.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 500-01, 497 A.2d at 491-92. Though Ms. Rosenberg designated two issues
in her cross-appeal, they were virtually identical.
130. Ms. Bohny is apparently Mr. Rosenberg's new wife. Id. at 501 n.2, 497 A.2d at
492 n.2.
131. Id. at 501, 497 A.2d at 492.
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dence that he intentionally dissipated the marital estate through
these transactions.13
2
The Court of Special Appeals declared that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's findings.133 Specifically, Mr. Rosenberg lent
money to Ms. Bohny after announcing his intention to end the mar-
riage, and he channelled the funds through a Texas bank account
and lawyer to Ms. Bohny.' 34 Nevertheless, he denied knowledge of
the transaction during his deposition."3 5 The promissory note for
the loan provided for repayment to a straw corporation used by Mr.
Rosenberg. 1 6 These facts, taken together, demonstrated Mr. Ro-
senberg's intent to conceal the transactions and thereby dissipate
the marital estate.' 1
7
In addition to including the value of the promissory note and
cash advances as part of marital property, the chancellor properly
included all interest foregone on the interest-free note.' 38 Had Mr.
Rosenberg lent this money in the ordinary course of business, he
would have earned interest. Through the fraudulent loan to Ms.
Bohny, Mr. Rosenberg wrongfully deprived his wife of an opportu-
nity to increase the marital estate." 9 Thus, the trial court did not err
by including imputed interest on the loan in its determination of
marital property.' 40
b. Valuation of Pension Plans and Retirement Accounts.-A large
portion of the marital property came from four pension and retire-
132. Id. at 502, 497 A.2d at 492.
133. Id. at 503, 497 A.2d at 493.
134. Mr. Rosenberg set up a network whereby he "transferred funds to a Texas bank
account, the bank delivered them to a Texas attorney, and the attorney transmitted the
amount to Bohny." Id. at 503, 497 A.2d at 492.
135. Id. The court did not discuss the extent of Mr. Rosenberg's liability for having
lied under oath.
136. Id. The corporation was Camac, Inc.
137. Id. at 502, 497 A.2d at 492. The court stated: " '[S]uch intentional dissipation is
no more than a fraud on marital rights ... and the chancellor should consider the dissi-
pated property as extant marital property... to be valued with the other existing marital
property.'" Id. (quoting Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md. App. 386, 399, 473 A.2d 499, 505
(1984)).
138. Id. at 503, 497 A.2d at 493.
139. Id. See Laminoirs v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
("An award of interest [may be] made so that a person wrongfully deprived of the use of
his money should be made whole for his loss.")
140. 64 Md. App. at 504, 497 A.2d at 493. Mr. Rosenberg argued that if the court
included the foregone interest as constructive income, it should also take into account
the 50% personal income tax imposed on the interest. The court reserved this issue for
later consideration.
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ment plans maintained by Crown for Mr. Rosenberg. 4 ' He objected
both to the date and method of valuing these plans.
Mr. Rosenberg first contended that the trial court erred in valu-
ing the pension and retirement plans as of the date the trial ended,
rather than the date of the divorce decree.' 42 He argued that Mary-
land case law requires the chancellor to value marital property inde-
pendently after the trial. 4 ' The Court of Special Appeals noted
that such a requirement would be burdensome and impractical.
The chancellor is required only to make a reasonable effort to ap-
proximate the value of marital property as of the divorce decree. 144
Since the chancellor based his valuations on evidence produced at
trial, and the trial ended only one month before the divorce decree,
the court found no error as to the valuation date.145
The trial court valued two retirement plans 1 46 based upon a
September 30, 1983, Crown benefit statement. Mr. Rosenberg ar-
gued that figures contained in the statement were outdated. Because
this was the most recent statement available, and because Mr. Ro-
senberg did not object to its use at trial, the court affirmed the chan-
cellor's use of the statement in valuation.14 7
Mr. Rosenberg also complained about the method of valuing
his Crown Retirement Income Plan benefits. First, he objected to
the trial court's assumption that his salary would increase by 9.5
percent per year until retirement. Second, he argued that the court
did not properly consider the effects of the 1982 Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) on the retirement plan.' 48
At trial, both parties had presented expert witnesses to assign a
present value to Mr. Rosenberg's Retirement Income Plan. The key
141. Those plans were: (1) an employee savings plan; (2) an employee stock owner-
ship plan; (3) an employee pension trust; and (4) a retirement income plan. The trial
court found that a fifth plan, a supplemental retirement income plan, was not marital
property, because Mr. Rosenberg could not participate in the plan during marriage.
Even when Mr. Rosenberg became eligible, the Board of Directors would have to ap-
prove his membership in the plan. Id. at 504-06, 497 A.2d at 493-94.
142. Id. at 507, 497 A.2d at 494-95. The trial ended on May 17, 1984, and the decree
was granted on June 15, 1984-28 days later.
143. See, e.g., Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. 662, 676, 471 A.2d 1068, 1075 (1984)
(requiring that marital property "be valued as of the date of the decree of absolute di-
vorce based upon evidence produced at trial").
144. 64 Md. App. at 507, 497 A.2d at 495.
145. Id. at 507-08, 497 A.2d at 495.
146. The employee savings plan and stock ownership plan. Id. at 508, 497 A.2d at
495.
147. Id. Crown issued benefit statements only once a year, and Mr. Rosenberg failed




difference between the parties' actuarial evaluations was the allow-
ance for a 9.5 percent yearly salary increase by Ms. Rosenberg's wit-
ness.' 49 The trial court accepted the allowance as reasonable, since
Mr. Rosenberg's annual salary increase as Chairman of the Board at
Crown had been 12.8 percent.'5 0 The Court of Special Appeals in
turn held that the chancellor's decision to allow for an expected sal-
ary increase was within his sound discretion.'15
Mr. Rosenberg claimed, at trial and on appeal, that in valuation
the court must consider limits imposed by TEFRA upon qualified
pension plans such as the Income Retirement Plan. The chancellor
ignored the TEFRA limits because Crown's Supplemental Retire-
ment Income Plan, already deemed nonmarital property, 5 1 "twas
created to provide [Mr. Rosenberg] . . . with the benefits TEFRA
would have denied." ' The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on
the same grounds; since the Supplemental Plan "indicate[s] a means
through which the company can provide accrued benefits that ex-
ceed the limits imposed" by TEFRA, those limits are "not relevant
to a determination of the present value of Mr. Rosenberg's pension
benefits."' 5 4
Mr. Rosenberg next contended that the trial court failed to con-
sider the effect of the federal income taxes that he would owe when
he realized the retirement benefits. The court responded that any
income tax consideration should be an "other factor"'155 in setting
the amount of the monetary award, rather than an adjustment to the
value of the benefits.' 56 The court therefore reserved the issue until
it considered the amount of the monetary award.' 5
7
Finally, Mr. Rosenberg argued that in valuing the employee
stock ownership plan, the chancellor should have considered the
149. Both actuaries considered mortality, interest, and retirement age, but Mr. Rosen-
berg's witness did not build a growth factor into Mr. Rosenberg's salary. Id. at 509, 497
A.2d at 496.
150. Id. at 510, 497 A.2d at 496.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 506, 497 A.2d at 494.
153. Id. at 510, 497 A.2d at 496. The court considered the likelihood of Mr. Rosen-
berg's being denied membership into the plan and found it to be negligible.
154. Id. at 511, 497 A.2d at 497.
155. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(10) (Supp. 1986).
156. 64 Md. App. at 512, 497 A.2d at 497.
157. This illustrates the very structured way in which a Maryland court must apply the
Marital Property Act. While the effect of income tax considerations may be the same in
either event, i.e., to decrease the monetary award, the court took great care to point out
that this determination must be made in step three of the three-step process (setting an
amount), rather than step two (valuation).
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time restrictions on distributions under the plan and the chance that
the value of the plan might change before distributions would be
permitted.' The court pointed out that "retirement plans, by defi-
nition, involve restrictions in one form or another."' 59 Yet this does
not preclude valuation of all retirement and pension plans. In addi-
tion, the chance of fluctuation is too speculative to affect the trial
court's calculation of present value. 160
c. Trust Interest-Nonmarital Assets.-In 1934 Mr. Rosenberg's
grandfather created a number of trusts that gave Mr. Rosenberg a
remainder interest, subject to a life interest and a testamentary
power of appointment in his mother.' 6' Between 1953 and 1972
Mr. Rosenberg's mother and grandmother created four "spendthrift
trusts"' 16 2 giving him a life interest and his descendants remainder
interests.1 63 The trial court classified all of these trust interests as
nonmarital property because they were acquired directly by gift or
inheritance."' 4 Mr. Rosenberg challenged the valuation of both
types of trust interests.
As to the remainder interests, the chancellor had accepted the
valuation method that Ms. Rosenberg's expert witness advanced.
On appeal, Mr. Rosenberg objected to the method used, because his
interest was neither fully vested nor freely transferrable, and was
subject to his mother's power of appointment. The court stated that
he had failed to preserve his objections to the valuation by raising
the issue below.' 65 The chancellor had also accepted calculations by
158. 64 Md. App. at 512, 497 A.2d at 497. "In a qualified [employee stock ownership
plan], such as the one here, shares of stock allocated to each participant's account must
remain in trust for eighty-four months before being distributed, unless the employee
dies, is disabled or is terminated." Id.; see I.R.C. § 409(d) (Supp. III 1985) (establishing
criteria for employee stock ownership plans).
159. 64 Md. App. at 512, 497 A.2d at 497.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 513, 497 A.2d at 498. The grandfather, Louis Blaustein, helped create the
Rosenberg family wealth. See id. at 494, 497 A.2d at 488.
162. See id. at 517-18, 497 A.2d at 500. A spendthrift trust is one "created to provide
a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary, and at the same time to secure it against his
improvidence or incapacity. . . . Most states permit spendthrift trust provisions that
prohibit creditors from attaching a spendthrift trust." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1256
(5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
Spendthrift trusts are valid in Maryland. Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497
(1888). The key feature of the trust is that income remains beyond the reach of credi-
tors. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 659, 65 A.2d 294, 295
(1949) (tracing the development of spendthrift trusts in Maryland).
163. 64 Md. App. at 513, 497 A.2d at 498.
164. Id.; see MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(2)(ii) (1984).
165. 64 Md. App. at 514-15, 497 A.2d at 498-99. The court rejected Mr. Rosenberg's
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Ms. Rosenberg's experts concerning the value of Mr. Rosenberg's
life interests. After describing, in detail, the method of valuation
used,' 66 the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Mr. Rosen-
berg's "fundamental complaint is that the chancellor was not per-
suaded by his experts. That does not constitute error." 1 67 Given
the thoroughness of the chancellor's opinion, it was clear that he did
not act arbitrarily or erroneously in accepting the testimony of Ms.
Rosenberg's expert. 1
6 8
Mr. Rosenberg's life interests arose from four spendthrift
trusts. Under the terms of each trust all payments were to go di-
rectly to the beneficiary, not to creditors or assignees. While Mr.
Rosenberg acknowledged that a spendthrift trust has an economic
value, he argued that a traditional market determination was inap-
plicable since the trust was inalienable. The appellate court noted
that "difficulty in valuing an asset, however, does not preclude it
from being valued."' 69 In fact, the chancellor recognized his obliga-
tion to value the spendthrift trusts. 170 Ms. Rosenberg's experts
again presented testimony on the value of the trusts. While Mr. Ro-
senberg did voice an objection to these figures, he offered no alter-
native method that would account for the trusts' spendthrift nature.
The court held that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by
accepting Ms. Rosenberg's expert testimony. '7'
d. Determining the Monetary Award.-Under Maryland law, the
chancellor must consider ten statutory factors in making a final de-
termination of the monetary award. 172 Mr. Rosenberg specifically
claim that he had accepted Ms. Rosenberg's stipulations on value simply to expedite the
trial.
166. Basically, Ms. Rosenberg's expert had calculated the value of Mr. Rosenberg's
life interests in two ways. First, he used actuarial methods and divided the total value of
the trust between the life and remainder interests. Second, he determined the present
value of the income that the trust would produce during Mr. Rosenberg's lifetime. Be-
cause the second method was more speculative, being based on projections of future
dividend income, the expert gave the first method three times greater weight and then
averaged the figures. Id. at 516-17, 497 A.2d at 499-500.
167. Id. at 517, 497 A.2d at 500 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 518, 497 A.2d at 500; see Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 129, 437 A.2d
883, 891 (1981) (recognizing that "trial courts are presented with a complex task in
properly valuing and allocating" benefits).
170. 64 Md. App. at 518, 497 A.2d at 500; see MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-204
(1984) ("The court shall determine the value of all marital property.").
171. 64 Md. App. at 518, 497 A.2d at 500.
172. Those factors are:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family;
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objected to the application of five of these factors. 173 The court
found little merit in his objections.
The chancellor must consider each party's contribution to the
well-being of the family.' 74 Mr. Rosenberg disputed the chancel-
lor's findings that Ms. Rosenberg bore the full responsibility of
child-rearing while he neglected his family obligations. The Court
of Special Appeals upheld the findings below as supported by the
evidence.' 75
Another statutory factor is "the economic circumstances of
each party at the time the award is to be made."' 76 Mr. Rosenberg
argued that the trial court should have treated Ms. Rosenberg's at-
torney's fees and costs, which he was ordered to pay, as his debts for
purposes of assessing the spouses' economic standing. The appel-
late court agreed that since the chancellor knew the amount of attor-
ney's fees when he made the monetary award, he should have
considered the fees as Mr. Rosenberg's debt.177 The chancellor had
reserved judgment on the issue of costs, however; therefore, he
could not yet have considered costs as part of the "economic cir-
cumstances."'' 78 The court instructed the chancellor to reconsider
this factor on remand.1 7
9
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to
be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in the pension,
retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, in-
cluding the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property
or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compen-
sation plan, or both;
(9) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court
has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to
consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of
an interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation
plan, or both.
MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(b) (Supp. 1986) (the July 1, 1986 amendment to the
statute rewrote subsections (8) and (10)).
173. 64 Md. App. at 519-23, 497 A.2d at 501-03.
174. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(1) (Supp. 1986).
175. 64 Md. App. at 519, 497 A.2d at 501.
176. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(3) (Supp. 1986).
177. 64 Md. App. at 519-20, 497 A.2d at 501.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 520, 497 A.2d at 501.
[VOL. 46:738
The circumstances surrounding the divorce may also affect the
monetary award. 80 There was testimony at the trial that Mr. Rosen-
berg supported Ms. Rosenberg's drug dependency and had numer-
ous affairs during the marriage.' 8 ' The chancellor found such
testimony credible, and the appellate court upheld this assessment
of witness credibility.18 2
The fourth factor that Mr. Rosenberg specified was "the effort
expended by each party in accumulating the marital property.', 8
3
He argued that the trial court confused this factor with a considera-
tion of the contribution to familial well-being by crediting Ms. Ro-
senberg for homemaking contributions. The chancellor stated that
Ms. Rosenberg "contributed, though non-monetarily, substantially
more than [Mr. Rosenberg] toward the marital property, ' ' " yet did
not specify which of her efforts produced any of the marital property
described. Mr. Rosenberg contended that most of the marital prop-
erty derived from his personal efforts at Crown Petroleum.' 85
Again, based upon a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the
court affirmed the chancellor's findings. 186
Finally, Mr. Rosenberg challenged the trial court's reliance on
his substantial borrowing capacity as an additional relevant factor in
ordering him to pay his former wife large sums of cash. 18 7 Neither
Ms. Rosenberg nor the Court of Special Appeals could find direct
evidence of Mr. Rosenberg's borrowing capacity.' 88 Therefore, the
court found the chancellor's determination in error and remanded
the issue for reconsideration.18 9
180. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(4) (Supp. 1986). Query whether Maryland
is truly a "no-fault" divorce state when the trial court can use Mr. Rosenberg's adultery
to increase the monetary award.
181. 64 Md. App. at 520, 497 A.2d at 501-02.
182. Id., 497 A.2d at 502; see MD. R. 1086.
183. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(8) (Supp. 1986).
184. 64 Md. App. at 521, 497 A.2d at 502 (emphasis added).
185. Id. It is undisputed that a substantial portion of the marital estate was derived
through Crown. See id. at 494-96, 497 A.2d at 488-89.
186. Id. at 521, 497 A.2d at 502. Mr. Rosenberg's argument seems to have merit.
The Marital Property Act's recognition of nonmonetary contributions to a marriage is
laudable. But to state that a housewife contributed "substantially more" towards acquir-
ing benefits from Crown than the husband who worked there for thirty years is
farfetched.
187. Id. at 522, 497 A.2d at 502; see MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(10) (Supp.
1986) (allowing the court to consider "any other factor that the court considers neces-
sary and appropriate").
188. Mr. Rosenberg claimed that counsel mentioned his borrowing capacity only dur-
ing closing argument. 64 Md. App. at 522, 497 A.2d at 502.
189. Id. at 523, 497 A.2d at 503. Even a man as wealthy as Henry Rosenberg must
borrow to pay a $1,750,000 award.
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The court next returned to the issue of what effect the trial
court should give to income tax consequences when valuing marital
property and making a monetary award. Mr. Rosenberg argued that
the chancellor erred by not considering: (1) income tax on the in-
terest imputed to his loan to Ms. Bohny; (2) deferred income taxes
upon realizing the benefits of his retirement plans; and (3) gain on
assets he would have to sell to pay the monetary award.' 90
In addressing this issue for the first time in Maryland,' the
Court of Special Appeals examined the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions 192 and then focused on the Maryland law concerning equitable
distribution. "Value" in Maryland means fair market value:1
9 3
"[t]he amount at which property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller."' 1 4 Value is the "appraised
worth" ' including taxes.' 96 Thus, the court should not consider
taxes in the valuation process.' 97 Rather, taxes are an "other fac-
tor"' 98 that may affect the determination of the monetary award.' 99
The court held that in revising his monetary award on remand,
the chancellor should consider the tax liability of the interest in-
come imputed to the marital estate.20 0 But the court found future
tax liabilities associated with the retirement plans and sale of other
assets too speculative for consideration.20 '
190. Id. at 523-24, 497 A.2d at 503.
191. Id. at 524, 497 A.2d at 503 (noting that "appellate courts.., have not previously
determined whether tax consequences should be considered").
192. Id. at 524-25, 497 A.2d at 503-04. By statute, Wisconsin requires the trial court
to consider the "[t]ax consequences to each party" in dividing the marital property.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(10) (West 1981). New York and Oregon courts have held
that the trial judge must reduce pension benefits awarded on an "if, as, and when" basis
by the applicable tax liability. Majauskas v. Majauskas, 94 A.D.2d 494, 497-98, 464
N.Y.S.2d 913, 916 (1983), aft'd, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699
(1984); In re Marriage of Rogers & Rogers, 47 Or. App. 963, 615 P.2d 412, 413 (1980).
Courts in Arizona and California ignore tax consequences in valuing pensions because
they are speculative and not immediate. Johnson v.Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 43, 638 P.2d
705, 710 (1981); In re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, 560, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215,
220 (1979).
193. See Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 172-73, 472 A.2d 1001, 1008
(1984) (holding that court should use appraisal, rather than tax assessment records, to
value real estate).
194. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 537 (5th ed. 1979).
195. Id. at 1391.
196. 64 Md. App. at 526, 497 A.2d at 504.
197. Id.
198. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205(b)(10) (Supp. 1986).
199. 64 Md. App. at 526, 497 A.2d at 504.
200. Id. These liabilities are "easily and specifically ascertainable" based on Mr. Ro-
senberg's recent tax returns. Id.
201. Id. at 526, 497 A.2d at 504-05.
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e. Computation of the Monetary Award.-Mr. Rosenberg charged
that the chancellor overstated the value of marital property by at
least $1,000,000. Adjusting the figure accordingly, and subtracting
the value of the marital home, Mr. Rosenberg computed a total
value of the marital estate that was less than the court-ordered mon-
etary award.2 °2
The court rejected the proposition that the chancellor had
overvalued the retirement plan by $1,000,000, thereby rejecting Mr.
Rosenberg's contention that the monetary award exceeded the mar-
ital estate.20 3 But the court agreed that the chancellor had erred by
including Ms. Rosenberg's jewelry, which he had previously desig-
nated a personal gift from Mr. Rosenberg, as joint personal prop-
erty to be divided equally by the spouses.2 °4 Therefore, on remand
the chancellor should reduce joint personal property by the value of
the jewelry and increase Ms. Rosenberg's personal assets by the
same amount.20 5
2. The Cross Appeal.-Ms. Rosenberg cross-appealed on the
ground that the chancellor erred in failing to include as marital
property the increased value of the four trusts under which Mr. Ro-
senberg was a lifetime beneficiary. The corpus of these trusts in-
cluded stock in the American Trading and Production Corporation
(ATAPCO), which held approximately fifty percent of the voting
stock in Crown. ATAPCO stock had risen greatly in value since cre-
ation of the trusts. 0 6 While the trusts themselves were nonmarital
property since they were gifts or inheritances, 20 7 Ms. Rosenberg ar-
gued that any accretion in the trusts and stock resulted from Mr.
Rosenberg's efforts during marriage, and therefore should augment
the marital estate. 08 She cited cases on the "continuing acquisi-
tion" doctrine: if property is acquired over time, the property is
nonmarital to the extent of any nonmarital funds used to pay for
i.209it.
2o
202. Id. at 526-27, 497 A.2d at 505. Mr. Rosenberg fixed the value of marital property
at $1,340,000, as compared with the modified monetary award of $1,609,000.
203. Id. at 527, 497 A.2d at 505.
204. Id.
205. Id. In light of the chancellor's great care with other aspects of the case, the court
deemed this mistake "an oversight."
206. Id. at 527-28, 497 A.2d at 505. Mr. Rosenberg's family created the trusts be-
tween 14 and 33 years ago, so the increase in value had been substantial. See id. at 497,
497 A.2d at 490.
207. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(2)(ii) (1984).
208. 64 Md. App. at 528, 497 A.2d at 505.
209. See Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 270, 477 A.2d 1163, 1170 (1984); Harper v.
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The trial court had examined the financial success of ATAPCO
and Crown in detail. The chancellor found that Ms. Rosenberg had
"not proven that [Mr. Rosenberg's] personal efforts at Crown or as
a member of the Board of Directors of ATAPCO either directly or
indirectly contributed to the increase in value of [his] life interests in
ATAPCO." 2 1° Too many factors contributed to ATAPCO's success
to assign credit to Mr. Rosenberg. Therefore, the chancellor held
that the increased value in ATAPCO stock was nonmarital prop-
erty.2 1' The Court of Special Appeals upheld the chancellor's find-
ings as not clearly erroneous.21 2
3. Alimony.--a. Indefinite Alimony.-The trial court had awarded
Ms. Rosenberg indefinite alimony because the respective standards
of living of the parties would remain "unconscionably disparate'; 2 1
while Mr. Rosenberg would remain in a position of power at Crown,
Ms. Rosenberg had developed no marketable skills during her
thirty-two years as a homemaker, and could not be expected to de-
velop such skills at her age.2 1 4 Mr. Rosenberg originally opposed
the award of indefinite alimony, but then apparently abandoned the
argument. In either event, the court held that the chancellor did not
err in awarding indefinite alimony.2 15
b. Amount of the Award.-The chancellor awarded annual ali-
mony of $275,000. Mr. Rosenberg attacked this figure as "grossly
excessive," since his wife's monthly allowance had been between
$6000 and $7000 during marriage. He argued that the alimony pay-
ment, plus the investment income generated by the monetary
award, would give Ms. Rosenberg a yearly income "vastly in excess"
of her reasonable, proven, and claimed needs.2 16
A trial judge must consider eleven statutory factors in deter-
mining the amount of alimony. 217 Among these are "the financial
needs and financial resources of each party," including any mone-
Harper, 294 Md. 54, 80, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982). This rule is simply an application of
the traditional "source of funds" doctrine to a continuous acquisition.
210. 64 Md. App. at 530, 497 A.2d at 506.
211. Id. at 530, 497 A.2d at 506-07.
212. Id. at 531, 497 A.2d at 507.
213. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-106(c)(2) (1984).
214. 64 Md. App. at 531-32, 497 A.2d at 507-08.
215. Id. at 532-33, 497 A.2d at 508.
216. Id. at 533, 497 A.2d at 508.
217. The factors are:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-
supporting;
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tary award ordered concurrently. 2 8 The appellate court could not
determine from the record whether the chancellor considered the
monetary award in setting alimony. Even if he did, his consideration
must have been superficial, since he failed to mention that the in-
come produced by the large monetary award would exceed the
amount of alimony. 21 9 Therefore, the court ordered the chancellor
to reexamine the financial status of the parties and review the ali-
mony award.220
4. Fees and Costs .- The lengthy divorce trial produced huge at-
torneys' fees and litigation costs for both parties. The chancellor
awarded Ms. Rosenberg nearly $700,000 in fees and costs. 22' Mr.
Rosenberg claimed that Ms. Rosenberg incurred most of the costs
needlessly during her unsuccessful attempt to have the ATAPCO
stock deemed marital property, and therefore the fees were not
"reasonable and necessary" as required by law.2 2
The court admitted that Ms. Rosenberg incurred much of the
costs and fees while litigating the ATAPCO issue. But the mere fail-
ure of her attempt to characterize the ATAPCO stock and its accre-
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient ed-
ucation or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their
marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that
party's needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties; and
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce
income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party;
and
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits.
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b) (1984).
218. Id. at § 11-106(b)(ll)(ii); see McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 347, 469 A.2d
1256, 1270 (1984) (recognizing "an interrelationship between a monetary award.., and
an award of alimony").
219. 64 Md. App. at 535-37, 497 A.2d at 509-10.
220. Id. at 537, 497 A.2d at 510.
221. Ms. Rosenberg's attorney's fees of $430,390 plus $224,579 in costs totalled
$654,969. Id.
222. Id.; MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-110(b) (1984).
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tion as marital property did not render the attempt "frivolous." 2 3
The ATAPCO stock was a large portion of Mr. Rosenberg's per-
sonal holdings, and Ms. Rosenberg's lawyer would have neglected
his adversarial duties had he not tried to prove the stock was marital
property. 24
The chancellor determined that the fees and costs were reason-
able and necessary, based upon his knowledge and experience.225
Because the Court of Special Appeals could not label that decision
an abuse of discretion, 26 it affirmed the full award of fees and
costs.
2 2 7
In sum, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed much of the
chancellor's opinion, but remanded the case so that the chancellor
could consider: (a) the effect on the monetary award of designating
Ms. Rosenberg's jewelry as personal property; (b) the monetary
award in light of the tax liability for the imputed interest on the loan
to Ms. Bohny; (c) the awards of fees and costs as an economic cir-
cumstance in making the monetary award; (d) the monetary award
in light of Mr. Rosenberg's ability to pay or borrow; and (e) the in-
vestment income from the monetary award in adjusting the alimony
award.
22 8
The Rosenberg decision illustrates not only the complexity of a
divorce proceeding under the Marital Property Act, but also the
great deference given a trial judge. Under the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review,2 29 appellate courts in Maryland respect the wis-
dom and experience of the chancellor in fashioning an equitable
remedy.
223. 64 Md. App. at 538, 497 A.2d at 510.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 539, 497 A.2d at 511; see Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md. App. 386, 406, 473 A.2d
499, 508 (1984) (allowing chancellor to consider his observations of counsel's trial con-
duct in determining fee award).
226. The award of fees and costs is within the "sound discretion of the trial court."
Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 182, 472 A.2d 1001, 1013 (1984).
227. 64 Md. App. at 539, 497 A.2d at 511. Normally, the award of fees and costs
varies according to the alimony and monetary award. Thus, the remand of the issues of
alimony and the monetary award would generally necessitate reconsideration of the liti-
gation expenses as well. But since the court affirmed a full award of the costs and fees
requested, it saw no need for further modification of the award on remand.
228. Id. at 539-40, 497 A.2d at 511.




1. Scope of Parental Duty.-In Presley v. Presley23° the issue was
whether the trial court had erred in ordering a father to make sup-
port payments and pay a share of the medical expenses for his
mildly retarded adult daughter.2 '" Generally, a parent's obligation
to support a child ends when the child reaches the age of eight-
een. 232 But when the adult child cannot support himself or herself
due to mental or physical infirmity, and the parent can provide
assistance, the parental obligation continues. 23 In this instance, the
daughter was employed and partially supporting herself.2 34 The
Court of Special Appeals remanded the case for a factual determina-
tion of the daughter's expenses and available funds, with instruc-
tions to order support payments if she lacked sufficient resources.235
2. Support Agreements.-In Boucher v. Shomber 23' divorcing
spouses entered into a separation agreement 237 that provided that
the father would assume payments for the daughter's college educa-
tion.238 The court later modified this agreement to provide that the
father would pay for "continual expenses" until the daughter com-
pleted four consecutive years of college.23 9 When the father ceased
to make educational support payments, the mother filed for con-
tempt. The father cross-petitioned on the ground that his daughter
had not fulfilled the continuity requirement of the agreement. 40
230. 65 Md. App. 265, 500 A.2d 322 (1985).
231. Id. at 268, 500 A.2d at 323.
232. Id. at 274, 278, 500 A.2d at 326, 328. This rule applies to both general support
and medical care.
233. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-101, -102 (1984). The statute conditions the
duty of support on two factors: (1) the adult child must have "no means of subsistence
... and cannot be self-supporting," id. at § 13-101(b); and (2) the parent must have
"sufficient means... to provide ... food, shelter, care and clothing," id. at § 13-102(b).
The court read a reasonableness standard into the first factor; the child need not be
totally without means of survival for the parental duty of support to exist. 65 Md. App.
at 277-78, 500 A.2d at 328.
234. 65 Md. App. at 271, 500 A.2d at 325. She was earning $14,200 per year working
at the National Institute of Health. Her net income fell short of general living expenses
by $2400 per year, and she incurred unreimbursed medical expenses of $900 per year.
Id. at 271-72, 500 A.2d at 325.
235. Id. at 279, 500 A.2d at 328-29.
236. 65 Md. App. 470, 501 A.2d 97 (1985).
237. The subsequent divorce decree incorporated the separation agreement. Id. at
473, 501 A.2d at 98.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 473-74, 501 A.2d at 98-99.
240. Id. at 474-75, 501 A.2d at 99.
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While admitting that the daughter failed to meet the "four-year
consecutive course of studies" clause 24' of the separation agree-
ment, the trial court nonetheless held that because a serious illness
had interrupted her studies, her father should not be released from
his support obligation. 242 The Court of Special Appeals found that
the trial court's refusal to relieve the father of his financial obliga-
tions to his daughter was "reasonable under the circumstances, "243
and thus affirmed the lower court's finding of liability.
244
3. Enforcement of Support Obligations.-The failure of parents to
honor their support obligations has become a nationwide problem.
In 1984 Maryland passed the Tax Refund Interception Program
(TRIP) 245 as a means of obtaining child support payments from de-
linquent parents. TRIP authorizes the withholding of income tax
refunds to satisfy overdue support obligations.246 In McCleland v.
Massinga24 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit analyzed the procedural framework of TRIP, and upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on due process grounds.2 48 The im-
pact of this holding upon family law is simply that TRIP may con-
241, Id. at 474, 501 A.2d at 99.
242. Id. at 480, 501 A.2d at 102. The daughter was hospitalized twice due to illness.
The court also noted that the daughter made good faith efforts to reduce her father's
liability as much as possible by delaying her education until she was a state resident,
seeking grants and loans, and working while in school. Id.
243. Id.
244. The father had opposed the contempt charge on the ground that one cannot be
held in contempt for failing to pay an indefinite sum such as "continuing college ex-
penses" or "reasonable medical expenses." The seminal case on this point is Kemp v.
Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 175-76, 411 A.2d 1028, 1035 (1980), which held that contempt
"power could not be exercised until the payment of a sum certain had been ordered".
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Kemp, but noted that in this case the trial court
was merely "determining the relative rights and obligations of the parties to its prior
decree," 65 Md. App. at 479, 501 A.2d at 101-02, even though it was responding to a
complaint for contempt. Only when the court has determined a definite sum, and the
father has failed to pay, may the court hold him in contempt. Id., 501 A.2d at 102.
The court also affirmed the lower court's refusal to modify its original decree based
on the father's 22% reduction in income. To conclude that this reduction did not con-
stitute a significant change in circumstance was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 481-82,
501 A.2d at 103. The court thus read a reasonableness requirement into the continuity
clause of the separation agreement. The extent to which a court might read such a re-
quirement into other separation agreements is unclear, as is generally the case when
"reasonableness" is the touchstone.
245. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 10-113 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
246. Id. at § 10-113(0.
247. 786 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1986).
248. Id. at 1216.
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tinue to protect the interests of the children, who are often the
innocent victims of a divorce proceeding.
E. Custody and Visitation
1. Custody.-'Joint custody" is a system of shared parental re-
sponsibility that is emerging as an alternative to traditional sole cus-
tody arrangements. 24 9 The term "joint custody" can be used to
describe two very different types of custody: legal custody and phys-
ical custody. Legal custody is the right and obligation to make long-
range decisions involving the child's education, religious training,
medical care, and other significant matters affecting the child's gen-
eral welfare. Physical custody is the right and obligation to provide a
home and make day-to-day decisions for the child while he or she is
in the parent's presence. As joint custody in both its forms contin-
ues to challenge the traditional custody model, courts are forced to
consider whether they have the power to issue a joint custody
resolution.25 °
In Taylor v. Taylor 25 1 the Court of Appeals held that a trial judge
has the authority to grant joint custody.252 The court defined the
two types of joint custody25 ' and delineated several criteria to be
considered when issuing a joint custody resolution. 254 The court
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of these
principles.255
After experiencing marital difficulties, the spouses in Taylor sep-
arated and sought divorce. 256 Both parties requested custody of the
children. 257 The trial court granted "a sort ofjoint custody, '25 ' and
the mother appealed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
consider two questions: (1) whether the trial judge had the author-
ity to grant joint custody; and (2) whether he abused his discretion
249. See JoINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING ch. 1, at 6-7 (J. Folberg ed. 1984); see
generally Ester, Maryland Custody Law-Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD. L.
REV. 225 (1982).
250. See Berman & Kirsh, Definitions ofJoint Custody, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 2 (Fall 1982).
251. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
252. Id. at 301, 508 A.2d at 969.
253. Id. at 296-97, 508 A.2d at 967.
254. See infra note 268.
255. 306 Md. at 313, 508 A.2d at 975.
256. Id. at 294, 508 A.2d at 965-66.
257. Id., 508 A.2d at 966.
258. Id. at 295, 508 A.2d at 966. The trial judge upheld an arrangement set forth in a




in awarding joint custody under the facts of this case.259
As to the first issue, the mother contended that a court of equity
lacks jurisdiction to grant custody.2 60 The Court of Appeals de-
clared that the authority to grant joint custody is inherent in the
broad equitable power of the court to "accomplish the paramount
purpose of securing the welfare and promoting the best interest of
the child."'26 1 When deciding whether to grant joint custody, the
trial judge must separately consider the concepts of legal custody
and physical custody, and state specifically the court's decision as to
each.262
The question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in
awarding joint custody in the instant case was more difficult to an-
swer.2 63 The Maryland Court of Appeals had not considered the
issue ofjoint custody since 1934.2' At that time courts denounced
joint custody as an "evil" to be avoided whenever possible.265 Soci-
ety has changed in the ensuing fifty years, as has its view of proper
child rearing. The court found that these changes mandated a reex-
amination of the concept of joint custody.2 6 6 In today's society, in
proper circumstances, joint custody may be beneficial to both the
child and the parents.
2 67
To aid judicial determination of the proper circumstances for
joint custody, the court delineated thirteen criteria, all designed to
protect the best interests of the child.268 The factors enumerated
259. Id.
260. Id. at 297-98, 508 A.2d at 967-68. The mother argued that absent express statu-
tory authority, a court of equity could not make such an award.
261. Id. at 301-02, 508 A.2d at 970. Because joint custody is within a court's broad
equitable powers, the Court of Special Appeals did not need to address whether the
child custody statutes implicitly authorize joint custody. Id. at 298, 508 A.2d at 968.
262. Id. at 297, 508 A.2d at 967.
263. "The resolution of a custody dispute continues to be one of the most difficult
and demanding tasks of a trial judge." Id. at 311, 508 A.2d at 974.
264. McCann v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 173 A. 7 (1934).
265. Id. at 172, 173 A. at 10. Joint custody was viewed as "fruitful in the destruction
of discipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the production of mental distress in the
child." Id.
266. 306 Md. at 302, 508 A.2d at 970.
267. Id. Joint custody is still widely criticized as creating confusion and instability for
children at a time when certainty is important, but when the circumstances warrant joint
custody, it can be of enormous advantage to both parents and children. Thus, a trial
judge should consider carefully its feasibility. Id. at 302-03, 508 A.2d at 970.
268. The criteria include:
(1) the parents' capacity to communicate with each other and to reach
shared decisions affecting the child's welfare;
(2) the parents' willingness to share custody;
(3) the parents' fitness;
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are not intended to be all-inclusive; rather, the trial judge must con-
sider all relevant factors in reaching the solution most beneficial for
the child. 269 In the case at bar the trial judge had neglected to stipu-
late whether he was awarding joint physical or legal custody.270 The
Court of Appeals remanded the case for this designation as well as
for reconsideration in light of the aforementioned criteria.2 7'
In Olson v. Olson 2 7 2 the Court of Special Appeals construed
Maryland's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)273 to
authorize a Maryland Circuit Court to modify a Rhode Island child
custody decree. 2 71 In doing so, the court nullified a pre-divorce
agreement between the mother and father that purported to confine
subject matter jurisdiction to Rhode Island.275 In addition, the
court reaffirmed that the "continuing jurisdiction rule" 276 no longer
applies under the UCCJA as a basis for denying jurisdiction.27 7
In February 1979 a married couple residing in Rhode Island
with their two children entered into a Property Settlement Agree-
ment.278 The agreement provided that "the support, maintenance
and custody of said minor children shall be determined by the Fam-
ily Court of the State of Rhode Island, which shall continue to reatin [sic]
jurisdiction over such matters, including the power to modify the same. "279
The couple was divorced by a decree of the Rhode Island Family
(4) the relationship existing between the child and each parent;
(5) the child's preference;
(6) the possible disruption of the child's social and school life;
(7) the geographic proximity of the parents' homes;
(8) the demands of parental employment;
(9) the age and number of the children;
(10) the sincerity of each parent's request;
(11) the financial status of the parents;
(12) the impact on state or federal assistance; and
(13) the benefit to the parents.
Id. at 304-11, 508 A.2d at 971-74.
269. Id. at 311, 508 A.2d at 974.
270. Id. at 311-12, 508 A.2d at 975. The judge stated only that the visitation agree-
ment constituted "a sort ofjoint custody." Id. at 295, 508 A.2d at 966.
271. Id. at 313, 508 A.2d at 975.
272. 64 Md. App. 154, 494 A.2d 737 (1985).
273. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to -214 (1984). Besides Maryland, 47 other
states, including Rhode Island, have adopted the UCCJA. 64 Md. App. at 159, 494 A.2d
at 740 (citing A. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 9.02 (1983)).
274. 64 Md. App. at 169, 494 A.2d at 745.
275. Id. at 159, 494 A.2d at 739.
276. Under the continuing jurisdiction rule a court might retain jurisdiction over the
custody of children even after their removal from the state. Id. at 167, 494 A.2d at 744.
277. Id. at 167-68, 494 A.2d at 744.
278. Id. at 157, 494 A.2d at 739.
279. Id. (emphasis added).
1987] 769
770 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 46:738
Court in July of the same year.280 The court awarded the father
physical custody of the children, but neglected to address the issues
of visitation and support.28 ' The decree made no mention of the
Property Settlement Agreement. 2 2
In 1984, after moving to Maryland, the father petitioned the
Circuit Court for St. Mary's County to modify the Rhode Island cus-
tody decree,283 so as to grant the mother "liberal but specified visi-
tation rights" and to order her to pay "a reasonable amount of child
support. "284 On the mother's motion, the court dismissed the claim
"for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. '"285
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the notion
that consent of the parties may confer jurisdiction upon a court,
stating that "[o]nly the court may decide whether it has jurisdiction
to proceed. ' 286 The court thus dismissed the Property Settlement
Agreement and held that in interstate child custody disputes the
UCCJA governs the issue of jurisdiction. 28 7 The court framed the
issues as: "(1) whether the Maryland court has jurisdiction under
[the] statute; and (2) whether it should exercise its jurisdiction. "288
The court began its analysis with section 9-204(a) of the
UCCJA,289 which sets forth the grounds upon which a Maryland




283. The father and the children moved to Maryland in September, 1979. Over the
next five years, the children spent four consecutive weeks every summer with their
mother, either at her home in Rhode Island or at her mother's home in Virginia. In
August of 1984, however, the mother informed the father that she intended to keep the
children in Rhode Island beyond the normal time. When she refused to agree in writing
to return the children before school began, the father became concerned that she might
try to keep the children in Rhode Island indefinitely.
He then sought and obtained an injunction against the mother, requiring the sheriff
to take custody of the children and to return them to the father. The injunction re-
stricted the mother from visiting the children except in their father's home. The chan-
cellor, however, dissolved the injunction upon learning of the mother's visitation record
of the previous five years. The father also petitioned the court to modify the child cus-
tody decree issued by the Rhode Island court in 1979. Id. at 157-58, 494 A.2d at 739.
284. Id. at 158, 494 A.2d at 739.
285. Id. The Court of Special Appeals later stated that it did not know "the precise
basis upon which the chancellor concluded that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion-his terse order did not explain his rationale." Id. at 159, 494 A.2d at 740.
286. Id., 494 A.2d at 739.
287. Id.
288. Id., 494 A.2d at 740 (emphasis added).
289. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-204(a) (1984).
290. Section 9-204(a)(1) provides that:
A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
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The father argued that the court had jurisdiction under section 9-
204(a)(1)(i), because Maryland was the children's "home state"; that
is, the children had lived with their father in Maryland for at least six
consecutive months prior to the suit. 29' The court agreed that
Maryland was indeed the children's home state and accordingly
found jurisdiction on that ground.29 2
According to section 9-214(a) of the UCCJA29 3 once a court of
another state has made a custody decree, no Maryland court can
modify that decree unless: (1) the court that rendered the decree no
longer has jurisdiction or has declined to assume jurisdiction; and
(2) the Maryland court has jurisdiction.294 Thus, the court was com-
pelled to examine whether the Rhode Island court might still have
jurisdiction over the case.
The mother contended that Rhode Island retained its jurisdic-
tion under its version of the UCCJA, 295 because she and the chil-
dren had a "significant connection" with the state.296 The court,
however, denied her claim, stating that the purpose of the Uniform
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial decree or modifica-
tion decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months
before commencement of the proceedings and the child is absent from this
State because of the child's removal or retention by a person claiming custody
or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live
in this State.
291. "Home state" is defined in § 9-201(0 as:
the state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with
the child's parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecu-
tive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old, the state in which
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of tem-
porary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month
or other period.
292. 64 Md. App. at 163, 494 A.2d at 741-42. The court next concluded that Mary-
land was not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction by the existence of a related ac-
tion pending in another state or by any improper conduct on the part of the father. Id.
at 163-64, 494 A.2d at 742; see MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 9-206(a), 9-208(b) (1984).
293. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-214(a) (1984).
294. Id.
295. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-14-4(2) (1981). The Rhode Island statute parallels MD.
FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 9-204(a)(2) (1984), which confers jurisdiction on the State if it is
in the child's best interests because of the child's and parent's connections with the
State.
296. 64 Md. App. at 164, 494 A.2d at 742. The bases of the mother's claim were that:
(1) the initial decree was rendered in Rhode Island; (2) she continued to live there;
(3) the children visited her there regularly and "for long periods of time"; and (4) the
children's only connections with Maryland were established by the father's "unilateral
action." Id. at 164-65, 494 A.2d at 742.
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Act is "to limit jurisdiction, not proliferate it,"' 297 and that the par-
ties must have maximum, not minimum, contacts with the state for
jurisdiction to exist. 298 The court noted that one of the major pur-
poses of the UCCJA was to " 'assure that litigation concerning the
custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the
child and the child's family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning the child's care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships is most readily available.' "299 Yet
the mother had introduced no evidence concerning the children's
"care, protection, training, and personal relationships.- 30 0
Last, the court rejected the mother's argument on the "continu-
ing jurisdiction rule," under which "a court would continue to have
jurisdiction over the custody of the children even after they were
removed from [the] State." '' The court pointed out that it had ab-
rogated that rule in 1977 in Howard v. Gish.30 2
2. Visitation.-In L.F.M. v. Department of Social Services30 3 the
Court of Special Appeals held that when the court has terminated
the rights of the natural parents and has placed a child in a confiden-
tial adoption, Maryland courts may not award visitation rights to the
child's natural grandparents, if a guardian with the right to consent
to adoption and the prospective adoptive parents object.3 0 4
The court rejected the argument that Maryland's adoption stat-
ute3 05 was unconstitutional because some interested parties, includ-
ing grandparents, do not receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard before termination of parental rights and adoption.30 6 His-
torically, grandparents' visitation rights have been granted through
parental permission.30 7 At common law, no legal right to visitation
297. Id. at 165, 494 A.2d at 743 (citing UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3
commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 124 (1979), and McCarron v. District Court, 671 P.2d
953, 957 (Colo. 1983)).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 165-66, 494 A.2d at 743 (quoting MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-202(a)(3)
(1984)).
300. Id. at 167, 494 A.2d at 744.
301. Id.
302. 36 Md. App. 446, 450, 373 A.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1977).
303. 67 Md. App. 379, 507 A.2d 1151 (1986).
304. Id. at 397, 507 A.2d at 1160. The natural parents had consented to the adoption;
the Baltimore County Department of Social Services petitioned for and was granted
guardianship and the right to consent to an adoption of the children. Id. at 381, 507
A.2d at 1152.
305. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -330 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
306. 67 Md. App. at 385-86, 507 A.2d at 1153-54.
307. Id. at 386, 507 A.2d at 1154.
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existed."' 8 Although the grandparents' desire for visitation may
spring from sincere affection for the grandchild, it does not rise to
the level of a constitutionally protected right.30°
Although the court recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and the family is a constitutionally protected
liberty, it stressed that this "liberty interest" is most frequently rec-
ognized in parent-child and husband-wife relationships. While
other relationships sometimes fall within the scope of this constitu-
tionally protected interest, the grandparents' request for visitation
does not.31
0
The court also rejected the argument that visitation could be
awarded in the child's best interests. 31' The court acknowledged
that strong arguments exist for allowing any person having an affec-
tionate relationship with the child to petition for visitation. Never-
theless, the court held that there must be some point at which the
adoptive parents are presumed to act in the child's best interests.
The courts must then defer to the adoptive parents' determination
of what is best for the child.3" 2
F. Adoption
In Bridges v. Nicely313 the Court of Appeals held that a natural
father may adopt his child born out of wedlock, with or without the
natural mother's consent.31 4 In Maryland, a court may grant a de-
cree of adoption without the consent of the child's natural parent to
any individual who has cared for a child for one year.315 Therefore,
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 386-87, 507 A.2d at 1154-55. The court distinguished Supreme Court de-
cisions that have extended the "family life" liberty interest beyond the husband-wife or
parent-child context, on the ground that the petitioning party in each of those cases had
actual or legal custody of the child at some point. In this case, the grandparents sought
only visitation rights; they never had, nor sought, custody of their grandchildren. Id. at
387, 507 A.2d at 1153-54.
311. Id. at 388, 507 A.2d at 1155. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201(a)(6) (1984)
provides that an equity court has jurisdiction over visitation of the child.
312. 67 Md. App. at 397, 507 A.2d at 1160. The court looked to the legislative pur-
pose of the adoption statutes, which are designed to protect the child, the adoptive par-
ents and the natural parents; the sealing of adoption records, which suggests a premium
on confidentiality; and the provisions for an interlocutory decree of adoption, which
treats the child as legally adopted by the prospective parents during a trial adjustment
period. Id. at 392-93, 507 A.2d at 1157-58.
313. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985).
314. Id. at 12-13, 497 A.2d at 147-48.
315. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-312(b) (1984).
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if the natural father has had custody of his child for at least one year,
he may unilaterally petition the court in an adoption proceeding.
In 1980 the unmarried defendant, Beverly Ann Nicely, gave
birth to a son, Jerry Wayne Bridges, Jr. The birth certificate stated
that Jerry Wayne Bridges, Sr., was the child's father, and the Circuit
Court for Allegany County issued a paternity decree to that ef-
fect.s l6 The decree granted legal custody to the mother and re-
quired the father to provide financial support. For the three years
preceding this litigation, however, the father had retained physical
custody of the child. 17
In 1984 the father filed a petition in circuit court to adopt his
son.3 i  The mother moved to dismiss the petition.31 9 The circuit
court granted her petition, holding that Maryland's adoption statute
does not permit a father to adopt his own natural child.3 2" The fa-
ther appealed, and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals to
"decide the significant issue presented in the case. "321
The court considered whether Maryland's adoption statute per-
mits a natural father to adopt his own child born out of wedlock.
Because adoption proceedings in Maryland are solely of statutory
origin,3 22 the answer to this question depends upon the "applicable
statutory provisions and the legislative intention in their enact-
ment. ' 323 The Maryland adoption statute states that "[a]ny individ-
ual . . . may be adopted" by "[a]ny adult.- 324
The court held that in light of this "broad, unqualified word-
316. 304 Md. at 2-3, 497 A.2d at 142-43.
317. Id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143.
318. Id. The father asserted that if adopted, his son would have greater rights to in-
heritance, support and maintenance, and social security. Similarly, the father would
benefit by obtaining "greater rights to the adoptee's services and income, to inheritance,
and to support and maintenance if the adoptive parent becomes destitute." Id. at 3-4,
497 A.2d at 143.
319. Id. at 3,497 A.2d at 143. The mother contended that "adoption is the taking of a
child, not related by blood, to be one's own child." Therefore, a natural parent cannot
adopt his or her own child. She also contended that the father already possessed a right
to parenthood and therefore could not obtain judicially what he already had. Finally,
she argued that the father's adoption ofJerry, Jr., would divest her of all parental rights,
duties and obligations, contrary to the State's public policy against unnecessarily sepa-
rating a child from the natural parent. Id. at 4, 497 A.2d at 143.
320. Id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143. The statute permits "any person" to adopt. The circuit
court, however, defined adoption as an act which establishes a legal relationship be-
tween two persons not related in blood. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 4, 497 A.2d at 143.
323. Id. at 5, 497 A.2d at 144.
324. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-307(a), 5-309(a) (1984).
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ing, '' 2 5 it was impossible to conclude that the "[l]egislature in-
tended to prohibit adoption in all circumstances by a natural parent
of a child born out of wedlock." '26 The court further stated that
there are circumstances in which adoption may be more socially
beneficial to the child than legitimation. 27
In the case at bar, because the father had custody of his son for
over a year, he would be eligible to adopt without the mother's con-
sent.328 This would effectively eliminate the mother as the child's
parent. In light of such drastic consequences 3 2 9 and of the State's
public policy of not separating a child from the natural parent un-
necessarily, 330 the Maryland Code requires clear and convincing evi-
dence33' that termination of the natural parent's rights is in the best
interests of the child.3 32 The applicable statute specifies factors for
the court to consider3 3 3 as well as factors for an investigating agency
to employ.
334
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of the statutory factors and considera-
tions.33 5 Maryland's adoption statute certainly permits the father to
adopt his son. The goal is to determine "whether it is in the best
interests of Jerry, Jr. to grant the adoption and thus terminate all of
325. 304 Md. at 12, 497 A.2d at 147.
326. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote that it was influenced by the
ambiguity of the legitimation statute, MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-207 (1974), as
to whether a legitimated child is placed in the same legal posture as an adopted child.
327. 304 Md. at 12, 497 A.2d at 147. The court cited several examples, such as when
the natural mother of an illegitimate child has died or has abandoned the child and the
natural father seeks adoption. Id. at 12-13, 497 A.2d at 147-48.
328. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-312 (1984).
329. 304 Md. at 13, 497 A.2d at 148; see Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 312-13,
262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970) (stressing "the harsh consequences of a decree of adoption"
in terminating parental rights).
330. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-303(b)(1)(i) (1984).
331. Id. at § 5-312(b). The clear and convincing standard applies when a parent does
not consent to the adoption.
332. 304 Md. at 13, 497 A.2d at 148.
333. To make such a determination, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the child has been out of the natural parent's custody for at least three years;
(2) whether the child has developed significant feelings and emotional ties with the peti-
tioner; (3) whether the natural parent has maintained meaningful contact with the child;
and (4) whether the natural parent has contributed to the child's physical care and sup-
port. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-312(b) (1984).
334. The agency should consider: (1) the child's feelings toward the natural parent,
siblings, petitioner, and any significant others; (2) the child's adjustment to his or her
surroundings; and (3) if the natural parent is absent, the petitioner's attempts to locate
the natural parent. Id. at § 5-312(c).
335. 304 Md. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148.
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his parental ties to his mother. '3 3
6
G. Enforceability of Private Agreements
Separation agreements have already been discussed in relation
to exclusions from marital property33 7 and parental support obliga-
tions.338 Two other appellate cases in the past year addressed the
enforceability of private agreements in a divorce proceeding.
1. Agreement Not to Litigate.-In Head v. Head"3 9 a couple had
entered into an antenuptial agreement.340 When the marriage
failed, the wife sued for divorce and sought to set aside the agree-
ment based upon her husband's unanticipated financial success.34 '
The parties subsequently entered into a new agreement that gave
the wife much more money than she would have received under the
antenuptial agreement.3 42 In consideration for this new contract,
she in effect promised not to litigate for additional funds and agreed
to a contract clause mutually waiving counsel fees. 43
During the divorce proceeding the husband moved for sum-
mary judgment based upon this new agreement. The wife opposed,
alleging that her husband fraudulently induced her to sign the new
agreement.3 4 4
The circuit court bypassed the fraud issue, ruling instead that
her opposition to summary judgment constituted default under the
terms of the new contract.3 " 5 Pursuant to that contract, the finding
of default against the wife negated the clause mutually waiving
counsel fees, and consequently the husband was entitled to reason-
336. Id.
337. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
339. 66 Md. App. 655, 505 A.2d 868 (1986).
340. Id. at 659, 505 A.2d at 870. Details of the Heads' controversy can be found in
the earlier opinion of Head v. Head, 59 Md. App. 570,477 A.2d 282, cert. denied, 301 Md.
471, 483 A.2d 754 (1984).
341. 66 Md. App. at 660, 505 A.2d at 870. Mr. Head developed and patented the
oversized "Prince" tennis racquet.
342. Id.
343. Id. The agreement included a provision mutually waiving counsel fees except for
any reasonable fees incurred in effecting compliance with the agreement in event of
default." Id. By agreeing to pay the other party the cost of defending the new agree-
ment, each party was in effect agreeing not to litigate the matter.
344. Id. At the time the new agreement was signed, the husband represented to his
wife that the Prince stock had a book value of $2,55 1,000. Six months later, however, he
sold the stock for $45,000,000. Id. at 664, 505 A.2d at 872.
345. Id. The chancellor found that the wife's defense was "clearly aimed at forestall-
ing the purposes and provisions of that contract." Id.
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able legal fees.3 46
The wife appealed the case to the Court of Special Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred in finding her in default on the
marriage settlement agreement. She argued that she was merely
"litigating a defense that the agreement was induced by fraud," and
this alone could not constitute default.3 47 The court rejected this
argument. Since default is defined as a "failure to perform a legal
or contractual duty,"-3 48 the trial court properly concluded that the
wife's actions constituted default.3 49
The Court of Special Appeals never directly addressed the
fraud issue. The court held only that the wife defaulted by attempt-
ing to set aside the terms of the settlement agreement. The wife,
therefore, was in a "Catch 22" position: if she attempted to demon-
strate fraud, she was considered in default. She attempted to prove
that her right to litigate the fraud defense was thereby infringed.
The court responded that it was "chilled perhaps, but not in-
fringed.13 5 0 The court then remanded the case for a determination
of reasonable attorney's fees. 5 1
2. Unconscionability.-In Williams v. Williams 15 2 the Court of Ap-
peals held that "judicial power exists to void a separation agreement
when its terms are so unjust and unfair as to be unconscionable. 3 5
The court then affirmed the trial judge's finding that the instant sep-
aration agreement was unconscionable 54 as to the husband. The
agreement provided for total weekly financial obligations in excess
of the husband's income.3 55 The court termed the agreement unfair
346. Id. at 660, 505 A.2d at 871. The court awarded the husband $120,000 in legal
fees.
347. Id. at 661, 505 A.2d at 871.
348. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th ed. 1979).
349. 65 Md. App. at 664, 505 A.2d 872.
350. Id. at 662, 505 A.2d at 872.
351. The wife had contended that the amount of legal fees awarded to her husband
was unreasonable. The court agreed, holding that the chancellor clearly abused his dis-
cretion in awarding the husband $120,000 in fees for only 227 hours of legal work. The
matter was remanded to enable the chancellor to determine a proper fee. Id. at 675, 505
A.2d at 878.
352. 306 Md. 332, 508 A.2d 985 (1986).
353. Id. at 342, 508 A.2d at 990.
354. Id. at 343, 505 A.2d at 941. An "unconscionable" contract is one that "shocks
the conscience" of the court. Id. at 336, 508 A.2d at 987. The doctrine of unconsciona-
bility states that the court will not enforce a grossly unfair bargain, even when the con-
tracting parties wish to be bound. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
(1981).
355. 306 Md. at 334, 508 A.2d at 986. Under the agreement, the wife also received
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and inequitable, since it oppressively burdened the husband. 356
Based upon the doctrine of unconscionability, the court properly set
aside the separation agreement.35 7
H. Other Developments
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.-In Williams v. Williams35" a former
wife sued for specific performance of support payment provisions in
a separation and property settlement agreement that by its terms
was not incorporated into the divorce decree.359 Her former hus-
band defended on the ground that an equity court lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to render a money judgment.3 60 The courts below
held for the wife, and the husband appealed.36 '
The Court of Appeals noted that while courts generally do not
decree specific performance of agreements to pay money, a recog-
nized3 62 exception exists when the court is enforcing agreements
between spouses for alimony or support payments.3 63 Thus, the eq-
uity court had the power to render a money decree arising out of
noncompliance with the terms of the agreement. The court ordered
the husband to pay his arrearages in support. 64
2. Infants.-In In re Colin R.3 65 the Court of Special Appeals
held that the lower court correctly adjudicated Colin, a young boy,
as a child in need of assistance (C.I.N.A.), and properly placed him
under the protective supervision of the Charles County Department
of Social Services.366
property valued at approximately $131,000, while the husband received property valued
at $1100. Id.
356. Id. at 341, 508 A.2d at 990 ("[T]he consideration was grossly inadequate and the
burdens on the husband were oppressive to the point that they were impossible to
perform.")
357. Id. at 343, 508 A.2d at 991.
358. 305 Md. 1, 501 A.2d 432 (1985).
359. The circuit court approved the agreement, but did not incorporate it into the
decree. Id. at 3, 501 A.2d at 433.
360. Id. at 7, 501 A.2d at 435.
361. The circuit court ordered the father to pay $58,748.81 in arrearages. Id. at 5,
501 A.2d at 434. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, dismissed hisjurisdictional argument as "without merit." Id.
362. See Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 292, 104 A.2d 573, 576 (1954). In Zouck, as in
the instant case, the agreement was not incorporated into the divorce decree. Id. at 296,
104 A.2d at 578.
363. 305 Md. at 8, 501 A.2d at 435.
364. Id. at 8-9, 501 A.2d at 435-36.
365. 63 Md. App. 684, 493 A.2d 1083 (1985).
366. Id. at 697, 493 A.2d at 1089-90.
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In 1982 Colin, then three years old, began suffering from se-
vere physical illness. After performing extensive testing, doctors
found the presence of a diuretic, Lasix, in Colin's urine.367 The
doctors believed that Colin's parents were injecting the drug into
Colin; therefore, they denied the parents unsupervised access to the
child. The doctors' theory was confirmed when, after the parents
were denied access, Colin's urine was found to be free of
diuretics.368
The physicians notified the Charles County Department of So-
cial Services of their findings and advised that the hospital would
not release Colin to his parents.369 In turn, the Department of So-
cial Services filed a petition with the court alleging that Colin was a
C.I.N.A., and obtained a search warrant for the parents' home. In
executing the warrant, police officers seized hypodermic syringes
and two vials of Lasix from the parents' bedroom.3 7' The court ad-
judicated Colin as a C.I.N.A. and placed him under the protective
supervision of the Department of Social Services.37 '
On appeal the parents contended that the lower court was
clearly erroneous in adjudicating Colin a C.I.N.A.3 72 The Maryland
Code defines a C.I.N.A. as a child "who is not receiving ordinary
and proper care and attention" and whose parents are unwilling or
unable to give such care and attention to the child.3 73 Taking into
consideration the medical testimony, the hospital records, 7 4 the di-
uretics and syringes found in the parents' home, as well as the par-
ents' failure to respond to this damaging evidence, the court
367. Id. at 688-90, 493 A.2d at 1085-86.
368. Id. at 690, 493 A.2d at 1086. Based upon these findings, the doctors diagnosed
Colin as having suffered Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, an aberration whereby par-
ents induce an illness in their child so that it appears that the child is actually suffering
from a disease.
369. Id. at 690-91, 493 A.2d at 1086.
370. Id. at 691, 493 A.2d at 1086.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 688, 493 A.2d at 1085. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-819(d)
(1984) states that allegations that a child meets the definition of C.I.N.A. must be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. The parents argued that constitutional safeguards
demand that such allegations be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The rec-
ord revealed that the parents raised no objection to the standard of proof at the trial and
therefore failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 63 Md. App. at 695, 493 A.2d at 1088.
The Court of Appeals assumed that the lower court actually did apply the higher stan-
dard in adjudicating Colin a C.I.N.A. Id. at 696, 493 A.2d at 1089.
373. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (1984).
374. The parents objected to the introduction into evidence of both the testimony of
court-appointed physicians who examined Colin and 16 memoranda that showed the
level of diuretics in his urine. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed both arguments.
63 Md. App. at 691-93, 698-99, 493 A.2d at 1086-87, 1090.
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affirmed that Colin was properly adjudicated a C.I.N.A.175
3. Restitution.-In In re Ramont K 376 the Court of Appeals held
that a grandmother who stands in loco parentis does not fall within the
meaning of the word "parent" in the Maryland statute that makes
the parent liable for restitution if a child commits a delinquent
act. 377 The trial court had used language from an earlier Court of
Appeals decision, In re James D. ,378 in concluding that those in loco
parentis are liable. The Ramont K court wrote that while dictum in
James D. had acknowledged that the term "parent" is sometimes
used to include persons standing in loco parentis,a79 the case did not
stand for the principle that such persons should be treated as par-
ents under the restitution statute.3 80 Furthermore, a subsequent
Court of Appeals decision expressly refused to extend parental lia-
bility under the statute to the State standing in loco parentis.38'
The Court of Appeals held that the word "parent" in the resti-
tution statute carries its common meaning as a mother or father,
and not a grandmother.382 The court noted that when the legisla-
ture intends commonly used words to mean something other than
their everyday interpretation, the statute explicitly defines the scope
of the words.383 Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent, the
375. The court further affirmed the trial judge's decision not to recuse himself due to
ex parte communication with the attorney for the Department of Social Services. "The
decision of whether to recuse is a matter within the sound discretion of the court and
will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion." 63 Md. App. at 701,493
A.2d at 1091.
376. 305 Md. 482, 505 A.2d 507 (1986).
377. MD CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829(a) (1984). The statute provides, in
pertinent part: "The court may enter a judgment of restitution against a parent of a
child, or the child in any case in which the court finds a child has committed a delinquent
act ...." (emphasis added).
378. 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983).
379. 305 Md. at 486, 505 A.2d at 509 (quotingJames D., 295 Md. at 327, 455 A.2d at
972: "Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947) is authority for the fact that
the term 'is sometimes used popularly and in statutes to include persons standing in
loco parentis other than the natural parents.' ").
380. James D. upheld the constitutionality of the restitution statute and held that the
statute did not place liability upon a mother or father for a delinquent act committed
while the child is in the custody of the State. 295 Md. at 327-28, 455 A.2d at 972. In
discussing the restitution statute, the court stated that "[t]he term 'parent' is commonly
understood to mean a father or a mother." Id. at 327, 455 A.2d at 972.
381. In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 521-22, 471 A.2d 313, 316 (1984). The court
interpreted the restitution statute as applying to mothers and fathers in custody of their
children at the time of the delinquent act. Id.
382. 305 Md. at 489, 505 A.2d at 511.
383. Id. at 488-89, 505 A.2d at 510-11. The court noted that the child abuse statute,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986), specifically refers to "[a] parent
FAMILY LAW
court refused to extend the duty of restitution to a juvenile's grand-




or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the
supervision of a child ... " (emphasis added). 305 Md. at 489, 505 A.2d at 511.
384. 305 Md. at 489, 505 A.2d at 511.
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VIII. HEALTH CARE
A. Cost Containment-Certificates of Need
In an attempt to stem escalating health care costs, Maryland has
recently passed legislation providing for a systematic, statewide ap-
proach to the planning and development of health care facilities.'
Generally, a health care facility that desires to increase its bed capac-
ity must first obtain a certificate of need2 from the State Health Re-
sources Planning Commission (the Commission).' The
Commission evaluates whether the certificate of need application is
consistent with both the State health plan4 and the Commission's
own review criteria,5 as codified in the Code of Maryland Regula-
tions (COMAR).6
1. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-102 (Supp. 1986). For an enumeration of the
various purposes of the subtitle, see id. at § 19-102(b).
2. Id. at § 19-101(b) defines "certificate of need" as a certification of public need
for the proposed purchase of new equipment or facilities issued by the Commission
under this subtitle for a health care project. "Commission" refers to the State Health
Resources Planning Commission. Id. at § 19-101(c).
3. Id. at § 19-115(h). The Commission is an independent body that functions in the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Id. at § 19-103.
4. Id. at § 19-114(a) provides as follows:
(a) Duty of Commission; contents of plan.-(1) At least every 5 years, begin-
ning no later than October 1, 1983, the Commission shall adopt a State health
plan that includes local health plans.
(2) The plan shall include:
(i) A description of the components that should comprise the health
care system;
(ii) The goals and policies for Maryland's health care system;
(iii) Identification of unmet needs, excess services, minimum access
criteria, and services to be regionalized;
(iv) An assessment of the financial resources required and available
for the health care system;
(v) The methodologies, standards, and criteria for certificate of
need review; and
(vi) Priority for conversion of acute capacity to alternative uses
where appropriate.
5. See id. at § 19-118(c)(1), which provides that the Commission's decision on a cer-
tificate application shall be based on both the State health plan and the Commission's
own standards for review. The Commission adopts its own rules and regulations con-
cerning certificate review pursuant to § 19-115(c).
6. The Commission must consider thirteen criteria before granting a certificate of
need. Some of these criteria appear at MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07(H)(2) (1984),
which states in relevant part:
(a) The State Health Plan. The application will be reviewed to deter-
mine its consistency with the Commission approved Health Systems Plan of the




In Doctors' Hospital v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Commis-
sion 7 the Court of Special Appeals reaffirmed that a certificate of
need application must comply with State Health Plan Standards as
well as COMAR criteria.8 Doctors' Hospital had applied to the
Commission for a certificate of need for an increase in bed capacity.9
Pursuant to the Commission's denial of the application, the hospital
appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed.' 0 The hospital ap-
pealed once again, contending in part" that the Commission's deci-
sion was not supported by "substantial evidence"' 2 and that the
Commission imposed an "illegal moratorium" on the issuance of
(c) The need of the population served or to be served. For purposes of
determining consistency, the Commission consideration will include the need
analysis (if any) included in the State Health Plan, and the special needs of low
income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons,
and other groups which may be underserved and the extent to which groups
which traditionally have experienced difficulties in obtaining equal access to
health services will have access to or be impacted on by the proposed project.
(d) The availability of less costly or more effective alternatives for ad-
dressing the unmet needs identified by the applicant ...
(e) The immediate and long-term financial viability of the proposal ....
(f) Having a positive impact on the existing health care system of the
area.
(h) Adequate arrangements for ancillary and support services required
for the proposed services or facility ....
7. 65 Md. App. 656, 501 A.2d 1324 (1986).
8. Id. at 684-85, 501 A.2d at 1338.
9. Id. at 661, 501 A.2d at 1326.
10. Id. The Commission had denied the certificate because it found that the hospi-
tal's application was inconsistent with seven of the 13 COMAR criteria, specifically:
(1) the relationship of the project to the applicable health systems plan; (2) the need for
the proposed health service among the population to be served, including the elderly;
(3) the availability of less costly alternative methods of providing the proposed health
services; (4) the immediate and long-term financial feasibility of proposal; (5) the propo-
sal's relationship to the existing health care system; (6) the relationship to ancillary serv-
ices; and (7) the proposal's contribution to meeting health needs of the medically
underserved. Id. at 664, 501 A.2d at 1327-28. See supra note 6.
11. The hospital also raised two other issues, specifically that the Commission had
arbitrarily discriminated against the hospital and that the Commission engaged in "re-
view by ambush." The court disposed of these issues without much discussion. See 65
Md. App. at 661-62, 679-84, 501 A.2d at 1326, 1335-38.
12. The court reiterated that "substantial evidence" was the proper standard for re-
viewing a decision of the Commission, a state agency. Id. at 667, 501 A.2d at 1329
(citing Prince George's Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 302 Md. 193, 486
A.2d 744 (1985), and Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Crowder, 43 Md. App.
276, 405 A.2d 279, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979)). Under this standard, the court's
review is limited to ensuring that the record contained reasonably substantial evidence
to support the agency's factual conclusions. 65 Md. App. at 667, 501 A.2d at 1329.
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certificates of need.' 3
The court found that while the applicant may have met the stan-
dards of the State and regional health plans,' 4 it had not demon-
strated compliance with the COMAR criteria.' 5  Substantial
evidence supported the Commission's finding that the need crite-
rion 16 was not satisfied.' 7 The court specifically rejected the hospi-
tal's argument that the Commission's role was merely to lay the
groundwork for calculating future needs, in this case the number of
additional beds necessary, and then to cease its analysis once that
number was fixed.'" Instead, the court determined that the Com-
mission was welcome to consider present and future "utilization fac-
tors" in assessing "need" for a particular project.'"
Concerning the "financial feasibility" criterion,2" the court held
that a mere projection that investors will contribute to a project,
13. 65 Md. App. at 661, 501 A.2d at 1326. The State health plan prohibited the
authorization of 37 additional beds, as identified in the regional health systems plan,
pending completion of a study concerning the appropriate location of these beds. Id. at
675, 501 A.2d at 1333. For this reason, the Commission further found that Doctors'
Hospital had not met the availability standard. Id. Doctors' Hospital argued that this
rejection constituted an "illegal moratorium" that violated article 9 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, which provides in relevant part "[tihat no power of suspending
laws or the execution of laws, unless by, or derived from the legislature, ought to be
exercised, or allowed." 65 Md. App. at 675, 501 A.2d at 1333. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 23-26.
14. The applicable regional health plan was the Southern Maryland Health Systems
Plan, which projected that Prince George's County would need 37 additional medi-
cal/surgical beds for 1987. In addition to this 37 bed projection (referred to as the
availability standard), the regional health systems plan contained other area-wide stan-
dards with which a certificate applicant had to prove itself compatible, namely an accessi-
bility standard and a cost standard. 65 Md. App. at 675, 501 A.2d at 1333. The
Commission was willing to concede that the hospital had met these three standards. Id.
at 668, 501 A.2d at 1330.
15. See id. at 668-74, 501 A.2d at 1330-33. The court reviewed the criteria of need,
less costly alternatives, relationship to existing health care systems, financial feasibility,
impact on ancillary services, and effect on the medically underserved. See supra note 6.
16. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07(H)(2)(c) (1984). This section is set out
supra at note 6. The court in Doctor's Hospital cited the predecessor to § 24.01.07(H)(2),
which was codified at § 24.01.06(B)(2).
17. 65 Md. App. at 670, 501 A.2d at 1330.
18. Id. at 669, 501 A.2d at 1330.
19. Id. The court explained that the Commissioner exercised proper discretion in
denying an application. The hospital had high length-of-stay rate, four other facilities in
the area operated below 85% medical/surgical occupancy rate set as a minimal standard
by health systems plans, and the hospital was not best suited to serve the needs of the
elderly. d. at 669-70, 501 A.2d at 1330-31.
20. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.02.06(B)(2)(e) (current version at § 24.02.
06(H)(2)(e) (1984)). The criterion pertains to methods of funding the construction and
equipment acquisitions required in connection with the additional beds. 65 Md. App. at
683, 501 A.2d at 1338.
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even if unrebutted, is not sufficient to meet the criterion. 2' The
court adopted the rule that the Commission could reject uncontra-
dicted evidence in a certificate application for substantial reasons
that it adequately explains.22
Additionally, the court held that the Commission's decision to
await receipt of necessary information on the appropriate location
of additional beds before issuing a certificate of need for a hospital
to increase bed capacity did not constitute the imposition of an "ille-
gal moratorium."' 2 3 The Commission had not suspended any law or
the execution of any law, for it had reviewed the merits of the hospi-
tal's application.24 Instead, the Commission had simply decided
that it lacked certain information relating to bed location essential
to a favorable decision.25 The hospital's insistence on a decision
before the Commission had received this information did not
change the hospital's failure to meet its burden of producing the
evidence required to support a certificate of need application.26
In Perini Services, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Com-
mission 27 the Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission did
not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on proposed State
health plan regulations that had not yet become effective under
Maryland law. 28 The court found that in its certificate review the
Commission correctly used current available data concerning the
need for nursing home beds even though the data became available
only in the process of drafting a proposed State health plan.29 The
court distinguished the appropriate use of current available data
from the actual application of a new State health policy.3 0 Specifi-
cally, the Commission could use new information in assessing a cer-
tificate of need's consistency with current State health plan
21. 65 Md. App. at 671-72, 501 A.2d at 1331-32.
22. Id. at 672, 501 A.2d at 1332 (citing 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 29:26, at 456 (2d ed. 1984)).
23. 65 Md. App. at 675-76, 501 A.2d at 1333-34. See supra note 13.
24. Id. at 675-76, 501 A.2d at 1334.
25. Id. at 676, 501 A.2d at 1334.
26. Id.
27. 67 Md. App. 189, 506 A.2d 1207, cert. denied, 307 Md. 261, 513 A.2d 314 (1986).
28. See id. at 216, 506 A.2d at 1221. All parties and the court admitted that the 1981
State Health Plan applied to Perini's application. Id. at 197, 506 A.2d at 1211. The
proposed State health plan, which embodied health planning through 1988, became ef-
fective later in 1984. This new plan projected that Washington County would need no
additional beds. Only 148 beds had been allocated to the entire Western Maryland area,
with priority given to Frederick County. Id. at 196-97, 506 A.2d at 1210-11.
29. Id. at 216, 506 A.2d at 1221.
30. Id. at 214, 506 A.2d at 1219.
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regulations concerning maldistribution and outmigration.3s Other-
wise, health care decisions in this state would be based on outdated
information. 2
The Perini court also affirmed the principle, discussed in Doctors'
Hospital,3 that proposed projects must comport not only with the
statistical bed need projections of the current State health plan, but
with other criteria as well. 4
B. Medical Malpractice-Arbitration
The Health Care Malpractice Claims Act,35 adopted by the
Maryland legislature in 1976, sets forth a process for the adjudica-
tion of health claims outside the traditional tort framework. Specifi-
cally, the Act requires malpractice claims against health care
providers seeking damages in excess of $10,000 to be filed with the
Health Claims Arbitration Office.3 6 The Office, acting through its
Director, refers all issues to a three-member panel consisting of an
attorney, a health care provider, and a member of the general pub-
lic.3 7 The panel conducts a hearing, determines the liability, if any,
31. Id. at 216, 506 A.2d at 1220. Historically, a disproportionate number of beds
and facilities had been located in Washington County. See id. at 204, 506 A.2d at 1214.
This unbalanced distribution pattern created a trend whereby Allegheny and Frederick
County residents "migrated" to neighboring Washington County for nursing home
care. Id.
32. See id. at 215, 506 A.2d at 1220.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
34. The court was referring to MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07(B)(2)(c) (current
version at § 24.01.07(H)(2)(c) (1984)) (COMAR), which requires that, after examining
current demographic and utilization data, the Commission must consider the needs of
the population that will be served or that is presently being served. See supra note 6.
The need for beds under the State health plan/regional health plan need not be identi-
cal to the need figure under COMAR. The COMAR need determination takes into con-
sideration special needs that the State plan does not address, e.g., the needs of Medicaid
patients, minority groups, and the disabled. Furthermore, COMAR permits a need anal-
ysis in cases in which the State health plan provides none. 67 Md. App. at 207, 506 A.2d
at 1216; cf. Princeton Comm. Hosp. v. State Health Planning and Dev. Agency, 328
S.E.2d 164, 170-71 (W. Va. 1985) (agency may issue certificate of need only after finding
that proposed health service is consistent with state health plan and is "needed" under
agency's own criteria).
35. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
36. Id. at § 3-2A-02(a). Before the 1986 amendment, the Act covered all claims seek-
ing damages in excess of $5000. Id. The Health Claims Arbitration Office is a public
office, created as a unit in the Executive Department and headed by a Director ap-
pointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. at § 3-2A-03(a).
37. See id. at §§ 3-2A-03(c), -04(e). Those arbitrators selected are not a part of the
Arbitration Office's staff, and they are paid by the parties themselves, not by any govern-
ment unit. Attorney General v.Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 286, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed,
439 U.S. 805 (1978).
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of the health care provider, and assesses appropriate damages in the
form of an award.3 ' The arbitration panel is further responsible for
assessing the costs of the proceedings against one party or appor-
tioning the costs among the parties. s9 If no party rejects the award,
it becomes final and binding when filed by the Director in the appro-
priate circuit court for confirmation.4 ° If a party seeks to reject the
award, the party may obtain judicial review as outlined by statute.4 '
1. Procedure.-In Tranen v. 4ziz 42 the Court of Appeals held
that to obtain judicial review of an arbitration award, an aggrieved
party must follow all necessary procedures set forth in the Act.4 3
The plaintiffs had filed a claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Of-
fice against a physician for failure to diagnose breast cancer.44 The
panel made an award in favor of the physician.45 The plaintiffs re-
sponded by filing a declaration and election of jury trial in circuit
court. 46 Although the declaration alleged the same acts of negli-
gence, it was silent as to the prior arbitration of the claim.47
The Court of Appeals held that the procedures established by
the Act were mandatory and created a condition precedent to the
effective institution of a court action; therefore, failure to comply
with those procedures necessitated dismissal of the action.4' The
court explained that the statute required two separate undertakings:
(1) the filing of a notice of rejection of the award with the Director
and other parties within thirty days after service of the award on the
rejecting party; and (2) the filing of an action in circuit court to nul-
lify the award and the filing of a copy of the action with the Director
during the same thirty-day period.4 9
The court determined that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the
second condition. Because the papers filed in circuit court made no
mention of the arbitration decision, the court held that the plaintiffs
38. See MD. CT. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(e) (Supp. 1986).
39. Id. at § 3-2A-05(f).
40. Id. at § 3-2A-05(i).
41. See id. at § 3-2A-06.
42. 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985).
43. Id. at 611, 500 A.2d at 638-39. The court referred to the applicable provisions of
the Act, namely § 3-2A-06(a)-(b).
44. Id. at 608, 500 A.2d at 637.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 608-09, 500 A.2d at 637.
47. See id. at 614, 500 A.2d at 640. The circuit court was not aware of the award itself
or that plaintiffs were rejecting an award.
48. Id. at 612, 500 A.2d at 639.
49. Id. at 611, 500 A.2d at 638-39.
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had failed to file an action to nullify the award.5 ° Because the plain-
tiffs neither notified the Director of their rejection of the award nor
filed an action to nullify, the court also held that they had not sub-
stantially complied with the Act's provisions.5'
Judge McAuliffe concurred, expressly reserving for future con-
sideration the principle of substantial compliance as applied to pro-
cedural requirements for instituting a court action following
arbitration.52 He suggested that a notice of action might be drafted,
filed, and served in a manner sufficient to satisfy the statutory re-
quirements for the filing of a notice of rejection, or that a complaint
might satisfy all notice and filing requirements for a notice of rejec-
tion and a notice of action.53
Tranen appears to follow the series of cases indicating that a liti-
gant's failure to follow strictly all prescribed steps required for re-
view of an arbitration claim may result in the action's dismissal.54
The concurring opinion, however, seems to ally itself with another
line of cases that leaves room for instances of substantial
compliance. 55
50. Id. at 612-13, 500 A.2d at 639. The plaintiffs contended that § 3-2A-06 would
not require the filing of a notice of rejection as a prerequisite to court action because,
under § 3-2A-06, a party could commence an action to nullify in court before filing the
notice of rejection. The court explained, however, that if the Director did not receive a
notice of rejection at some point, the Director would file the arbitration award in circuit
court and the court would have to confirm the award pursuant to § 3-2A-05(h). Id., 500
A.2d at 639-40.
51. Id. at 613, 500 A.2d at 640. The court noted that an action to nullify in circuit
court is in turn a two-step process, governed by the Maryland rules, specifically rules
BY2 and BY4. First, rule BY2 provides that an action to nullify an arbitration award
"shall be commenced by filing notice of the action with the clerk of the court .... The
Notice shall identify the award and state that it is being rejected by the party filing no-
tice." Id. Second, rule BY4 provides that within 30 days after filing notice of action, the
plaintiff shall file and serve a declaration, setting forth the allegations entitling the ag-
grieved party to relief. Id. at 613-14, 500 A.2d at 640. By not apprising the court of the
award or their rejection of the award, the plaintiffs did not properly file an action to
nullify; they merely filed a new action, independent of the arbitration proceeding. Id. at
614, 500 A.2d at 640.
52. Id. at 614-15, 500 A.2d at 640-41 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). Judge Rodowsky
joined Judge McAuliffe in the concurrence.
53. Id. at 615, 500 A.2d at 641.
54. See Bailey v. Woel, 55 Md. App. 488, 462 A.2d 91 (1984) (claimant must present
evidence to arbitration panel to satisfy condition precedent to circuit court action, as
mere filing of claim with Health Claims Arbitration Office will not satisfy statutory re-
quirement); Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 452 A.2d 1302 (1982) (plaintiff's failure
first to file medical malpractice claim greater than $5000 in Health Claims Arbitration
Office was grounds for dismissing suit in circuit court).
55. See Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, 62 Md. App. 519, 490 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 304
Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985) (claimants substantially complied because they merely
failed to affix technically correct caption on documents that otherwise met statutory re-
In Alfred Munzer, M.D., P.A. v. Ramsey56 the Court of Special Ap-
peals further clarified the procedures essential to invoke judicial re-
view of an arbitration proceeding. The plaintiffs filed a medical
malpractice claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office against
Dr. Munzer and four other health care providers. After a hearing,
a panel chairman granted summary judgment in favor of the physi-
cian, but did not determine or assess costs.58 The parties received
copies of the order, but the panel chairman never sent the order to
the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office.59 The plain-
tiffs then filed their notice of rejection and their declaration in the
circuit court, seeking to nullify the summary judgment order.60 Dr.
Munzer moved to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, because the panel had never entered an
award, and because the plaintiffs had not timely filed an action to
nullify the panel chairman's order.6 The trial court agreed that it
lacked jurisdiction.62
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the panel
had never entered an arbitration award within the contemplation of
the statute.63 According to the court, the Act made clear that the
arbitration process was to end with an award that resolved the issues
of liability and damages and assessed the costs of arbitration.' Ad-
ditionally, the panel chairman must then deliver this award to the
Director, who in turn must serve it on each party.65 In the present
case, the Director never received an award embodying the order
granting summary judgment.66
The court distinguished this failure to comply with statutory
quirements); Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113, 484 A.2d 1060 (1984), aft'd, 304
Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985) (claimants substantially complied with Act provision be-
cause they filed timely notice of rejection with Director of Health Claims Arbitration
Office and sent a copy to health care provider's counsel, notwithstanding that they did
not send copies to members of the arbitration panel).
56. 63 Md. App. 350, 492 A.2d 946 (1985).
57. Id. at 353-54, 492 A.2d at 947.
58. Id. at 354, 492 A.2d at 947-48.
59. Id., 492 A.2d at 948.
60. Id.
61. Id. The panel chairman granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Munzer on
September 23, 1983. Presumably the notice was filed more than 30 days after this date.
62. Id. at 355, 492 A.2d at 948.
63. Id. at 357, 492 A.2d at 949.
64. Id. at 358, 492 A.2d at 950 (citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
05(e) (1984 & Supp. 1985) (current version at § 3-2A-05(f) (Supp. 1986)), and MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 01, § 03.02.12(D)(1) (current version at tit. 01, § 03.01.12(F)(3)(1985)).




provisions from other less significant omissions on the basis that
this matter went to the very heart of the health claims arbitration
system.67 First, without delivery to the Director, there could be no
public record of the panel chairman's action, no triggering of the
time required for other actions, and no ripening of the panel chair-
man's decision into a final judgment.6" Second, the award's failure
to apportion costs among the parties was no small omission since
apportionment is an important method of assuring that the parties
defray at least a portion of the expense of the health claims arbitra-
tion scheme.6 9
The court then discussed the relative positions of the parties.
Since a condition precedent to circuit court action had not occurred,
dismissal of the plaintiffs' court action was necessary. 70 Unlike pre-
vious situations addressed by the courts, 7 ' however, no valid award
had ever been entered in this case. Thus, the court decided that the
case should return to the panel for entry of an award to satisfy statu-
tory requirements. 72
The court was less certain of the proper course for the arbitra-
tors or panel chairman to follow when the case actually returned to
arbitration. The court recalled its suggestion in Stifler v. Weiner: a
claim should be adjudicated on a summary basis if it is susceptible to
such treatment, but summary disposition must be made by the
whole panel and not just by one member of it.73 A recent statutory
amendment appears to endorse, at least in part, the Stifler analysis. 4
67. See id. at 357, 492 A.2d at 949.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 358, 492 A.2d at 950.
70. Id. at 360, 492 A.2d at 951.
71. The court distinguished Tranen v. Aziz, 59 Md. App. 528, 476 A.2d 1170 (1984),
aff'd, 304 Md. 605, 500 A.2d 636 (1985) (see supra notes 42-55), and Bailey v. Woel, 302
Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984). In those cases the court dismissed a claimant's action to
nullify in order to prevent a challenge to a panel's determination, a determination that
would, nonetheless, remain a valid award. 63 Md. App. at 361, 492 A.2d at 951.
72. 63 Md. App. at 362, 492 A.2d at 951. By vacating that portion of the judgment
directing remand to the panel, the court avoided ruling on whether the circuit court ever
had the power to remand a case to arbitration. Apparently Maryland's appellate courts
have yet to resolve this question. Compare Stifler v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19, 25, 488
A.2d 192, 195 (1985) (suggesting that circuit court possessed that power) with Schwartz
v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 321, 452 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1982) (reversing judgment trans-
ferring case from circuit court to arbitral).
73. 63 Md. App. at 362, 492 A.2d at 952 (citing Stifler, 62 Md. App. at 25, 488 A.2d at
195).
74. The court dismissed the newly passed (1985) amendment of § 3-2A-05(a) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 63 Md. App. at 362-63, 488 A.2d at 952. The
section as amended states, in relevant part: "(1) Except as provided under paragraph
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In Wyndham v. Haines71 the Court of Appeals limited the re-
quirements for appeal to the circuit court from an adverse Health
Claims Arbitration award. The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice
claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office (the Office). 76 At
the conclusion of the hearing, the panel agreed unanimously to
grant the health care provider's motion to dismiss on account of the
plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case of liability. 77 The
plaintiffs promptly filed notice of rejection with the Office, and, in
addition, filed an action to nullify, a declaration, and a prayer for
jury trial in circuit court. 7' They also filed a petition to vacate the
award on the basis of the panel chairman's alleged partiality. 79 The
circuit court denied the petition to vacate, 80 but it granted the
health care provider's motion to dismiss on the ground that plain-
tiff's failure to establish a prima facie case of liability at the arbitra-
tion level was tantamount to a refusal to properly submit the claim
to arbitration."
The Court of Appeals found no statutory basis for the trial
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss and thus reversed.82 In Bai-
ley v. Woels 3 the Court of Appeals had held that a plaintiff must pres-
ent to the panel some evidence of liability; a however, the Wyndham
court refused to extend Bailey to require that the plaintiff present a
prima facie case of liability.8 5 Indeed, the court suggested that this
(2) of this subsection, all issues of law shall be referred by the director to the panel
chairman. All issues of fact shall be referred by the director to the arbitration panel."
The court noted that in an appropriate case the new law does not explicitly bar
either a panel or a chairman from making a summary award without an evidentiary hear-
ing. The court speculated that the absence of such a bar might represent legislative
approval of Stifler, and may authorize the chairman alone to rule on questions of law. As
the amendment had not taken effect when this case was decided below, however, the
court avoided any conclusions. 63 Md. App. at 362-63, 488 A.2d at 952.
75. 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986).
76. See id. at 271, 503 A.2d at 721.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 272, 503 A.2d at 721.
79. Id. The claimants discovered that the panel chairman's opposing counsel in two
unrelated matters was also counsel to Dr. Haines in the present case. The claimants
allegedly feared that the chairman's desire to maintain a good rapport with defense
counsel in the negotiation and settlement of his unrelated cases might subconsciously
bias the chairman's decisionmaking. Id. at 277-78, 503 A.2d at 724.
80. Id. at 273, 503 A.2d at 721.
81. See id. at 272-73, 503 A.2d at 721.
82. See id. at 275, 503 A.2d at 723.
83. 302 Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984).
84. Id. at 45, 485 A.2d at 268.
85. See 305 Md. at 275, 503 A.2d at 722-23.
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extension would be contrary to provisions of the Act.86
The court added that by refusing to imply this additional condi-
tion precedent, it would not thwart the statutory objective of screen-.
ing out unmeritorious health claims."7 The court cited Osheroff v.
Chestnut Lodge,"8 in which Judge Gilbert stated that the screening
process was to occur at the arbitration level only; once a plaintiff had
properly invoked judicial review, the case came to resemble any
other suit and screening was no longer appropriate.8 9
Lastly, the court affirmed the denial of a petition to vacate, 90
agreeing with the trial court that plaintiffs had failed to adduce the
required proof of "evident partiality."'" The court held that a party
moving to vacate must offer more than speculation and bald allega-
tions of bias, but rather must prove facts sufficient to permit an in-
ference that the arbitrator was indeed partial.92
2. Joint Tortfeasor Releases.-In Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co. 93 the Court of Special Appeals held that the execu-
tion of a general release in settlement of a health claims arbitration
case against a physician included a corporate manufacturer in its
terms,94 even though that manufacturer was not and could not have
86. Id., 503 A.2d at 723.
87. See id. at 276, 503 A.2d at 723; cf. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute:
Maryland's Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 95 (1980)
(noting that statute was intended to discourage frivolous litigation).
88. 62 Md. App. 519, 525, 490 A.2d 720, 723, cert. denied, 304 Md. 163, 497 A.2d
1163 (1985).
89. 305 Md. at 276-77, 503 A.2d at 723 (citing Osheroff, 62 Md. App. at 525, 490 A.2d
at 723).
90. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724.
91. Id. The court referred to the governing Code provision, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(2) (1984), which allows a court to vacate an award if"[t]here was
evident partiality by an arbitrator." 305 Md. at 278, 503 A.2d at 724.
92. 305 Md. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724-25. The court expressly addressed Hartman v.
Cooper, 59 Md. App. 154, 168, 474 A.2d 959, 967, cert. denied, 301 Md. 41,481 A.2d 801
(1984), overruling the part of the opinion that stated that a mere appearance of possible
bias was sufficient to vacate an arbitration award. 305 Md. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724-25.
The court, however, did not insist on a standard so high as to require a showing of
actual bias or proof of improper conduct.
93. 63 Md. App. 515, 492 A.2d 1358 (1985).
94. Id. at 530, 492 A.2d at 1366. The actual language of the release is as follows:
I hereby release and discharge ROLAND CAVANAUGH, M.D., his or their suc-
cessors and assigns, and all other persons, firms or corporations who are or
might be liable, from all claims . . .resulting or to result from the incident
which happened on or about March 28, 1980 and which is the subject matter of
the lawsuit filed in the Health Claims Arbitration Office for Maryland, HCA No.
81-166 ....
Id. at 524, 492 A.2d at 1362-63.
been a party to the arbitration proceeding.95 The plaintiff had filed
a claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Office against a physician,
asserting negligence.9 6 Before arbitration, the parties agreed to a
settlement of $4500 whereby the plaintiff executed a release. 97
Later, the plaintiff filed an action against the manufacturer of cast-
ing tape used by the physician, alleging negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and product liability.9" The manufacturer prevailed on a
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the release
barred the suit.99
The plaintiff appealed on two grounds, 100 the second of which
was that the release could not apply to the manufacturer, but only to
the physician. She maintained that the settlement agreement's ref-
erence to the Health Claims Arbitration lawsuit necessarily re-
stricted the scope of discharge to the doctor only, as the
manufacturer was not a health care provider.' 0 '
The court, however, determined that the language releasing
"all other persons, firms and corporations" effectively discharged all
joint tortfeasors, including the manufacturer. 10 2 References in the
release to the date of the accident and the "subject matter" of the
arbitration proceeding could not distinguish between the suits
against the physician and the manufacturer, because these items
were the same in each case.' The plain language of the agreement
precluded any interpretation other than that it released all joint
tortfeasors. 10 4 The court noted that the plaintiff had the chance to
95. See id. at 518-19, 492 A.2d at 1360. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
02(a) (Supp. 1986) provides that the subtitle applies only to actions "by a person against
a health care provider"; § 3-2A-01 (e) (1984) defines "health care provider" as a hospi-
tal, related institution, physician, or other listed health care professional.
96. 63 Md. App. at 519, 492 A.2d at 1360.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 519-20, 492 A.2d at 1360.
100. Id. at 520, 492 A.2d at 1360. At an earlier stage in the proceedings, a different
circuit court judge had denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff's first ground of appeal was that the "law of the case" doctrine precluded the
second judge from granting the motion for summary judgment that a court of coordi-
nate jurisdiction previously denied. The Court of Special Appeals explained that denial
of the motion did not preclude reiubmission of it at a later point in the proceedings. Id.
at 522, 492 A.2d at 1362 (citingJoy v. Anne Arundel County, 52 Md. App. 653, 660-61,
451 A.2d 1237, 1242 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 440 (1983), and Placido v. Citizens
Bank and Trust Co., 38 Md. App. 33, 44-46, 379 A.2d 773, 779-80 (1977)).
101. 63 Md. App. at 525, 492 A.2d at 1363. For the statutory definition of "health
care provider," see supra note 95.
102. Id. at 530-31, 492 A.2d at 1366.
103. Id. at 530, 492 A.2d at 1365-66.
104. Id. at 530, 492 A.2d at 1366.
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remove the language or otherwise to limit the effect of the release,
but had failed to do so.' 0 5
C. Legislative Developments
1. Cost Containment.-Two bills passed by the General Assem-
bly during the 1986 session establish exemptions from the lengthy
and costly certificate of need process.' 06 Chapter 82717 eliminates
the requirement of a certificate of need before nursing homes may
expend capital for equipment, construction, or renovation, provided
the expenditure is not for projects directly related to patient care or
for projects that increase patient charges or other rates.' 0 8 The ex-
emption does not apply if the project would form part of a patient
care or health care project for which a certificate of need would
otherwise be required.'0 9
Chapter 864110 closes a loophole in the health planning law that
105. Id. at 530-31, 492 A.2d at 1366.
Other Developments:
1. In McClurkin v. Maldonado, 304 Md. 225, 498 A.2d 626 (1985), the Court of
Appeals held that a single arbitration panel chairman lacked the authority to dismiss an
action brought under the Health Claims Arbitration Act. Id. at 234, 498 A.2d at 631.
2. In Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 304 Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985), the Court of
Appeals upheld the adequacy of a rejection notice filed with the Director of the Health
Claims Arbitration Office alone, even though MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
06(a) (1984) requires that a rejection notice be filed with both the Director and the
arbitration panel. Id. at 368, 499 A.2d at 478.
106. The certificate of need application process often involves multiple applications
for health care projects that are usually "batched" by the Commission and considered as
a group. Before the Commission can render a decision as to which health care facility is
most appropriate, multiple hearings must occur. Any party or interested person may
request an evidentiary hearing pursuant to MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-118(f)
(Supp. 1986). The preparation for this hearing involves a great quantity of time and
paperwork. In fact, competitors often use a hearing as a delay tactic. Also, the Commis-
sion may find that it requires more information to make a decision, which further delays
the process. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, Joint Committee on Health Care Cost
Containment (Sept. 25, 1986).
107. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 827, 1986 Md. Laws 3171 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 19-115(j) (Supp. 1986)).
108. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-115(j)(5)(vi) (Supp. 1986). The General As-
sembly intended the statute to cover expenditures such as the construction of parking
lots or other physical facilities unrelated to patient care. These expenditures do not raise
the costs to patients, but rather enable nursing homes to operate more efficiently or to
upgrade their physical plant. Consequently, the General Assembly believed it unneces-
sary to burden an already overworked Commission with these matters. Telephone inter-
view with Karl AroJoint Committee on Health Care Cost Containment (Sept. 24, 1986).
109. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-115(j)(6) (Supp. 1986). Compare the Act of
May 27, 1986, ch. 730, 1986 Md. Laws 2775 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 19-115(i) (Supp. 1986)), which provides the identical exemption for hospitals.
110. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 864, 1986 Md. Laws 3506 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 19-101(e)(l)(iii), (e)(2)(v) (Supp. 1986)).
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permitted the construction and operation of "multispeciality ambu-
latory surgical facilities" without requiring a certificate of need.'
Specifically, the law alters the definition of "ambulatory surgical fa-
cility" to include these facilities, which are often extremely expen-
sive to build and costly to the health care system, 112 under certificate
of need requirements." 3 In addition, the legislation provides an ex-
emption for physicians, podiatrists, or dentists who perform sur-
geries within a single medical or surgical subspecialty in their
office.'" 4 Lastly, the statute contains a grandfather clause for those
entities that, before February 12, 1986, had either (1) received certi-
fication from Medicare to be reimbursed as an ambulatory surgical
facility; or (2) received a letter of determination from the Commis-
sion that a certificate of need was not required, and had spent at
least $100,000 in reliance on that determination.'' 5
The General Assembly enacted two other bills that amend the
1985 Health Care Cost Containment package. 1 6 Chapter 80317
provides that future State health plans, developed after incorpora-
tion of the institution-specific plan" t 8 into the State health plan,
shall include the various requirements specified in the institution-
specific plan."' The Commission will then use the institution-spe-
111. Certain multiservice facilities, termed "hospitals without beds," which per-
formed outpatient surgery and other services on a large scale, were technically exempt
from certificate of need requirements. The Maryland Hospital Association wanted to
close this loophole because these physician-operated facilities held a competitive advan-
tage over ordinary hospitals. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, supra note 108.
112. These facilities were essentially "hospitals" in their construction and operation,
and their operation caused a serious drain on state health resources. Telephone inter-
view with Karl Aro, supra note 106.
113. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-101(e)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1986).
114. Id. at § 19-101(e)(2)(v). This provision reflects a compromise between physi-
cians and the Maryland Hospital Association, permitting a small group of practitioners,
including podiatrists and ophthalmologists, to perform procedures for patients who
leave after a few hours. The certificate of need exemption, however, covers facilities
with no more than four surgical suites. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, supra note
108.
115. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 864, § 2, 1986 Md. Laws 3506, 3509 (codified at MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-101 (Supp. 1986)).
116. Health Care Cost Containment Act, ch. 102, 1985 Md. Laws 1241; chs. 107-112,
1985 Md. Laws 1496 to 1552 (codified at scattered sections of MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN., MD. Com. LAw CODE ANN., and MD. ANN. CODE arts. 41, 43C, 48A (Supp. 1986)).
117. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 803, 1986 Md. Laws 3074 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 19-114, -114.1 (Supp. 1986)).
118. An institution-specific plan, also called a hospital capacity plan, identifies excess
bed capacity and determines reduction for each hospital. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-114.1 (Supp. 1986).
119. Id. at § 19-114.1(d)(4). These requirements are set forth in MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 19-114.1(b) (Supp. 1986), which provides:
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cific plan, in conjunction with the State health plan, to review certifi-
cate of need applications for conversion, expansion, consolidation,
or introduction of hospital services.120
The statute also directs the Joint Committee on Health Care
Cost Containment 12 to study the effects of the 1985 Health Care
Cost Containment package on hospital capacity, access to health
care, and quality of care.1 22 The Joint Committee is to report its
findings and recommendations to the General Assembly on or
before the first day of the 1990 Session. 21
Finally, Chapter 809124 authorizes the Secretary of Health the
Mental Hygiene to investigate complaints concerning the conform-
ance of licenses for major medical equipment 25 with statutory and
regulatory licensing requirements.' 26 The Secretary may also in-
spect the operation of licensed major medical equipment to verify
(b) The institution-specific plan shall address:
(1) Accurate bed count data for licensed beds and staffed and oper-
ated beds;
(2) Cost data associated with all hospital beds and associated serv-
ices on a hospital specific basis;
(3) Migration patterns and current and future projected population
data;
(4) Accessibility and availability of beds;
(5) Quality of care;
(6) Current health care needs, as well as growth trends for such
needs, for the area covered by each hospital;
(7) Hospitals in high growth areas; and
(8) Utilization.
The statute ensures that the above methodology will henceforth be incorporated in
the State health plan, so that hospitals cannot avoid these requirements when a new
State health plan comes into effect. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, supra note 106.
120. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-114.1(d)(1) (Supp. 1986).
121. The Joint Committee comprises five Senators and five Delegates, appointed by
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates, respectively; it is
staffed by the Department of Legislative Reference and Department of Fiscal Services.
Health Care Cost Containment Act, ch. 109, § 4, 1985 Md. Laws 1532; ch. 111, § 3,
1985 Md. Laws 1541.
122. Health Care Cost Containment Act, ch. 109, § 4, amended by Act of May 27, 1986,
ch. 803, 1986 Md. Laws 3078; ch. 111, § 3, amended by Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 803, 1986
Md. Laws 3078-79.
123. Id. The General Assembly added these provisions to enable an assessment con-
cerning whether the methodology that it had created for health care costs would prove
flexible enough to encourage reductions in bed capacity, yet remain sensitive to market
growth. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, supra note 106.
124. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 809, 1986 Md. Laws 3103 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 19-1005.1, -1006(a) (Supp. 1986)).
125. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-1001(c) (Supp. 1986) defines "major medical
equipment" as medical equipment used to provide health care services if the total cost
of the equipment exceeds $600,000 after adjustment for inflation.
126. Id. at § 19-1005.1(a)(1).
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that safety standards are being met. 12 7 Furthermore, the Secretary
may deny a license to individuals and corporate entities if they pre-
viously had a license revoked in their individual capacity or as a dif-
ferent corporate entity.128
2. Medical Malpractice-Arbitration.-In a continuing response
to the medical malpractice concern in the state, 129 the General As-
sembly passed Chapter 642,"30 providing for a stricter reporting and
management program for claims against physicians. The Director of
the Health Claims Arbitration Office must now forward copies of
claims against a health care provider to the Commission on Medical
Discipline and the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland.' 3 1
The Commission will have two consumer members, one of whom
should be knowledgeable in risk management or quality assur-
ance. ' 2 The Faculty must report complaints or malpractice claims
against physicians to the Commission. 13 Furthermore, every six
months, hospitals must file with the Commission reports of certain
complaints or claims against physicians. '3 4 Under certain circum-
stances, the Commission must notify hospitals and other facilities of
127. Id. at § 19-1005.1(a)(2). These two powers, to investigate and to inspect, were
explicitly granted to the Secretary to fill a gap in the previous legislation concerning
major medical equipment. The Health Care Cost Containment Act, ch. 107, 1985 Md.
Laws 1496 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1001 to -1008 (Supp. 1986))
had failed to address these issues. The Secretary now has the authority to enforce better
compliance with the statute and thereby to promote safety.
128. Section 19-1006(a)(3) encompasses officers, owners, or directors of corporate
entities. The purpose of the legislation was to prevent those who earlier had licenses
revoked from obtaining licenses at a later time by merely reincorporating under another
entity. Telephone interview with Karl Aro, supra note 106.
129. See generally REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON HEALTH CARE COST CON-
TAINMENT, Recommendation 36 (Dec. 14, 1984).
130. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 642, 1986 Md. Laws 2365 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a)(l) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 14-
402(a), (f), 14-501(c), -510.1(d), -512, -603 (Supp. 1986); and MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 19-319(e), (g) (Supp. 1986)).
131. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a)(l) (Supp. 1986).
132. MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-402(a)(2)(ii)(4), (2)(iii) (Supp. 1986). Quality
assurance, as the term suggests, embraces clinical issues of medical care delivery at an
institution and whether that care meets certain standards. Recently, the field has become
related to the area of risk management. For fuller discussion, see infra note 137.
133. See MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(c) (1986).
134. Id. at § 14-512(a)(1). These reports would state whether, during the six months
preceding the report, the hospital had taken any disciplinary action or placed restric-
tions on any licensed physicians in the hospital for reasons that might be grounds for
disciplinary action under MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-504 (1986 & Supp. 1986).
Section 14-504 enumerates various grounds for reprimand, probation, suspension, or
revocation of a physician's license, including incompetence, substance abuse, and falsifi-
cation of records.
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these complaints or reports. 35
Chapter 642 further prescribes that each hospital establish a
process for providing credentials to physicians who have staff privi-
leges at the hospital or who are employed by the hospital.' 36 It also
requires that hospitals maintain a risk management program. 37
135. Id. at § 14-510.1(d)(1) (Supp. 1986). Circumstances for notification would arise
if the nature of the complaint signifies a reasonable possibility of an imminent threat to
patient safety, or if the complaint or report resulted from a claim filed in the Health
Claims Arbitration Office. Id.
136. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-319(e) (Supp. 1986). The statute requires in
pertinent part:
(2) The Secretary shall, by regulation and in consultation with hospitals,
physicians, interested community and advocacy groups, and representatives of
the Maryland Defense Bar and Plaintiffs' Bar, establish minimum standards for
a credentialling process which shall include:
(i) A formal written appointment process documenting the physi-
cian's education, clinical expertise, licensure history, insurance history, medical
history, claims history, and professional experience.
(ii) A requirement that an initial appointment to staff not be com-
plete until the physician has successfully completed a probationary period.
(iii) A formal, written reappointment process to be conducted at
least every 2 years. The reappointment process shall document the physician's
pattern of performance by analyzing claims filed against the physician, data
dealing with utilization, quality, and risk, a review of clinical skills, adherence to
hospital bylaws, policies and procedures, compliance with continuing education
requirements, and mental and physical status.
137. Id. at § 19-319(g). Risk management entails the determination and analysis of
the potential losses, i.e., risks, assumed by any business or institution, such as a hospital,
in connection with its activity of production or service. Historically, the primary func-
tion of the risk manager was to assess the amount of insurance the hospital needed to
cover adequately these potential losses. The risk manager's role was defensive; it largely
required the tracking of occurrences or incidents that might later evolve into a claim.
Recent developments in the insurance market have altered that role. In part, due
to the proliferation of malpractice suits and awards, the insurance market has decreased,
limiting the number of sources from which hospitals and physicians can procure cover-
age. Furthermore, coverage is fairly standard and premiums tend to be uniformly ele-
vated. Hence, this defensive aspect of the risk manager's position has become less
significant.
Within the past few years, a greater focus on loss-prevention has led to a more
active, affirmative role for risk managers. Hospitals had traditionally employed written
"incident reports" to chronicle wayward occurrences such as medication errors or "slip
and falls." This system, however, failed to account for more than half of actual incidents,
and the more serious incidents tended to go unreported. Quality assurance personnel
responded by creating a generic screening process whereby a list of criteria were applied
against all patients in the hospital. Screening items might include death within 24 to 48
hours of admission, infection not present on admission, or neurodeficiency not present
on admission. Consequently, hospitals could catch potential claims as well as detect im-
portant practice trends. Hospitals discovered that the outcome of these claims, i.e.,
whether the claims could result in lawsuits, often hinged on how hospital staff communi-
cated to the patient and family the reasons for the turn of events. The number of law-
suits is not expected to drop, but to stabilize at its present high rate.
If quality assurance personnel detect a trend or practice pattern that needs to be
Failure to comply with either of these provisions may cause the hos-
pital to lose its license or subject it to a monetary penalty.13 8
3. Health Insurance-Policies-Nonduplication Provisions.-The
General Assembly enacted Chapter 494,139 revising sections of the
Insurance Code that regulate nonduplication provisions in health
insurance policies.' 40 Previously, the Code expressly permitted
health insurance policies to contain nonduplication provisions or
provisions to coordinate coverage with other insurers, including
nonprofit health service plans. 14 ' The bill modified this provision
only to the extent of prohibiting a nonprofit health insurance policy
or plan from containing "nonduplication provisions or provisions to
coordinate coverage .. .with any individually underwritten and is-
sued, guaranteed renewable, specified disease policy ... which does
not provide benefits on an expense incurred basis."' 14 ' As a result, a
nonprofit health insurer can no longer restrict its coverage because
an individual also maintains a separate disease policy.
addressed, they will usually offer this information to a risk management or quality assur-
ance committee. The committee will then study the data and assess liability. If quality
assurance personnel are concerned about a particular practitioner, then the committee
may refer the person to peer review or limit his or her privileges.
Until very recently, hospitals did not have such an organized approach. Rather,
they often designated an administrative official to handle risk management, among other
duties, or asked a safety officer who dealt with occurrences like "slip and falls" to do so.
The statute, however, mandates that all hospitals implement a formal risk management
system. Telephone conversation with Department of Risk Management, Medical Mutual
Liability Insurance Society of Maryland (Oct. 21, 1986).
138. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-319(e)(4)(ii) & 319(g)(3)(ii) (Supp. 1986)
each direct a $500 per day fine for every day the violation persists.
139. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 494, 1986 Md. Laws 1862 (to be codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, §§ 361F, 470S, 477Y).
140. Id.
141. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 361F(A), 470S(A), and 477Y(A) now provide:
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, THE Insurance
Commissioner, in accordance with regulations issued by him, shall permit
health insurance policies to contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to
coordinate the coverage with other health insurance policies, including those of
nonprofit health service plans, and those of commercial group, blanket, and
individual policies, and with other established programs under which the in-
sured may make a claim. (Capitals indicate language added by House Bill 791).
142. Id. Sections 361F(B), 470S(B), and 477Y(B) of article 48A now provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (A) of this section or any other
provision of this article, a nonprofit health insurance policy or nonprofit health
service plan may not contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordi-
nate coverage with any individually underwritten and issued, guaranteed re-
newable, specified disease policy, as defined in § 468H of this article, which
does not provide benefits on an expense incurred basis.
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4. Developmental Disabilities Administration.-Finally, the General
Assembly enacted Chapter 637,'43 to establish a Developmental Dis-
abilities Administration.1 44 In general, this Act provides for State
administered services to individuals with developmental and other
disabilities.' 4 5 By expanding the definition of "disabled," the Act
enables persons with physical as well as mental disabilities, and per-
sons who are not institutionalized, to receive services. The Act calls
for a State plan to identify the target population, assess their needs,
and provide them with the necessary services.' 46
JOHN J. KIM
KATHRYN A. TURNER
143. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 637, 1986 Md. Laws 2288.
144. House Bill 711 repealed the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
Law, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-101 to -1001 (1982), and the Family Support
Services Program, id. at §§ 10-813, 15-201 to -204. The bill, however, added a new Title
7 as well as a new § 10-813 (codified in Supp. 1986); in addition, the bill repealed and
reenacted, with amendments, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-103(c), 2-106(a), 12-
105(b), 16-101(d)-(e), 16-401, 16-403, 16-406 (1985 & Supp. 1986); and MD. EDUC.
CODE ANN. §§ 2-303(h)(1), 8-411(c), 22-201(b), 22-203(c) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
145. "Developmental disability" means:
a severe chronic disability of an individual that:
(1) Is atiributable to a physical or mental impairment, other than the sole di-
agnosis of mental illness, or to a combination of mental and physical
impairments;
(2) Is manifested before the individual attains the age of 22;
(3) Is likely to continue indefinitely;
(4) Results in an inability to live independently without external support or
continuing and regular assistance; and
(5) Reflects the need for a combination and sequence of special, interdiscipli-
nary, or generic care, treatment, or other services that are individually planned
and coordinated for the individual.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-101(e) (Supp. 1986).
146. Id. at § 7-301 to -306. Individuals with developmental disabilities are to be pro-
vided with the following:
(i) Day habilitation services;
(ii) Family support services;
(iii) Individual support services;
(iv) Prevention and early detection of disabilities;
(v) Residential services in community-based settings;
(vi) Services coordination;
(vii) Services in State residential centers;
(viii) Services to insure protection of the individual rights and liberties of indi-
viduals with developmental disability;
(ix) Vocational services; and
(x) Any other services that may be necessary to permit delivery of the services
under this subsection.
Id. at § 7-303.
IX. PROPERTY
A. Zoning and Planning
1. Zoning Board of Appeals.-In Miller v. Pinto' the Court of Ap-
peals held that the Kent County Board of Appeals possessed the
requisite statutory authority to make an original determination as to
whether an existing use of land violated the county zoning ordi-
nance.2 In reaching this conclusion, the court explored the source
of the Board of Appeal's enforcement authority and the extent of its
powers in light of Kent County's status as a nonchartered, code
home rule county.3
The court determined that the Board's immediate source of au-
thority was the zoning ordinance enacted by the local legislative
body of Kent County, the County Commissioners. In turn, the
Commissioners' authority derived from state enabling legislation.4
The trial court had concluded that the Board of Appeals lacked
statutory authority to make an original determination as to whether
an existing zoning use violated the county zoning ordinance. The
court determined that the local zoning ordinance exceeded the au-
thority delegated to the Board by article 66B, section 4.07(d) of the
Maryland Code,5 which the court termed "the sole source of Kent
County's authority to enact zoning ordinances."' Section 4.07(d)
permits local legislative bodies to provide for a board of appeals
whose powers are limited to hearing and deciding appeals of errors
and special exceptions, and authorizing variances.7 The trial court
thus reasoned that section 4.07(d) did not enable the Kent County
Commissioners to authorize the Board of Appeals to make original
1. 305 Md. 396, 504 A.2d 1140 (1986).
2. Id. at 405-06, 504 A.2d at 1145.
3. Home rule legislation provides for a measure of self-government by local cities
and counties. In Maryland, code home rule may be adopted pursuant to article XI-F of
the Maryland Constitution and article 25B of the Maryland Annotated Code. See 305
Md. at 401 n.1, 504 A.2d at 1142 n.l. Alternatively, a unit of local government may
adopt charter home rule pursuant to article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. See gen-
erally Moser, County Home Rule--Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties,
28 MD. L. REV. 327 (1968).
4. In a chartered county, the authority of the local legislative body derives from the
county charter, which is adopted by the citizens of the county. In a code home rule
county, by contrast, the authority of the local legislative body derives directly from state
statutes. 305 Md. at 404 n.5, 504 A.2d at 1144 n.5.
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d) (1983).
6. 305 Md. at 400, 504 A.2d at 1142.
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d) (1983).
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determinations concerning zoning uses. s
The Court of Appeals, however, found that another statute, ar-
ticle 25B, section 13, empowered the County Commissioners to
vest authority in the Board of Appeals to make original determina-
tions. 0 Section 13 covers the general powers of nonchartered, code
home rule counties; it also incorporates by reference article 25A,
section 5(U)," which delegates to local governments the authority
to establish and empower boards of appeals.' 2 Thus, section 13 op-
erates as enabling legislation for local zoning ordinances. The court
believed it "manifest" that the General Assembly intended that both
statutes afford boards of appeal the powers authorized by each of
them. 13 Consequently, the Kent County Zoning Ordinance, which
authorizes the Board of Appeals "[t]o make a determination, in
cases of uncertainty, of the district classification of any use not spe-
cifically named in these regulations," was within the boundaries set
by the enabling legislation.' 4
In Baltimore County v. Batza '" the Court of Special Appeals held
that the issuance of permits for the construction of private septic
systems on private property was a governmental function; 16 there-
fore, the County enjoyed immunity from tort liability for its failure
to determine that seepage from the private septic systems would
pollute the drinking supply.' 7 As a result, the County was not equi-
tably estopped from imposing a special assessment upon owners of
the private septic systems in order to finance the extension of public
sewerage to their properties.'
The court also held that the County could properly force the
owners to pay fifty-two percent of the project's cost, notwithstand-
ing the substantial public benefit-clean drinking water-that would
8. 305 Md. at 400-01, 504 A.2d at 1142.
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B, § 13 (1981).
10. 305 Md. at 401-02, 504 A.2d at 1142-43.
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(U) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
12. Id.
13. 305 Md. at 402, 504 A.2d at 1143.
14. Id. at 405, 504 A.2d at 1144 (quoting KENT CourTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE art.
13, § 3 (1975)).
15. 67 Md. App. 282, 507 A.2d 216, cert. denied, 307 Md. 83, 512 A.2d 377 (1986).
16. Id. at 299-300, 507 A.2d at 224-25.
17. Id. at 299, 507 A.2d at 225. The construction of a public sewage system, how-
ever, is a proprietary, rather than a governmental, function; therefore, the County could
not have claimed immunity if its negligence had occurred in the construction of a public
sewage system. See id. and authorities cited therein.
18. Id. at 299-300, 507 A.2d at 224-25.
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flow from the project's completion.' 9
2. Procedure-De Novo Hearings of Zoning Appeals.-In Lohrmann
v. Arundel Corp.20 the Court of Special Appeals held that a board of
zoning appeals' evenly-divided vote operated as an affirmance of a
hearing officer's decision to grant a special exemption.2 '
The court concluded that a de novo hearing before a board of
zoning appeals is analogous to a de novo appeal to a circuit court
from a district court.22 In the latter case, the circuit court proceeds
as though the district court had never entered judgment.23 Thus,
the court does not review the lower court's decision; instead, it pro-
ceeds "with the burdens of proof and persuasion allocated as an
original proceeding, and with the entry of a new judgment at the
conclusion of the trial." 24
Applying this analogy, the court observed that a decision by an
evenly-divided board tended to show that the appellants had not
met their burden. 25 Thus, the effect of the board's action was to
deny the request for a special exception.26
3. Master Plans.-In People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Web-
ster27 the Court of Special Appeals emphasized that courts should
exercise flexibility in considering whether a county's zoning
processes are consistent with its master plan. 2' The controversy
concerned the use of property for a new office building in an area of
transition between commercial and residential districts. 29 The local
board of zoning appeals, the court held, did not err in granting a
special exception for new office construction, even though the
amended master plan recommended against that decision.3
Section 523(b) of the Baltimore County Charter requires that
the county zoning maps be consistent with the master plan.3 The
Webster court stressed the need for consistency, but reaffirmed the
19. Id. at 305-06, 507 A.2d at 227-28.
20. 65 Md. App. 309, 500 A.2d 344 (1985).
21. Id. at 319-20, 500 A.2d at 349.
22. Id. at 318-19, 500 A.2d at 348-49.
23. Id. at 318, 500 A.2d at 348-49.
24. Id., 500 A.2d at 349.
25. Id. at 319, 500 A.2d at 349.
26. Id. at 319-20, 500 A.2d at 349.
27. 65 Md. App. 694, 501 A.2d 1343, cert. denied, 306 Md. 70, 507 A.2d 184 (1986).
28. Id. at 701-04, 501 A.2d at 1347-48.
29. Id. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 1346.
30. Id. at 701-04, 501 A.2d at 1347-48.
31. BALTIMORE CO., MD., CHARTER § 523(b) (1978 & Supp. 1984).
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well-settled principle that a master plan is to serve as a guide, not as
a "straightjacket," in the implementation of zoning regulations.3 2
The plain language of the County Charter, which provided for the
master plan "to serve as a guide for the development of the
county,"33 conformed with the generally accepted view under Mary-
land case law that a master plan is not mandatory.34 Therefore, the
People's Counsel's allegation that the permitted use of the property
did not exactly conform with the master plan was not in and of itself
fatal.
In addition, giving full consideration to the historical context,
the court found that the County Council's subsequent revision of
the comprehensive zoning map fully satisfied the concerns ex-
pressed in the plan.3 5 The revision reclassified part of the transition
area of the district, including the appellee's property, and permitted
office buildings of certain height and area restrictions. 36 Thus, the
decision reflected the diminished importance of master plans as well
as the court's sensitivity to political and commercial developments.
B. Takings
1. Standard.-In Greenberg v. State37 the Court of Special Ap-
peals reiterated the basic proposition that state-imposed restrictions
on private property constitute a taking of land without just compen-
sation only if the restrictions are so substantial as to render the
property completely worthless and useless. 38 Therefore, proof that
the restriction merely deprived the property of its most reasonable
or profitable use, even if the restriction caused a severe decline in
32. 65 Md. App. at 702-03, 501 A.2d at 1347.
33. Id. at 702, 501 A.2d at 1347 (quoting BALTIMORE CO., MD., CHARTER art. V, div.
2, subd. 6, § 523(a) (1978 & Supp. 1984)).
34. For Maryland precedents on this proposition, see Chapman v. Montgomery
County Council, 259 Md. 641, 271 A.2d 156 (1970); Board of County Comm'rs for
Prince George's County v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209 (1965); Floyd v.
County Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md. App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983).
35. 65 Md. App. at 703-04, 501 A.2d at 1347-48.
36. The area's original designation, DR-16, permitted office buildings by special ex-
ception only. Consultants worried that because the provisions set no limits on height or
area, the special exceptions might overwhelm the purpose of the classification as a tran-
sition area. The County Council, before amending the master plan to incorporate the
consultants' "working paper," created a new classification (R-O) that allowed use of
property for small office buildings by special exception, but set height and area restric-
tions and eliminated the special exception provision of the DR-16 classification. BALTI-
MORE CO., MD., COUNCIL BILLS 13-80 and 167-80 (codified at BALTIMORE CO., MD.,
ZONING REGULATIONS §§ 203 & 1B02.01 (1981)).
37. 66 Md. App. 24, 502 A.2d 522, cert. denied, 305 Md. 621, 505 A.2d 1342 (1986).
38. Id. at 30-31, 502 A.2d at 525.
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the property's value, would not support a finding that a taking had
occurred.39
In Greenberg the appellants owned an undeveloped piece of
property40 located within the Baltimore-Washington International
Airport noise zone.4' State noise zone regulations prohibited resi-
dential development in this area.42 The Anne Arundel County zon-
ing ordinance imposed additional restrictions on the allowable uses
of the land.43 The appellants alleged that the combined effect of the
state noise zone regulation and the county zoning ordinance consti-
tuted a taking of their property without just compensation.44
The court disagreed. Greenberg did not allege that he had lost
all reasonable uses of his land, but only that the value of his prop-
erty was severely diminished; therefore, he was not eligible for
compensation.4 5
The restrictions constituted a valid exercise of the police power,
rather than a taking.46 Generally, a zoning ordinance cannot effect a
taking so long as the ordinance substantially advances legitimate
state interests and "do[es] not extinguish a fundamental attribute of
ownership." 47 As the state had a legitimate concern in regulating
noise pollution, the court found that no taking had occurred.48
39. Id. at 30, 502 A.2d at 525.
40. Id. at 26, 502 A.2d at 523. The appellants were trying to sell property located
near Crain Highway in Glen Burnie. They had entered into a contract with Harkins As-
sociations contingent upon Harkins' ability to build apartments on the property. Id. at
27, 502 A.2d at 523-24.
41. Id. at 26, 502 A.2d at 523. The property was within a 65-70 Ldn noise zone. Ldn
is the yearly day-night sound level in decibels and results from yearly average daily traf-
fic and use of runways and flight paths. Id. at 26 n.l, 502 A.2d at 523 n.1.
42. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 11, § 03.03.03 (1977) prohibits residential development
within a 65-70 Ldn noise zone. 66 Md. App. at 27, 502 A.2d at 523.
43. 66 Md. App. at 27, 502 A.2d at 523. The property was located in an R-22 Me-
dium Density Multi-Family District.
44. Id. at 29-30, 502 A.2d at 525.
45. Id. at 36-37, 502 A.2d at 528.
46. There was a question whether the "governmental action involved constituted a
'taking' in exercise of the power of eminent domain, or rather a regulation under the
State's police power." Id. at 32, 502 A.2d at 526. The police power involves regulation
of the use and enjoyment of certain property, while exercise of the power of eminent
domain involves its actual appropriation. The distinction is important since payment is
the remedy for a taking for public use without compensation. On the other hand, any
" 'governmental action that violates due process requirements may be invalidated, with-
out regard to whether compensation is provided.'" Id. at 33, 502 A.2d at 526-27 (quot-
ing Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 8, 405
A.2d 241, 244-45 (1979)).
47. 66 Md. App. at 32, 502 A.2d at 526.
48. Id. at 36-37, 502 A.2d at 528.
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In Ungar v. State49 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
state-imposed sewer moratorium did not constitute a taking of pri-
vate property without just compensation or a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law. 50 Rather, the moratorium
represented a reasonable exercise of the police power.5'
The police power's domain is large; it validates regulations en-
acted in furtherance of the public interest and regulations reason-
ably necessary to achieve a public goal. 52 Thus, courts will generally
uphold a regulation enacted pursuant to the police power even
against the charge that the regulation prohibits the beneficial use of
property. In fact, the State need not pay compensation for diminu-
tion of property value resulting from the reasonable exercise of the
police power.53
Applying these principles, the Ungar court observed that the
State imposed the sewer moratorium in order to prevent public
harm. 54 Because the moratorium was, therefore, a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power, Ungar was not entitled to compensation. 5
2. Landowner's Testimony.-In Brannon v. State Roads Commis-
sion " the Court of Appeals explained guidelines for the permissible
scope of a landowner's testimony concerning damages in a condem-
nation proceeding. The court held that a landowner is the most
49. 63 Md. App. 472, 492 A.2d 1336 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1379 (1986).
50. Id. at 483, 492 A.2d at 1342.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 481-82, 492 A.2d at 1341.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 483, 492 A.2d at 1342.
55. See id.
56. 305 Md. 793, 506 A.2d 634 (1986).
57. Id. at 799-801, 506 A.2d at 637-38. The goal of awarding damages is to put the
landowner in as good a pecuniary position as he or she would have occupied had the
appropriation not occurred. Two different standards for measuring damages are avail-
able to a landowner who has lost a portion of property. Section 12-104(b) of the Real
Property Article provides that the measure of damages for partial takings is "the actual
value of the part taken plus any severance or resulting damages to the remaining land by
reason of the taking and of future use by the plaintiff of the part taken." MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 12-104(b) (1981). Using this standard, once the actual value of the part
taken is determined, the landowner is then responsible for proving severance and conse-
quential damages. One way of doing this is to employ experts to measure the various
elements of damage.
Maryland case law provides another option. Under this standard, the measure of
damages is "the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract before the
taking and the fair market value of what is left thereafter." Big Pool Holstein Farms, Inc.
v. State Roads Comm'n, 245 Md. 108, 113, 225 A.2d 283, 285 (1967). Injured parties
who choose this method take the risk of receiving lower damage awards if they do not
provide direct proof of consequential damages. On the other hand, they save the ex-
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logical person to testify as to the land's value,5" and is presumptively
competent to express an opinion as to its worth. 59 Thus, the dollar
estimate as well as the reasons that form the basis of the valuation
are admissible, although the jury is free to reject the owner's
analysis.6°
C. Property Rights
1. Adverse Possession.-To acquire title by adverse possession, a
claimant must prove that his or her occupation of land has been
actual, hostile, notorious, exclusive, under claim of title, and contin-
uous or uninterrupted for twenty years.6 ' When adverse possession
is not claimed under color of title, the claimant can only acquire the
land that he or she actually occupied.62 In determining exactly how
much land the claimant occupied, courts look to the character of the
land, its uses, and the purposes for which it is adapted.6 3
In Peters v. Staubitz 4 the adverse possessor, who did not claim
under color of title, asserted that a fence delineated the extent of his
occupancy."5 The Court of Special Appeals held that while a visible
line of demarcation may provide evidence as to the outer limits of
the claimant's possible dominion and control, it could not conclu-
sively establish the extent of the claim.66 The fence marked the
greatest possible area that the claimant could acquire, but did not
pense of hiring expert witnesses and do not have to offer specific evidence categorizing
each element of damage as a separate and distinct item of loss. The owner is free to
testify as to the value of the property.
The Brannons chose this second method. Thus, the court's ruling is limited to the
second method of measuring damages.
58. The landowner's estimate as to the property's value is admissible to the extent
that the estimate is based on a unique familiarity with the land. 305 Md. at 802, 506
A.2d at 639.
59. Id. at 801, 506 A.2d at 638-39. The court also found that a value estimate, with-
out any explanation of the reasons supporting it, is of little or no use to the trier of fact.
"'To permit a witness to express an opinion of value without allowing him to set forth
the basis for his opinion is to deny the trier of fact a basis for weighing and evaluating
[the] testimony.'" Id. at 803, 506 A.2d at 639 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v.
Berglund-Cherne Co., 193 Colo. 562, 569, 568 P.2d 478, 483 (1977)).
60. Id. at 802, 506 A.2d at 639.
61. Peters v. Staubitz, 64 Md. App. 639, 644, 498 A.2d 661, 664 (1985).
62. Id. at 645, 498 A.2d at 664.
63. Id.
64. 64 Md. App. 639, 498 A.2d 661 (1985).
65. Id. at 641, 498 A.2d at 662. A prior landowner constructed a barbed wire fence
to keep his cows from going into the neighbor's yard. In the related case of Costello v.
Staublitz, 300 Md. 60, 475 A.2d 1185 (1984), the court found that the owner built the
fence for his own purposes and that the fence was not evidence of the boundary of the
claimant's adverse possession. Id. at 73-74, 475 A.2d at 1191-92.
66. 64 Md. App. at 644, 497 A.2d at 664.
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prove that the adverse possessor had actually occupied the entire
area. To acquire title, the adverse possessor must demonstrate oc-
cupation of the entire area claimed, which the claimant in this case
was unable to do.67
2. Accretion.-Under Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1862,68 ripa-
rian owners were entitled to any accretions to their land, whether
made by "natural causes or otherwise." 6 In 1970 the General As-
sembly repealed the 1862 Act and enacted Maryland's Wetlands
Act.7 ° Under the Wetlands Act riparian owners are entitled only to
natural accretions to their land.7' To avoid the destruction of prop-
erty rights that vested under the 1862 Act, the Wetlands Act con-
tained a grandfather clause: "[A] riparian owner may not be
deprived of any right, privilege, or enjoyment of riparian ownership
that he had prior to July 1, 1970. 172
In Rayne v. Coulbourne71 the Court of Special Appeals permitted
riparian landowners to share in an equitable distribution of an artifi-
cial peninsula that was created by the Army Corps of Engineers in
the water in front of their land.7 ' The peninsula had formed be-
tween 1951 and 1969. 75
In support of its position, the court recognized that "[o]ne of
the greatest assets of being riparian is the right of access to naviga-
ble water."' 76 The right of access to navigable water involves not
only a practical ability to reach the water, but also "the legal right to
use, improve and build out from the land that borders on the
water."'77 As these riparian owners possessed the statutory right to
67. Id. at 647, 498 A.2d at 665. The court found that while use of part of the dis-
puted land for a fire pit and a boathouse satisfied a finding of occupation, the mere
demarcation with a fence did not establish a claim for the entire area.
68. 1862 Md. Laws ch. 129 (formerly codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 54, § 45 (1968),
repealed by MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 9-201(a) (1983)).
69. 1862 Md. Laws ch. 129, § 1.
70. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-501 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
71. Id. at § 9-201(a) (1983).
72. Id. at § 9-103 (1983).
73. 65 Md. App. 351, 500 A.2d 665 (1985).
74. Id. at 371-72, 500 A.2d at 676. Riparian owners find themselves in a unique
situation. They are at the mercy of nature since large quantities of their property may be
lost to erosion. By the same token, however, the owner of "fast land" has the common
law right to any accretion to the land. Id. at 358, 500 A.2d at 669.
75. Id. at 371-72, 500 A.2d at 676. The deposit of spoils from dredging of the river
created an eight-acre peninsula that lay between the original fast land and the river. The
appellants filed suit seeking a proportionate share of the artificial tract of land that cut
off their former frontage on the Wicomico River. Id. at 353-54, 500 A.2d at 666.
76. Id. at 365, 500 A.2d at 672.
77. Id. at 366, 500 A.2d at 673. The peninsula lay between the water and the
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build out into the water in front of their property, any accretion that
formed in the water in front of their land would deprive the owners
of this right.
78
The right of access to the Wicomico River was severely im-
paired by the artificial peninsula directly in front of the riparian
owner's property. The peninsula's very existence hindered the
owner's ability to build out from the land. The court found that the
riparian owner enjoys a "quasi-property right to extend his prop-
erty, whether by accretion-as he could do at common law, or by
making improvements into the water-an enhanced right under the
Act of 1862." 79 Consequently, the court held that the landowner
was entitled to a proportionate share of the tract of land.8 °
3. Antenuptial Contracts.-In Watson v. Watson"' the Court of
Appeals held that an antenuptial contract to convey an interest in
land upon marriage to an intended spouse passes an equitable inter-
est in the realty; therefore, a post-marriage judgment against the
vendor will not encumber the property.8 2 The court applied the
doctrine of equitable conversion to reach this conclusion.84 The
doctrine is applicable only if the promise is subject to specific per-
formance; 85 however, in Maryland, a promise to convey real estate
in consideration of marriage is specifically performable.8 6 Gener-
ally, then, equitable conversion will apply to antenuptial covenants
unless the promise to convey the realty is made for the purpose of
defrauding creditors.8 7
owner's frontage property, thereby preventing him from building out into the water. Id.
at 353, 500 A.2d at 666.
78. Id. at 368, 500 A.2d at 674.
79. Id. at 369-70, 500 A.2d at 674-75.
80. Id. at 371-72, 500 A.2d at 676.
81. 304 Md. 48, 497 A.2d 794 (1985).
82. Id. at 65, 497 A.2d at 802.
83. The doctrine of equitable conversion provides that before execution of a deed,
one who has contracted to purchase realty becomes equitable owner of the realty; the
vendor retains bare legal title. Id. at 60, 497 A.2d at 800. The doctrine is based on the
maxim that equity considers as done that which ought to be done. Equitable conversion
by contract is still viable in Maryland. Himmighoefer v. Medallion Indus., Inc., 302 Md.
270, 497 A.2d 282 (1985).
84. 304 Md. at 59-62, 497 A.2d at 800.
85. Id. at 61, 497 A.2d at 800.
86. Id. at 62, 497 A.2d at 801. The court rejected a per se rule voiding all convey-
ances between spouses or conveyances made in consideration of marriage since mar-
riage is valuable consideration under Maryland law. Id. at 63-66, 497 A.2d at 801-03.
87. Id. at 66, 497 A.2d at 803.
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D. Landlord-Tenant
1. Security Deposits-Treble Damages.-Section 8-203(f)(4) of the
Real Property Article provides that "[i]f the landlord, without a rea-
sonable basis, fails to return any part of the security deposit, plus
accrued interest, within 45 days after termination of the tenancy, the
tenant has an action of up to threefold of the withheld amount, plus
reasonable attorney's fees." 88 In Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern89 the
Court of Appeals held that the statute provides for treble damages
based not on the entire amount withheld, but rather only on the
amount of the security deposit withheld without a reasonable
basis .90
In Rohrbaugh the landlord withheld the tenant's $675 security
deposit more than forty-five days after the lease's termination.9'
The trial court found that a small portion of the security deposit had
been withheld without a reasonable basis,92 but it awarded the ten-
ant's estate damages of $2097.50." The court calculated this figure
by tripling the security deposit, adding attorney's fees, and sub-
tracting the amount the landlord legally withheld.94 In contrast, the
Court of Appeals determined the proper damages to be $702.50. 9-
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the
ambiguous language of section 8-203(f)(4). 96 While the district
court interpreted the phrase "withheld amount" to mean the entire
amount withheld,97 the appellate court noted that the language may
also be read as the amount "withheld without a reasonable basis." 98
Thus, the issue became one of statutory construction.
Noted commentators support the court's holding that section 8-
88. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203(0(4) (1981).
89. 305 Md. 443, 505 A.2d 113 (1986).
90. Id. at 450, 505 A.2d at 117.
91. Id. at 445-46, 505 A.2d at 114. Shortly after the tenant's death, the landlord
informed the tenant's personal representative that he intended to withhold the entire
security deposit to cover unpaid rent and alleged damage to the premises. Six months
later the personal representative brought suit against the landlord seeking return of the
security deposit plus treble damages under § 8-203(0(4). Id.
92. Id. at 446, 505 A.2d at 115.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court tripled the security deposit ($675), added reasonable attorney's
fees ($660), and subtracted the amount the landlord properly withheld ($587.50) to ar-
rive at the $2097.50 damages award.
95. Id. at 451, 505 A.2d at 117. The Court of Appeals tripled the amount wrongfully
withheld ($67.50), and added reasonable attorney's fees to arrive at its $702.50 damages
award.
96. Id. at 447, 505 A.2d at 115.
97. Id. at 446, 505 A.2d at 115.
98. Id. at 448, 505 A.2d at 115-16.
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203(f)(4) authorizes treble damages only on the amount wrongfully
withheld.99 Professor Steven Davison, the Reporter for the commit-
tee that drafted section 8-203(0(4), stated that the statute "autho-
rizes punitive damages up to threefold the amount withheld
'without a reasonable basis' after 45 days from termination of the
lease, plus reasonable attorney's fees."' 00 A Maryland treatise on
landlord-tenant law also confirms this interpretation.' 0 '
The court noted that the ambiguity arose during the recodifica-
tion of prior statutes into the new Real Property Article. 0 2 The
previous provision clearly provided for treble damages on the
amount wrongfully withheld.'0 3 Recodification did not change the
statute's meaning. 10 4 The revisor's note to section 8-203(0)(4) indi-
cates that the language change is simply stylistic.' 05
The Court of Appeals also established guidelines for applying
section 8-203(f)(4). Two distinct determinations are required.
First, the trier of fact must decide "whether the landlord withheld
more of the secured deposit than that to which he was entitled."' 0 6
Second, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, it must be
further determined "whether any part of this excess was withheld
without a reasonable basis."'0 7 An excess withheld "incorrectly,"
but not unreasonably, does not warrant a treble damages award.10 8
99. Id., 505 A.2d at 116.
100. Id. The court cited Davison, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and Its
Potential Effects Upon Maiyland Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 247, 269 (1976).
101. 305 Md. at 447, 505 A.2d at 116; D. BREGMAN & G. EVERNGAM, MARYLAND LAND-
LORD-TENANT LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 51 (1983).
102. 305 Md. at 448, 505 A.2d at 116.
103. Before 1974, § 8-203(f)(4) was codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(f)(iv)
(1973) and read as follows: "If the landlord shall, without a reasonable basis, fail to
return all or any part of the security deposit, plus accrued interest, within 45 days after
termination of the tenancy, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the amount so
withheld, plus reasonable attorney's fees." 305 Md. at 449, 505 A.2d at 116 (emphasis
added).
104. 305 Md. at 449, 505 A.2d at 116. The court, quoting from previous decisions,
emphasized that
" '[r]ecodification of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather
than change of meaning. Thus, even a change in the phraseology of a statute
by a codification will not ordinarily modify the law unless the change is so mate-
rial that the intention of the General Assembly to modify the law appears un-
mistakably from the language of the Code.'"
Id. (quoting Consumer Protection Div. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 304 Md. 731, 768,
501 A.2d 48, 67 (1985), which quoted In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573,
576-77, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1985)).
105. 305 Md. at 450, 505 A.2d at 116.
106. Id. at 451, 505 A.2d at 117.
107. Id.
108. Id. The amount incorrectly withheld, however, is certainly recoverable.
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Additionally, assessment of treble damages requires "egregious"
behavior on the landlord's part in withholding the excessive
amount. 109
2. Smoke Detectors.-In Salvatore v. Cunningham " ° the Court of
Appeals held that "the common law duty to maintain safe premises
for a tenant does not encompass the installation of fire protection
devices.""' If any such duty ever existed, it became void upon the
enactment of article 38A, section 12A." 2
The Salvatore complaint alleged that the owners of a ski cha-
let'' 3 had breached both their statutory' 14 and common law' 15 du-
ties by failing to equip the chalet with a fire detection system. ,16
The trial court dismissed the causes of action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted."17
Despite the tenants' contrary contention, the Court of Appeals
found the chalet to be a single family dwelling within the meaning of
article 38A, section 12A. 1s Therefore, under the statute, if the cha-
let had been constructed beforeJuly 1, 1975,"19 the owners had un-
til July 1, 1982, six months after the date of the fire, to install and
maintain a smoke detector.' 20
109. Id.
110. 305 Md. 421, 505 A.2d 102 (1986).
111. Id. at 430, 505 A.2d at 106. The case is a consolidation of two suits arising out of
the same incident and tried separately by the Circuit Court for Howard County. The
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari prior to a decision by the Court of Special
Appeals. Id. at 423, 505 A.2d at 103.
112. Id. at 430, 505 A.2d at 106. Article 38A, § 12A provides for smoke detection
systems in hotels and multifamily buildings (§ 12A(a)), and in one, two, or three family
dwellings constructed prior to July 1, 1975 (§ 12A(b)). MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 12A
(1986).
113. The chalet contained three bedrooms, a loft, a common kitchen, a bathroom,
and living facilities; it could sleep twelve persons. The owners rented the chalet by
weekend and weekly rates. 305 Md. at 425, 505 A.2d at 104.
114. The complaint alleged that the owners failed to comply with MD. ANN. CODE art.
38A, § 12A (1986). 305 Md. at 425, 505 A.2d at 104.
115. The complaint further alleged that the owners breached a common-law duty to
make rental property reasonably safe for tenants. 305 Md. at 425, 505 A.2d at 104.
116. Id. Two persons, among a group renting the chalet, died in a fire that destroyed
the dwelling on January 1, 1982.
117. Id. at 423, 505 A.2d at 103.
118. Id. at 429-30, 505 A.2d at 106.
119. The plaintiffs failed to allege the chalet's construction date in their complaint. In
their brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs did "not contend the chalet
was constructed subsequent to July 1, 1975." Id. at 427 n.2, 505 A.2d at 105 n.2.
120. Article 38A, § 12A(b) provides that: "An occupant of a one, two or three family
residential dwelling constructed prior to July 1, 1975 shall by July 1, 1982: (1) Equip
each occupant's living unit with a minimum of one approved battery or AC primary
812
The tenants had contended that because the owners intended
the chalet to be used as a temporary accommodation for renters and
not as a residential dwelling, the owners had a duty pursuant to arti-
cle 38A, section 12A(a) to install a smoke detector.12' The court re-
jected this argument, holding that the "construction and
configuration of the premises" and not the owner's intended use of
the premises determines its classification as a residential dwelling or
as a hotel and multifamily building. 1
22
E. Estates
1. Wills.-In Casson v. Swogell 123 the Court of Appeals held that
"publication"' 124 is not essential to the valid execution and attesta-
tion of a will. 125 The court used this case to clarify any confusion
that may have resulted from its earlier opinions.
Katherine Korbien died leaving two wills. 126 The first desig-
nated her attorney, Benjamin Swogell, as personal representative
and principal beneficiary. Some months after the first will was ad-
mitted to probate, Ms. Korbien's cousin, Bernice Casson, intro-
duced a second will.' 27 This second will named Ms. Casson as
electric powered smoke detector; and (2) Maintain the smoke detector." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 38A, § 12A(b) (1986).
121. 305 Md. at 424-25, 505 A.2d at 103-04. Article 38A, § 12A(a), as codified at the
time of the fire, provided in pertinent part: "Smoke detector required in sleeping area;
light signal for deaf or hearing impaired occupants; compliance by hotels and multi-
family buildings. (1) Each sleeping area within all occupancies classified residential...
shall be provided with a minimum of one approved smoke detector .... "
122. Id. at 429, 505 A.2d at 106. The classification of the building determines
whether § 12A(a) or § 12A(b) is applicable.
123. 304 Md. 641, 500 A.2d 1031 (1985).
124. When used in the context of the law of wills, "publication" means a declaration
or other manifestation by the testator to the witness that conveys the knowledge that the
instrument is a will. Id. at 643, 500 A.2d at 1032. If the testator signs the will outside
the presence of witnesses, publication may provide an alternative method of proving
execution of a will. Id. In this case the will was signed in the presence of both Casson,
the personal representative, and Cooney, the witness. Id. at 646, 500 A.2d at 1033.
Therefore, publication was not required.
125. Id. at 643, 500 A.2d at 1032.
126. Id.
127. Id. The second will was actually captioned "Power of Attorney." But it also con-
tained testamentary language and the signature of witnesses, id. at 643, 500 A.2d at
1032, although the witnesses did not sign the document at the same place, id. at 657,
500 A.2d at 1039. Furthermore, the testamentary language was added at a later date and
the additions did not conform to the margins of the paper, nor were they typed on the
same typewriter. Id. at 645, 500 A.2d at 1033. The court found that the discrepancies
might bear on the jury question of whether the will was actually a fraud, but would not
"constitute a fatal variance from the required procedure for lawful execution." Id. at
657, 500 A.2d at 1039.
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personal representative and principal beneficiary of the estate.
Swogell contested the validity of the second will primarily because
Mr. Cooney, a witness, said that at the time Ms. Korbien signed the
instrument, he did not know that the document was a will.' 28
Swogell alleged that prior Maryland case law implied that publica-
tion was required for valid attestation, 129 which in turn was essential
to the valid execution of a will.'
A majority of states do not require publication; and, generally,
the states that require publication do so because of an express statu-
tory mandate.' 3 ' The laws of Maryland, however, have never con-
tained a specific requirement of publication. 3 2 Currently, for
example, section 4-102 of the Estates and Trusts Article requires
only that a will be:
(1) in writing, (2) signed by the testator, or by some other
person for him, in his presence and by his express direc-
tion, and (3) attested and signed by two or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator.13 3
Nonetheless, Swogell contended that under Maryland case law
publication had become an element of attestation. 1 4 In rejecting
this contention, the court thoroughly recounted the history of the
attestation requirement, beginning with the Statute of Wills of
1540.131 Maryland's statutory requirement of attestation, the court
observed, derives from the Statute of Frauds of 1677; however, the
Statute of Frauds has never been understood to contain a require-
128. Id. at 646, 500 A.2d at 1033-34. In addition, Swogell alleged that the will was
invalid because the witnesses' signatures were not at the end of the document and were
not in close proximity to each other. He also argued that the document could not be
admitted to probate because (1) it was captioned "Power of Attorney"; or (2) it imper-
missibly combined two legal documents into one. The court quickly dismissed both of
these contentions. Id. at 657, 500 A.2d at 1039.
129. Id. at 653, 500 A.2d at 1037. Swogell cited Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87
A. 28 (1913), in support of the proposition that publication is a requirement of attesta-
tion. That case concerned whether the testator actually requested someone to witness a
document. 304 Md. at 653-54, 500 A.2d at 1037. The Casson court did not agree that
Conrades reversed the "long-settled" English rule that publication is unnecessary. Id. at
653, 500 A.2d at 1037.
130. Id. at 648, 500 A.2d at 1034.
131. Id. at 647-48, 500 A.2d at 1034.
132. Id. at 648-49. Maryland statutes concerning the attestation of wills have tracked
the Statute of Frauds of 1677, which contained no publication requirement. Id. at 649,
500 A.2d at 1035.
133. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-102 (1981).
134. 304 Md. at 648, 500 A.2d at 1034.
135. Id. at 648-57, 500 A.2d at 1034-39.
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ment of publication. 36 Thus, despite two Maryland cases that
seemed to suggest otherwise, 37 the court held that publication is
not an element of attestation.'
38
Accordingly, the court expressly held that compliance with the
attestation requirement does not necessitate any knowledge on the
part of the witness as to the document's contents. 3 9 Nor does a
valid attestation rest on any particular knowledge as to the character
of the instrument. 40 An individual could validly attest to the sign-
ing of a document, therefore, without actually knowing that the in-
strument was a will. 14
2. Appeal by Personal Representative.-In Alston v. Gray 142 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a personal representative may
not appeal from an order of the Orphans' Court; 143 instead, as the
Court of Appeals had previously held, 144 a personal representative
must distribute the estate in accordance with the determination of
the Orphans' Court.'
4 1
136. See id. at 649, 500 A.2d at 1036.
137. The two cases were Woodstock College v. Hankey, 129 Md. 675, 99 A. 962
(1917), and Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87 A. 28 (1913), on which the Woodstock
College court relied. The court stated: "To the extent Conrades implies that a testator
must declare the instrument a will, or by word, act, sign or conduct convey that knowl-
edge to the witness, it is disapproved." 304 Md. at 654, 500 A.2d at 1038.
138. 304 Md. at 654, 500 A.2d at 1038. If, however, the testator signs the will out of a
witness' presence, the testator must "acknowledge" the will before the absent witness
may sign. Acknowledgement does not necessarily consist of a verbal declaration by the
testator to the witness that the document to be signed is the testator's will. The testa-
tor's conduct or the paper itself might suffice to apprise the witness of that fact. Id. at
656, 500 A.2d at 1039.
139. Id. at 654-56, 500 A.2d at 1038-39.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 303 Md. 163, 492 A.2d 900 (1985).
143. Id. at 166, 492 A.2d at 902. Prior to distribution of the estate, Alston, the per-
sonal representative, received a letter informing her that Harrison, the intestate, may
have fathered an as-yet-unborn child who would have a claim on the estate. Alston filed
a Petition for Instructions in the Orphans' Court to resolve the legitimacy question and
to discharge her responsibilities as personal representative.
The Orphans' Court conducted the legitimacy hearing and found that Harrison
had openly and notoriously recognized one Gray as his child. The court told Alston to
list this child as an interested party in any further proceedings and ordered her to fur-
nish Gray with a distributive share. Gray, as only surviving issue, could receive the
corpus of the estate.
Alston appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals, specifically noting
the appeal in her capacity as personal representative. Id. at 165-66, 492 A.2d at 901-02.
144. See id. at 166-67, 492 A.2d at 902 and authorities cited therein.
145. Id. at 167, 492 A.2d at 902. Generally, the same order that binds the representa-
tive to distribute the estate in a certain manner also protects the representative from any
liability; however, this is not always so. See Goldsborough v. DeWitt, 171 Md. 225, 257,
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The Alston court reasoned that a personal representative is not
an aggrieved party and thus has no right to appeal an order.146 Ad-
ditionally, if a personal representative or an executor possessed an
unlimited right of appeal, continuous litigation could seriously de-
plete the assets of a small estate and indefinitely delay the distribu-
tion of assets to deserving heirs.' 47 Finally, the court noted, absent
this restriction on the right to appeal, the courthouse doors would
be open to appeals " 'presenting issues which might well be moot,
or seeking opinions on abstract propositions.' "148
F. Security Interests
1. Foreclosure Sale Price.-In Walker v. Ward 149 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that after ratifying a foreclosure sale price, a court
cannot change the price to reflect the amount paid by substituted
purchasers. 150 In Walker the circuit court ratified a foreclosure sale
price of $57,000 and referred the case to the Auditor to state the
account. 5 ' Before ratification of the Auditor's Report, the circuit
court granted a petition to convey the property to substituted pur-
chasers. 152 The substituted purchasers paid $86,500 for the prop-
189 A.2d 226, 241 (1937) (personal representative held liable for imprudent invest-
ments even though Orphans' Court had authorized those investments).
146. 303 Md. at 166, 492 A.2d at 902. The court dismissed Alston's appeal for want
of a proper party-appellant. Clearly, had she brought the appeal in her individual capac-
ity as sister of the deceased, instead of her representative one, the court would have
allowed it. Id. at 166-67, 492 A.2d at 902.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge contended that the record showed that
because Alston was the decedent's sister, she was an heir at law and an aggrieved party.
Since probate court proceedings are generally informal and since substance should
override form, Judge Eldridge argued that justice should prevail over technicalities and
that the appeal should thus be allowed. Id. at 170-72, 492 A.2d at 904-05 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. at 167, 492 A.2d at 902.
148. Id. (quoting Webster v. Larmore, 270 Md. 351, 353, 311 A.2d 405, 406 (1983)).
149. 65 Md. App. 443, 501 A.2d 83 (1985).
150. Id. at 450, 501 A.2d at 87. To hold otherwise would change the amount origi-
nally credited to the mortgagors. Id. at 448-49, 501 A.2d at 86. The court further held it
error for the trial court to question sua sponte the validity of a sale to substituted pur-
chasers, absent fraud or illegality. Id. at 450, 501 A.2d at 87.
151. Id. at 445, 501 A.2d at 84. The Court of Special Appeals noted that: "The func-
tion of an auditor is that of a calculator and accountant for the court." Id. at 448, 501
A.2d at 85 (citing Green v. Green, 182 Md. 571, 35 A.2d 238 (1944)). MD. R. 2-543
authorizes the appointment of auditors and sets forth their powers.
152. 65 Md. App. at 446, 501 A.2d at 85. MD. R. W74(g)(3) provides that: "The
court may, at any time after sale, upon exparte petition and consent of the purchaser and
person making the sale, authorize the conveyance to be made after final ratification to a
substituted purchaser."
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erty.' 53 The court then ratified the Auditor's Report, which
reflected the price paid by the substituted purchasers, rather than
the previously ratified foreclosure price. Hence, a surplus payable
to the original mortgagors resulted.' 54 The Court of Special Ap-
peals held that it was error to state an account based on the substi-
tuted purchaser's price once the foreclosure sale price had been
ratified. '5
2. Mechanics' Liens.-In 5500 Coastal Highway Limited Partnership
v. Electrical Equipment Co., '56 the Court of Appeals held that suppliers
of materials to an out-of-state modular home builder are entitled to
mechanics' liens under section 9-102 of the Real Property Article'
57
if the modules are constructed for use within Maryland.' 58 The
court rejected the contention that section 9-102 did not apply be-
cause modular units are completed buildings prior to their place-
ment on the building site.' 59 In the court's view, "A module is not
in and of itself a building."' 6
That the materials were originally supplied to an out-of-state
contractor is irrelevant.' 6 ' The relevant determination is whether
the materials are incorporated into a building constructed to order
in Maryland. 162 A mechanic's lien, however, would not be available
153. 65 Md. App. at 446, 501 A.2d at 85.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 448-49, 501 A.2d at 86. MD. R. W74(g)(3) does not address the considera-
tion paid by substituted purchasers; therefore, according to the court, an auditor's re-
port should not reflect that consideration. 65 Md. App. at 449, 501 A.2d at 86.
Moreover, the court reasoned that it would be unfair to both the mortgagor and the
mortgagee to include in the foreclosure sale audit the price paid by the substituted pur-
chasers. Id.
156. 305 Md. 532, 505 A.2d 533 (1986).
157. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
Every building erected and every building repaired, rebuilt, or improved to the
extent of 25 percent of its value is subject to establishment of a lien in accord-
ance with this subtitle for the payment of all debts, without regard to the
amount, contracted for work done for or about the building and for materials
furnished for or about the building ....
158. 305 Md. at 533, 540, 505 A.2d at 533, 537.
159. Id. at 540, 505 A.2d at 537. An undelivered module is not a completed building.
Certain work, including the installation of wiring and plumbing connections, can only be
finished after the module arrives at the building site. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The court also cited Maryland case law permitting the establishment of liens
for necessary work done away from the building site. Id. at 538, 505 A.2d at 536 (citing
Morris J. Liebergott & Assocs. v. Investment Bldg. Corp., 249 Md. 584, 241 A.2d 138
(1968); Evans Co. v. International Trust Co., 101 Md. 210, 60 A. 667 (1905)).
162. Id. In 5500 Coastal Highway this was evidenced by an agreement between the
modular home manufacturer and the supplier for the materials to be used specifically in
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for materials supplied for modules produced for stock purposes and
subsequently sold under contracts after construction. 163
G. Power of Attorney
In King v. Bankerd " the Maryland Court of Appeals held that,
as a matter of law, a power of attorney authorizing an agent to "con-
vey, grant, bargain and/or sell" property did not permit the agent
gratuitously to transfer that property. 65
Maryland statutes 6 6 and prior Maryland cases 1 67 provide little,
if any, guidance concerning the proper construction of powers of
attorney. Thus, after reviewing the rules of interpretation pertain-
ing to powers of attorney, the principles of agency, and decisions
from other jurisdictions, the court established a definition of these
instruments. A power of attorney, the court declared, is "a written
document by which one party, as principal, appoints another as
agent (attorney in fact) and confers upon the latter the authority to
perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the
a building for which the manufacturer and a Maryland real property owner had a prior
contract. Id. at 534-35, 505 A.2d at 534.
163. Id. at 536, 505 A.2d at 534-35.
164. 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608 (1985).
165. Id. at 110-12, 492 A.2d at 614-15. The court affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment to a landowner/principal who had sued his attorney/agent for
breach of trust and fiduciary duty in the transfer of property. See King v. Bankerd, 55
Md. App. 619, 465 A.2d 1181 (1983). The landowner had executed a power of attorney
before he went west in 1968 and then in 1975 had executed a new power of attorney
authorizing his attorney to "convey, grant, bargain and/or sell" the property. The attor-
ney later attempted to locate the landowner, but was unsuccessful. He ultimately con-
veyed the property, without consideration, to the landowner's wife. 303 Md. at 102-03,
492 A.2d at 610.
The agent believed the principal had either abandoned the property, did not care
about the property, or had died. The court found, however, that this argument did not
support an inference that the principal intended to authorize the gift, but only that the
agent could justify the gift. Also, the only evidence before the court relevant to the issue
of intent indicated that the principal did not authorize the agent to give the property
away. Id. at 112-13, 492 A.2d at 615.
166. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-107 (1981) (requiring that an agent's
authority to grant property be executed in the same manner as a deed); id. at § 14-112
(generally authorizing trustee or trustee's personal representative to convey property if
settlor did not designate beneficiary).
167. Only a handful of Maryland cases directly deal with the construction of powers of
attorney. In Posner v. Bayless, 59 Md. 56 (1882), the Court of Appeals recognized the
rule of strict construction, with the proviso that the intention of the parties should pre-
vail. In American Bonding Co. v. Ensey, 105 Md. 211, 65 A. 921 (1907), and Kaminski
v. Wladerek, 149 Md. 548, 131 A. 810 (1926), the court reiterated these principles. Fi-
nally, in Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (1978), the court observed that if a
limited partner vests a general partner with power of attorney, the court must narrowly
construe the general partner's authority. Id. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140.
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principal."1 '
The court then reviewed the various rules that govern the inter-
pretation of powers of attorney. In Maryland, as a general rule,
powers of attorney are to be strictly construed and grant only those
powers clearly delineated in the document.' 69 Nonetheless, the rule
of strict construction cannot override the cardinal rule that the court
must determine the intention of the parties in light of the surround-
ing circumstances.' 70 Furthermore, in accordance with principles of
contract law, the court should resolve ambiguities in the document
against the maker.' 7 ' Because powers of attorney usually are care-
fully crafted documents, courts should give these documents' terms
their technical, rather than their popular, meaning.' 72 Also, general
words are to be restricted by the context in which they are used. 73
Finally, the all-embracing expressions found in powers of attorney
should be disregarded as "meaningless verbiage."' 74
The court then applied the fundamental principle that a general
power of attorney authorizing the sale of property implies a sale for
the principal's benefit.' 75 Thus, that power does not authorize the
agent to make a gift of the property or otherwise transfer it without
a present consideration. 176 This finding formed the basis for the
court's conclusion that
an agent holding a broad power of attorney lacks the power
to make a gift of the principal's property, unless that power
(1) is expressly conferred, (2) arises as a necessary implica-
tion from the conferred powers, or (3) is clearly intended
by the parties, as evidenced by the surrounding facts and
circumstances. 1
77
The court cited several reasons for reaching its conclusions.
First, the court observed, the power to make a gift of the principal's
property is potentially hazardous to the principal's interests and
thus will not be lightly inferred from a general power of attorney. 78
168. 303 Md. at 105, 492 A.2d at 611.
169. Id. (citing Klein, 284 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 106, 492 A.2d at 612.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34 comment h
(1958) and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to support this proposition.
303 Md. at 106, 492 A.2d at 612.
175. 303 Md. at 106-07, 492 A.2d at 612.
176. Id. at 107, 492 A.2d at 612.
177. Id., 492 A.2d at 612-13.
178. Id. at 108, 492 A.2d at 613.
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Second, the agent's first loyalty must necessarily be to the princi-
pal.' 7 9 It is difficult to imagine that a gift would benefit the princi-
pal, however, if neither the power of attorney nor the principal
intended the agent to have this power. 8 ° Third, it would be most
unusual for a property owner to authorize an agent to give property
away. 181
H. The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
The Court of Appeals in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
v. C.. Mitchell &Best Co. 182 held that the Washington Suburban San-
itary Commission (WSSC) did not have statutory authority to levy a
one-time, up-front, special connection charge on new WSSC cus-
tomers. 8 The WSSC had adopted the special charge exclusively to
offset the general annual costs of long-term debt service on certain
capital costs. 184
The court determined that the WSSC's power to levy charges is
limited by the WSSC's enabling statute, article 29 of the Maryland
Code.'8 5 Various sections of article 29 permit the WSSC to assess
service connection charges, front foot connection charges, user
charges, and ad valorem taxes to pay for identified costs, 186 but none
authorize the WSSC to levy a special connection charge for the
Costs. 18 7 Thus, the court concluded that an act of the General As-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 109, 492 A.2d at 613.
181. Id.
182. 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d 30 (1985).
183. Id. at 571, 495 A.2d at 44. The General Assembly created the WSSC to provide
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of water supply, sewerage, and storm
drainage facilities in the Washington Suburban Sanitary District, which encompasses
over 950 square miles in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties. The county exec-
utives and county councils of the two counties have the power to review and approve the
WSSC's capital and operating budgets. Id. at 550, 495 A.2d at 33.
Among other matters, the court held that MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 6-110 (1983),
which authorized the Public Service Commission (PSC) to determine the reasonableness
of WSSC service charges, did not create a special statutory remedy before the PSC to
challenge the WSSC's power to levy the special connection charge. Thus, the develop-
ers had exhausted all administrative remedies and could seek judicial review of WSSC's
power to levy the charge. 303 Md. at 560, 495 A.2d at 38. The court also held that the
developer's payments to WSSC for the special connection charge were voluntary and
thus not recoverable. Id. at 577-78, 495 A.2d at 47.
184. 303 Md. at 550-51, 495 A.2d at 33.
185. Id. at 565, 495 A.2d at 40.
186. MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, §§ 4-105, 4-106, 4-110, 5-101, 6-101, 6-104 (1986).
187. 303 Md. at 571, 495 A.2d at 44. Section 4-105 authorizes the two county coun-
cils to levy an ad valorem tax to retire the WSSC notes and bonds; section 4-106 autho-
rizes the WSSC to assess a water service charge to pay for bond costs; section 4-110(d)
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sembly is necessary to enable the WSSC to levy such a charge. '88
I. In Rem Actions
Under Maryland Rule 1028189 a civil litigant must submit a
printed record extract to the Court of Special Appeals to preserve
the right of appeal.' 9 ° In Allied Bail Bonds v. State' 9 ' the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that a challenge to the forfeiture of a
bail bond was a civil in rem proceeding, an action against a thing-
the bail bond.'9 2 Thus, even though the dispute arose in a criminal
proceeding, the party challenging the forfeiture was a civil liti-
gant.' 93 Because that party had neglected to abide by rule 1028, the
court refused to review the trial court's decision on the merits.
194
J. Legislation-Chesapeake Bay Critical Area
In the spring of 1986 the Maryland General Assembly enacted
Chapters 602, 603, and 604 of the Laws of Maryland:' 95 the Chesa-
peake Bay Critical Areas Act. This landmark Act promulgates new
regulations and augments prior regulations governing development
in "critical" or "resource conservation" areas196 near the Bay.
Echoing regulations previously adopted by the Chesapeake Bay
Critical Areas Commission (the Commission), 9 7 the 1986 Act es-
tablishes guidelines that localities must follow when prescribing lo-
cations for new areas of intense and limited development. 98 The
authorizes the WSSC to assess sewer user charges to help retire bonds; section 5-101
authorizes WSSC to set up front foot benefit charges to pay for sewage construction and
services; section 6-101 authorizes service connection charges for identified costs; and
section 6-104 authorizes user charges for costs of operation in general.
188. 303 Md. at 571, 495 A.2d at 44.
189. MD. R. 1028.
190. Id.
191. 66 Md. App. 754, 505 A.2d 918 (1986).
192. Id. at 756, 505 A.2d at 919. The court relied heavily on its decision in One 1983
Toyota v. State, 63 Md. App. 208, 492 A.2d 643 (1985), in which it had held that an
action to recover an impounded automobile was a civil action. 66 Md. App. at 755, 492
A.2d at 918.
193. 66 Md. App. at 756, 492 A.2d at 919.
194. Id. at 756-57, 492 A.2d at 919.
195. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1808.1, -1808.2, -1808.3 (Supp. 1986).
196. The General Assembly appears to have used these terms interchangeably. Sec-
tion 8-1807 of the Natural Resources Article, which took effect in 1984, delineates the
perimeters of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area.
197. In 1984 the General Assembly established the Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas
Commission. Act approved May 29, 1984, ch. 794, 1984 Md. Laws 3744. The Commis-
sion's powers and the scope of its mission are set forth in MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-1801, -1807 (Supp. 1986).
198. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1808.1(b) (Supp. 1986).
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Act advocates "clustering": further development should be limited
to areas that have experienced prior development. Hence, localities
should place new areas of intense development either in areas in
which limited development has occurred or adjacent to areas in
which intense development has occurred.' 99 Similarly, localities
should place new areas of limited development adjacent to existing
areas of limited or intense development.2 ° °
The Commission will devise criteria for the allocation of future
expansion; however, no more than half the expansion thus allocated
may occur in resource conservation areas. 20 ' Any new area of in-
tense or limited development located in a resource conservation
area must conform to all criteria that the Commission may promul-
gate; the area must also be designated on a comprehensive zoning
map. 20 2
Subject to certain conditions,20 3 the Act drastically restricts the
density of development on parcels located in the critical area: ap-
parently, 20 4 local jurisdictions may permit only one "dwelling unit"
per twenty acres.20 5
Notwithstanding density limitations previously established by
the Commission, Chapter 603 allows "bona fide intrafamily trans-
fers" for the purpose of establishing a new residence for a family
member on land within a resource conservation area.2 0 6 A local ju-
risdiction may permit intrafamily transfers only if the land conveyed
was of record on March 1, 1986, and the land consists of between
seven and sixty acres.20 7 Before approving an intrafamily transfer,
however, a local jurisdiction must require that the relevant deed
contain a covenant stating that the lot is created subject to the provi-
sions of the Act.208 No person who receives land through an in-
trafamily transfer may subsequently convey that land to anyone
199. Id. at § 8-1808.1(b)(1).
200. Id. at § 8-1808.1(b)(2).
201. Id. at § 8-1808.1(b)(3).
202. Id. at § 8-1808.1(b)(4).
203. Id. at § 8-1808.1(c)(1),(2).
204. It is unclear whether the Act authorizes one acre of any sort of development per
20 acres, or simply one acre of residential development per 20 acres.
205. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8.1808.1(c) (Supp. 1986).
206. Id. at § 8-1802.2(b). The Act defines "bona fide intrafamily transfers" as follows:
"[A] transfer to a member of the owner's immediate family of a portion of the owners'
property for the purpose of establishing a residence for that family member." Id. at § 8-
1802.2(a)(2). "Immediate family" means "a father, mother, son, daughter, grandfather,
grandmother, grandson, or granddaughter." Id. at § 8-1802.2(a)(3).
207. Id. at § 8 -1808.2(c).
208. Id. at § 8-1808.2(f)(i).
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other than a member of his or her immediate family.2 °9
Finally, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 604210 to limit
the Commission's power to establish certain "impervious surfaces
limitations." 21 ' This section, which supersedes all prior regulations
of impervious surfaces in the critical area,2 12 provides the following
limitations: for storm water runoff, human-caused impervious areas
may not exceed fifteen percent of a parcel to be developed; how-
ever, impervious surfaces may cover up to twenty-five percent of lots
larger than one acre in subdivisions approved afterJune 1, 1986.2 ,I




209. Id. at § 8-1808.2(f)(ii).
210. Id. at § 8-1808.3.
211. Id. at § 8-1808.3(c).
212. Id. at § 8-1808.3(a)(2),(3).




1. Domestic International Sales Corporations.-In Ward Europa, Inc.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held that the Comptroller can alter the three-factor formula of prop-
erty, payroll, and sales2 to determine the taxes of a domestic inter-
national sales corporation (DISC).-
Ward Europa, a DISC, bought goods from its parent company
and resold those goods to foreign buyers.4 For the tax years in
question, 1979 to 1982, Ward Europa and its parent were a unitary
business;5 therefore, Ward Europa had to apportion its income
based on the three-factor formula.6 In calculating its taxes, using
1. 66 Md. App. 332, 503 A.2d 1371 (1986).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980) stated:
The portion of the business income derived from or reasonably attributable to
the trade or business carried on within this State may be determined by a sepa-
rate accounting where practicable, but never in the case of a unitary business;
however, where separate accounting is neither allowable nor practicable the
portion of the business income of the corporation allowable to this State shall
be determined in accordance with a three-factor formula of property, payroll
and sales, in which each factor shall be given equal weight and in which the
property factor shall include rented as well as owned property and tangible
personal property having a permanent situs within this State and used in the
trade or business shall be included as well as real property. The Comptroller of
the Treasury shall have the right, in those cases where circumstances warrant,
to alter any of the above rules as to the use of the separate accounting method
or the formula method, the weight to be given the various factors in the
formula, the manner of valuation of rented property included in the property
factor and the determination of the extent to which tangible personal property
is permanently located within the State.
The statute has been amended, but the relevant portion of the statute remains
unchanged save that "net income" replaced "business income." MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 316 (Supp. 1985).
3. 66 Md. App. at 347-48, 503 A.2d at 1379. DISCs were shell corporations that
allowed domestic exporting companies to isolate and defer tax liability on some of their
profits. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982). They were abolished by the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 805, 98 Stat. 1001 (1984). Foreign sales corporations
(FSCs) replaced the defunct DISCs. The Court of Special Appeals prefaced its decision
with the following caveat: "[T]his opinion focuses only on DISCs, entities formed under
the then-existing sections of the IRC, and may not be applicable to foreign sales corpo-
rations." 66 Md. App. at 334, 503 A.2d at 1372.
4. 66 Md. App. at 337, 503 A.2d at 1374.
5. Id. at 339, 503 A.2d at 1374. In a prior case the Maryland Tax Court had ruled
that a DISC and its parent company constituted a unitary business. Id. at n.4. For a
review of factors determining whether a business is unitary, see Ramsay, Scarlett & Co.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296 (1985).
6. 66 Md. App. at 339, 503 A.2d at 1374-75.
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the Comptroller's regulations, 7 Ward Europa determined-that it
owed no tax at all since it owned no property anywhere, had no
payroll, and made all its sales outside of Maryland.'
The Comptroller disagreed and assessed deficiencies against
Ward Europa.9 Confronted with the unique circumstances sur-
rounding DISCs, the Comptroller decided to alter the three-factor
formula. The payroll and property factors used by the parent com-
pany in apportioning its taxes were included in the formula used by
Ward Europa.'"
Ward Europa argued that the Comptroller could only modify
those variables specifically mentioned in the statute concerning the
allocation of corporate income." The court disagreed, reasoning
that the legislature did not intend for creatures such as DISCs to
escape all tax liability.12 Instead, the legislature granted the Comp-
troller the power to revise the three-factor formula to contend with
unusual circumstances. 3 Revision of the formula, therefore, was
proper.
2. Valuation of Mineral Leases.-In Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Shell Oil Co. " the Court of Special Appeals held that royalties paid
for minerals extracted under lease agreements 15 constituted "gross
rents"' 6 for the purpose of valuing a multistate corporation's as-
sets; 1 7 therefore, the property to be valued was not the gas and oil
7. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 3, § 04.01.03 (1978).
8. 66 Md. App. at 342, 503 A.2d at 1376.
9. Id. at 343, 503 A.2d at 1377.
10. Id., 503 A.2d at 1376.
11. Id. at 344, 503 A.2d at 1377.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 345, 503 A.2d at 1377.
14. 65 Md. App. 252, 500 A.2d 315 (1985).
15. The consideration for the leases in question included a bonus lump sum pay-
ment upon execution of the lease, and royalty payments made at designated intervals
based on a percentage of the gas or oil extracted from the land. Id. at 255, 500 A.2d at
316.
16. The Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) defines "gross rent" as follows:
The term "Gross Rent" shall include payments made by a tenant for the privi-
lege of occupying or using the property, including such items as fixed rent,
percentage rent, real estate taxes, insurance and maintenance expense borne
by the tenant. The term does not include utilities such as gas, electricity, oil,
water or items normally consumed by the tenant.
MD. REGS. CODE tit. 3, § 04.01.03(4)(a) (1986).
17. The relevant portion of the statute for the years in question, 1976, 1977, and
1978, stated:
[T]he portion of the business income of the corporation allowable to this State
shall be determined in accordance with a three-factor formula of property, pay-
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extracted, but rather the leasehold interest in the land.",
Shell calculated its taxes by treating as gross rent the royalties it
paid' 9 and by capitalizing the royalties to determine the value of its
leased property.20 The Comptroller disapproved of this method
and assessed additional taxes. 21 The Comptroller refused to capi-
talize Shell's royalty payments on the theory that the transaction be-
tween Shell and its lessors was the sale of minerals instead of the
conveyance of a leasehold.22 Alternatively, the Comptroller argued
that if the transaction did convey a leasehold interest, its total value
should be measured by the royalty payments.2 ' The Tax Court
agreed, but both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals
rejected the Comptroller's position. 24 The appellate court found
the royalty payments to be in the nature of a percentage rent for the
land and held that, as a matter of law, the property to be valued was
the leasehold interest.
25
roll and sales, in which each factor shall be given equal weight and in which the
property factor shall include rented as well as owned property....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980).
The General Assembly has amended this statute; however, the portion considered
in this case remains unchanged save for the substitution of "net income" for "business
income." Id. at § 316 (Supp. 1985).
Explaining the operation of the three-factor formula, the court stated: "[T]he per-
centage of Shell's total business income allocable to Maryland is determined by averag-
ing three fractions: (1) Shell's property in Maryland/Shell's total property; (2) Shell's
payroll in Maryland/Shell's total payroll; and (3) Shell's sales in Maryland/Shell's total
sales." 65 Md. App. at 254, 500 A.2d at 316.
18. 65 Md. App. at 262, 500 A.2d at 320.
19. Id. at 253, 500 A.2d at 315.
20. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 3, § 04.01.03(4) (1986) provides in relevant part:
(a) In determining the capitalized value of rented or leased property includi-
ble in the property factor.., the term "leased or rented property" shall include
property held by the taxpayer where the legal relation between the parties is
that of "Landlord and Tenant", whether that property be held under a gross
lease, net lease, percentage lease, or a lease of similar purport ....
(b) The term "Capitalized Value", for the purpose of these regulations, shall
mean a value determined by multiplying the "Gross Rent", as defined in these
regulations by eight ....
21. 65 Md. App. at 253, 500 A.2d at 315.
22. Id. at 257, 500 A.2d at 317.
23. Id. at 262, 500 A.2d at 320.
24. Id. at 258, 500 A.2d at 318.
25. Id. at 262, 500 A.2d at 320. Although no direct precedential authority dictated
the decision, the court reviewed several analogous cases for guidance. Thus, for exam-
ple, in Kiser v. Eberly, 200 Md. 242, 246, 88 A.2d 570, 572 (1952), the Court of Appeals
found that a tract of land included in an oil and gas lease conveyed an interest in the
land rather than a sale of the minerals. In Ammendale Normal Inst., Inc. v. Schrom
Constr. Co., 264 Md. 617, 626-27, 288 A.2d 140, 145 (1972), the Court of Appeals
construed an agreement allowing the mining of sand and gravel at a certain amount per
ton to be neither a sale of goods nor a lease, but rather a license to extract certain
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B. Interest on Refunds
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Fairchild Industries 26 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the income tax refund statute2 7 requires
payment of interest to a corporate taxpayer on a refund arising from
a carryback 28 of net operating loss unless the taxpayer's mistake that
caused the overpayment is not attributable to the State.2 ' Addition-
ally, the court found that interest accrues from the date that the tax-
payer files a claim for a refund.3"
Fairchild incurred a net operating loss for tax year 1978."' A
corporation can use such a loss as a deduction for the three preced-
ing tax years.32 Therefore, Fairchild recalculated its taxes for 1975,
1976, and 1977 to reflect the loss, and it filed amended returns on
September 27, 1979." 3 The Comptroller granted the refunds, but
refused to pay interest thereon.34
The Comptroller unsuccessfully argued that the State should
not pay interest on a refund if the tax was originally paid due to
taxpayer error or if the error was not attributable to the State.35
That is, the Comptroller contended that the two conditions barring
interest payment provided in the income tax refund statute should
be disjunctively construed,36 despite the statutory mandate that in-
materials from the ground. In Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d
585, 600, 446 P.2d 1006, 1015, 72 Cal. Rptr. 886, 895 (1968), the California Supreme
Court found that royalties paid on gas and oil extracted from land constituted the rent
paid for the leasehold interest. Finally, in Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 107 (1932)
the United States Supreme Court decided that a lease bonus and royalty payments for an
oil and gas lease were not a sale of the minerals, but that title to the minerals passed as
incidents to the interest in the land.
26. 303 Md. 280, 493 A.2d 341 (1985).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 310(s) (1980) states in pertinent part:
Interest... shall be paid on such amounts refunded accounting from the date
the return required under this subtitle was due to be filed, but interest may not
be paid on tax refunds now pending or subsequently filed pursuant to this sec-
tion if the tax originally paid was paid in whole or in part by reason of a mistake
or error on the part of the taxpayer and not attributable to the state or any
department or agency thereof.
28. A carryback is a retroactive income tax deduction. 303 Md. at 283, 493 A.2d at
342.
29. Id. at 286, 493 A.2d at 344.
30. Id. at 289-90, 493 A.2d at 346.
31. Id. at 283, 493 A.2d at 342.
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A (1980).
33. 303 Md. at 283, 493 A.2d at 342.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 284-85, 493 A.2d at 343.
36. The Comptroller relied on Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158, 453 A.2d
1215 (1983), in which the Court of Appeals found that "and" and "or" may be in-
terchanged "when it is reasonable and logical to do so." Id. at 163, 453 A.2d at 1218.
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terest be paid unless the original tax was paid due to "a mistake or
error on the part of the taxpayer and not attributable to the State
.. * -**7 In the Comptroller's view, the substitution of "or" for
"and" was a reasonable and logical means of effectuating the legis-
lature's intention that the State must be at fault before interest is
paid on a tax return. s
In rejecting the Comptroller's position, the Court of Appeals
construed the word "and" to have its ordinary conjunctive mean-
ing.39 Although acknowledging that "and" can be construed to
mean "or" to effectuate obvious legislative intent,40 the court found
that since the legislature's intention was clear,4' the refund statute
did not require such construction. The plain and ordinary meaning
of the income tax refund statute is that the State must pay interest
on a tax refund unless overpayment results solely from taxpayer er-
ror. The court found support for this interpretation in Comptroller of
the Treasury v. Davidson,42 in which the Court of Appeals had con-
strued identical language in an earlier statute to require a taxpayer
mistake before forfeiture of refund interest.4" Since Fairchild made
no mistake in filing its returns, the corporation was entitled to a
refund.
As to the time from which interest on a refund accrues,
Fairchild argued that interest should be calculated from October 15
of 1975, 1976, and 1977, the dates on which it properly filed the
original returns.44 The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the
Comptroller that interest should instead be computed from Septem-
ber 27, 1979, the date on which Fairchild filed the amended re-
turns. 45 Since the State was fully entitled to Fairchild's tax
payments until the amended returns were filed, the court reasoned
that it would be illogical for interest to accrue during the period
prior to the filing of those amended returns.46
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 310(c) (1980).
38. 303 Md. at 285, 493 A.2d at 343.
39. Id. at 285-87, 493 A.2d at 343.
40. See Little Store, 295 Md. at 162, 453 A.2d at 1217-18.
41. 303 Md. at 286, 493 A.2d at 344.
42. 234 Md. 269, 199 A.2d 360 (1964).
43. "In order to have a forfeiture under sec. 218, there must have been a mistake or
error by the taxpayer, not attributable to the State or a State agency." Id. at 273, 199
A.2d at 361.
44. 303 Md. at 287-88, 493 A.2d at 345.




C. Maryland Tax Court
1. Statute of Limitations.-In Comptroller of the Treasury v. World
Book Childcraft International, Inc.4 7 the Court of Special Appeals, in a
case of first impression, ruled that in tax cases the party relying on
an exception to the statute of limitations48 bears the burden of dem-
onstrating the applicability of that exception.49
The Comptroller assessed World Book in 1979 for taxes alleg-
edly due from 1939 to 1977.50 The Maryland Tax Court, however,
found that the three-year statute of limitation barred the assess-
ments prior to 1976. 5t A net operating loss in 1976, which was car-
ried forward in 1977, negated the taxes due for the years not
affected by the statute.52
The Comptroller unsuccessfully argued that because World
Book had failed to file returns, the statute of limitations was inappli-
cable.5" Applying a narrow scope of review,54 the court upheld the
Tax Court's finding that the Comptroller had not proved that World
Book had a duty to file returns. 55 Additionally, the court held that
47. 67 Md. App. 424, 508 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d 314 (1986).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 309(b) (1980) states: "Except as otherwise provided in
this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this subtitle shall be assessed within 3
years after the return was filed or within 3 years after the due date for such return,
whichever date is later."
49. 67 Md. App. at 445, 508 A.2d at 159.
50. Id. at 429, 508 A.2d at 151.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 430, 508 A.2d at 151.
53. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 309(c)(2) (1980) provides an exception to the three-
year statute of limitations: "In the case of a failure to file a return or in the case of the
filing of an incomplete return, the tax may be assessed at any time."
15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1982) prohibits a state from taxing income derived from the
solicitation of sales by independent contractors in the state, if the solicitation is the only
business activity carried on in the state. The Tax Court found as a fact that the Comp-
troller failed to prove that World Book's activity in Maryland went beyond the solicita-
tion of sales. 67 Md. App. at 436, 508 A.2d at 154.
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(o) (Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent part that
reviewing courts "shall affirm the Tax Court order if it is not erroneous as a matter of
law and if it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record." A reviewing
court can reverse a Tax Court order based solely on an erroneous conclusion of law.
Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 834, 490 A.2d
1296, 1301 (1985). If the Tax Court has not erred on a question of law, a reviewing
court must defer to the Tax Court's factual finding if the finding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record. Id. In reviewing the Tax Court's application of law to
facts, a court must defer to the agency's decision if a reasoning mind could reach the
same conclusion. Id. at 839, 490 A.2d at 1303. In this case, the Court of Special Ap-
peals found that the Tax Court did not err on a question of law and thus deferred to the
Tax Court's finding of fact. 67 Md. App. at 439, 508 A.2d at 156.
55. 67 Md. App. at 441, 508 A.2d at 157.
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the Tax Court had properly placed on the Comptroller the burden
of proving the correctness of the assessment.56 The court reasoned
that the taxpayer would be forced to prove a negative-that it had
no duty to file-if it were to avoid an assessment brought under an
exception to the limitation." Requiring taxpayers to preserve, be-
yond the statutory period, records that prove they owe no taxes
would be inconsistent with the policy underlying the statute of
limitations.5"
In Osborne v. Comptroller of the Treasury 59 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that an assessment 60 of retail sales tax does not constitute
an "action" for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. 6'
An "action" can be an assumpsit claim 62 or the filing of a lien.63
Since the Comptroller failed to bring such an "action" against Os-
borne within the statutory four-year period,6 4 the Comptroller
56. Id. at 445, 508 A.2d at 159. Normally, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
an assessment incorrect. Id. at 442 n.7, 508 A.2d at 158 n.7 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, § 309(d) (Supp. 1985)).
57. Id. at 443, 508 A.2d at 158.
58. See id.
59. 67 Md. App. 555, 508 A.2d 538, cert. granted, 307 Md. 342, 513 A.2d 911 (1986),
appeal dismissed, 308 Md. 322, 519 A.2d 206 (1987).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 345(a) (1980) provides in relevant part:
If the Comptroller finds from an examination of the returns or records of any
taxpayer or otherwise that the taxpayer has filed an incorrect return and paid
less than the amount of the tax due under this subtitle, he shall levy a deficiency
assessment against the taxpayer, which shall be prima facie correct.
61. 67 Md. App. at 564, 508 A.2d at 543. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 342(a) (1980)
provides in relevant part:
An action may be brought at any time within four (4) years from the time the
tax shall be due and payable by the Comptroller in the name of the State to
recover the amount of any taxes, penalties and interest due under the provi-
sions of this subtitle, but if there is proof of fraud or gross negligence, there
shall be no limitation of the period in which the action may be brought.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 206(a) (1980) states:
Any tax may be collected from the person liable under this article to pay the
same by action of assumpsit instituted at any time after said tax shall become
due and payable, within the period of limitations prescribed by this article, and
such suit may be maintained notwithstanding the existence of other remedies
by way of sale of real estate, or otherwise.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 342(b) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
The tax, and all increases, interests and penalties thereon shall be a lien upon
all the property, real and/or personal, of any person liable to pay the same to
the State from and after the time when notice has been given that such tax has
become due and payable as provided herein. Notice of such lien shall be filed
by the Comptroller with the clerk of the circuit court .... The lien provided for
in this section shall have the full force and effect of a lien of judgment.
64. In 1978 the Comptroller levied an assessment against Harford Excavating, Inc.
(Harford, Inc.) for taxes owed from 1975 to 1977 by Harford Excavating Co. (Harford
Co.), a company of which Osborne was sole proprietor. 67 Md. App. at 559, 508 A.2d at
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could not collect the assessment. 65
2. Exhaustion of Remedies.-In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Brand
Iron, Inc.66 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that by failing to ap-
pear at an informal conference and a formal hearing for revision of
an assessment,67 the taxpayer had not exhausted its remedies before
the taxing authority. 68 Therefore, the Maryland Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction over the taxpayer's appeal,6" and a dismissal was
mandated.
D. Personal Property Tax
In Phillips Harborplace, Inc. v. State Department of Assessments and
Taxation70 the Court of Special Appeals held that a restaurant's
kitchen equipment did not qualify for a manufacturing equipment
exemption 7 ' from personal property tax.72 Because the food pre-
pared with kitchen equipment did not undergo what the average
person would consider a substantial transformation from its natural
state, the court found that the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation had properly assessed the kitchen equipment as personal
540-41. The Comptroller mistakenly believed that Harford, Inc. had succeeded the ven-
dor Harford Co. Id. at 561, 508 A.2d at 542. By the time the Comptroller disallowed
liability against Harford, Inc. in 1983, the limitations period for bringing an action
against Osborne as sole proprietor had expired. Id. at 567, 508 A.2d at 545.
65. Id. at 567, 508 A.2d at 545.
66. 65 Md. App. 207, 499 A.2d 1325 (1985).
67. Id. at 209-10, 499 A.2d at 1326.
68. "No appeal to the Maryland Tax Court shall be allowed until the party seeking to
appeal has exhausted his remedies before the appropriate assessing or taxing authority
.... MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 230 (1980).
69. 65 Md. App. at 212, 499 A.2d at 1327. The Tax Court dismissed the appeal in
which Brand Iron protested the finality and correctness of the assessment, but the court
remanded the case for an informal conference before the Comptroller. Id. at 210, 499
A.2d at 1326. The Court of Special Appeals stated, however, that the Tax Court had
authority only to dismiss the taxpayer's appeal. Id. at 212, 499 A.2d at 1327.
70. 65 Md. App. 461, 501 A.2d 92 (1985).
71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9A(c)(1) (1980) provided an exemption from state as-
sessment for the following property used in manufacturing: "tools (including mechani-
cal tools); implements, however operated; machinery; manufacturing apparatus or
engines, whether or not in use; except where the property is declared to be taxable by
this subsection." In Phillips the tax year in question was 1981. Section 9A was repealed
by the Act of April 9, 1985, ch. 8, 1985 Md. Laws 45. The present codification of the
manufacturing equipment exemption is found in MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-225(a)
(1986): "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, if used in manufacturing,
the following personal property, however operated and whether or not in use, is not
subject to property tax: (1) tools; (2) implements; (3) machinery; or (4) manufacturing
apparatus or engines."




In determining what constitutes "manufacturing," Maryland
courts have looked to what "manufacturing" means to the average
person.7 ' For guidance, the court looked to the statement of the
United States Supreme Court in Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v.
United States:75
Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not
manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result
of treatment, labor and manipulation. But something more
is necessary .... There must be transformation; a new and
different article must emerge, "having a distinctive name,
character or use."
76
Applying this rationale,77 the court rejected Phillips' contention that
anything that changes food is manufacturing equipment. A new
product is not manufactured by preparing and cooking food.78
Phillips further contended that the average person who man-
ages a large restaurant would consider cooking to be manufactur-
ing.79 The court rejected this argument, stating that it would
employ an objective rather than subjective standard to determine
the meaning of "manufacture. "80 The average person does not
manage Phillips Harborplace. Lastly, the court rejected Phillips' po-
sition that since kitchen equipment is subject to retail sales tax as
manufacturing equipment,8 kitchen equipment must be considered
manufacturing equipment for purposes of the property tax.8 2 Phil-
lips, the court observed, did not sell kitchen equipment;8" therefore,
the Retail Sales Act 84 was irrelevant to personal property taxation.
Inconsistent treatment of the same item in different tax statutes re-
73. Id. at 467-68, 501 A.2d at 95-96.
74. See, e.g., Macke Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments and Taxation, 264 Md. 121,
285 A.2d 593 (1972) (vending machine that makes cold drinks and ice is not used in
manufacturing).
75. 207 U.S. 556 (1908).
76. Id. at 562 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
77. The Maryland Tax Court found the kitchen equipment was properly assessed as
personal property. 65 Md. App. at 464, 501 A.2d at 94. That decision was upheld by
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Id. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals was
limited to reviewing whether substantial evidence supported the judgment. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 229(o) (Supp. 1985).
78. 65 Md. App. at 467, 501 A.2d at 95.
79. Id., 501 A.2d at 95-96.
80. Id. at 468, 501 A.2d at 96.
81. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324(s) (1980).
82. 65 Md. App. at 469, 501 A.2d at 96.
83. Id.
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 371 (1980).
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flects the varying legislative purposes underlying the statutes.8 5 The
definitional provisions of a tax statute are limited to that statute and
do not apply to other statutes.8 6 Thus, the court upheld the assess-
ment in every aspect.
E. Real Estate Taxes
1. Property Tax Exemption.-In Supervisor of Assessments of Balti-
more City v. Friends School s7 the Court of Special Appeals held that
property owned by an educational institution qualified for a prop-
erty tax exemption 88 if the property is: "1) owned by an educational
institution or organization; 2) actually used and necessary for the
educational purposes of that institution or organization; and 3) used
in the promotion of the general public welfare of the citizens." 89
Addressing the second prong of the test, the court looked to several
factors in deciding whether property is "actually used" for educa-
tional purposes. The use must be "actual and present.""0 The
court also considered the type, frequency, and regularity of activities
taking place on the property. 9 ' Whether a property is "necessary
for educational purposes" depends on:
85. 65 Md. App. at 469, 501 A.2d at 96. The court stated:
To grant an exemption in order to induce a manufacturer to operate in Mary-
land-a manufacturer who might conduct its business anywhere-serves the
policy underlying § 9A(c)(1). To grant that exemption to a restaurant that
must in any case operate where its patrons are to be found-here, in Balti-
more-does not serve that purpose ....
86. Id.
87. 67 Md. App. 508, 508 A.2d 514, cert. granted, 307 Md. 342, 513 A.2d 911 (1986).
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(e)(2) (1980), the relevant statute, provided an ex-
emption from state property tax for: "[P]roperty owned by ... educational... organiza-
tions.., when any of such property described above is actually used exclusively for and
necessary for... educational purposes (including athletic programs and activities of an
educational institution) in the promotion of the general public welfare of the people of
the State." This statute was repealed by the Act of April 9, 1985, ch. 8, 1985 Md. Laws
45 and as rewritten is now codified at MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-202 (1986). The
new statute provides an exemption if the property:
(i) is necessary for and actually used exclusively for a charitable or educa-
tional purpose to promote the general welfare of the people of the State, in-
cluding an activity or an athletic program of an educational institution; and
(ii) is owned by:
1. a nonprofit hospital;
2. a nonprofit charitable, fraternal, educational, or literary organi-
zation.
89. 67 Md. App. at 518-19, 508 A.2d at 520.
90. Id. at 519, 508 A.2d at 520 (citing Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore
County v. Trustees of Bosly Methodist Church Graveyard, 293 Md. 208, 443 A.2d 91
(1982)).
91. 67 Md. App. at 519-20, 508 A.2d at 520.
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the particular type of institution, i.e., day or boarding
school; the needs of the student body, taking into account
their age, educational level, social development, and other
special requirements; the location of the school, i.e., rural,
suburban or city; the proximity of the subject property to
the students or campus buildings; and whether the services
performed in or on the property can be contracted out or
are shared by other school employees.9 2
Applying this test, the court concluded that a caretaker's resi-
dence at the Friends School did not qualify for a property tax ex-
emption.95 Because the caretaker's residence was not necessary for
educational purposes, the taxpayer did not satisfy the second prong
of the test; furthermore, because the property was used only as a
personal residence, the taxpayer did not satisfy the third prong of
the test.94
2. Transfer Tax.-In Montgomery County v. Fulks95 the Court of
Special Appeals held that the state agricultural transfer tax statute 96
imposed a ceiling on the total tax a locality could levy on a transfer
92. Id. at 520, 508 A.2d at 520-21.
93. Id., 508 A.2d at 521.
94. Id. at 521, 508 A.2d at 521.
95. 65 Md. App. 227, 500 A.2d 302 (1985).
96. The relevant part of the statute read:
Furthermore, in any county that has imposed a transfer tax at a rate in excess of
the rate of transfer tax levied on improved residential property, the combina-
tion of the state and local transfer tax rates may not exceed 5 percent plus the
rate applicable to improved residential property. If the combined rates exceed
the maximum allowable rate, the tax imposed by this section shall be collected
in full, and the local tax shall be reduced as required.
Id. at 232, 500 A.2d at 305 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 278F(j) (Supp. 1981)
(footnote omitted)).
The transfer in question occurred in 1981; however, § 278F(j) was repealed by the
Act of April 9, 1985, ch. 8, 1985 Md. Laws 45. The subsection is now codified at MD.
TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 13-407 (1986), which reads in pertinent part:
(2) If a county has imposed a county transfer tax at a rate that exceeds the rate
applicable to the transfer of improved residential property, the total rate of tax
that applies to a transfer subject to the agricultural land transfer tax may not
exceed 5% plus the rate that applies to improved residential property under
the county transfer tax.
(3) If the total rate of tax that applies to a transfer subject to the agricultural
land transfer tax exceeds the minimum rate allowed under paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the tax that applies to the transfer:
(i) is payable at the rate specified for the agricultural land transfer tax;
and
(ii) the rate of the county transfer tax shall be reduced as necessary to
comply with the 5% limit.
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of property subject to the agricultural transfer tax.97 By the terms of
the statute, the total tax on transfers of agricultural property could
not exceed six percent. 98 The taxpayers had already paid a six per-
cent rezoning transfer tax;9 9 however, the county argued that the
statutory ceiling applied only to the agricultural land portion of lo-
cal taxes.' 00 Rejecting this argument, the court found that the statu-
tory language clearly expressed the General Assembly's intent to
limit the total tax a locality could impose. 1'
In Hampton Associates Limited Partnership v. Baltimore County 102 the
Court of Special Appeals ruled that Baltimore County could impose
its local transfer tax10 3 on a real estate transfer effected by filing arti-
cles of transfer'0 4 with the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation. 1 0 5
Hampton Apartments, Inc., a Maryland corporation, sold real
estate located in Baltimore County to Hampton Associates.' 0 6 The
parties effected the conveyance by the filing of articles of transfer
with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation in Balti-
more City.' 0 7 Hampton Associates argued that by imposing the tax
the county had exceeded its statutory authority.' 0 8 For, Hampton
maintained, Baltimore County can only tax events that occur within
the county,' 0 9 but the filing of the articles of transfer had occurred
within the city." 0 The court found, however, that the tax went to
97. 65 Md. App. at 236, 500 A.2d at 307.
98. Id. at 232, 500 A.2d at 305.
99. Id. at 228, 500 A.2d at 303.
100. Id. at 232, 500 A.2d at 305.
101. Id. at 236, 500 A.2d at 307.
102. 66 Md. App. 551, 505 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 307 Md. 406, 514 A.2d 24 (1986).
103. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE § 11-74 (1978) placed a 1.6% tax on the value of
any estate of inheritance or freehold or any estate longer than seven years. Although the
court acknowledged that § 11-74 did not meet the notice requirement mandated by BAL-
TIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE § 11-15(c) (1978), the legislation was valid because it did
not conflict with any charter or constitutional provision. 66 Md. App. at 566, 505 A.2d
at 545.
104. Filing articles of transfer with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation
effects a realty transfer under MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-113 (1985).
105. 66 Md. App. at 566, 505 A.2d at 545.
106. Id. at 553, 505 A.2d at 538.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 558, 505 A.2d at 541.
109. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE § 11-15(a) (1978) provides:
The county is hereby authorized to have and exercise, within the limits of the
county, in addition to any and all taxing powers heretofore granted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the power to tax to the same extent as the state has or could
exercise such power within the limits of the county as part of its general taxing
power ....
110. 66 Md. App. at 558, 505 A.2d at 541.
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the underlying transfer of property and not to the act of filing."l'
Additionally, the court rejected the position that the statute '12
authorizing the State Department of Assessments and Taxation to
collect transfer taxes for any county except Baltimore County"1
3
precluded Baltimore County from collecting the tax itself." 4 The
statute was not a grant of taxing power, but rather a collection and
distribution device for taxes imposed under the counties' author-
ity.l"5 Therefore, Baltimore County could impose and collect trans-
fer taxes on property in the county conveyed by filing articles of
transfer with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation.
F. Use and Retail Sales Tax
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Washington National Arena Limited
Partnership " 6 the Court of Special Appeals held that tickets for arena
admissions were intangible personal property. 1 7 Hence, the equip-
111. Id. at 559, 505 A.2d at 541. Because Hampton Associates confused filing the
articles of transfer with the event of transfer, it had contended that the subject matter of
MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-203, -204 (1985) (original version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, §§ 129, 130 (1957)) extended to the transfer itself. 66 Md. App. at 560,
505 A.2d at 542. Sections 1-203 and 1-204 set out a schedule of filing and recording
fees and procedures to be followed when depositing corporate documents with the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation. If these statutes extended to the transfer it-
self, then the county's transfer tax would have been invalid under BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MD., CODE § 11-15(b) (1978), which denies the county the power to impose taxes on the
subject matter of former §§ 129 and 130. The court, however, read § 1-203 as a mere
recording fee schedule and § 1-204 as a list of the in-house procedures for completing
files kept on each registered corporation. 66 Md. App. at 560, 505 A.2d at 542. There-
fore, the subject matter of §§ 1-203 and 1-204 did not extend to real property transfer
taxes.
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 91, § 277A (1980), the relevant statute, provided:
The Department of Assessments and Taxation is hereby authorized and di-
rected to collect the transfer tax of any of the counties or Baltimore City, at the
rate locally imposed on the sale or transfer of real property, upon the filing of
articles of sale, lease, exchange, or other transfer of all or substantially all the
property and assets of a corporation with respect to the property subject to the
certificate required under § 3-112 of the Corporations and Associations Article
.... The provisions of this section do not apply to Baltimore County.
Section 277A was repealed by the Act of April 9, 1985, ch. 8, 1985 Md. Laws 45.
The section as rewritten is now codified in MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. § 13-404 (1986),
which states, "[T]he Department shall collect county transfer tax at the rate set by each
county for articles of transfer filed with the Department as required by § 3-107 of the
Corporations and Associations Article."
113. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 157, 1985 Md. Laws 1769 removed the Baltimore
County exception from § 277A and § 13-404.
114. 66 Md. App. at 561, 505 A.2d at 542.
115. Id.
116. 66 Md. App. 416, 504 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 306 Md. 289, 508 A.2d 489 (1986).
117. Id. at 428, 504 A.2d at 672. In the court's view, the tickets' value was wholly
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ment and ticket stock needed in printing the tickets were not used in
the sale or resale of "tangible personal property.""18 Therefore,
neither the equipment nor the ticket stock were exempt from taxa-
tion under the Use and Retail Sales Tax Acts.' 9
TIMOTHY P. BRANIGAN
symbolic: a ticket represents the right to attend an amusement. Id. at 426, 504 A.2d at
671.
118. Id. at 424-28, 504 A.2d at 671-72.
119. Id. at 428, 504 A.2d at 672. The use tax incorporates by reference the retail sales
tax provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324(f)(i)-(iii) (1980). See MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, § 372(d)(1),(3) (1980). Section 324(f) defines "retail sales" as follows:
[A]II sales of tangible personal property to any person for any purpose other
than those in which the purpose of the purchaser is (i) to resell the property so
transferred in the form in which the same is, or is to be, received by him .... or
(iii) to use or incorporate the property so transferred as a material or part of
other tangible personal property to be produced for sale by manufacturing,
assembling, processing or refining.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(mm) (1980) provides an exemption to the retail sales tax
for "[s]ales of manufacturing machinery and equipment."
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A. Abuse of Process
In Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood I the Court of Special Appeals held
that a trier of fact may award compensatory damages for abuse of
process even if the defendant had probable cause for initiating the
lawsuit;2 however, the trier of fact may not award punitive damages
under such circumstances absent evidence of malice. 3
In Palmer the court laid to rest a case that had been to court on
seven previous occasions. 4 As a result of a repair bill dispute,
Palmer Ford had retained possession of Wood's car.5 Nevertheless,
Wood obtained the car from an anonymous Palmer Ford employee
for a reduced payment.6 When Wood returned the car for another
repair job, the defendant retained the automobile once again, in-
sisted on full payment of Wood's original bill, and then notified the
police, who charged Wood with embezzlement.7 Palmer Ford
threatened to send Mrs. Wood's son to jail unless she paid the bill,
though her son was already in police custody.' Consequently,
Wood sued for abuse of process and won compensatory and puni-
tive damages.9
In affirming the compensatory award, the Court of Special Ap-
peals reasoned that the evidence confirmed that the plaintiff's inju-
ries resulted from the defendant's abuse of criminal prosecution as a
means of threat and debt collection.' 0 In such a situation, a court
may award compensatory damages for "humiliation, disgrace or in-
1. 65 Md. App. 390, 500 A.2d 1055 (1985).
2. Id. at 397, 500 A.2d at 1059.
3. Id. at 400-01, 500 A.2d at 1060-61.
4. The plaintiff first sued in 1979 for abuse of process. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, but this decision was reversed and remanded on
appeal. A jury then found for the plaintiff on the grounds of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process, and it awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal,
the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; but the Court of Appeals reversed as to malicious
prosecution and remanded the case for damage redetermination. Following a mistrial,
the third trial court awarded the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. The
present case addressed the defendant's appeal. Id. at 392-93, 500 A.2d at 1056.
5. Id. at 393, 500 A.2d at 1057.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 394, 500 A.2d at 1057. The charge was later changed to false pretenses
and finally to grand larceny and unauthorized use of an automobile. Eventually the
charges were dropped. Id.
8. Id.
9. See supra note 4.
10. 65 Md. App. at 399-400, 500 A.2d at 1060.
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dignity suffered as well as monetary losses incurred...." 1 1 Despite
the defendant's argument to the contrary, the court found that the
existence of probable cause for arrest did not negate Wood's claim
for compensatory damages.12
The court, however, reversed the punitive damage award for
lack of evidence of actual or implied malice.' 3 While malice is not
an element of abuse of process, it is a prerequisite for punitive dam-
ages. 14 Thus, merely establishing abuse of process is insufficient in
itself to merit punitive damages.
B. Damages
1. Cap.-Recent legislation-Chapter 639 of the 1986 Mary-
land laws' 5-attempts to control damage awards in personal injury
cases through dollar limitations and procedural restrictions. 16
Though originally designed for medical malpractice litigation, the
legislation as adopted covers all personal injury actions."
Chapter 639 places a $350,000 limit on awards for
noneconomic damages in cases in which the cause of action for per-
sonal injury arises on or after July 1, 1986.18 Noneconomic dam-
ages include, for example, pain, suffering, and physical
disfigurement,' 9 but not punitive damages. 20 Awards under this
provision include those made by the Health Claims Arbitration
Panel.2'
Chapter 639 makes no distinction between types of personal in-
11. Id. at 400, 500 A.2d at 1060.
12. The court stated: "Once it has been established that legal process has been per-
verted by misapplication to an end for which that process was never intended, the
abuser is liable for all the consequences that reasonably result from the process." Id. at
397-98, 500 A.2d at 1059.
13. Id. at 401-02, 500 A.2d at 1061.
14. Id. at 400-01, 500 A.2d at 1060 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans,
275 Md. 441, 448, 340 A.2d 705, 709 (1975); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan,
45 Md. App. 97, 115, 412 A.2d 407, 419 (1980)).
15. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 639, 1986 Md. Laws 2347 (certain provisions codified at
MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-913, 11-108, 11-109 (Supp. 1986)).
16. Id. at 2347 (describing the purpose of the act).
17. Id. at 2347-51 (evidencing editorial transition). The final provision of the act
emphasizes the acquisition of information concerning the act's impact on medical mal-
practice claims and insurance premiums. Id. at 2352.
18. Id. at 2350 (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108(b) (Supp.
1986)).
19. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108(a)(l) (Supp. 1986)).
Other noneconomic losses include inconvenience and loss of consortium. Id.
20. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108(a)(2) (Supp. 1986)).
21. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108(c) (Supp. 1986)).
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jury and thus presents no equal protection question. 2' Further-
more, the United States Supreme Court has previously upheld the
constitutionality of statutory limits on dollar recovery.23 Thus, the
act may well withstand a test of its constitutionality.
Maryland's personal injury Act requires the trier of fact to item-
ize damage awards. 24 The court or the Health Claims Arbitration
Panel may order payment of future economic damage 25 awards in a
lump sum or in periodic payments,2 6 if the defendants or their in-
surers provide security. 27 The court may also appoint a conservator
to resolve interparty disputes over the need for or cost of the plain-
tiff's care or treatment.28 In the event of the plaintiff's death, the
unpaid balance of plaintiff's future loss of earnings reverts to his or
her estate. In contrast, the unpaid balance of the award for future
medical expenses reverts to the entity that originally provided the
funds for the award.29
Concerning punitive damages, evidence of defendant's financial
means is now admissible only after a finding of liability and only if
the plaintiff presents facts supporting punitive damages.3 ' This pro-
vision applies both to court actions and claims filed with the Health
Care Arbitration office. 3
The legislation, which took effectJuly 1, 1986,12 requires all in-
surers who provide professional health care liability insurance to
22. Cf. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding Califor-
nia's medical malpractice damage cap despite plaintiff's claim that the statute denied
him equal protection).
23. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding
an act limiting the amount of damages recoverable from the defendant in the event of a
nuclear accident).
24. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 639, 1986 Md. Laws 2351 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC CODE ANN. § 11-109(b) (Supp. 1986)). The six categories include past medical
expenses, future medical expenses, past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings,
noneconomic damages, and "other" damages. Id.
25. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(C)(1) (Supp. 1986)).
Economic damages include loss of earnings and medical expenses, but not punitive
damages.
26. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(a)(l)-(2) (Supp.
1986)).
27. Id. at 2352 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(c)(2) (Supp.
1986)).
28. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(c)(3) (Supp. 1986)).
29. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(d) (Supp. 1986)).
30. Id. at 2349 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-913(a) (Supp.
1986)).
31. Id. (codified at MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-913(b) (Supp. 1986)).
32. Id. at 2353.
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submit yearly reports on their claims and insurance rates."3 The In-
surance Commissioner may also require similar information from
other insurers. 34 The Commissioner will then report to the General
Assembly on the Act's effectiveness in combatting rising insurance
premiums.
2. Punitive Damages.-In Miller Building Supply, Inc. v. Rosen 36
the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff must show actual malice 37
to recover punitive damages for fraud arising from a contractual re-
lationship.3 8 In so doing, the court strongly reaffirmed the Tes-
terman3 '9 rule: that in tort actions arising out of a contract, actual
malice is a necessary predicate of punitive damages.4"
In Miller the employer sued its employees, disloyal salesmen
who had diverted profits to themselves. 4' Urging the court to adopt
a standard of "implied malice," 4 2 the employer argued that fraudu-
lent conduct should warrant the imposition of punitive damages, re-
gardless of whether the conduct occurs in connection with a
contract or rises to the level of actual malice.4 3
The Court of Appeals correctly refused to make an exception to
33. Id. at 2352.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 305 Md. 341, 503 A.2d 1344 (1986).
37. Actual malice involves an unlawful act without legal justification, motivated by
hate. See Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971).
The Miller Building Supply court stated that in certain torts, outrageous and extraordinary
conduct may be considered the legal equivalent of actual malice. 305 Md. at 347-48,
503 A.2d at 1347. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d
721, 731 (1972).
38. 305 Md. at 343, 503 A.2d at 1345.
39. H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975). For a detailed
analysis of the Testerman rule, see Strausberg, Punitive Damages in Tort Arising Out of Con-
tract in Maryland, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 275 (1984).
40. Testerman, 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53. The issue in Testerman was whether to
allow the recovery of punitive damages for "contorts"-torts arising out of a contractual
relationship. The law permits punitive damages for certain pure torts upon the finding
of implied malice; on the other end of the spectrum, the law completely denies punitive
damages for pure breaches of contract. The Court of Appeals in Testerman decided to
adopt an actual malice standard that would lie between the above two extremes. 275
Md. at 43-44, 338 A.2d at 53. This common sense approach allows recovery if the con-
duct warrants the imposition of punitive damages; however, to avoid unnecessary puni-
tive damage awards, it imposes a more stringent standard than that imposed in pure tort
cases. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
41. 305 Md. at 343-46, 503 A.2d at 1345-46.
42. 305 Md. at 348, 503 A.2d at 1347. Implied malice does not require finding that
conduct has been motivated by hatred or spite. Id.
43. Id. at 352-53, 503 A.2d at 1350. The plaintiff cited Wedeman v. City Chevrolet
Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), in support of its argument. The court correctly
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the Testerman rule and advanced persuasive practical considerations
for imposing the actual malice standard.4 4 An implied malice stan-
dard is unlikely to deter a greater amount of potential fraud than
does the actual malice standard. 45 Moreover, criminal sanctions al-
ready provide ample deterrence against fraud. 46 Finally, the court
explained, since fraud is a broad concept, the potential for abusive
punitive damage claims would be too great without a stringent stan-
dard.47 Hence, the court retained the actual malice standard for
fraud actions that arise out of a contract.
C. Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Intentional.-The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress remains difficult to establish in Maryland. But for the first
time since Maryland recognized the tort, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that a plaintiff had successfully pleaded a cause of
action.
In Young v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 41 the plaintiff sought
to hold her employer's workers' compensation insurer liable for in-
tentionally aggravating a disabling emotional injury.49 Ignoring
medical advice to refrain from further psychiatric evaluation of the
plaintiff, the insurers insisted on repeated evaluations.5" The plain-
tiff alleged that this caused her to attempt suicide.5'
First, the court addressed the issue of whether the insurer's ac-
tions were privileged. Citing comment g to section 46 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,5 2 the court acknowledged that the insurer
distinguished Wedeman by noting that that case involved a tort that did not arise out of a
contract. 305 Md. at 352-53, 503 A.2d at 1349-50.
44. 305 Md. at 353-54, 503 A.2d at 1350. The court cited several cases in which the
Maryland courts previously analyzed punitive damages claims under the Testerman rule.
See id. and authorities cited therein.
45. Id. at 354, 503 A.2d at 1350. The court also mentioned that prejudgment inter-
est is a deterrent against fraud. Id.
46. Id., 503 A.2d at 1351.
47. Id. at 354-55, 503 A.2d at 1350-51. "Fraud" has been widely recognized as a
vague and ambiguous concept. See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 105, at 727-28 (5th ed. 1984).
48. 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 (1985).
49. Id. at 188-89, 492 A.2d at 1273.
50. Id. at 187-88, 492 A.2d at 1272.
51. Id., 492 A.2d at 1273.
52. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment g (1965) states in part:
The conduct, although it would otherwise be extreme and outrageous, may
be privileged under the circumstances. The actor is never liable, for example,
where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible




could not be liable for insisting upon its right to evaluate a claim-
ant's health in a "permissible" way.53 The court found, however,
that the plaintiff's allegations depicted the insurer's motive in insist-
ing upon further evaluation as pure harassment. 54 In such a case,
the insurer would not be entitled to the section 46 privilege.55
Therefore, the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. 56
In two other cases allegations of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress were found insufficient.
In Dick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 17 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. 5s
In this case a debtor sought recovery from his creditor because the
creditor's agent had threatened to attach his home and wages, yelled
at him over the telephone, and accused him of lying.59 The court
held that this conduct was not sufficiently "extreme and outra-
geous" to sustain the cause of action.60 A plaintiff can prove ex-
treme and outrageous conduct only if" 'the average member of the
community must regard the defendant's conduct... as being a com-
plete denial of the plaintiff's dignity as a person.' "61
The court explained that although the bank official's conduct
may have been uncivil,62 he had a right to threaten to resort to
proper legal procedures to enforce debt obligations.63 The court
also emphasized that in previous cases plaintiffs had failed to re-
cover even though they had suffered greater abuse than the plaintiff
in this case.'
53. 303 Md. at 197-98, 492 A.2d at 1277-78.
54. Id. at 198-99, 492 A.2d at 1278. The court called this an "escalated level" of
intentional conduct. Id. at 199, 492 A.2d at 1278.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 63 Md. App. 270, 492 A.2d 674 (1985).
58. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional and reckless; (2) the de-
fendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4)
the plaintiff's resulting emotional distress was severe. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560,
566, 380 A.2d 611, 614, aff Jones v. Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977).
59. 63 Md. App. at 274-75, 492 A.2d at 676.
60. Id. at 277, 492 A.2d at 678.
61. Id. at 276, 492 A.2d at 677 (quoting Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359-60, 124
N.W.2d 312, 318 (1963)). See Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979); Har-
ris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment d (1965).
62. 63 Md. App. at 277, 492 A.2d at 678.
63. Id. at 276, 492 A.2d at 677.
64. The court cited Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878
(1969) (five or six phone calls that included objectionable language did not constitute
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In Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 65 the Court
of Appeals held that an insurer's failure to pay workers' compensa-
tion benefits in a timely manner did not yield a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.66 By alleging only the defendant's
failure to pay, the plaintiff failed to plead that the conduct com-
plained of was extreme or outrageous, or that the emotional distress
was severe. 67 Thus, the plaintiff had neglected to allege specific
facts that demonstrated intentional conduct and depicted a causal
relationship with the injuries.6"
2. Negligent.-In Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 69 the Court of
Special Appeals refused to recognize the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress.70 In Hamilton a buyer and co-buyer of a truck
brought suit against their financing company in connection with the
repossession of the truck. 7 ' The buyers alleged that the defendant's
rude conduct caused them emotional distress.7 2 Unable to satisfy
the rigid standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 73
the plaintiffs settled on a negligence theory.
Language in a prior case 74 and in the Maryland Pattern Jury
Instructions 75 suggested that Maryland allows recovery for negli-
invasion of privacy); Continental Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176
(1982) (yelling and screaming by supervisor to sensitive person did not amount to ex-
treme and outrageous behavior in the intentional infliction of emotional distress con-
text); and Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 477 A.2d 1197, cert. denied,
301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984) (supervisor's threats to fire employee, harassment,
and physical assault failed to establish extreme and outrageous conduct for intentional
infliction of emotional distress). The court also cited Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349,
124 N.W.2d 312 (1963), and Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d
765 (1976).
65. 303 Md. 201, 492 A.2d 1280 (1985).
66. Id. at 211, 492 A.2d at 1284-85.
67. Id. The court allowed the claimant to amend his complaint. Id. at 213, 492 A.2d
at 1285.
68. Id. at 212, 492 A.2d at 1285.
69. 66 Md. App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986).
70. Id. at 63-64, 502 A.2d at 1065-66.
71. Id. at 55-56, 502 A.2d at 1062.
72. Id. at 50-53, 502 A.2d at 1059-61.
73. Id. at 61-64, 502 A.2d at 1065-66.
74. Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 396 A.2d 296, rev'd, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d
728 (1979). In that case, which involved a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the Court of Special Appeals disapproved of the "impact" or "physical injury"
rule, which prevents the recovery of damages for emotional injuries unless the plaintiff
suffered physical injuries as well. Id. at 137-38, 396 A.2d at 301.
75. Maryland PatternJury Instruction 19:7 reads: "A person who negligently causes
severe mental distress to another may be held responsible." The comment to that sec-
tion claims support from the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Vance. Finally, the
comment to Maryland PatternJury Instruction 15:12 distinguishes intentional and negli-
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gent infliction of emotional distress. The court, however, consid-
ered that language inapposite: "Recovery may be had in a tort
action for emotional distress arising out of negligent conduct. In
such case, the emotional distress is an element of damage, not an
independent tort.' ' 76 Thus, although at least two jurisdictions have
recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, 77 the court was unwilling to extend liability that far; accord-
ingly, it refused to recognize the new tort.
3. Damages. -In Exxon Corp. USA v. Schoene 78 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held, in a case of first impression, that a spouse may
predicate an action for loss of consortium on mental or emotional
injury unaccompanied by physical harm. 79 The court found it un-
necessary to distinguish between physical harm and emotional harm
if the resultant damage in either situation is identical.8 0 Thus, Mary-
land joins the small number of jurisdictions that hold that physical
injury is not a prerequisite for damages for loss of consortium."i
D. Invasion of Privacy
In Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.82 the Court of Special Ap-
peals set forth the elements for two types of invasion of privacy.
These two types are: unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another, and unreasonable publicity given to another's private life.8"
gent infliction of emotional harm; the plaintiffs suggested that Maryland thus recognized
the latter as a distinct tort. 66 Md. App. at 62, 502 A.2d at 1065.
76. 66 Md. App. at 63, 502 A.2d at 1066.
77. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
78. 67 Md. App. 412, 508 A.2d 142 (1986).
79. Id. at 423, 508 A.2d at 148.
80. Id. at 423-24, 508 A.2d at 148. Cf Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231
A.2d 514 (1967) (physical injury can form basis for loss of consortium if injury causes
significant change to spouse's personality or ability to participate in married life).
81. See 67 Md. App. at 423, 508 A.2d at 148 and authorities cited therein.
82. 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 306 Md. 289, 508 A.2d 488, cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 571 (1986).
83. Id. at 161, 502 A.2d at 1115. Maryland has looked primarily to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and to Prosser's Law of Torts in defining the conduct that is actionable for
invasion of privacy. See 66 Md. App. at 161, 502 A.2d at 1115 and authorities cited
therein. The Restatement defines the tort of invasion of privacy as follows:
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another .. or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ... or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life .. .or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(A)(2) (1977).
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A labor union's business agent brought an action against a steel
corporation, alleging invasion of privacy.8 4 Specifically, the plaintiff
asserted that the steel corporation: sent his employer documents,
including a mug shot, that revealed his prior criminal conviction;
85
sent his wife documents concerning his marital infidelity;86 and
placed him under surveillance, using a "detection device."' 87 The
corporation admitted that it had conducted surveillance, but denied
that it had publicized any of the information thus collected.88
Citing with approval the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court
defined an actionable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. The
court described the tort as:
[T]he intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person .... [T]he gist of
the offense is the intrusion into a private place or the inva-
sion of a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown
about his person or affairs. There is no liability for observ-
ing him in public places, "since he is not then in
seclusion." 89
Depending on the manner in which it is conducted, surveillance
may constitute an actionable intrusion.90 In Pemberton the plaintiff
was unaware of the surveillance.9' This would normally render the
surveillance unactionable.92 Listening devices, however, inflict an
extensive intrusion.9 3 The court thus remanded because, in some
circumstances, the use of a listening device might constitute an ac-
tionable intrusion.94
The court adopted a two-part test to determine liability for the
tort of unreasonable publicity of another's private life: (1) whether
the matter disclosed became public by communication to more than
84. 66 Md. App. at 141, 502 A.2d at 1105. The plaintiff also brought an action for
intentional infliction of emotional harm; however, the court found the defendant's con-
duct insufficiently "outrageous" to satisfy the high standard of Harris v. Jones, 281 Md.
560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). 66 Md. App. at 160-61, 502 A.2d at 1115.
85. 66 Md. App. at 141, 502 A.2d at 1105.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 162, 502 A.2d at 1116.
89. Id. at 163, 502 A.2d at 1116-17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B comment c (1977)).
90. See id. at 164, 502 A.2d at 1117 and authorities cited therein.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court advanced no authority for this proposition.
93. See id. at 164-65, 502 A.2d at 1117 and authorities cited therein.
94. Id. at 165, 502 A.2d at 1117.
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a small group of persons; and (2) whether the matter disclosed is
open to public inspection and is, therefore, not a private fact.95 The
plaintiff, the court determined, could satisfy neither prong of this
test.
The application of the first prong, which the court borrowed
from the Restatement,96 clearly indicated that the disclosure of the
extramarital affairs was not a "publication." The defendant had dis-
closed this information only to the plaintiff's wife, not to a large
group of persons.9 7 Therefore, this disclosure could not form the
basis for an invasion of privacy claim.9"
The second prong derived from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.99 In that case the
Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit impo-
sition of sanctions against the publication of truthful information
contained in official court records open to the public.' 0 0 Following
Cox Broadcasting, the Court of Special Appeals observed that the pub-
lication of the plaintiff's criminal record was constitutionally pro-
tected and thus could not form the basis for tort liability.' 0 '
E. Malpractice
1. Attorney.-In Flaherty v. Weinberg' 012 the Court of Appeals
held that an attorney may be liable to someone other than a client
for professional malpractice if the direct purpose of the attorney-
client relationship was to benefit that third party. t'0 In so holding,
the court expanded the third party beneficiary exception to the strict
privity rule to include actions of tort in addition to contract. 0 4
In Flaherty the plaintiffs purchased a home relying on the advice
of their lender's attorney, who assured them of the property's spe-
cific boundaries.'0 5 The plaintiffs were not the attorney's clients;
rather, the lender was the attorney's client.'0 6 After building a pool
and making other improvements, the plaintiffs discovered that the
95. Id. at 166-68, 502 A.2d at 1118-19.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
97. 66 Md. App. at 141, 502 A.2d at 1105.
98. Id. at 166-67, 502 A.2d at 1118.
99. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
100. Id. at 494-95.
101. 66 Md. App. at 168, 502 A.2d at 1119. The court also held that, on the facts of
this case, the plaintiff's mug shot was an official public record. Id.
102. 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985).
103. Id. at 130, 492 A.2d at 625.
104. Id.




improvements encroached on their neighbor's property. 0 7 The
plaintiffs sued the attorney, alleging negligence, breach of warranty,
and negligent misrepresentation. When the trial court granted the
defendant's demurrer, the plaintiffs appealed.10 8
The Court of Appeals reversed, indicating that the plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation by claim-
ing that the attorney, Weinberg, had a duty of care to them as third
party beneficiaries of his contract with the lender.' 0 9 The court con-
cluded that if the plaintiffs could prove that the lender actually in-
tended to benefit them through the relationship," t0 the plaintiffs
would be entitled to a remedy.' The court reasoned that this was
a logical application of the third party beneficiary concept in con-
tract to the duty concept in tort, the tort in this case being attorney
malpractice." 12
In expanding the third party beneficiary rule to actions in tort,
107. Id. at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626.
108. Id. at 133-34, 492 A.2d at 626-27.
109. Id. at 139, 492 A.2d at 629-30. The elements of negligent misrepresentation
include the following:
(1) The defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a
false statement;
(2) The defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the
plaintiff;
(3) The defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the
statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(4) The plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and
(5) The plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Id. at 135, 492 A.2d at 627-28 (citing Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328,
337, 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982)).
The court found it proper to enter a demurrer in the negligence action because of
the absence of allegations of an express or implied employment relationship between
plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 134, 492 A.2d at 627 (citing Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md.
606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943), which held that an essential element of establishing attorney
negligence is an employment relationship between the attorney and the plaintiff). The
court found that the claim of breach of express or implied warranty was demurrable
because the plaintiffs had not alleged employment by contract or extension of duty by
statute. Id. at 135, 492 A.2d at 627.
110. The court pointed out that even though (1) the plaintiffs had elected to go to
settlement without separate counsel, (2) the plaintiffs ultimately paid the attorney's fee,
and (3) the bank and the plaintiffs had concentric interests, this did not prove the allega-
tion that the bank intended to confer a benefit on the plaintiffs. Id. at 137-38, 492 A.2d
at 628-29. In fact, the court noted that the plaintiffs would have difficulty establishing
that intent: they had received a letter stating that the defendant would represent the
bank as well as a statement of charges indicating that the defendant performed his serv-
ices for the bank, not its borrowers. Id. at 139 n.9, 492 A.2d at 630 n.9. If, however, the
plaintiffs could prove intent, the attorney would be liable.
111. Id. at 139, 492 A.2d at 629-30.
112. Id. at 130, 492 A.2d at 625.
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the court noted that this exception to the strict privity rule is still a
narrow one. 1 3 Two factors restrict the scope of the exception: the
difficulty in proving the client's actual intent; and the limits of an
attorney's responsibility in adversarial situations to persons other
than the client."i 4 The exceptions, however, increasingly reflect a
national trend toward greater liability." l5
2. Medical.-a. Statute of Limitations.-In Hill v. Fitzgerald "16
the Maryland Court of Appeals explained the intricacies of section
5-109 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article," 17 which
113. Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 625-26.
114. Id. (citing MD. CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY Canons 5 & 7 (1980)).
115. A majority of jurisdictions have held that absent fraud, collusion, or privity of
contract, an attorney is not liable to a third party for professional malpractice. Cf. Sav-
ings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (stating above rule). In the context of decreased
emphasis on privity, however, see Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y.
170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), many jurisdictions have now relaxed privity require-
ments through (1) the balancing of factors theory or (2) the third party beneficiary the-
ory. 303 Md. at 123, 492 A.2d at 621 (1985). In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364
P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), the Supreme Court of California balanced such
policy considerations as:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2)
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.
303 Md. at 124, 492 A.2d at 622.
Under another theory, a third party beneficiary contract arises if two parties enter
an agreement with the intent to confer a benefit on a third party. 303 Md. at 125, 492
A.2d at 622.
Like the rest of the nation, Maryland originally adhered to the strict privity rule. See
Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943) (holding that a land purchaser's
attorney was not liable to the vendor for erroneously informing the purchaser of an
obligation to correct a defective covenant of special warranty); Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178
Md. 453, 13 A.2d 774 (1940) (holding that, as a general rule, an attorney is not liable to
a third party for certifying a defective title as good and merchantable). In Prescott v.
Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972), however, the Court of Appeals held that
the third party beneficiary theory acts as a limited exception to strict privity in an attor-
ney-client relationship. See also Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 478 A.2d 713 (1984)
(applying Prescott's third party beneficiary theory); Clagget v. Dacy, 47 Md. App. 23, 420
A.2d 1285 (1980) (same). In Prescott the plaintiff, a deposit insurance company with
priority over the funds of a savings and loan association, sued the counsel for the associ-
ation's receiver. The plaintiff claimed that the attorney caused the association to pay
sums to lower priority creditors instead of to the plaintiff. 266 Md. at 565, 296 A.2d at
151. The Flaherty case, then, carries Maryland still further along the path chosen in
Prescott.
116. 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985).
117. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984). The statute provides that:
An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to
render professional services by a health care provider, as defined in § 3-2A-01
of this article shall be filed (1) within five years of the time the injury was com-
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shortens the effective period of limitations for medical malpractice
actions arising after July 1, 1975.11" Previously, under section 5-
101,' 11 the general statute of limitations, a person could file a mal-
practice suit up to three years after the "accrual of action." 120 An
action accrues after completion of treatment' 2 ' and discovery of
harm.' 22 In contrast, under section 5-109 a person can file suit up
to three years after the discovery of "injury," but no later than five
years after the "injury" took place.' 2 1 In Hill the Court of Appeals
concluded that "injury" occurs upon first harm-the point at which
the defendant's negligent act is coupled with some harm to the
plaintiff.1
24
In Hill Dr. Fitzgerald first treated the plaintiff on January 27,
1975,125 misdiagnosed him no later than February 1975,126 and
ended treatment on November 2, 1975.127 Having allegedly discov-
ered the misdiagnosis on December 5, 1980, the plaintiff filed suit in
federal district court on December 2, 1983.128
The defendant 12 moved for summary judgment on the groundthat section 5-109 barred the suit.'3 0 Invoking the common law
mitted or (2) within three years of the date when the injury was discovered,
whichever is shorter.
118. Id.
119. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984). The statute provides that:
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues
unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within
which an action shall be commenced.
120. See 304 Md. at 693, 501 A.2d at 29.
121. The court stated: "[I]f the facts show continuing medical ... treatment for...
which there is malpractice producing or aggravating harm, the cause of action of the
patient accrues at the end of the treatment.., unless the patient sooner knew or reason-
ably should have known of the injury .... Id. at 698, 501 A.2d at 32 (citing Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 142, 215 A.2d 825, 828 (1965)).
According to the Waldman court, this "continuous treatment rule" serves to avoid
the harsh result that would follow if the statute ran from the date of the physician's
negligence and the patient lacked the knowledge to recognize the negligence before the
period of limitations had run. 241 Md. at 139-40, 215 A.2d at 827.
122. Under Maryland's common-law discovery rule, a cause of action cannot accrue
until the claimant first knows or reasonably should have known of the alleged wrong.
304 Md. at 693, 501 A.2d at 29 (citing Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d
677 (1981)).
123. MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984).
124. 304 Md. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 32.
125. Id. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28.
126. Both parties agreed on this fact. Id. at 694, 501 A.2d at 29.
127. Id. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28.
128. Id. at 693, 501 A.2d at 29.
129. The defendant was Katherine R. Fitzgerald, personal representative of the de-
ceased Dr. Fitzgerald. Id. at 693, 501 A.2d at 28.
130. Id., 501 A.2d at 28-29.
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continuous treatment rule,' 3 ' the defendant contended that "in-
jury" occurred upon the completion of treatment in November of
1975, five months after section 5-109 took effect.' Filed seven
years after the injury occurred, the claim had thus exceeded section
5-109's five-year limit.1
3 3
According to the plaintiff, however, the "injury" occurred upon
the initial misdiagnosis, rather than upon completion of treat-
ment. 13 4 Because the misdiagnosis occurred several months before
section 5-109 took effect, section 5-101 applied instead.' 3 5 Under
section 5-101, the statute did not begin to run until the completion
of treatment and discovery of the harm in 1980; therefore, the plain-
tiff concluded that he had filed within the appropriate three-year
limit.13 6
In its uncertainty over the statutory meaning of "injury" and
the constitutionality of a special statute of limitations for malprac-
tice cases, the federal district court certified three questions to the
Court of Appeals: 1) when did section 5-109 apply; 2) when did
section 5-109 begin to run; and 3) did section 5-109 violate article
19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.'1 7
In resolving the first question, the court relied on Oxtoby v. Mc-
Gowan t38 in which the Court of Appeals had interpreted the effec-
tive date of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (HCMCA).'1 9
In Oxtoby the court held that if a patient were harmed through mal-
practice before the HCMCA's effective date, but died thereafter, the
patient's "medical injuries" occurred upon the first harm.' 40 The
131. For a discussion of the continuous treatment rule, see supra note 121 and infra
text accompanying notes 142-143.





137. Id. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28. Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the Law of the land.
138. 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982).
139. Id. at 85, 447 A.2d at 862. The HCMCA requires that certain medical malprac-
tice claims be heard by an arbitration panel prior to a court of law; effectiveJuly 1, 1976,
the Act applies to "medical injuries" that take place on or after that date. 304 Md. at
694, 501 A.2d at 29.
140. 304 Md. at 696, 501 A.2d at 30. Based on the broad meaning given "injury" in
State ex rel. McManus v. Board of Trustees of Policeman's Pension Fund, 138 Wis. 133,
135-36, 119 N.W. 806, 807 (1909), the Oxtoby court found that the occurrence of a
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Hill court thus held it to be a question of fact "[w]hether the original
allegedly negligent misdiagnosis of Hill's condition caused some
harm and therefore 'injury' prior to" section 5-109's effective
date.' 41 If, but only if, the plaintiff prevailed on this issue, section 5-
101 would govern instead and the suit could proceed.
Under the continuous treatment rule, however, if the patient's
treatment involves a continuous course of conduct, and if the pa-
tient's disease imposes on the physician a duty of continuing care,
then the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termi-
nation of treatment. 4 ' The defendant thus maintained that the
plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until the termination of
treatment in November 1975, five months after section 5-109 took
effect. 14 3 The court disagreed: although the rule may delay the date
on which a cause of action accrues, it has no bearing on when "in-
jury" occurred.' 44
In response to the second certified question, the court assumed
the applicability of section 5-109 and attempted to determine when
its three- and five-year limitation periods would begin to run. 14 5 It
was evident that the legislature designed section 5-109 to prevent
excessive delays under the discovery rule.1 46 Thus, the period of
limitations would run five years after first harm, regardless of
whether three years had passed since the discovery of injury or
whether the injury was even reasonably discoverable. 14 7 Further-
more, the court held that by requiring the statute to run upon the
occurrence or discovery of first harm, the legislature effectively ab-
rogated the continuous treatment rule.
48
"medical injury," within the meaning of the HCMCA, requires only that the physician's
negligence be coupled with some harm. 304 Md. at 696, 501 A.2d at 30. A "medical
injury" can occur even if the victim suffers the greater part of his or her injury at a later
date. Id.
141. 304 Md. at 697, 501 A.2d at 31.
142. Id. at 698, 501 A.2d at 31.
143. Id. at 697, 501 A.2d at 31.
144. Id. at 698-99, 501 A.2d at 31-32.
145. Id. at 699, 501 A.2d at 32.
146. Id. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32-33. The court concluded that the statute's creation of
an absolute five-year limit from time of injury was designed to restrict "the amount of
time that could lapse between the allegedly negligent treatment of a patient and the
filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment." Id., 501 A.2d at 32.
147. Id., 501 A.2d at 32-33
148. Id., 501 A.2d at 32. The court explained that: "Section 5-109 is couched in
terms of when the injury was committed and not when the entire course of treatment is
finally concluded. The provisions of § 5-109, and the intent underlying the enactment




Finally, the court reasoned that section 5-109 did not violate
article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by denying access
to the courts. 149 Because it did not significantly interfere with a fun-
damental right, the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny.' 50 In-
stead, the court found that section 5-109 struck a "fair balance": it
furthered the State's interest in barring stale claims while affording
reasonable protection to victims of medical malpractice.'15
b. Burden of Proof.-In Hetrick v. Weimer 1 5 2 the Court of Special
Appeals adhered to a relaxed burden of proof in medical malprac-
tice cases that involve victims who have died before trial.1 53 The
court found that plaintiffs do not have to prove with certainty that
but for the doctor's negligence the patient definitely would have
lived; rather, they must prove only that the doctor's negligence sub-
stantially reduced the patient's chances of survival.
154
On May 23, 1987, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and
strongly disapproved of any relaxed burden of proof.'5 5 The court
distinguished the cases that endorsed the relaxed burden, 56 point-
ing out that in those cases the evidence of the defendant's negli-
gence either amply supported a jury verdict for the plaintiff or was
uncontradicted. 15 7 By contrast, in Hetrick the defendant had
presented evidence that he was not negligent, and the jury had
clearly relied on that evidence in entering a verdict for the
defendant.'
58
149. Id. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34.
150. Id. at 702-03, 501 A.2d at 33-34. The court emphasized that a statute of limita-
tions merely affects the remedy without destroying or impairing a vested right; there-
fore, the statute does not violate the fourteenth amendment, upon which article 19
analysis is based. Id. at 702, 501 A.2d at 33 (quoting Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363-
64 66 A.2d 795, 797 (1949)).
151. 304 Md. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. The court remarked that this statute of limita-
tions was still longer than the statute of limitations in effect when article 19 was adopted.
Id. at 705, 501 A.2d at 35.
Judge Eldridge did not join this portion of the opinion of the court. Id. (Eldridge,
J., concurring).
152. 67 Md. App. 522, 508 A.2d 522 (1986), rev'd, 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643.
153. Id. at 541-43, 508 A.2d at 531-32.
154. Id. at 541, 508 A.2d at 531. Maryland adopted the "substantial possibility of
survival" test in Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972). The Thomas court
relied on Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
155. 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987).
156. See supra note 154.
157. 309 Md. at 551, 525 A.2d at 651.
158. Id. at 552, 525 A.2d at 651.
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F. Negligence
1. Duty.-In Rowley v. City of Baltimore'59 the Court of Appeals
held that one who employs an independent contractor is not liable
for injuries to the contractor's employees resulting from the con-
tractor's negligence in the scope of its contractual duties.' 60
The City of Baltimore engaged an independent contractor to
manage and operate the Baltimore Convention Center.' 6 ' Pursuant
to the agreement, the contractor assumed responsibility for mainte-
nance and routine repairs. 162 The contractor hired Rowley as a se-
curity guard. 63 While performing her duties, Rowley was robbed,
beaten, and raped by an unknown assailant, who had gained access
to the Center through a defective door." This defect had existed
for at least eleven months before the incident and had been re-
ported numerous times.' 65 Rowley brought a negligence action
against the City alleging that, as owner of the Convention Center,
the City had a nondelegable duty to provide a safe work place.' 66
The court agreed that the City has a nondelegable duty to licen-
sees to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. 167 The
court held, however, that the duty did not extend to the independ-
ent contractor or its employees when the defects arose from the
contractor's failure to accomplish the very repairs it had undertaken
to perform. 68
159. 305 Md. 456, 505 A.2d 494 (1986).
160. Id. at 475, 505 A.2d at 503.
161. Id. at 459-60, 505 A.2d at 495-96.




166. Id. at 461, 505 A.2d at 496. The plaintiff conceded that the City's legal relation-
ship with the contractor was that of employer and independent contractor, and therefore
liability could not be imposed on the City under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
167. The general rule is that one who employs an independent contractor is not liable
for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 409 (1965); W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 71 (5th ed. 1984).
This general rule today has numerous exceptions; one major exception is that the em-
ployer cannot delegate some duties if the employer has a particular relationship with the
public or an individual. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 comment b (1965).
Rowley suggested that the City's duties arose from three distinct sources: (1) its
status as owner and occupier of premises, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343
(1965); (2) its status as municipal government maintaining a building for public use, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 418 (1965); or (3) its status as employer of in-
dependent contractor, see Bauman v. Woodfield, 244 Md. 207, 223 A.2d 364 (1966).
305 Md. at 463, 505 A.2d at 497. The court did not specify the exact grounds upon
which it would impose this nondelegable duty. Id.
168. 305 Md. at 474, 505 A.2d at 503.
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The availability of workers' compensation strongly affected the
court's decision.' 69 The expense of workers' compensation insur-
ance is a factor in the determination of the contract price between
an independent contractor and its employer. Thus, the independ-
ent contractor's employee should not be placed in a better position
than an ordinary employee by being able to bring suit against a con-
tractor's employer as well as being able to collect workers' compen-
sation.' 70 Conversely, an employer should not be subjected to
greater liability because it engaged the services of an independent
contractor rather than hiring its own employees.' 7'
In Lamb v. Hopkins 172 the Court of Appeals held that even if a
probation officer fails to carry out the duty to notify a sentencing
court of a probationer's violations, the officer is not liable to third
parties whom the probationer has injured. 173 In so holding, the
court adopted section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1 7 4
under which the officer could not be liable to third parties unless the
injuries occurred while the probationer was in the officer's
custody. ' 75
The probationer in this case was a convicted armed robber
whose probation had been continued despite three subsequent alco-
hol-related driving offenses and his failure to participate in a
mandatory alcohol treatment program. 176 In continuing his proba-
tion, the circuit court emphasized that another violation would
probably lead to imprisonment. 177 The probationer was then con-
victed in the district court of three other driving offenses as well as
the discharge of a firearm.' 78 Contrary to court order and state law,
however, his probation officers did not inform the original sentenc-
ing court of these violations. 79 Subsequently, while driving under
the influence of alcohol, the probationer collided with a vehicle
driven by the plaintiff, Cynthia Lou Lamb, and rendered her infant
daughter Laura a quadriplegic.180
169. 305 Md. at 468-69, 505 A.2d at 500-01 (quoting King v. Shelby Rural Elec.
Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974)).
170. 305 Md. at 468-69, 505 A.2d at 500-01 (quoting King, 502 S.W.2d at 663).
171. Id.
172. 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).
173. Id. at 248-49, 492 A.2d at 1304.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
175. 303 Md. at 245, 492 A.2d at 1302.
176. Id. at 239, 492 A.2d at 1299.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299.
179. Id. at 239, 492 A.2d at 1299.
180. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299.
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The Lambs' 8 ' sued the probation officers,' 8 2 alleging that they
had proximately caused the collision by failing to report the proba-
tioner's violations or to seek his incarceration. 8 3 The defendants
successfully demurred on the grounds that they owed no duty to the
plaintiffs. 184
On certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether the defendants had a duty to control the
probationer. 18 5 The Lambs argued that because the probation of-
ficers had a special relationship with the driver, whom they knew to
be dangerous, the officers owed the public such a duty. In failing to
fulfill their duty to report the violations, the officers became liable
for the actions of the probationer, namely the injury of Laura
Lamb.' 86 The defendants contended, however, that they had no
special relationship with the probationer; therefore, they concluded,
they owed no duty to third parties whom he may have harmed. 87
Both parties relied on sections 315 and 319 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.'88
The Court of Appeals indicated that previously it had implicitly
adopted section 315,189 which states that, absent a special relation-
ship, one has no duty to control the actions of a another person and
thus has no liability to third parties for the other person's con-
duct.190 The court then expressly adopted section 319, which states
that:
one who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control the third person to prevent him from doing such
181. Alan C. Lamb and Cynthia Lou Lamb sued on behalf of their daughter. Id.
182. The plaintiffs also sued the director and employees of the State's Division of
Parole and Probation. Id. The plaintiffs settled their claim against the probationer two
months before trial. Id. at 240 n.3, 492 A.2d at 1299 n.3.
183. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299.
184. Id. at 240-41, 492 A.2d at 1299-1300.
185. Id. at 241, 492 A.2d at 1300.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 242, 492 A.2d at 1300-01; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 319
(1965).
189. 303 Md. at 245, 492 A.2d at 1302 (citing Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359
A.2d 548, 552 (1976)).
190. 303 Md. at 242, 492 A.2d at 1300. Special relationships include those between,
for example, parent and minor child, master and servant, and the possessor of land or
chattels and the possessor's licensee. Id. at 243, 492 A.2d at 1301 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-317 (1965)).
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harm.191
The court noted that "taking charge" usually applies to custo-
dial situations. 92 While acknowledging that a minority ofjurisdic-
tions permit third party liability in noncustodial situations,' 93 the
court adhered to the majority view that custody is a prerequisite of
third party liability.19
4
In characterizing the instant relationship as noncustodial, the
court observed that the probationer was free to carry on his daily
activities as long as he periodically reported to the officers.' 95 The
court drew an analogy to other noncustodial relationships in which
courts had refused to impose liability.' 96 In so doing, the court re-
jected psychotherapist-patient analogies as inapposite to the officer-
probationer relationship. 97 Absent custody, the officers had no
duty to control the probationer.
The Lambs also contended that the Maryland Code' 98 and the
probation order, which required the officers to report violations to
the sentencing court, established a duty of care that ran to the pub-
lic. 199 Rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals held that this
191. Id. at 243, 492 Md. at 291 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319
(1965)).
192. 303 Md. at 244, 492 A.2d at 1301 (citing W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS § 56, at 383 n.16 (5th ed. 1984)).
193. Id. at 249, 492 A.2d at 1304. The court rejected a comparison to Semler v. Psy-
chiatric Inst. of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Folliard v.
Semler, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). In Semler a probation officer was held liable for injuries
that resulted from his approval of a psychiatric patient's transfer to outpatient status: a
court had specifically ordered that the patient remain in the institution's custody. The
Maryland court remarked, however, that Lamb involved no custody order. 303 Md. at
250-51, 492 A.2d at 1305.
194. 303 Md. at 249, 492 A.2d at 1304 (citing Liuzzo v. United States, 565 F. Supp.
640 (E.D. Mich. 1983), and Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983)).
195. Id. at 248-49, 492 A.2d at 1304.
196. Id. at 246-49, 492 A.2d at 1302-04 (citing Bailey v. Town of Forks, 38 Wash.
App. 656, 688 P.2d 526 (1984), which held that an officer who ordered an intoxicated
person out of a tavern and watched him drive away had no duty to control that person;
Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 253, 602 P.2d 532 (1979), which held
that a city that conditionally released a psychiatric patient acquitted of sexual offenses
had no duty to control that patient; and Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982), which held that speedway owners who ordered relatives to drive an inebri-
ated party home had no duty to control that party). The Lamb court also rejected a
comparison to cases that impose a duty to control upon institutions that have released
dangerous parties from their care. See 303 Md. at 246, 492 A.2d at 1302-03 and authori-
ties cited therein.
197. Id. at 250, 492 A.2d at 1304 (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp.
185 (D. Neb. 1980)).
198. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124 (1986).
199. 303 Md. at 251, 492 A.2d at 1305.
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duty ran only to the sentencing court.20 0  Despite its harshness
under the specific facts of the case, this decision is consistent with
Maryland case law, which evidences judicial reluctance to establish
third party liability.20'
2. Contributory Negligence. -In Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co. 202
the Court of Appeals held that one who knows of the presence of an
electrical line and is then injured upon approaching or touching it is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.20 3 In so holding, the
court noted that subjective criteria concerning whether the plaintiff
appreciated the degree of danger involved was relevant only in es-
tablishing assumption of risk.20 4
In Liscombe the plaintiff elevated the bed of his dump truck as
though he were aware of the presence of power lines directly over-
head.20 5 He subsequently suffered electric shock when his truck
came into contact with the lines .2 6 The plaintiff sued both the com-
pany that maintained the lines and the company on whose facilities
the lines were located. 20 7 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants based on the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. 20 8  The plaintiff appealed, contending that the issue of
contributory negligence should have gone to the jury.2 0 9
The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants' verdict: factual
disputes concerning the magnetism of the power lines, the effect of
200. Id. at 252-53, 492 A.2d at 1305-06.
201. Id. at 245 n.7, 492 A.2d at 1302 n.7 (citing Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438
A.2d 494 (1981), and State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951), in
both of which the court refused to establish third party liability for alcohol vendors ab-
sent a statute to the contrary).
202. 303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985).
203. Id. at 633, 495 A.2d 845.
204. Id. The elements of assumption of the risk are (1) knowledge of the risk of dan-
ger, (2) appreciation of that risk, and (3) voluntary exposure. Id. at 630, 495 A.2d 843
(quoting Stancill v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 744 F.2d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
205. 303 Md. at 623, 495 A.2d at 840. In fact, injury flags were attached to the power
lines to improve visibility from the ground. Id. at 622, 495 A.2d at 839.
206. Id. at 623, 495 A.2d at 840.
207. Id. at 620-21, 495 A.2d at 838-39.
208. Id. at 621, 495 A.2d at 839.
209. Id. The plaintiff argued in the alternative that contributory negligence was not a
defense to the defendants' gross negligence. The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the plaintiff had not put forth sufficient evidence of gross negligence.
Id. at 637, 495 A.2d at 847. The plaintiff also argued that the defendants were liable
under the doctrine of last clear chance. The court responded that the doctrine did not
apply when, as in this case, the plaintiff's negligence is concurrent with any negligence
on the part of the defendants. Id. at 637-38, 495 A.2d at 847 (citing Sanner v. Guard,
236 Md. 271, 276, 203 A.2d 885, 888 (1964)).
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the sun's glare on the plaintiff's vision, and the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of similar accidents were all immaterial in determining the
plaintiff's negligence. 2 '0 The relevant facts-that the plaintiff knew
of the power lines but continued to approach them-were not in
dispute. 21 These facts have consistently been sufficient to establish
contributory negligence as a matter of Maryland law; therefore, the
court affirmed the lower court's decision. 2
G. Negligent Hiring
Two Maryland cases provide new insight into the requirements
of negligent hiring claims. The first addresses whether an employer
has a duty to conduct research into a potential employee's back-
ground. The second concerns the negligent assignment of duties to
a known convict.
In Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery
County213 the Court of Appeals held that, in a suit for negligent hir-
ing, evidence concerning the employer's access to the employee's
criminal record is relevant to the determination of the employer's
liability. 214 Therefore, it was prejudicial error for the trial court not
to admit this evidence. 1 5
The plaintiff was raped in the townhouse she rented from the
Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County
(HOC). 216 Her assailant was a housing inspector employed by the
HOC.2 17 The inspector's job required him to come into close con-
210. 303 Md. at 626-27, 495 A.2d at 841-42. As long as the plaintiff had sole control
of the truck's movement, the magnetism of the power lines was immaterial to his negli-
gence. Id. at 626, 495 A.2d at 841. The effect of the sun's glare on his vision was merely
a consideration in evaluating whether he discharged his duty to act with reasonable care;
the glare could not absolve him of negligence. Id. at 627, 494 A.2d at 841-42. As long
as the plaintiff was aware of the power lines, his lack of knowledge of past electric shock
incidents was immaterial to his negligence. Id. at 626, 495 A.2d at 841.
211. Id. at 622-24, 495 A.2d at 839-40.
212. Id. at 627-29, 495 A.2d at 842-43 (citing Frazee v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 255
Md. 627, 633, 258 A.2d 425, 428 (1969); Driver v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 247 Md.
75, 79, 230 A.2d 321, 324 (1967); Southern Md. Elec. Co. v. Blanchard, 239 Md. 481,
212 A.2d 301 (1965); LeVonas v. Acme Paper Board Co., 184 Md. 16, 19, 40 A.2d 43,
44-45 (1944); Potomac Edison Co. v. State, 168 Md. 156, 161, 177 A. 163, 166 (1935);
and State v. Potomac Edison Co., 166 Md. 138, 147, 170 A. 568, 571 (1934)). The court
noted that, in interpreting the conduct of parties involved in electrical accidents, Mary-
land courts favor the causative concept of contributory negligence over the volitional
concept of assumption of risk. 303 Md. at 632, 495 A.2d at 844.
213. 304 Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35 (1985).
214. Id. at 717, 501 A.2d at 41.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 707, 501 A.2d at 36.
217. Id.
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tact with tenants; under some circumstances, for example, they
would provide him with the keys to their homes.2" 8 At trial, the
plaintiff alleged that the HOC was negligent in hiring the inspector
because it failed to undertake a reasonable inquiry as to whether he
was trustworthy or fit for the job." 9
Under Maryland law an employer has a nondelegable duty to
make a reasonable inquiry into an employee's fitness before hiring
the employee for a position that puts him or her into close contact
with the public; however, the employer need not make this inquiry if
it has some other basis for believing that the employee is trustwor-
thy and suitable.220
After establishing that the employer failed to make an adequate
inquiry into the employee's background, the plaintiff must prove
that this failure resulted in the employee's hiring.22' If a reasonable
search would have yielded no information that would lead a reason-
able employer to refuse employment, then the failure to conduct a
search is not a proximate cause of the harm.2 2 2
The availability of the information concerning the employee's
criminal record was extremely pertinent in determining whether the
employer's inquiry was "reasonable.- 223 As a result, the court held
that the trial court should have allowed the trier of fact to consider
evidence concerning the availability of this information.2 24 The
court also held that the same evidence was relevant to the issue of
causation.2 25 A jury could reasonably have found that but for his
218. Id. at 711, 501 A.2d at 38. Depending on the circumstances, what constitutes a
reasonable inquiry will vary. If the hiring of an unfit employee poses a serious danger to
society, "as in the hiring of a police officer," the employer may well have a duty to
conduct a criminal investigation. Id. at 716, 501 A.2d at 40.
219. Id. at 711, 501 A.2d at 38. The employee had a lengthy criminal record: he had
been convicted of assault and battery, burglary, and robbery, and had served time in
prison from 1969 until 1973. Id. at 707, 501 A.2d at 36.
220. See id. at 712, 501 A.2d at 38 and authorities cited therein. The employer may
not rely on information provided by someone else, however reasonable the reliance was
under the circumstances. Id., 501 A.2d at 39.
221. Id. (citing Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976)). For example,
suppose an employer negligently hires an employee. If this employee assaults the plain-
tiff while the employee is not on duty, there is no causal relationship between the negli-
gent hiring and the assault upon the plaintiff; hence, the employer is not liable to the
plaintiff. Id. at 713, 501 A.2d at 39.
222. Id. At trial, the plaintiff offered to prove that the employee's criminal record was
easily available. The HOC could have obtained the record either by calling the Mont-
gomery County Police Department or requesting a record from the employee himself.
The trial judge refused to allow the jury to consider this. Id. at 714, 501 A.2d at 39-40.
223. Id. at 717, 501 A.2d at 41.
224. Id. at 720-21, 501 A.2d at 43.
225. Id. at 717, 501 A.2d at 41.
TORTS
employment, the assailant could not have gained access to informa-
tion about the layout of the victim's apartment. 226 Therefore, it was
again prejudicial error for the trial judge not to admit this
evidence.227
In Cramer the court recognized that an employee has not only a
right of privacy, but also an interest in securing employment. 228 So-
ciety, however, has an equally legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from the consequences of negligent hiring.229 The attempts
of Congress and the Maryland General Assembly to balance these
interests are reflected in the laws that regulate when and how an
employer can obtain access to a potential employee's criminal rec-
ord.230 Because the legislature has decided to make information
concerning a person's criminal record available to the public, the
factfinder may decide whether the employer acted negligently by
not failing to consider the information.23 1
In Henley v. Prince George's County23 2 the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on the issue
of whether an employer negligently assigned security duties to its
employee, a former convict.233 Before remanding, however, the
court made several observations on the tort of negligent hiring and
retention.
An employer must use reasonable care to ensure that its em-
ployees will not pose a danger to any persons that foreseeably will
come into contact with the employee.23 '4 Even if the employer can-
not identify that class of persons in advance, the employer may still
be liable if, in retrospect, it appears that the plaintiff falls within the
class. 23 5 Finally, the trier of fact must ascertain whether the em-
ployer's negligence proximately resulted in the plaintiff's injuries:
the trier of fact can find proximate cause if the plaintiff produces
proof of an "appropriate nexus" between the employee's duties to
the employer and the victim's injuries.23 6
226. Id. at 720-21, 501 A.2d at 43.
227. Id. at 721, 501 A.2d at 43.
228. Id. at 716, 501 A.2d at 41.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 716-17, 501 A.2d at 41.
232. 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986).
233. Id. at 332-33, 503 A.2d at 1339.
234. Id. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341.
235. Id.




To prevail on any claim for misrepresentation, a plaintiff must
show that he or she justifiably relied on a representation of material
fact.2 37 In Ward Development Co. v. Ingrao2 .8 the Court of Special Ap-
peals adopted the definition of a "material fact" found in section
538 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.239 A fact is material if:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its exist-
ence or non-existence in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the rep-
resentation knows or has reason to know that its recipient
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in de-
termining his choice of action, although a reasonable man
would not so regard it.2 40
In so holding, the court rejected the narrower definition
adopted by the Court of Appeals in Babb v. Bolyard:2 4 1 " '[T]he
fraud must be material, by which is meant, without it, that the trans-
action would not have been made.' "242 The Babb definition empha-
sizes the recipient's subjective belief. In contrast, the Restatement
permits the court to premise a finding of materiality on either the
recipient's objective belief or the maker's subjective or objective be-
lief. Thus, under the Restatement's definition, materiality is possible
in a greater variety of circumstances. This effectively eases a plain-
tiff's burden of proof.2 43
237. Ward Dev. Co. v. Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 655, 493 A.2d 421, 426 (1985).
238. Id. at 645, 493 A.2d at 421.
239. Id. at 655, 493 A.2d at 426; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). The
court also held that damages for negligent misrepresentation should be calculated in the
same manner as damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. 63 Md. App. at 659, 493
A.2d at 426.
240. 63 Md. App. at 655, 493 A.2d at 426 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538 (1977)).
241. Id. (citing Babb v. Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 72 A.2d 13 (1950)).
242. Babb, 194 Md. at 609, 72 A.2d at 16 (quoting Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543,
552, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905)).
243. The authority for this new definition is questionable. If viewed as contradicting
the Court of Appeals' definition, the new definition is barren of authority; however, if
the new definition merely supplements or expands that of the Court of Appeals, then the
definition has some weight, though it is still subject to approval by the court above.
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I. Privilege and Immunity
1. Immunity.-In Frye v. Frye244 the Maryland Court of Appeals
refused to abrogate parent-child immunity245 despite its recent ab-
rogation of interspousal immunity in Boblitz v. Boblitz.246 Relying on
the doctrine of stare decisis,247 the court distinguished Boblitz and
reasoned that the parent-child relationship had not changed signifi-
cantly enough to justify abrogation.248
On behalf of their minor son, the plaintiff sued her husband for
his negligent operation of an automobile, which had led to the in-
jury of their minor son.2 49 Upon entry ofjudgment for the defend-
ant, the plaintiff appealed, contending that the court should
abrogate parent-child immunity for the same reasons it had abol-
ished interspousal immunity in Boblitz.25°
The Court of Appeals considered the continuing viability of
parent-child immunity. 25' The court determined that Boblitz did not
control. In that case, the court asserted, it abrogated interspousal
immunity because of the change in the status of women, 252 as evi-
denced by Maryland's adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment.
253
In contrast, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the traditional ba-
244. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of this case,
see Note, Frye v. Frye. Maryland Sacrifices the Childfor the Sake of the Family, 46 MD. L. REV.
194 (1986) (authored by Kathryn Webb Lovill).
245. Though at English common law parents were not immune from suits instituted
by their children, parents did have superior personal rights over their children in order
to maintain discipline and perform parental duties. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64,
77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951). At first, courts in the United States expanded this principle by
creating absolute parent-child immunity. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891). Courts, however, later modified the doctrine to allow recovery for intentional
torts. 197 Md. at 68-70, 77 A.2d at 926-27.
246. 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
247. The Court of Appeals has described the doctrine of stare decisis as "the policy
which entails the reaffirmation of a decisional doctrine of an appellate court, even
though if considered for the first time, the court might reach a different conclusion."
Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 458, 456 A.2d 894, 902
(1983). While recognizing the importance of stare decisis, the Court of Appeals has
noted that the doctrine has never prevented judicial alteration of the common law if it
appears, "in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has be-
come unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suita-
ble to our people." Id. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903.
248. 305 Md. at 565, 505 A.2d at 838.
249. Id. at 544, 505 A.2d at 827.
250. Id. at 552-53, 505 A.2d at 831-32.
251. Parent-child immunity was first established in Maryland in Schneider v. Schnei-
der, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
252. 305 Md. at 553, 505 A.2d at 832.
253. MD. CoNsT. DECL. OF RTs. art. 46. The Boblitz court held that "after legislative
passage and approval by the people of Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights any an-
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ses of the parent-child relationship. 5 4 While acknowledging the
modern trend opposing parent-child immunity,2 55 the court noted
that few jurisdictions have relied on the abrogation of interspousal
immunity to eliminate the rule.256
The growing majority of states that have judicially abrogated
the doctrine have done so because of the its inability to achieve its
original purpose of promoting family harmony.2 7 The doctrine's
rationale is that suits between parents and their unemancipated chil-
dren violate the public interest by eroding parental discipline and
the tranquility of the home. 25" But this rationale does not extend to
all actions between parent and child. For example, as many states
have found, the operation of an automobile falls outside the bound-
aries of parental authority; furthermore, insurance buffers any po-
tential disharmony that might result from litigation. 25 9 Hence, in
those states the immunity would not apply in cases such as Frye,
cases that involve automobile torts. In fact, some courts note that
the child's inability to recover may lead to financial strain on the
family and thus to disharmony. 260 Accordingly, most courts, the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts,26 1 and leading legal scholars 26 2 advocate
either partial or total abrogation of the doctrine.
Yet the Fye court rejected this reasoning and concluded that
parent-child immunity still achieves its original purpose of promot-
ing family harmony.263 The court found the existence of insurance
irrelevant to the determination of liability.2 4 In reviewing recent
legislation mandating automobile insurance coverage for all family
cient deprivation of rights based upon sex would contravene the basic law of this state."
296 Md. at 274-75, 462 A.2d at 522.
254. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984) (describing the establishment of guard-
ianship and the responsibility of a parent for a minor child's "support, care, nurture,
welfare, and education"); see also id. at § 5-204 (child's domicile is that of custodial
parent).
255. 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836-37 (indicating that 40 states and the District of
Columbia have abrogated parent-child immunity at least in part).
256. Id. at 562, 505 A.2d at 836 (citing New Mexico and South Carolina as states that
have abrogated parent-child immunity because they had previously abrogated inter-
spousal immunity).
257. Id.
258. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.11 (2d ed. 1986).
259. See 305 Md. at 562, 505 A.2d at 837.
260. See, e.g., Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971).
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(l) (1977).
262. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAy, supra note 254, § 8.11, at 220 (2d ed. 1986); W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 122 (5th ed. 1984).
263. 305 Md. at 548, 505 A. at 829 (quoting Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 21-
22, 152 A. 498, 499 (1930)).
264. 305 Md. at 564-65, 505 A.2d at 837-38. The court recognized, however, that
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members, 265 the court discerned no explicit legislative intent to al-
low recovery between parent and child.
Without legislative direction to abrogate the doctrine or evi-
dence of change in parent-child relationships, the court held that it
must adhere to its precedents upholding the immunity. 66 Thus, the
General Assembly must balance the injured child's right to recovery
against the impact recovery would have on the legislated insurance
scheme in terms of both increased costs and family collusion.267
The court's reasoning is flawed. While a court should not cre-
ate liability based on the presence of insurance, a court may elimi-
nate an exception to liability if insurance removes the justification
for liability. Therefore, in automobile torts insurance removes the
justification for parent-child immunity. In addition, it is true that
the court might in effect rewrite part of the Insurance Code by creat-
ing an exception to parent-child immunity. Still, this prospect
clearly has not deterred the court from, for example, abrogating in-
terspousal immunity. 268 The solution, however, now lies with the
when it previously concluded in Schneider that insurance was irrelevant to parent-child
immunity, the mandatory automobile insurance statute did not yet exist.
265. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(a) (1986). This provision requires motor vehicle
liability insurance benefits to "cover the named insured and members of his family resid-
ing in his household ... injured in any motor vehicle accident .... "
266. 305 Md. at 565-67, 505 A.2d at 838-39. Stare decisis requires the court not to
overturn prior cases, but rather to defer doctrinal change to the legislature unless a
change in circumstances is so significant as to render the prior cases unsound. If policy
and the modern trend recommend a change in the common law, the court typically looks
to expression of legislative intent to determine whether a significant change of circum-
stances has taken place. Recognizing the great effect doctrinal change has on public
policy, the court has stated that the legislature is best equipped to express the will of the
State for initiating such change. See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429
(1984) (allowing recovery for wrongful birth based on the absence of a legislative barrier
and in accord with traditional negligence principles of damage); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296
Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogating interspousal immunity on the basis that it was
contrary to the theory of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment, the enactment of which
reflected a dramatic change in the husband-wife relationship); Harrison v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983) (refusing to abrogate contribu-
tory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, reasoning from the absence of
changed circumstances and from the legislature's rejection of 21 bills proposing abroga-
tion); Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981) (refusing to establish a "dram
shop" rule on the basis that the legislature had made unreasonable sale of alcohol a
misdemeanor and had not established civil liability); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414
A.2d 829 (1980) (abrogating the tort of criminal conversation on the basis that it vio-
lated Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment); Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51,
405 A.2d 255 (1979) (refusing to abrogate or to clarify the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in tort, reasoning that the legislature had determined that the State should be liable
only in contract actions).
267. 305 Md. at 565-67, 505 A.2d at 838-39.




In Wilson v. Jackson 269 the Court of Special Appeals held that in
a suit against a public official for a violation of a person's federal
civil rights, the official cannot assert a state common-law defense of
qualified immunity.27
A federal civil rights claim was instituted by the personal repre-
sentative of a citizen whom a Montgomery County police officer
shot and killed.27' Because the officer acted in the performance of
his duty, he was entitled to qualified immunity. 272 In accordance
with the common law, the trial judge instructed the jury that the
officer was immune unless he acted with actual malice-"knowingly,
or deliberately, for an improper motive, and without legal
justification. ,273
Looking to two United States Supreme Court decisions, Marti-
nez v. California2 7 4 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald,275 the court held that
since this was a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983,276 the state standard should not apply.277 Instead, the trial
court should have applied the less stringent federal standard.278
Relying on its prior decision in Leese v. Baltimore County,2 7 9 the court
held that under the federal standard one can show malice by prov-
ing that the official acted with either actual malice or with a reckless
disregard for the injured person's rights.2 0 The jury instruction
was confined to the state common-law standard under which proof
of actual malice is necessary; it did not include the less stringent
federal standard, in which a showing of recklessness is sufficient.
269. 66 Md. App. 744, 505 A.2d 913 (1986).
270. Id. at 749-50, 505 A.2d at 915-16 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980)).
271. Id. at 746-47, 505 A.2d at 914.
272. Even though the police officer could not assert an immunity defense grounded in
state common law, he was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law for official
acts performed in good faith. Id. at 750, 505 A.2d at 916 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967)).
273. Id. at 752, 505 A.2d at 917.
274. 444 U.S. 277, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
275. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
277. 66 Md. App. at 750, 505 A.2d at 916.
278. The standard of malice required to prove a § 1983 claim, unlike the actual malice
standard under state law, " 'can be satisfied by either actual malice or its legal
equivalent.' " Id. at 751, 505 A.2d at 916 (quoting Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md.
App. 442, 484, 497 A.2d 159, 181 (1985) (emphasis in Wilson)).
279. 64 Md. App. 442, 497 A.2d 159 (1985).
280. 66 Md. App. at 751, 505 A.2d at 916 (quoting Leese, 64 Md. App. at 484, 497
A.2d at 181). The Leese court derived this proposition from Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555 (1978).
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Thus, the court found the instruction erroneous 28' and reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial.
The court correctly implied that federal law is supreme to state
law. Therefore, state officials must obey federal law. Immunizing
state officials who deprive citizens of their federal civil rights would
void the protections of the federal civil rights laws.282
2. Privilege.-In Exxon Corp. USA v. Schoene283 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that in an employee's defamation claim, an em-
ployer could claim a conditional, but not an absolute, privilege.28 4
Schoene, the plaintiff, had formerly operated an Exxon service
station.28 5 In the course of investigating cash shortages at the sta-
tion, Lent, an Exxon representative, falsely accused Schoene of
theft. 6 Exxon contended that by responding to Lent's request that
they discuss a "problem," Schoene had invited the defamatory state-
ment.2 8 7 Because Schoene thus consented to the statement's publi-
cation, Exxon concluded that it could claim an absolute privilege
from liability. 8 The court, however, disagreed: in acceding to the
request to discuss the problem, Schoene "could not reasonably be
charged with knowledge that Lent's response would be
defamatory. 289
Still, the court found sufficient evidence for the trial court to
determine whether Exxon could claim a conditional privilege.290 It
is well established in Maryland that a conditional privilege attaches
to statements made within the context of the employer-employee
relationship that are in furtherance of the protection of the em-
ployer's property. 91 The question of whether a defamatory state-
281. 66 Md. App. at 752, 505 A.2d at 916-17.
282. Id.
283. 67 Md. App. 412, 508 A.2d 142 (1986).
284. Id. at 421-22, 508 A.2d at 147.
285. Id. at 416, 508 A.2d at 144.
286. Id. at 417-18, 508 A.2d at 145.
287. Id. at 419, 508 A.2d at 146.
288. Id. at 419-20, 508 A.2d at 146. No Maryland court has yet recognized this abso-
lute privilege; however, other jurisdictions and the Restatement do so. See id. at 420, 508
A.2d at 146 and authorities cited therein. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583
(1977) provides: "The consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter con-
cerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation." Comment d to § 583
limits the applicability of the privilege as follows: "The extent of the privilege is deter-
mined by the terms of the consent. These again are to be determined by the language
or acts by which it is manifested in the light of the surrounding circumstances."
289. 67 Md. App. at 420, 508 A.2d at 147.
290. Id. at 421, 508 A.2d at 147.
291. See id. and authorities cited therein.
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ment is conditionally privileged is a question of law for the court.
2 92
The Court of Special Appeals was thus able to determine that Lent's
statements were conditionally privileged.293
On the other hand, the conditional privilege is subject to forfei-
ture if abused.294 The question of whether Lent abused the privi-
lege is one of fact.295 In Exxon, the court observed, the trier of fact
could have found abuse.296 The court held, then, that the trial court
erred "in refusing to instruct the jury as to the conditional privilege
applicable to Lent's statements and as to the manner in which that
privilege could be abused.1 29 7
In Miner v. Novotny 298 the Court of Appeals held that the abso-
lute privilege for judicial testimony applied to a citizen's police bru-
tality complaint. 299 Therefore, a citizen's complaint could not form
the basis for a deputy sheriff's defamation suit.30 0
After his arrest for driving while intoxicated, Novotny filed a
brutality complaint against the arresting deputy sheriff.3"' An inves-
tigation conducted by the sheriff's office found the deputy not guilty
of misconduct.30 2 The deputy then brought a defamation suit
against Novotny. 03 Novotny contended that under the Court of
Special Appeals' decision in Sherrard v. Hull,3 04 the petition clause of
the first amendment305 clothed his complaint with an absolute privi-
292. Id. at 422, 508 A.2d at 147.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 421, 508 A.2d at 147.
295. Id. at 422, 508 A.2d at 147.
296. Id. Lent retracted his accusations shortly after making them. The court felt that
this indicated the presence of malice. Id. at 421-22, 508 A.2d at 147.
297. Id. at 422, 508 A.2d at 147.
298. 304 Md. 164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985).
299. Id. at 176-78, 498 A.2d at 275-76.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 166, 498 A.2d at 270.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, aft'd, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983) (per
curiam). In Sherrard the Court of Special Appeals held that the first amendment provides
an absolute privilege for remarks made in the course of petitioning a legislative body for
a redress of grievances. Id. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. Although some courts in other
jurisdictions disagree, see id. at 563-74, 456 A.2d at 65-71 and authorities cited therein,
the Court of Appeals simply adopted in toto the Court of Special Appeals' opinion. See
Sherrard v. Hull, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983) (per curiam). Later, in Bass v.
Rohr, 57 Md. App. 609, 619-21, 471 A.2d 752, 757-58, cert. dismissed, 301 Md. 641, 484
A.2d 275 (1984), the Court of Special Appeals extended the privilege to statements
made before an administrative agency. Id. at 619-21, 471 A.2d at 752.
305. The petition clause provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging.., the
right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
lege. °6 The lower courts agreed. 0 7
In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
McDonald v. Smith, 30 8 however, the Court of Appeals found it unnec-
essary to rely on the petition clause. In McDonald the Supreme
Court held that the framers of the first amendment never intended
to provide absolute immunity from liability for defamation.3 0 9
Rather, the qualified privilege established in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 3 '0 and its progeny marks the extent of first amendment pro-
tection from liability for defamation. 1
Following McDonald, the Court of Appeals held that Novotny
could not claim an absolute privilege under the first amendment.3 1 2
Instead, the court held that he was protected by the absolute com-
mon-law privilege established in Maryland in Gersh v. Ambrose.3 i3 In
Gersh the Court of Appeals extended the absolute privilege afforded
judicial testimony to defamatory statements made in the course of
administrative proceedings.3 1 4 The Gersh court also stated that the
decision to extend this privilege should be made on a case-by-case
basis and should turn on two factors: (1) the nature of the public
function that the proceeding serves; and (2) the adequacy of proce-
dural safeguards to minimize the occurrence of defamatory
statements. 1 5
The Miner court found adequate procedural safeguards.3 16 Fur-
thermore, it concluded that the public interest in the filing and in-
vestigation of valid brutality complaints outweighs the possible
harm that a false complaint may bring to an officer's reputation.3 1 7
306. 304 Md. at 166-67, 498 A.2d at 270.
307. Id. at 167, 498 A.2d at 270.
308. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
309. Id. at 484.
310. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
311. 304 Md. at 170, 498 A.2d at 272.
312. Id. The court wrote: "To the extent that they are inconsistent with McDonald
and this opinion, Sherrard and Bass are no longer authoritative rulings." Id.
313. 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981).
314. Id. at 193, 434 A.2d at 550.
315. Id. at 197, 434 A.2d at 552.
316. 304 Md. at 173-75, 498 A.2d at 273-74. The filing of a brutality complaint trig-
gers an administrative disciplinary proceeding governed by MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27,
§§ 727-734 (1982), the Law-Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights (LEOBR). Under LE-
OBR, unless the aggrieved person or the person's guardian has duly sworn to the brutal-
ity complaint, no investigation can proceed. Id. at § 728(b)(4). A person who knowingly
makes a false complaint is subject to criminal liability. Id. at § 734C. If the investigation
of an officer leads to a recommendation of disciplinary sanctions, the officer has a right
to notice and a hearing at which to contest the sanctions. Id. at § 730(a). At the hearing,
the officer has the right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at § 730(b).
317. 304 Md. at 176, 498 A.2d at 275.
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Moreover, the court noted that most other courts that have consid-
ered this issue have reached this conclusion.3" 8 The Court of Ap-
peals thus affirmed the lower courts' decisions, although on a
different ground.3" 9
A person seeking a writ of attachment on a satisfied debt has an
absolute privilege against defamation;320 however, in Keys v. Chrysler
Credit Corp. the Court of Appeals held that the privilege does not
protect such a person from liability for the tort of conversion.
32
J. Products Liability
In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc. 1 22 the Court of Appeals held that
a manufacturer or marketer of a "Saturday Night Special" handgun
may be found strictly liable to persons who suffer gunshot injuries
caused from the criminal use of such weapons.323
Kelley was shot during a robbery. 324 He brought a tort action
in federal court against the manufacturer and marketer of the hand-
gun used in the crime.325 At a hearing on the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the district court found no controlling state law precedent
on the strict liability issue.326 Thus, it certified the following issues
to the Court of Appeals: (1) whether the marketing or manufactur-
ing of handguns generally merits imposition of strict liability; (2)
whether strict liability can be imposed upon the manufacturer or
marketer of a Saturday Night Special; and (3) whether the handgun
that injured the plaintiff was a Saturday Night Special.327
Addressing the first question, the court discussed two theories
of strict liability advanced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 28
First, the court held that even if the marketing of a handgun satisfied
318. See id. and authorities cited therein.
319. Id. at 177-78, 498 A.2d at 275-76.
320. Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 405, 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985).
321. Id. at 404, 494 A.2d at 203.
322. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). For a detailed analysis of this case, see
Note, Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.-When Hard Cases Make Good Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 486
(1987) (authored by Susan M. Stevens).
323. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
324. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
325. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. The victim, Kelley, set forth several theories for
recovery. The first two counts were based on strict liability; the plaintiff claimed that
handgun marketing was an "abnormally dangerous activity," and that the handgun was
"unreasonably dangerous" due to a defect in the gun's "marketing, promotion, distribu-
tion and design." The third count was based on a general negligence theory. The
fourth was for damages due to loss of consortium. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146.
328. Id. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146.
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the Restatement's criteria for an abnormally dangerous activity,3 29
Maryland law would not permit the imposition of liability unless:
the tortfeasor was an owner or occupier of land; and the tortious
activity "bears a relation to the occupation and location of the land
on which the activity occurs. '3 ° Since the hazards of handgun use
do not bear any relation to the ownership or occupation of land,
liability under this doctrine cannot apply to handgun manufacturers
or marketers.33 '
Similarly, a handgun is not an abnormally dangerous product
under section 402A of the Restatement. 32 For strict liability to be
imposed under this theory, Maryland law expressly requires that the
product be sold in a defective condition; 33 in other words, the
handgun would have to be dangerous beyond the expectation of the
ordinary consumer.33 4 In the instant case, however, the handgun
worked precisely as intended and as expected. 3 5 The handgun's
small size and concealability would not lead to the conclusion that
the handgun was defectively designed: these are not conditions that
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) provides that for an activity to be
considered an abnormally dangerous activity it must meet the following six factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
330. See 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147 and authorities cited therein.
331. Id.
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
333. 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148. Maryland adopted § 402A in Phipps v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). The Phipps court held that to
recover under this theory, the plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the posses-
sion or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) that the
product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial
change in its condition.
278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965)).
334. 304 Md. at 135-36, 497 A.2d at 1148 (quoting Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d
955). The court briefly discussed the "risk/utility" test, which other jurisdictions have
applied to determine whether a particular product's design is defective. The court de-
clined, however, to adopt that standard in this case, holding that it only applied "when
something goes wrong with a product." 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
335. Id. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
872 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 46:838
cause the gun to malfunction or lead to unexpected injuries.3 3 6
Thus, the court concluded, handgun manufacturers and marketers
were not liable under either the abnormally dangerous activity or
the strict product liability doctrines for injuries caused by their
handguns during the commission of a crime.33 7
The court then addressed the question of whether Saturday
Night Specials constitute a special type of handgun justifying
imposition of strict liability. Examining both federal338 and
Maryland 33 9 gun control legislation, the court determined that pub-
lic policy clearly does not sanction Saturday Night Specials.340 In
the court's view, this legislation indicates that law enforcement,
sport, and protection are the only legitimate uses for handguns. 341
336. Id. at 139, 497 A.2d at 1150 (quoting Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,
132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 650, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1985)).
337. 304 Md. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146. The court distinguished Kelley's injury from
an injury inflicted when a handgun malfunctions. In the latter case, established princi-
ples of product liability may allow recovery.
338. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1982) bans the importation into the United States of any fire-
arm or ammunition not specifically excepted. That section provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in section 925(d) of this chapter, it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly to import or bring into the United States... any firearm
or ammunition; and it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been imported or brought into the United
States . . . in violation of the provisions of this chapter.
339. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(B)(b) (1982 & Supp. 1984) provides in relevant
part:
(b) Unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting of handguns; penalties.-Any
person who shall wear, carry or transport any handgun, whether concealed or
open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry or know-
ingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle travel-
ing upon the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon roads or
parking lots generally used by the public in this State shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor; and it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person is knowingly
transporting the handgun ....
340. 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
341. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c)(1) (1982) provides in part: "Nothing in this
section shall prevent the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by (i) law en-
forcement personnel .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c)(3) (1982) provides in part:
"[N]othing in this section shall prevent any person from ... wearing, carrying, or trans-
porting a handgun used in connection with a target shoot, formal or informal target
practice, sport shooting event, hunting, [and] trapping .... "
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c)(4) (1982) provides in part: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall prevent a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the
confines of real estate owned or leased by him or upon which he resides or within the
confines of a business establishment owned or leased by him."
18 U.S.C. § 925 (1982), titled "Exceptions: Relief from disabilities," excepts from
the general ban on importation those firearms used for law enforcement, military, or
other governmental purposes. Furthermore, § 925(a) enables the Secretary of the
Treasury to authorize the importation of a firearm or ammunition for scientific or re-
search purposes, for use in connection with competition or training, if the firearm is not
Because of their poor quality, inaccuracy, and unreliability, Saturday
Night Specials are not suitable for these legitimate purposes.342
Moreover, because these guns are inexpensive and easy to conceal,
they are most commonly used in criminal activity. 43 In light of
these qualities, the court found that the manufacturers and sellers
should foresee that their product would be used in criminal activ-
ity.34 4 Therefore, the court held that the manufacturers and market-
a serviceable firearm, or if the firearm is recognized as suitable or easily adaptable for
sporting purposes.
27 C.F.R. § 1178.112 (1986) provides in part:
(c) ... No firearm shall be placed on the Importation List unless it is found
that (1) the caliber or gauge of the firearm is suitable for use in a recognized
shooting sport, (2) the type of firearm is generally recognized as particularly
suitable for or readily adaptable to such use, and (3) the use of the firearm in a
recognized shooting sport will not endanger the person using it due to deterio-
ration through such use or because of inferior workmanship, materials, or
design.
342. 304 Md. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54. The court observed that federal laws
also reflect the prevailing view that Saturday Night Specials have no legitimate purpose.
The court cited various federal statutes and regulations that in effect bar the importation
of firearms that are not used for military, law enforcement, or sporting purposes. See
supra notes 334 and 337. Furthermore, handguns that meet the sporting purposes crite-
ria may nevertheless be banned from importation if the use of the firearm may endanger
the user due to deterioration caused by inferior workmanship, materials, or design. See
supra note 337.
The court also found that in several hearings on the Gun Control Act of 1968,
Saturday Night Specials were specifically singled out as handguns that the Act intended
to ban. 304 Md. at 147-53, 497 A.2d at 1154-57. This was because the real purpose of
these weapons is for use in criminal activity. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
76-80, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2164-67. The Senate Report
stated:
Substantial numbers of firearms that are sold via the mail-order route in the
United States are foreign imported firearms, either of the military surplus cate-
gory or the category of inexpensive, small-caliber firearms, which have been
termed as "unsafe" and as "Saturday Night Specials." Our law enforcement
officials have testified that from 50 to 80 percent of the crime guns that are
confiscated each year are foreign imports of either of the above categories of
weapons. Many of these imports.., are rebored and rechambered... and the
barrels are cut down for concealment purposes.
Id. at 2165.
It appears that these guns are clearly not sanctioned under federal policy. Even the
National Rifle Association doesn't defend Saturday Night Specials. Maxwell Rich, Exec-
utive Vice President of the National Rifle Association, testified in Senate hearings that
"[Saturday Night Specials] have never to my knowledge been accepted for advertising in
our official journal, the American Rifleman. Our reason is that they have no sporting
purpose, they are frequently poorly made, and they do not represent value received to
any purchaser." 304 Md. at 146 n.10, 497 A.2d at 1154 n.10 (quoting Hearings on S.
2507 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1971)).
343. 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1159.
344. Id. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159 (citing Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md.
1987] TORTS 873
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ers of Saturday Night Specials may be held strictly liable to innocent
persons who suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of those
weapons.345
The court then attempted to define a "Saturday Night Spe-
cial."'3 4 6 Because many relative factors must be considered in label-
ing a gun a Saturday Night Special,347 the court decided a handgun
should rarely, if ever, be deemed a Saturday Night Special as a mat-
ter of law.348 Instead, this is a question for the trier of fact to de-
cide.349 Once the trier of fact has determined that a handgun is a
Saturday Night Special, the manufacturer and any other person in
the marketing chain, including the retailer, 50 is strictly liable to the
201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974)). The court also drew an analogy to a Michigan Supreme
Court case, Moning v. Alfano, 400 Mich. 415, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), which held a
slingshot manufacturer liable for the injuries sustained by an eleven year old child. Be-
cause it marketed the slingshot directly to children, the manufacturer should have fore-
seen the child's misuse. The Michigan court deemed it unreasonable to market a
dangerous product to a class of purchasers who were likely to misuse the product. 400
Mich. at 446-49, 254 N.W.2d at 768-69.
345. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
346. Id.
347. Among the relevant factors are "the gun's barrel length, concealability, cost,
quality of materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, reliability, whether it has been
banned from import by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and other re-
lated characteristics." Id., 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
348. Id. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1160.
349. Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160. Before the question of liability goes to the trier of
fact, the plaintiff must establish to the trial court that the gun in question possesses
sufficient characteristics of a Saturday Night Special. A handgun's small size and short
barrel is not sufficient to make it a Saturday Night Special. Many law enforcement per-
sonnel carry high quality, short-barrelled guns for legitimate purposes. Rather, the
court should consider the size of the gun along with other factors, such as cost, quality,
and unreliability. Id.
350. Id. The plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent must have been injured or killed by a
bullet fired from a Saturday Night Special. The shooting must have been a criminal act
or must have occurred during the commission of another crime in which the person who
fired the gun was a participant in the crime. Contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk are not valid defenses; however, the plaintiff cannot recover if he or she was the
perpetrator of the crime. Once these elements are satisfied, the defendant will be liable
for all damages resulting from the shooting, consistent with established principles con-
cerning tort damages. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160.
Since the issue of whether the handgun in the instant case was a Saturday Night
Special was for the trier of fact, the court did not rule on this issue. Still, the court did
make some general observations. It was relevant that R.G. Industries, the American
subsidiary of the manufacturer (Rohm), has been called the nation's major producer of
Saturday Night Specials and was included on a list of domestic manufacturers of hand-
guns that do not meet the federal standards for importation. The guns have been de-
scribed as "junk guns" having no "legitimate sporting purpose," and all of the guns
manufactured by Rohm were considered to be the poorest quality of handguns. The
recent suggested retail price of an RG-38S, the handgun used to shoot Kelley, was be-
tween $35.00 and $55.00. Federal law bars the importation of Rohm handguns with
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crime victim.
Finally, the court applied its decision prospectively: Kelley will
govern only injuries caused by the guns marketed after October 3,
1985, the date of the decision.3 5 1 It would be unfair to impose lia-
bility for guns sold before the decision because until then manufac-
turers and marketers had little reason to expect that their actions
might result in tort liability. 352
The plaintiff's "misuse" of a product may defeat a products lia-
bility claim.3 5 3 In Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc. 351 the Court of Ap-
peals defined "misuse" as the use of the product in a manner that is
not reasonably foreseeable.3 55 In addition, the court held that, un-
like assumption of risk, misuse is not an affirmative defense; rather,
to establish a prima facie products liability claim, the plaintiff must
prove that he or she did not misuse the product.356
In Ellsworth the plaintiff purchased a nightgown from the de-
fendant, Sherne Lingerie, which issued no warning as to the gar-
ment's flammability.357 While wearing the nightgown inside out,
the plaintiff momentarily brushed the inside pocket of her gown
across the stove; consequently, her nightgown ignited, and she was
severely burned.35' The plaintiff subsequently sued on a theory of
strict liability in tort. 59
The trial judge instructed the jury that if the plaintiff met her
burden of proof in establishing the garment's defectiveness, the
burden then shifted to the defendants to establish the plaintiff's
misuse of the product.3 6 ° The jury found for the defendants, and
two-inch barrels and Rohm RG-38 .38 caliber handguns with three-inch barrels. Id. at
159-61, 497 A.2d at 1160-61.
351. Id. at 162, 497 A.2d at 1162.
352. Id. The court also held that the burden of production and persuasion is upon the
defendant manufacturers and marketers to show that the handgun was purchased before
the date of this decision. The court believed this was appropriate because the facts con-
cerning the date of a sale to a member of the public can be ascertained more easily by
the defendant than by the plaintiff. Id. at 162 n.31, 497 A.2d at 1162 n.31.
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
354. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985).
355. Id. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355.
356. Id. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356.
357. Id. at 588, 495 A.2d at 351. On its shipping invoice, however, the defendant
Cone Mills, which had manufactured the fabric, clearly warned Sherne of the fabric's
flammability. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 587, 495 A.2d at 351. The plaintiff also alleged negligence and breach of
the implied warranty of fitness. Id.
360. Id. at 590-91, 495 A.2d at 352.
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the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.36' On certiorari, the Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.3 62
First, the court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of estab-
lishing absence of misuse. 3  In the court's view, this duty follows
from a plaintiff's other duties in a products liability claim. For ex-
ample, a plaintiff must establish that the product is defective, i.e.,
that it is dangerous beyond the knowledge or expectation of the or-
dinary purchaser.164 Then the court defined "misuse." If the plain-
tiff's injury results from a reasonably foreseeable use of the product,
the product is defective.365 Conversely, if the injury results from a
reasonably unforeseeable use, the product is not defective. 6 6 Thus,
to prove the existence of a material defect in a product, the plaintiff
must establish that he or she used the product in a reasonably fore-
seeable manner.3 67 Finally, the court found that, as a matter of law,
the plaintiff's wearing of the nightgown inside out and near a stove
was reasonably foreseeable.3 68 Because the plaintiff had thus met
her burden of proof of proper use, the judge should not have al-
lowed the defendant to contend or the jury to determine that the
plaintiff had misused the product.3 69
The trial court, however, did not err in refusing to instruct the
jury that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability in
tort.3 7 0 The Court of Appeals refused to make such an instruction a
361. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 60 Md. App. 104, 481 A.2d 250 (1984).
362. 303 Md. at 613, 495 A.2d at 364.
363. Id. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356.
364. Id. at 591, 495 A.2d at 351.
365. Id. at 596, 495 A.2d at 355.
366. Id. The court cited Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 545-46, 332 A.2d 11, 16
(1975). In Moran the court considered whether the defendant perfume manufacturer
negligently failed to warn of its product's high flammability. The court noted that the
manufacturer's duty "to warn of latent dangers inherent in its product goes beyond the
precise use contemplated by the producer and extends to all those who are reasonably
foreseeable." 273 Md. at 545, 332 A.2d at 15-16 (citations omitted). The court cited as
an example of reasonably foreseeable use the wearing of a flammable cocktail robe in
the kitchen near a fire. Id. at 546, 332 A.2d at 16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 395 comment k (1965)). The court concluded that the test of foreseeability was
not whether the defendant might have expected the actual harm the plaintiff suffered;
rather, the test is "whether the actual harm fell within a generalfield of danger which should have
been anticipated." Id. at 551, 332 A.2d at 19 (quoting McLeod v. Grant County School
Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 321, 255 P.2d 360, 363 (1953) (emphasis in Moran)). The Moran
court held that a jury should determine whether the plaintiff's actions fell within that
area of general danger. Id. at 554, 332 A.2d at 21.
367. 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355.
368. Id. at 598, 495 A.2d at 357.
369. Id., 495 A.2d at 356-57.
370. Id. at 599, 495 A.2d at 357.
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per se requirement.37 I For if a plaintiff alternatively pleads both
negligence and strict liability, a defendant may be entitled to a jury
instruction that refers both to contributory negligence and mis-
use.3 7 2 Thus, the court concurred with Maryland Rule 2-520(c),
which permits judges to use their discretion in fairly instructing the
jury on a particular issue. 73
K Statutes of Limitations
1. Generally.-In Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp.374 the
Court of Appeals held that a defendant's promises or voluntary at-
tempts to repair tortious injury do not toll the general statute of
limitations, section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Ar-
ticle.3 75 The court declined the opportunity to extend the acknowl-
edgement doctrine, which delays accrual of an action until the
376 377completion of a continuing service, to noncontractual claims.
Furthermore, the court suggested that something like the continu-
ous treatment rule, which delays the accrual of an action until the
termination of medical treatment,178 would apply only for negli-
gence in the repair process. 379 Thus, the discovery rule still deter-
mines, in general, the accrual of action under section 5-101.8'
In Booth the plaintiff alleged negligent installation of glasswork
in a building completed in June of 1976.38' From then until April of
1978, the defendant attempted to repair the defective installation;
his assurances that the leaking would be corrected continued until
371. Id. at 599-600, 495 A.2d at 357.
372. Id. at 599, 495 A.2d at 357.
373. Id. at 599-600, 495 A.2d at 357 (citing MD. R. 2-520(c), which permits judges to
adopt their own instructions as opposed to requested ones when the judge fairly covers
the issue).
374. 304 Md. 615, 500 A.2d 641 (1985).
375. Id. at 624-25, 500 A.2d at 645-46. Under the general statute of limitations, "[a]
civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another
provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be
commenced." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984).
376. 304 Md. at 618, 500 A.2d at 642.
377. See id. at 619, 500 A.2d at 643.
378. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 142, 215 A.2d 825, 828 (1965). In Hill v.
Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that by enacting
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984), the General Assembly had effectively
abrogated the continuous treatment rule. 304 Md. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32.
379. 304 Md. at 622-24, 500 A.2d at 644-45.
380. Id. at 622, 500 A.2d at 644. Under the discovery rule an action accrues "when
the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong." Poffenberger
v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981).
381. 304 Md. at 617, 500 A.2d at 642.
1987] TORTS 877
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
July or August of 1980.382 On July 24, 1980, the plaintiff finally filed
suit.3
83
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the three-year statute of limitations had begun to run upon dis-
covery of the defect, and that the action was thus barred.384 The
trial court held that the suit could proceed because the acknowledg-
ment doctrine tolled the statute.385 In affirming, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals relied instead on the continuous course of treatment
rule; the acknowledgement theory did not apply since Booth Glass
was not under contract to perform repairs.386
The Court of Appeals did not consider whether the acknowl-
edgement rule would apply.387 Nonetheless, the court reversed,
holding that the statute of limitations began to run in June 1976,
upon the plaintiff's first discovery of negligence; therefore, the
three-year limitations period had elapsed when the plaintiff filed suit
inJuly 1980.388 The court reasoned that the tort sued upon was not
of a continuing nature: the plaintiff alleged negligent installation,
not continuing negligence in the repair process. 389 Thus, the con-
tinuous treatment rule was inapplicable.390 Instead, the general tort
rule of discovery applied.39 1
The Court of Appeals recognized that on similar facts courts in
other jurisdictions have employed a theory of equitable estoppel to
toll the statute.392 Yet the court refused to follow that path, observ-
ing that: "We have long adhered to the principle that where the
legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute
of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable ex-
ception to be engrafted upon it."
3 9 3
2. Latent Diseases.-In Trimper v. Porter-Hayden394 the Court of
Appeals held that the discovery rule does not apply to actions
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 618, 500 A.2d at 642.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. The court granted certiorari only to consider the intermediate appellate court's
application of the continuous treatment rule. Id. at 619, 500 A.2d at 643.
388. Id. at 622, 500 A.2d at 644.
389. Id. at 621-22, 500 A.2d at 644.
390. Id. at 622, 500 A.2d at 644.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 622-24, 500 A.2d at 644-45 and authorities cited therein.
393. Id. at 623, 500 A.2d at 645.
394. 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985).
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brought under the wrongful death and survival statutes395 if death
resulted from a latent disease.396 Accordingly, the statute of limita-
tions begins to run at the decedent's death.397
More than three years after their husbands' deaths, two widows
separately398 filed wrongful death and survival actions against their
deceased husbands' employers, alleging that their husbands died
because of asbestos exposure.3 99 The court, in deciding whether
the widows' actions were time-barred, considered separately the
wrongful death statute and the survival statute.4 °°
Wrongful death claims are statutory in nature and are subject to
an explicit three-year limitation period.40 1  Hence, the statute's
plain meaning does not allow an extended filing period.40 2 Given
the General Assembly's clear intent to the contrary, the court would
not extend the three-year limitation period by permitting the plain-
tiffs to avail themselves of the discovery rule.40 3 Thus, even though
the plaintiffs could not have ascertained the cause of their husbands'
deaths within the limitation period, their wrongful death claims
were barred: the discovery rule does not apply to wrongful death
actions .404
The survival statute,40 5 however, codifies a common-law cause
of action.40 6 Under the survival statute, most actions by or against
the decedent's estate survive the decedent's death.40 7 Section 5-101
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,408 the general three-
395. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 1-102 (1985) (wrongful death); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 6-401(a) (1984) (survival).
396. 305 Md. at 52, 501 A.2d at 457-58.
397. Id.
398. Their appeals were consolidated. Id. at 33, 501 A.2d at 448.
399. Id. at 32, 501 A.2d at 447.
400. Id. at 33, 501 A.2d at 448.
401. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(g) (1984) provides: "An action under
this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person."
402. 305 Md. at 36, 501 A.2d at 449.
403. Id. at 35-36, 501 A.2d at 449.
404. Id. at 49, 501 A.2d at 456. Furthermore, application of the discovery rule to
wrongful death claims would circumvent a long line of precedent. See id. at 35, 501 A.2d
at 449 and authorities cited therein.
405. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401(a) (1984) provides: "A cause of ac-
tion at law, whether real, personal or mixed, except slander, survives the death of either
party."
406. 305 Md. at 38, 501 A.2d at 450.
407. Id. at 38-39, 501 A.2d at 450. The survival statute does not preserve slander
actions. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401(a) (1984).
408. MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984). This statute provides: "A
civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another
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year statute of limitations, governs survival actions. 40 9 Because the
discovery rule generally determines the accrual of actions under sec-
tion 5-101,41 the plaintiffs contended that the discovery rule ap-
plied as well to survival actions. 41 '
Finding no guidance in prior cases from Maryland or other ju-
risdictions,41 2 the court looked to analogous Maryland statutes for
indications of legislative intent.413 Wrongful death and survival
cases, the court observed, generally involve similar liability issues
and defenses.41 4 For wrongful death claims, however, the statute of
limitations begins to run at death.4" 5 Therefore, if the court did not
apply the same statute of limitations both to survival actions and
wrongful death actions, the resulting inconsistency would under-
mine legislative policy towards the latter.4 16 In addition, the court
considered the Workers' Compensation Act provisions concerning
death resulting from latent occupational diseases. In such cases, the
statute of limitations begins to run at death, regardless of whether a
worker's dependents knew that death was caused by the
employment.
4 17
The court reasoned that these statutes indicate a legislative pol-
icy to restrict the application of the discovery rule in cases involving
latent disease. Therefore, the court held that a cause of action ac-
crues either: (1) at the time the injured person discovers or through
provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be
commenced."
409. 305 Md. at 34, 501 A.2d at 448.
410. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
411. 305 Md. at 39, 501 A.2d at 45. The court considered the applicability of Pof-
fenberger, 290 Md. at 631, 431 A.2d at 677, which established the general discovery rule
in Maryland. None of the cases considered in Poffenberger, nor Poffenberger itself, dealt
with the running of limitations in instances in which an injured person had died; there-
fore, the court found that Poffenberger was not dispositive. 305 Md. at 41, 501 A.2d at
451-52.
412. The court looked to decisions in other jurisdictions in an attempt to find a clear
policy rationale upon which it could base its decision; however, it found itself unable to
discern a general principle from those cases. 305 Md. at 43-49, 501 A.2d at 451-56.




417. Id. at 52, 501 A.2d at 457. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 26(a)(4) (1985) provides in
relevant part:
If no claim for disability or death from an occupational disease be filed with the
Workmens' Compensation Commission within two (2) years... from the date
of disablement or death, or the date when the employee or his dependents first
has actual knowledge such disablement was caused by the employment, or




the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
cause of injury, or (2) at death, whichever occurs first.4 1 8
L. Workers' Compensation
1. Exclusive Remedy.-Subject only to the most limited excep-
tions, the Workers' Compensation Act4 19 preempts all common-law
remedies for injured employees.42 ° Section 44 of the Act provides
one exception: If the worker's injury or death results from the em-
ployer's "deliberate intention to produce such injury or death," the
worker or the worker's survivors retain the right to bring a common-
law tort claim.4 2 ' In Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc.422
the Court of Appeals held that even if an employer recklessly ex-
poses an employee to an extremely dangerous working condition,
the employer's actions do not satisfy section 44's requirement of
"deliberate intention" to produce injury or death.4 2' Therefore, an
injured employee is relegated to limited recovery under the Act un-
less the employer desired or acted with the specific intent to injure
the employee.4 24
In Johnson the mother of a deceased sixteen year old worker
brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against her son's
employer, Mountaire Farms.4 2 5 She alleged that Mountaire negli-
gently failed to warn her son of the dangerous condition of certain
machinery, willfully violated state safety regulations, and recklessly
exposed her son to a dangerous working environment.4 26 This
418. 305 Md. at 52, 501 A.2d at 457-58.
419. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ I to 102 (1985).
420. Id. at § 15. See Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francis, 147 Md. 368, 376-77, 128 A. 635,
638 (1925).
421. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1985).
422. 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986).
423. Id. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709.
426. See id. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712. While using a sump pump to remove liquid
chicken fat and water from a ground depression, Ms. Johnson's son was electrocuted.
Approximately two months before the accident, the Maryland Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (MOSHA) had inspected the sump pump and had cited
Mountaire for a "serious violation" under MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 40(b) (1979), which
states that "a serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there
is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condi-
tion which exists." The court acknowledged that the sump pump was seriously defec-
tive: its "outer covering was broken; the insulation on the conductor was damaged and
exposed the conductor itself; the cord was spliced on each end; and the plug lacked a
ground prong." After receiving the citations, Mountaire did not correct these viola-
tions; however, it did falsely inform MOSHA that they had been corrected. 305 Md. at
248, 503 A.2d at 709.
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reckless, wanton, and wilful misconduct, the plaintiff alleged,
amounted to a deliberate intent to cause her son's injury; therefore,
she contended, this conduct satisfied section 44's "deliberate inten-
tion" exception."'
In response, the court reviewed the purpose and practical ef-
fects of the workers' compensation scheme. The General Assembly
enacted the Workers' Compensation Act to ameliorate the inade-
quate common-law tort remedies for workers injured on the job.42 8
The Act benefits employers by limiting their liability,42 9 and it
spares employees, employers, and taxpayers the costs of litigation
for work-related injury claims.430 To ensure an efficient and fair sys-
tem, however, the Act must also serve as the exclusive remedy for
431occupational injuries.
With this in mind, the court followed the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have held that "deliberate intention" contemplates inten-
tional wrongdoing; consequently, the Act requires a specific
purpose and intent to cause injury or death.432 Reckless, wanton, or
willful misconduct does not constitute "deliberate intention. 433
Since the plaintiff failed to allege that Mountaire "desired" or in-
tended to injure the employee, its actions did not rise to the level of
intentional wrongdoing; therefore, the plaintiff failed to overcome
the Act's exclusivity provision.434
In Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 435 the Court
of Appeals held that section 15 of the Workers' Compensation
Act, 4 3 6 the Act's exclusivity provision, does not bar a worker's com-
427. 305 Md. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709.
428. Id. at 249, 503 A.2d at 709.
429. See id. and authorities cited therein.
430. Id. at 249 n.2, 503 A.2d at 709-10 n.2 (quoting the preamble to Maryland's
Workers' Compensation Act, 1914 Md. Laws 1429).
431. Id. at 251, 503 A.2d at 710.
432. Id. at 253-54, 503 A.2d at 711-12.
433. Id. at 252, 503 A.2d at 711. Deliberate wrongdoing differs from reckless, wan-
ton, or willful misconduct. In both the actor knows that because of his or her actions, it
is highly probable that harm may result. In addition, however, deliberate wrongdoing
requires the actor to have the specific purpose and desire to cause such harm. See id. at
253-54, 503 A.2d at 712 and authorities cited therein.
434. Id. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712.
435. 303 Md. 201, 492 A.2d 1280 (1985).
436. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985). Section 15 provides in relevant part:
Every employer subject to the provisions of this article, shall pay or pro-
vide as required herein compensation.., for the disability or death of his em-
ployee resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee
arising out of and in the course of his employment ....
The liability prescribed by the preceding paragraph shall be exclusive ....
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mon-law claim against an insurer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.43 7 Maryland thus joins a substantial number of
jurisdictions that hold that an intentional tort claim for late payment
or nonpayment of benefits is beyond the exclusivity provision's
scope.43 s
A worker brought an action against his employer's insurer, al-
leging that the insurer was both grossly negligent and willfully mali-
cious in withholding the payment of worker's compensation
benefits. 4 9 The insurer replied and the trial court agreed that the
Workers' Compensation Act provided the plaintiff's sole remedy
and therefore precluded this action.44 °
In rejecting the insurer's contention, the appellate court
stressed the inequities that might result from a contrary decision:
an exclusivity defense would allow insurers to badger and harass
claimants with impunity.44' Moreover, the intentional tort alleged is
ordinarily unrelated to the original work-related injury; however,
the Workers' Compensation Act governs only work-related
442injuries.
Still, the defendant pointed out that Maryland imposes a statu-
tory penalty upon insurers that fail to pay benefits.44 3 The court,
however, refused to join the jurisdictions that hold that such a pen-
alty precludes a worker's remedies at common law.444 Because the
Act permits the imposition of a penalty even if the insurer is merely
extremely careless or inefficient, the court held that "the penalty
statute does not preclude otherwise permitted intentional torts
actions. 445
437. 303 Md. at 210, 492 A.2d at 1284. The court initially reached this result in
Young v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 (1985), Gal-
lagher's companion case. In Young the court drew on section 44 of the Act, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 44 (1985), which permits an injured employee to bring a common-law
claim against his or her employer for the employer's intentional torts. Reasoning by
analogy, the court concluded that such an employee should also be able to bring a com-
mon-law claim against his or her employer's insurer for the insurer's intentional torts.
Young, 303 Md. at 200, 492 A.2d at 1279.
438. See Gallagher, 303 Md. at 207, 492 A.2d at 1282 and authorities cited therein.
439. Id. at 205-06, 492 A.2d at 1282.
440. Id. at 204, 492 A.2d at 1281.
441. See id. at 208-09, 492 A.2d at 1283 and authorities cited therein.
442. Id. at 207, 492 A.2d. at 1282.
443. Id. at 209, 492 A.2d at 1283. See MD. ANN CODE art. 101, § 36(13) (1985).
444. See 303 Md. at 209-10, 492 A.2d at 1283-84 and authorities cited therein.
445. Id. at 210, 492 A.2d at 1284.
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2. Wrongful Discharge.-Section 39A of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act 4 4 6 prevents an employer from discharging an employee
solely on the ground that the employee filed for workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 44 7 In Kern v. South Baltimore General Hospital448 the
Court of Special Appeals held that section 39A does not prevent an
employer from discharging an employee on the ground of excessive
absenteeism due to a work-related injury.4 4'9 Rather, the plaintiff
must show that the discharge violated either an existing rule of
law450 or another specific statutory provision. 451
The plaintiff, an employee of South Baltimore General Hospital
(SBGH), filed a claim for and received workers' compensation bene-
fits for a work-related injury. 4 5 2 Because of excessive absenteeism
allegedly resulting from the injury, SBGH later discharged her.4 53
In a suit for wrongful discharge the plaintiff asserted that she was
fired not only for excessive absenteeism, but also in retaliation for
filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits.4 5 4
Since the plaintiff alleged that one reason for her discharge was
excessive absences, she could not argue that she was discharged
solely for filing a claim.455 Even though the Act should be con-
strued as liberally as possible in favor of the employee,456 the court
could not disregard the Act's plain language; therefore, it held, the
trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim.4 5 7
The plaintiff contended, however, that if section 39A did not
prevent discharge on the grounds of absenteeism, employees would
be deterred from filing legitimate workers' compensation claims.458
The court responded that in enacting the workers' compensation
scheme, the General Assembly did not intend to protect employees
who could no longer work; rather, it intended to provide a system
that would both compensate injured workers without the burden of
446. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1985).
447. Id.
448. 66 Md. App. 441, 504 A.2d 1154 (1986).
449. Id. at 452, 504 A.2d at 1159.
450. E.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
451. 66 Md. App. at 452, 504 A.2d at 1159.
452. Id. at 443, 504 A.2d at 1155.
453. Id. at 443-44, 504 A.2d at 1155.
454. Id. at 445, 504 A.2d at 1156.
455. Id. at 447, 504 A.2d at 1157.
456. Id. at 446, 504 A.2d at 1156 (citing Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 217,
373 A.2d 613, 622 (1977), and Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens Inc. v.
Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980)).
457. Id.
458. Id. at 452, 504 A.2d at 1159.
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a trial and protect employers from high monetary awards. 459 Thus,
if an injured employee can no longer carry out his or her duties, an
employer may terminate the employee if it appears that the "period
of disability is not determinable.
460
At first glance, the court's strict interpretation of section 39A
appears harsh. The court did state, however, that if the discharge is
a "sham" and the facts suggest that the real reason for the discharge
was retaliation for the filing of a claim, the employee may institute a
wrongful discharge suit.4 6 1 The court also recognized that remov-
ing an employer's right to discharge a permanently disabled em-




459. Id. at 450, 504 A.2d at 1158.
460. Id. at 452, 504 A.2d at 1159.
461. Id. at 452 n.9, 504 A.2d at 1159 n.9.
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